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INTRODUCTION
As an economist by training I initially intended to carry out
research on the subject of capital accumulation in Greece.After
some time I decided to concentrate my research on the Greek
bankers in Con/pie and examine their particular role with regard
to the 19th century Greek economy.During the course of my
studies,however,I gave emphasis to Greek banking in Con/ple and
gradually dropped interest in Greece proper.Therefore,the
contribution of the Constantinopolitan Greek bankers to t/ Greek
economic development is only partly examined here.On the other
hand,however,any approach to the question of t7 Greek economic
history in the 19th century which does not take into account the
activities of the Greek diaspora would be unrealistic.In
addition,the history of Greeks living outside the small Greek
kingdom is an essential and integral part of the history of the
Greeks in modern time.To this extent,I hope that my thesis
presents an acceptable account of this particular aspect of the
Greek history.
At a later stage of my studies my interest was shifted to
another question.What was the economic role of the diaspora
Greeks.The answer to this question is far beyond the scope of this
thesis since any discussion would involve the examination of a
variety of aspects regarding Greek economic activities in
general,in various areas,and in the course of at least three
centuries.Yet,it is not an exaera..tion to say that this question
hovers over this thesis,in which I discuss some aspects of the
question such as,the business
	 mentality of Greek bankers in
Con/ple,their motives and their function in the context of the
Ottoman econom! in 1850-1881.
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It is essential to note that such aspects of the Greek
diaspora are not only little studied but,to the extent they have
been discussed at all,misunderstood as well.There are few,and not
always convincing,monographs,and articles examining the Greek
diaspora.Since the diaspora Greeks are considered to be a product
of European capitalism-which is undoubtedly true-their economic
activities are always examined in this context.Thus,there has been
no analysis of the Greek diaspora as a relatively autonomous
phenomenon in the context of particular economies and in
particular eras.
Finally the primary material used in this thesis should be
presented.It is unfortunate that my thesis does not draw upon the
archives of individual Greek bankers.To the best of my knowledge
such archives simply do not exist.I was,therefore,obliged to
consult various archives most of which touch only indirectly on
the subject.The archives of the National Bank of Greece,which was
in regular correspondence with the House of Zarifi and Zafiropoulo
in Con/ple,proved very helpful.Additionally,I found much useful
information in the Public Records office,the Archives of the
french Ministry of Finance,and the Greek Foreign
Ministry.Contemporary newspapers and magazines,such as Neologos of
Constantinople and the Levant Herald proved a valuable source of
information,containing as they do the annual reports of the Greek
banks as well as much information about banking in Con/ple.The
Memoirs of the Greek banker Andreas Syngros were also very
helpful.This unique three volume work provides many details about
banking in Con/ple during the period under discussion and can be
used as a valuable source of first hand information.
The reader will come	 across	 the	 use	 of	 different
currencies.The reason why I refer to various currencies,instead of
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one,is because I wanted to present the figures in the form and
currency used by in the original sources.This may create some
confusion and the reader should consult Appendix I where the
parities of currencies used in this thesis is presented.
The thesis is divided into two Parts.The first Part is
introductory and is divided into three chapters.An attempt is made
at an analysis of the Ottoman economy,Ottoman finances,and the
development of the Greek commercial community in Con/ple.The
second Part deals with Greek banking activity in Con/ple.It is
divided into seven Chapters.The first of these Chapters(IV) deals
generally with the development of credit in the Ottoman empire.In
the second(V) the attempts of Greek bankers to involve themselves
in the establishment of a State Bank in Turkey during the 1850's
are treated in detail..The next two Chapters(VI and VII) discuss
Greek banking in Con/ple during the period 1850-1881.Emphasis is
placed on the short term advances which the Greek bankers
contracted with the Treasury.Speciai attention is also given to
the association of the Greek bankers with the European money
markets.Chapter VIII examines the development and activities of
three Constantinopo].itan banks strongly associated with or founded
by Greek capital there.Chapter IX deals with the involvement of
Greek bankers in the placing of the loans of the Greek state in
Con/pie.Finaliy,the role of the Greek bankers in the settlement of
the Ottoman public Debt is examined in Chapter X.The
Conciusion(XI) discuss the major aspects of Greek banking in
Con/pie and advance arguments to analyse the investment behaviour
of Greek bankers.An appendix section,which I hope the reader will
find useful,deais with the Currency parities,and the documents of
the Convention of 22 November 1879 signed between the Ottoman
government and local bankers.
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PART I
CHAPTER I:The 19th century Ottoman empire:the economic landscape.
This chapter deals with the major economic developments in
the Ottoman economy during the 19th century.In many respects these
developments-connected with the growth of agriculture and the
introduction of foreign capital-were the factors which determined
the nature and scope of banking in Con/ple.During the period under
discussion the Ottoman economy had already passed into the sphere
of European capitalism.Whether this particular relation implies
the peripheralisation of the Ottoman economy is another question
[ISMAMOGLOU and KEYDAR(1977) ,WALLERSTEIN and KASABA(1983)] .The
fact is that this economy had established tight links with the
European capitalist system.This statement alone,however,tells us
little.What is more important is the extent to which the Ottoman
command economy was affected by the demand of European markets.
Agriculture and urban crafts constituted the main productive
sectors of the Ottoman economy.Both activities were regulated by a
carefully established administrative system.Initially agriculture
was controlled through the timar system which was based on the
concept that land belonged to the Sultan,the God's representative
on earth.The Sultan granted timar lands to his warriors for their
war services.In return they were obliged to provide a number of
mounted soldiers in case of war.Timariots,however,did not own the
land.Nor did they have the right to bequeath it to their
heirs.Their task was to see that land was continuously cultivated
and that taxes were paid regularly.Timariots were civil servants
whose income derived from their holding 	 instead	 of the
Treasury.However,the position of cultivators was relatively
advantageous.The timariot had no rights over them and they were
granted the tenure of their lands for life.Their heirs could
1
nt\herit their land and the timariot had no right to
intervene.Moreover,they had very limited obligations towards the
timariot,name].y the cultivation of his land for a ,few days each
year or the carrying of his harvest to the market.Corvee in the
sense in which it was used in Western Europe simply did not
exist.Compared to the life of cultivators living outside the
Sultan's realm where serfdom was an institutionalised
reality,Qttoman peasants were relatively privileged.The timar
system meant that the C.entral authority was in contLi.ous receipt
of taxes,while at the same time the establishment of
	 big
landownership was averted [To mention only a few of the books &
articles referring to the Ottoman land regime see GIBB and
BOWEN(1950)
I,235-264,INALCIIc(1955) ,VERGOPOULOS(1975) ,CVETKOVA(1979) ,MC
GOWAN(1980) 44-79,WALLERSTEIN and KASABA(1983)].
Craft industry was similarly regulated.Urban crafts were
hierarchically organised and their activities were carefully
supervised by the head of each craft who was also the craft's
representative .Productjon of crafts tended to be of very high
quality as it had to meet the standards set by the
authorities. prices were carefully regulated by the government in
order to preserve the balance between supply and demand.The prices
of raw materials and their distribution among the individual
members of each craft were also regulated by the government.The
head of each craft was responsible for the collection of the
taxes,the supervision of the distribution of raw materials and the
control of prices.The craft system reproduced a specific division
of labour and prevented accumulation of private wealth.At the same
time,it allowed the circulation of goods and provided the Ottoman
government with part of its income [On the guild system see
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BAER(1979a) and(1979b),GIBB and BOWEN(1950) 11,277-298].
These two redistributjve mechanisms constituted the basis of
the Ottoman command economy.Through them the $tate regulated
production and taxation,prevented the accumulation of either land
or capital	 in private	 hands	 and	 secured	 economic
self-sufficiency.In addition,all other seres of economic
activity in the Empire were regulated.Export trade in particular
was cioseI j
 regulated by the government..The sale of most products
was monopolised by various guilds which along with the state
monopolies controlled the Ottoman market [KOYMEN(1970)307-310] .In
addition,the Ottoman state had the right of pre-emption of
foodstuffs for the provisioning of 	 the Ottoman capital
[GUCER ( 1950) 15 3-162 , CVETKOVA ( 19 70) 17 2-193]
The Ottoman social system was based on the administrative
functions of the State.In this sense the Ottoman empire during the
15-18th centuries certainly merits the description of an "Empire
Monde" because social and political coherence came as a result of
the redistributive and administrative mechanisms of the state
[SUNAR(1981) 551-2].Nevertheless this system was depended upon
certain preconditions.It is generally agreed that territorial
expansion was a very important factor contributing to social and
economic stability.Conquest of new lands increased incomes and
strengthened the system itself.The checking of Ottoman expansion
inevitably led to the decline of timariot incomes.In addition the
inflation of the 16th and 17th centuries and the continual
devaluation of the Ottoman currency further decreased the income
of timariots [CvETK0vA(1979) 98-99] .Not surprisingly,these
developments spread discontent among timariots,a factor tending to
distabilize the Ottoman land regime.
The checking of territorial expansion affected the central
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government as well.State income decreased rapidly.The devaluation
of the Ottoman currency could not be used with much effect because
of inflation.The Treasury faced a serious financial
crisis.Promptly the government applied measures in order to offset
the loss.New taxes were imposed upon the population. In addition a
new fiscal measure was introduced;tax farming(mukataa).The
government farmed out large parts of the Imperial lands in the
hope of increasing its income in the short term.Indeed tax farming
proved useful and provided temporary relief for the Treasury.In
the long term,however,thjs measure proved a most distabilizing
factor;it was the fatal blow for the timar system.Although some
timariots succeeded in getting tax farming contracts,the main
beneficiaries were state dignitaries (KARPAT(1974)
90-91].Gradually,agricultural production came under the control of
tax farmers.The introduction of the r4alikane system(lifetime
taxfarming) simply strengthened this process.The appropriation of
economic surplus by tax farmers intensified the conflict within
the Ottoman ruling class,to the great detriment of the Central
government.The emergence of strong landlords and local
notables(ayan) was the outcome of the conflict which led to the
total subversion of the timar system and the establishment of the
chiftlik economy (1).
To the imbalances produced by the change in the land regime a
new and most important factor was added:the industrial revolution
in Europe.Due to the changes this revolution brought on
Europe,demand for foodstuffs and raw materials increased
dramatically.Not surprisingly,this demand affected production in
the Ottoman lands,and particularly in the Balkan provinces.In this
context the development of the chiftlik economy is very
important;chiftliks became increasingly connected with European
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demand.In fact the bulk of production in these estates was
absorbed by the European markets [STOIANOVICH(1953) 403-407].The
traditional grain centres of the Empire,located in the Western and
Northern parts of the Aegean and Black Seas,promptly responded to
this demand.Theoretica].ly,exports of grain were prohibited because
cereal production was used for the provisioning of
Con/ple.Contraband,however,was widespread and through it large
quantities of grain found their way to Europe.In the event,the
increase in prices proved the major factor which severely affected
the Ottoman command economy.Since its establishment the State had
emphasised imports rather than exports,which were carefully
regulated.Now,due to European demand this process was reversed to
the great detriment of the Ottoman state's control over the
economy.
During the 19th century this process was intensified.It can
be assumed that tighter links with European economies led to the
gradual and inevitable destruction of the Ottoman command
ecomony.Certainly commercial relations with the West were not a
new phenomenon.Yet it was only during the 19th and early 20th
centuries that trade with Europe increased considerably.It is
estimated that Ottoman trade with Europe increased fifty fold
between 1800 and 1913 [ISSAWI(1980) 76,see also ISSAWI(1974)
113-116).The interval of the Napoleonic wars-which proved a major
setback to the development of the Levant trade and totally
destroyed the predominance of French commerce in the region-was
followed by a period of rapid growth in commercial transactions
[OWEN(1981) 84-91].The commercial Treaty signed between the
British and the Ottoman governments in 1838 simply endorsed an
already existing trend.However,this convention provided a more
stable and safe ground for commercial activities and in this sense
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it further contributed to the development of foreign
trade.Commercial considerations apart,the Treaty was of vital
importance to the British who wanted to revitalise the Empire in
order to check Russian expansionism [CAIN(1980) 32-33].
Many historians share the view that the Treaty was
responsible for the destruction of Ottoman craft 	 industry
[ISSAWI(1966)	 42,KOYMEN(1970)	 310-316,AREN(1983)
453-454,KANCAL(1983) 366-369].A more careful examination of the
Treaty's articles reveals objections to this hypothesis
[KURMUS(1983)].Yet the Treaty established free trade in the empire
and allowed mass imports of European goods which eventually
offered a strong competition to the Ottoman craft industry.To this
extent the Treaty had grave long term implications and it was a
blow to the Ottoman craft industry.In fact craft industry in
Turkey could be sound only in the context of a close and state
protected economy (2).Compared to European industries Turkish
crafts were an obsolete	 institution	 with	 inadequate
technologies,management and financing.To say,however,that European
goods immediately flooded the Ottoman market is an
exaggeration.The introduction of foreign goods was a slow process
which in its first stages affected only certain areas of the
Empire.Craft industry continued to meet local demand in many
provinces,particularly in the Eastern parts of the Empire.In
addition the population increase after the 1860's combined with
the sudden disappearence of plague in the Eastern and Arab lands
contributed to the revival of the clothing craft 	 industry
[OWEN(1981) 93-94].
Yet,on the whole,foreign goods in the Empire successfully
competed with local products and gradually gained ground.Turkish
imports consisted mainly of industrial products.In	 1825,for
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example,Turkish imports of cotton products from the U.K accounted
for 45% of total British exports to Turkey [BAILEY(1942),247].In
1875 this proportion had reached 78.9% [KANCAL(1983) 380].A
similar situation existed with regard to the exports of other
European countries.In 1839 French exports to Turkey mainly
consisted of linen and silk products and refined sugar(60% of the
total) .In 1875 Turkish imports from France almost entirely
consisted of manufactured goods despite the fact that the
proportion of these three products had declined to 36 % of the
total[KANCAL(1983) 386-87].In the event Ottoman crafts were not in
a position to stem the imports of European goods and their
economic role inevitably declined.Thus,increasing commercial
transactions with Europe in the 19th century severely affected one
of the Empire's major institutions.
However,if industry in Turkey was affected by foreign
competition the situation in the agricultural sector looked more
promising.The end of the Napoleonic wars reintroduced large scale
trade in the region.As a consequence of the new industrial era the
demand for foodstuffs and raw materials substantially increased.As
early as the 1830's raw materials such as madder roots,silk etc
were exported from Turkey in large quantities.This development is
clearly shown by the growth of Ottoman exports to England.From
£726.065 in 1830 Turkish exports rose to 1.465.972 in 1845 and
then jumped to £3,050,518 in 1852 [BAILEY(1942) 70-72].
Yet economic growth in Turkey was unsteady.It was based on an
irregular development of foreign trade which,in turn,was
conditional upon the vicissitudes of European demand.In fact
agricultural production in the 19th century was considerably
boosted by two extraordinary events;The Crimean and American Civil
Wars.In both cases the export-oriented sector of the Ottoman
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agriculture responded to soaring prices.As a consequence of the
Crimean war Russian cereal exports to Europe ceased.In
addition,the presence of large European armies in the area
required considerable quantities of foodstuffs.Cereai prices rose
dramaticaily.During the years 1853-55 wheat prices in Salonica
varied between 20-25 fr per Kiie(=25kg approximateily) in
comparison to 4fr in 1851 [VAKALOPOULOS(1980) 741.In the same
period barley prices in Con/pie reached 8 fr per Kile whereas
before the War they had never exceeded 2 fr[SYNGROS(1908) 1,251].
The American Civil War also affected prices and production in
the Ottoman Empire.The interruption of raw cotton exports from the
Confederacy due to the blockade of its ports resulted in a sudden
shortage of cotton supply to the European textile
industries.European industrialists sought new sources of supply
and the Middle East received much attention from them.Egypt and
Turkey benefitted from such a move.Cotton prices in this region
soared.In the Smyrna area for example,cotton prices jumped from
250-300 piastres per quintal in 1860 to 700-1000 in 1863 and
reached 1300 piastres in 1864 [OWEN(1981) 112].In 1865 in Salonica
cotton prices reached 500 fr for each bale of 150kg
[VAKALOP0ULOs(1980) 79].Foliowing this sharp rise in prices cotton
production and exports rapidly increased.In Bulgaria and Thrace
the area devoted to cotton production doubled,while in Smyrna it
increased five fold [ISSAWI(1980) 234]dThe total cotton production
of Anatolia during the American Civil war probably exceeded
the,until then unprecedented,level of 80.000 bales.The increase in
exports was even more spectacular.In Smyrna alone cotton exports
rose from 1200 tons in 1858 to 13.860 in 1865 [ISSAWI(1980)
234,OWEN(1980) 112].The value of cotton exported from Salonica
reached 16 million fr in 1865 in comparison with 2.782.000 fr in
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1862 [VAKALOPOULOS(1980) 77).
The impact of the Crimean and American Wars on Ottoman
agriculture was important.Ottoman agriculture experienced a
considerable growth both in terms of production and exports.The
increase in prices provided a further stimulus to the expansion of
cash crop cultivation,whose products continued to enjoy high
prices.However,the growth of Ottoman agriculture during the 1860's
came to an abrupt halt in the following decade.This was due to the
"Great" European depression of 1873 which caused prices to
decrease rapidly.From 1873 onwards the price of almost every item
produced in Turkey such as cotton,silk,cereals,opium etc fell and
both production and exports declined.Moreover,the development of
European overseas trade also affected the Turkish economy
adversely.Large quantities of American agricultural products
overwhelmed the European markets and offered., an increasing,and by
and large,successful competition to goods produced in the Middle
East.The revival of American cotton production for example largely
contributed to the reduction of European demand for Turkish and
Egyptian cotton.In addition Turkish exports and production of
goods such as silk,wool and cotton yarn were affected by the
opening of new sources in the Far East (3).
One may assume,however,that economic growth in the 19th
century Ottoman empire was mainly associated with agriculure.Yet
this growth could not conceal the intrinsic problems of Ottoman
agriculture.In fact only certain areas in the empire experienced
acceptable levels of growth.In other words the growth of
agriculture did not affect all Turkish provinces equally.The
development of cash crop cultivation was confined mainly to the
Balkan provinces and the regions around Adana and Smyrna.It was in
these areas that the development of the export-oriented sectors of
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Ottoman agriculture reached a substantial level.
In addition,agricultura]. growth proper eventually came to be
associated with cash crop cultivation..For in an underdeveloped
pre-capitalist society and economy cereals were a traditional
product and as such cereal production should be considered rather
as a sign of traditional agriculture than a sign of economic
specialization.Undoubtedly,wor].d demand provided an incentive for
cereal production as well.And,in this sense,the commercialisation
of Ottoman agriculture also involved cereals.Yet,in the Ottoman
ernpire,cereals were mainly used for home consumption,a fact which
hampered their exports.In addition cereal production was further
hampered by the primitive technology involved,as well as by the
poor transport system which increased the final cost.
Conversely cash crop cultivation proved a much more dynamic
sector.The technologies it involved were more advanced,while the
fact that cash crops were produced in areas with good transport
facilities confined the final cost to acceptable and competitive
levels.Indeed the areas where cash crop cultivation thrived were
near ports such as Smyrna,Salonica and Mersina which were serviced
by large numbers of sail and steam vessels.In addition,these ports
were connected by rail with their adjacent hinterlands.In fact,the
first Ottoman railway,the SmyrnaCassaba line,was built in 1866
precisely for this purpose.In the event,cash crop production
became the leading export item of the Ottoman agriculture.By the
end of the 19th century the bulk of Ottoman exports consisted of
cash crops.In 1897 for example,the export value of grapes
tobacco,figs,coton and raw silk reached 576.milliQ'l piastres and
accounted for 52% of total
	 exports	 [SHAW(1977)	 237] .This
proportion substantialy increased during the following years
[QtJATAERT(1973)	 336ff] .Conversely,cereal	 exports	 were	 in
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decline.In fact,during the following decades the Ottoman empire
became a net importer of cereals EISSAWI(1980) 211].
At this point,it should be emphasised that the pattern of
agricultural growth in the Ottoman empire was not based on
monocrop cultivation. Indeed,the export oriented sector of Ottoman
agriculture specialized in a variety of cash crops such as
silk,cotton,opium,tobacco,figs,and grapes [QUATAERT(1973) 217-314
and QUATAERT(1980) 40-43].The diversification of agricultural
production in Turkey provided a different pattern of agricultural
growth.Other countries in the area such as Greece,Serbia and Egypt
experienced monocrop cultivation.Currants were the major product
of the Greek economy which in the period 1857-1875 accounted for
47.5%	 of	 exports	 on	 average	 terms	 [DAKIN(1979)	 Appen
VIII] .Serbia's main products were plums and prunes [LAMPE and
JACKSON(1982) 177-79] whereas the main product of the Egyptian
economy was cotton [OWEN(1981) 135-9].Certainly the fact that
Ottoman cultivators were involved in the production of a variety
of crops does not necessarily imply that the Ottoman economy was
less dependent upon European demand than the other
economies.Indeed this demand was the major stimulus for production
and its vicissitudes affected both the monocrop and more
diversified economies to the same extent.
Inevitably,Ottoman agriculture adapted itself to the laws of
world market economy;the level of prices defined the response of
Ottoman agriculture to European demand.As a consequence the
control of the Ottoman state over agricultural production and
trade weakened.This was particularly true for grain production and
exports.It was no longer possible to impose an official ban on
cereal exports without facing strong reactions from European
merchants.Although the Ottoman government reserved the right to
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ban such exports,and indeed sometimes did so,cereals became a
major export item.Thus during the period under discussion the
connection of Ottoman agriculture with the European capitalist
economies was considerably strengthened.European capitalism
imposed a division of labour on the Ottoman economy which finally
led to the shrinking of craft industry and the growth of
agriculture.In the final analysis the Empire became a net exporter
of raw materials and foodstuffs and at the same time a net
importer of manufactured goods.The new division of
labour,however,imposed a form of economic dependency never before
faced.The Ottoman economy was not in a position to meet local
demand except through Euro pea,1 imports.In this sense the
traditional system of self sufficiency was totally overthrown.The
increasing commercialisation of Ottoman agriculture gradually
redefined the patterns of production and exports in a fashion not
always compatible with the state policy,whereas European products
imposed new patterns of demand which the Ottoman craft industry
was unable to meet.
In addition,the development of the export oriented sector of
Ottoman agriculture was not enough;throughout the period under
consideration the Ottoman balance-of-trade was in deficit.The
increase in production and exports could not counterbalance
imports.When the first official balance of trade was published in
1881 it showed a total trade deficit of £T 2.7 million [Report by
WYNDHAM,CR(1883-84),Turkey,483-4).It is now argued that Ottoman
exports were usually undervalued [KEYDAR(1980)
325,ISSAWI(1980)79].However true this may be there is no doubt
that the Ottoman empire experienced trade deficits.This is
apparent if Turkey's commercial relations with its main trade
partners are examined;England,France and Austria absorbed more
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than 80% of Turkish exports and at the same time provided 75% of
the	 total	 Ottoman	 imports	 [ISSAWI(1980)79,86-87].Great
Britain,Turkey's leading trade partner always enjoyed trade
surpluses.During the period 1841-45 Great Britain exported goods
worth £5.814.000(on average terms)whereas Turkish exports to the
U.K were £ 1.227.000	 [BAILEY(1942)74].Thirty	 years	 later,if
improved,the Turco-British trade was still in Britain's
favour.Turkish exports to the U.K averaged C 6.175.000 whereas
British imports to Turkey were £7.000.000 (KANCAL(1983)371].Great
Britain remained the leading trade partner of Turkey till the eve
of WW	 I	 but	 its	 share	 declined	 sharply	 after	 1880
[ISSAWI (1980) 79]
Conversely,Turkey fared better with the French.France was a
very important customer for products such as cotton,opium,olive
oil,and raisins.There were periods where France enjoyed trade
surpluses.In 1876,for example,French exports to Turkey amounted to
£ 2.957.000 whereas Turkey exported to France goods worth £
2,332.000 [SHAW(1977)122].Nevertheless it was Turkey which usually
experienced trade surpluses EKANcAL(1983)372].On the other hand
Austro-Turkish trade was always in Austria'a favour.From 1840's
onwards Turkey imported large quantities of Austro-Hungarian
products but its exports never matched or even approached the
level of imports.In 1876,for example,Turkey exported goods worth
CT 891.759 whereas Austrian imports reached CT 2.885.157
[SHAW(1977)122].The movement in the trade with Great Britain and
Austria testify that indeed Turkey suffered large trade deficits
which could not have been counterbalanced by the surpluses of the
trade with France.
Trade deficits are usually attributed to the fact that the
Ottoman	 state	 was	 never	 subject	 to	 colonisation
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[KEYDAR(1980)325].However tempting this analysis might look it is
not well substantiated.In addition the experience of other
countries such as the Latin American Republics or others such as
Bulgaria and Romania most of the time enjoyed trade surpluses.It
would be more proper to suggest that trade deficits derived from
the limited expansion of cash crop cultivation.In fact the bulk of
cultivated land was devoted to cereal cultivation.In the late 19th
century more than 80% of the total cultivated land was used for
cereal production which was extensive even in those areas
specialising in cash crop cultivation.As late as 1909 in the
provinces of Smyrna,Adana and Bursa-the main cash crop production
areas-70% of the cultivated land was still devoted to cereal
cultivation [OwEN(1981)200] .It seems,therefore,that regional
inequalities in production patterns were responsible for trade
deficits.Had cash crop cultivation been expanded Ottoman exports
would have been substantially increased.
However,the commercialisation of Ottoman agriculture,and of
cash crop cultivation in particular,brought a radical change in
the Ottoman economy.This process intensified the drive towards the
establishment of private property in land.It is well known that
land ownership in the Ottoman empire belonged to the State.In
1858,however,the Ottoman government published the Land Code which
codified existing practices in Land tenure.According to it the
land was divided into five major classifications:mulk or freehold
land;miri land,which was directly controlled by the state;vakif
land,whose revenues were devoted to pious foundations;metruke or
vacant land;muevat or unused land [NICOLAIDES(1889) 1005-1008].In
reality the bulk of land consisted of miri holdings and to a
lesser extent of vakif.Only a tiny proportion of the total was
mulk land.
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A closer analysis of Ottoman land policy would reveal that
the code was part of the centralising policies of the Tanzimat
period.There is evidence to believe that a large part of miri land
was claimed by individuals [KARPAT(1968)85].By publishing the Code
the government attempted to re-establish the state's rights to
land.Consequently miri land was subjected to tighter control.The
bulk of the Code's articles concerned miri land.Moreover the
Ottoman government attempted to check the expansion of vakif
land.Vakif revenues were devoted to charitable purposes and were
exempted from taxation.It seems that through the previous
centuries a large part of land had been converted into vakif in
order to avoid taxation or confiscation.According to the Code only
freehold property,mulk,could be converted into vakif.On the other
hand the cultivator was provided with an official document,the
tapu	 senedi,which	 secured	 the	 tenure	 of	 his	 plot
[NICOLAIDEs(1889)1017 	 (4)].Moreover the Code enabled him to
dispose of his land freelly or even to buy the tenure of more
land.The state also guaranteed certain rights of
inheritQnce,especially with the promulgation of the 1867 law which
extended these rights down to seventeen degrees of kinship
[NICOLAIDES:ibid,1023-1023]
Although the Code improved the cultivator's legal status it
also incorporated certain resrictions.The land could be
transferred only with the approval of the local authorities.The
cultivator was obliged to farm the land continuously;if he left it
uncultivated for more than threeyears the State had the right to
confiscate it.The erection of new buildings within the allocated
area was prohibited.If such buildings were erected the authorities
reserved the right to demolish them.In addition the cultivator
could not plant vineyards or other kinds of fruit trees at the
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expense of cereals without the offical permission of the local
authorities.Finally,the 	 cultivator's	 mortgage	 rights	 were
restricted and the mortgaging of land was allowed only under
certain	 conditions	 [NICOLAIDES (1889)
1030-31,1013-15,BAER(1966)83-88,HERSHLAG(1964)40-43]
It is clear that the Code's emphasis was placed on
production and the re-assertion of state rights to land.The
Ottoman government presumably used its control to encourage
production in an attempt to increase the cultivator's taxpaying
capacity.It is usually claimed that the Land Code introduced the
concept of private property in land
[STEEG(1924) ,INALCIK(1955) ,WARRINER(1966) ,BALARBI (1983) ,QUATAERT(1
973)].Other historians claim that although the Ottoman government
did not intend to introduce private property in land it was
obliged to do so because the Land Code proved unworkable
[KARPAT(1968) and (1977a)].Yet there is evidence to suggest that
the Ottoman State never institutionalised private property in
land.Apart from the 1867 law which extended rights of inheritence
no other innovation was ever introduced.The only significant
exception was the 1913 Code of"Landed property" which extended
property rights in land.However,the Young Turks did not abolish
the 1858 Code.Let alone that their agrarian policy was
considerably hampered by the existing social relations in the
counrtyside and the exigencies of war [AHMAD(1983)275-288].In fact
the establishment of private property in land was a development
closely associated with the emergence of National states in the
area.All National States in the Balkans-including the Turkish
Republic-introduced and institutionalised private property in
land.That was only to be expected because the subversion of the
Ottoman institutions became the corner-stone of 	 nationalist
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politics.
However,those involved in cash crop production attempted to
establish a tighter control over their lands.This process was a
long term phenomenon in part connected with the emergence of the
chiftlik economy.Indeed chiftlik estates appeared in zones
specialising in cash crop cultivation and their production was
absorbed by the European markets.Certainly chiftlik lands were not
entirely devoted to cash crop cultivation.Cereal cultivation was
equally important.There were even occasions when chiftlik holders
neglected	 cash	 crop	 production
[PANAGIOT0P0tJL0s(1984)359-373] .Yet,whatever the nature of the
produce of chiftlik lands,it was mainly exported to Europe.As
early as the 18th century,Macedonia and Thrace exported half of
their grain and cotton production to Europe [WALLERSTEIN and
KASABA(1983)342].In this sense the chiftlik economy played an
important role in the commercialisation of Ottoman
agriculture.Moreover,there is evidence to suggest that during the
19th century chiftlik holders shifted to cash crop cultivation.
However,it would be an exaggeration to claim that the growth
of cash crop cultivation derived entirely from the chiftlik
economy;small cultivators were also involved in cash crop
production and to a large extent they,too,contributed to its
growth	 [QUATAERT(1980) 54,LAMPE	 and
JACKSON(1982)134-139] .Nevertheless,in both cases cash crop
cultivation required flexibility in production.Instead the Land
Code encouraged cereal production whereas cash crop cultivation
received little official attention.Inevitably this restriction led
to various reactjons.It is reasonable to assume that landholders
in various ways demanded the introduction of a more flexible land
regime.These reactions-a study of which is badly needed- cculd have
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taken a variety of forms ranging from bribing officials to the
abuse of,or the ignoring of the Code proper.In addition,claims to
land ownership became more pressing as land values increased with
improved communication and commercialised agriculture.Moreover,the
1867 law which extended rights over land to Europeans provided a
further motive towards property in land.Europeans were interested
only in commercialised agriculture and in fact most of their
estates were found around the Smyrna area [OWEN(1981)114].To the
extent that farmers and landowners wanted to involve themselves in
cash crop production they came to realise the ambiguities limits
and contradictions of the Ottoman land regime.In the event many
individuals succeeded in getting a firmer control over their
lands,a kind of de facto private property.This change,however,was
never institutionalised by the Ottoman state.
In this way changes in the land regime were caused by the
close connection of some parts of the Ottoman empire with European
markets.As a consequence the grip of the Ottoman State over land
substantially weakened.Therefore,during the 19th century European
demand considerably affected the Ottoman command economy and
contributed to its final disarticulation.The introduction and
domination of free trade in the region weakened the control of the
Ottoman state over the movement of goods whereas European demand
affected the pattern of production and provided motives for cash
crop cultivation.Such changes brought the Ottoman economy further
into the network of European capitalism.This development
inevitably led to a further stage:the introduction of foreign
capital into the Ottoman empire.
The 1850's marked a new era in the economic history of
Western Europe.The "golden age" of European capitalisn was about
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to begin.The 1848 revolutionary tide had stopped.Having restored
social "peace" and tranquillity all Western European states rushed
into	 the	 road	 of	 rapid	 economic	 development
[HOBSBAWN(1977)43-63].The	 increase	 in	 trade	 was
phenomenal.Industrial output rose beyond expectation.Yet,a very
important aspect,closely associated with the development of
European capitalism is to be found in the international movement
of capital.In fact European foreign investments began in the early
19th century.The money markets of London and Paris had promptly
responded to several capital calls concerning state loans and,at a
later stage,the funding of railway lines.However,this long term
phenomenon assumed enormous dimensions only in the second half of
the 19th century.It was during that period,and until the eve of WW
I,that the international movement of capital exercised a profound
and unique impact on the structure of world economy.
Foreign investment in the Ottoman empire was negligible until
the 1850's [ISSAWI(1974)117].The first Ottoman loan was raised
during the Crimean War presumably in order to allow the Ottoman
state to cope with the War emergencies.Frorn 1854 onwards the
Empire experienced an almost continuous influx of foreign capital
punctuated by sharp reversals between 1875 and 1881.The placing of
European investments in this country followed a concrete
pattern.Foreign capital was mainly invested in three sectors;in
railways (5);in the Ottoman loans;and in banks.During the period
under discussion,however,investments in the last two sectors were
of much greater importarice.The Ottoman Imperial loans absorbed the
bulk of foreign capital whereas investments in banks allowed the
establishment of such institutions whose continuous assistance to
foreign investments proved valuable.
	
Foreign investors found in the Ottoman 	 loans very
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remunerative terms for their capital.In fact investment attitudes
were uniform.Both French and British investors-by far the most
important factors in the movement of foreign capital in
Turkey-manifested a conspicuous preference for the Ottoman
loans.During the period 1860-1874,for example,the Ottoman state
raised £ 87.8 million in the London money market
LJENKS(1971)421-4241.This figure represented 14% of the total of £
662.1 million raised in this market on behalf of independent
states.To this amount a further £ 14 million must be added
representing the loans raised in the London market between 1854
and 1859.Certainly,if direct investments in the British empire and
the Americas are taken into consideration the proportion of
Ottoman loans to total British overseas investments was not so
impressive.However,it is beyond doubt that these loans became an
important outlet for British investors.Conversely,and apart from
some isolated cases,the latter eschewed mass investments in other
sectors.In fact this investment attitude prevailed for the rest of
the 19th century and at least until the eve of WW I.The figures
for 1914 better illustrate the situation:out of a total British
investment of approximately 808 million fr(=T 35 million),578
million or 71.5% of the total were placed in the Ottoman Public
debt [FEIS(1930)320,for the reriod 1909-1912 see ISSAWI(1980)324].
French investments in Turkey followed a similar
pattern.tinfortunately,no figures are available regarding the total
French investments in this country before 1881.A modern source
suggests that the total French investments in the Middle East in
the period 1854-1881 amounted to 3450 million fr(=T 150.000.000)
(CAMERON(1971)95-97).This amount,accounting for 23% of the
total,indicates the importance which the Middle East held for
French investments.In this case also,the bulk of capital,2850
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million fr, was invested in loans.The suggested figure,however,is
confusing because it includes investments in Egypt as
well.Moreover,no sufficient indication regarding the volume of
French investments in Turkey could be found in the number of loans
issued by French banks.According to the existing information five
out of a total of sixteen loans were issued by French banks.These
loans,amounting to £T 120 million,accounted for 49% of the Ottoman
Public debt in the period 1854-1881[See Table I,21a].In
addition, large parts of the loans issued by the Imperial Bank-a
French British concern-were also held by French investors.However
this number is misleading.Almost every Ottoman loan was
simultanuously placed both in the London and Paris money markets
regardless of which bank was the contractor.Therefore substantial
parts of the loans issued by the French were held by British
investors.Moreover large numbers of Ottoman bonds were transacted
in other minor European money markets and eventually came into the
posseion of Dutch,German,Austrian and Italian capitalists.
There is evidence to suggest that the number of Ottoman
bonds held by French investors decreased after 1875 mainly owing
to the Ottoman suspension of debt service which took place in this
year.According to E Mercret,the director of the Credit Lyonnais
branch in Con/ple,in 1877 the value of Ottoman bonds held by
French was £T 35 miilion out of a total of £T 175 [COURRIER
D'ORIENT,no 117,4/4/1877 (6)].According to the same source,the
single largest group of bondholders was the British who actually
held bonds valued at £T 90 million followed by the the French,and
the Ottomans(IT 25 million) .The remaining Ottoman Debt was almost
equally held by Austrian,German,Italian and Dutch investors.The
figure regarding British participation in the Ottoman Debt seems
fairly consistent with the one provided by Jenks.This implies that
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Table I:The Ottoman Loans.
Rate of	 Rate ofj est	 Nominal amount Issue	 Contractors Securities
Egyptian Tribute.
Eavntian Tr jhute. Customs ofrflyrna ana syria.
CustDms revenues of Con/pie.
Indirect contributions and
tithes of various sandJaks.
3300	 80	 Dent,palrner and Co









1862	 6 8800 68	 Ottoman Bank,Deveux et Cie Taxes on salt,tobacco and
patentes.
71	 Ottoman Imperial Bank	 The tithe of various \jilayets
66	 Ottoman Imperial Bank
	 Sheep Tax of Rumelia and of
Archipelago, Tokat mines.
60	 Societe Genérale(Paris )
	













vilayets.54	 Comptoir d'Escornpte	 The tithe of various
32	 Societ Impriale des
	 Kilometric guarantee.
Chemins de fer de la Turquie
d' Europe
73	 Credit Gn 'ral Ottoman,	 Egyptian Tribute.
Dent,Palmer and Co.
98	 Credit Gn 'ral Ottoman.	 Revenues of various
54	 Cre'dit Ottoman,Banque de










1873***	 5	 22252	 54
1874	 5	 44000	 43.5
* Loan not rq.tif led.
**Realised in a period of three years.
***TreasUry Bonds.
Uttoman Imperial Bank.
	 No specific guarantee.
Source:A&P: 1878 LXXXII
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British investors held their bonds even after the suspension of
payments was declared.If one takes into account the important
role played by the British committees in the settlement of the
Ottoman Debt that appears to be true.
One may,therefore,suggest that French investments in the
Ottoman loans never exceeded those of the British.The value of
Ottoman bonds held by French capitalists probably varied between
£.T 50-70 million but it rapidly decreased after 1873.From 1881
onwards,however,French investments increased rapidly and soon
assumed the leadind role in foreign investments in the Ottoman
empire.On the eve of WW I French investments amounted to 2.5
billion fr and by far outnumbered every other [ISSAWI(1980)324].
On any reckoning the movement of both French and British
capital in Turkey was part of the proliferation of the process of
capital investment.Certainly French and British capitalists did
not employ the same investment criteria.The French almost totally
ignored their empire investing instead heavily in Europe and the
Middle East with a particular preference in loans and railways.On
the other hand the British massively invested in the British
empire and the Americas,particularly the North,but paid little
attention	 to	 investment	 opportunities	 in	 Europe
[SIMON(1968)23-27].In their case	 preference	 was	 given	 to
investments in transportation and public works whereas investments
in loans were the second best choice.However,regardless of
differences in investment attitudes and criteria both groups
responded to particular needs.In this context the involvement of
foreign capital in the Ottoman loans was a natural outlet for
European investors coinciding with the decision of the Ottoman
state to tap directly the European money markets.
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- The Ottoman Imperial Loans.
The Ottoman state realised the advantages of the European
capital markets during the early 1850's (for a short account see
SUVLA(1966)95-104).The 1854 loan apart,a new loan was raised in
1855.The loan amounted to £T 5.5 million was guaranteed by the
British and French governments.Europeans,particularly the
British,were only happy to put their money in an operation
involving such outstanding guarantors.The increasingly favourable
economic and financial environment in Europe in the 1850's allowed
the Ottoman state to raise three more loans in Europe.Within a
period of six years the Ottoman Debt had reached 315 million fr
[DtJ VELAY(1903)154,DAMIRIS(1915)41].
The growth of the Ottoman Public Debt gained new momentum
during the 1860's.In this decade the Ottoman state raised six
loans whose nominal value was £T 90.410.000.This capital was spent
in various sectors.A considerable part was used to sustain the
cost of administration and particularly the payment of salaries
and arrears.The 1862 loan was entirely devoted to the withdrawal
of paper money circulation.Previous attempts to withdraw this
currency had failed [DU VELAY(1903)264,DAMIRIS(1915)20-30].In
addition,a substantial part of military expenditure was covered by
these loans.The purchase of military equipment and provisions
apart,the entire 1869 loan of approximately £ T 24 million was
spent to offset the expenditure caused by the Cretan
insurrection(1866-1868) [DU VELAY(1903)264].One must
emphasise,however,the 1865 loan which marked a turning point in
the history of the Ottoman Public Debt.In 1865 the Ottoman
government decided to proceed with the conversion of its internal
Debt [DU vELAY(1903)269-275,POULGY(1915)32].A loan of 909 million
fr(=T 44 million)was issued by the Societe Generale of Paris and
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the General Credit of London:625 million fr were spent on the
conversion and the remainder were left with the government for its
current needs [BAILLEUX DE MERISY(1874)651].The 1865 loan was the
largest one raised till then.As a result the Ottoman debt more
than doubled.This growth produced a sudden shift in Ottoman
finances.The annual burden of the Ottoman Debt increased by £
1.300.000,an expenditure equal to that of the Ministry of
Interior.From 1865 onwards the payments of the Ottoman debt almost
doubled.There is evidence to believe that this burden was,at least
in part,responsible for further borrowing.In addition the largest
part of the loan was placed on,and absorbed by,the European money
markets.As a consequence a considerable part of the Ottoman
Internal Debt was transferred into the hands 	 of	 foreign
investors.This development considerably increased both the
financial and political influence of the groups of European
capitalists (see also below,t4O].
The Ottoman state continued borrowing during the 1870's.Not
surprisingly the bulk of these loans was used to pay budgetary
deficits caused by the Debt itself.For example,the 1871 loan
guaranteed by an increase in the Egyptian Tribute was spent
entirely on budget deficits.The 1872 loan(Treasury bonds) was
spent on the conversion of part of the General Debt.The proceeds
of the 1873 loan were destined to pay off the floating Debt,the
most difficult item of expenditure to deal with.The last loan of
the period under consideration was issued in 1874.Again it was
devoted to pay the interest of the Public Debt [DU
VELAY(1903)313-315,POULGY(1915)62].The only loan of the period not
raised to pay interest on the Public Debt or to cover budget
deficits was issued in 1870.This loan was supposed to fund the
Oriental railway project of Baron Hirsh [POULGY(1915)57-59].
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Thus in a period of approximately twenty years the Ottoman
state had borrowed an arrount equal to IT 241.632.000.As a
consequence the burden of the Public Debt payments in total
expenditure increased substantially.The existing figures suggest
that from £2.061.216,or 14.5% of the total expenditure,iri 1865
these payments jumped to £ 7.520.365,or 37.5,in 1874/75(see Table
II,25a,see also chapter II,5fl.Due to this large,indeed almost
insupportatle Duraen,the Ottoman state suspended the payments of
its Public Debt in October 1875.This radical measure put an end,if
temporarily,to the further growth of the Ottoman Debt.It was
accompanied,however,by a rather undesirable developmemt.Not only
did European investors massively protest against the suspension of
payments,but they also eschewed investing in Turkey,thus excluding
the Ottoman state from the European money markets.
However,one might wonder at the reason why European investors
put their money in the Ottoman loans in the first place.True,the
financial environment in Europe favoured investments in foreign
loans.Yet,the Ottoman empire was a country with special
problems.In the era of the highest nationalist aspirations the
Empire's political future was unpredictable,to say the least.In
addition,the Ottoman state,corrupt and ineffective by Western
European standards,had a long tradition of maladministration and
extravagance..would it not be risky for European investors to
undertake such a large financial operation as was the case in the
Ottoman loans?As has already been mentioned the impetus towards
foreign investments was irresistible.However,two further points
should be emphasised.Firstly the European governments,and the
British in particular,encouraged investments in the Ottoman
empire.Without underestimating the 	 political	 and	 financial
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there was nothing essentially wrong with Ottoman finances.They
favoured the introduction of financial reforms in Turkey claiming
that these reforms would sweep away maladministration and increase
Public revenue (7).
In addition,a number of Near Eastern specialists dwelled on
the wealth of the Empire in terms of natural resources and incited
European capitalists to invest there on the 	 grounds	 of
unexpectedly high returns [FARLEY(1862) and
(1866),UBICINI(1856),BIANCONI(1878)].This argument implied that
growth in production and trade would increase Public wealth and
raise Public revenues accordingly.The introduction of Tanzimat
reforms backed these arguments.In fact Turkey was presented as a
country with enormous,if undeveloped,resources whose political
leadership	 had	 at	 last	 opted	 for	 a	 large	 scale
modernisation.Certainly	 these	 arguments	 did	 not	 remain
unchallenged in
	 Europe.It	 seems,however,that	 Turkey's	 new
appealing image soothed the anxieties of many Europeans
encouraging them to invest.Nevertheless these authorities did not
advise investments in loans.On the contrary the emphasis was
placed on the productive sectors.In the event,however,investors
usually ignored productive investments and preferred the much more
lucrative Ottoman loans.
Predictably capital flows where it receives the highest
returns.To this extent European investors were mostly seduced by
the actual terms of the Ottoman loans rather than by Turkey's
unlimited resources.The general trend to invest abroad met the
specific requirements of a profitable investment.Undoubtedly the
Ottoman loans presented investors with highly remunerative
terms.The interest rate on most of these loans varied between 5
and 9 per cent -double the interest prevalent in Europe at the
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time.In addition most of these loans were issued at an extremely
low pIiCI.The average issue price for all sixteen loans contracted
in the period 1854-1874 was only 67.3.Moreover,one should
emphasise the fact that,year after year,the issue price of Ottoman
loans declined.For example the average price of the loans raised
during the 1850's was 85.3 whereas the average price of the loans
raised during the 1860's and 1870's
	 was	 60.5	 and	 59.2
respectively[See Table I ].One could reasonably assume that
such terms promised very satisfactory returns-a prospect which did
not pass unnoticed among European investors.
Nevertheless the low level of issue prices was to be
expected.The Ottoman state's difficulty in paying the coupons of
its Debt had regularly shaken the solvency of the Empire.In fact
low issue prices gradually became the indispensible term for
raising a loan in Europe.The lower the issue price was the better
the prospects of the loan.However the long term implications of
low issue prices inevitably were negative.Although in the short
term a low price could encourage investors,in the long term the
Ottoman debt increased disproportionately.In the event the Ottoman
state received much less than it actually had to pay back:of a
total nominal amount borrowed in the period 1854-1874 of
approximately £T 244 million the Ottoman state received only £T
127 million.Yet interest had to be paid on the nominal rather than
the actual amount and consequently the service of the Public Debt
swelled rapidly and was soon beyond control.
Certainly the Ottoman insolvency in 1875 was not a unique
phenomenon.The burden of Public debt led to bankruptcy other states
as well such as Spain,Egypt,and some of the Latin American
Republics [JENKS(1971)291-93].These developments highlighted the
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functions of the European money markets.Not because some states
were led to bankruptcy through increasing borrowing:this side
effect was,at least in so far as European investors were concerned
unintentional and unplanned.State insolvencies were only partly
the result of foreign lending and usually other factors were
equally important.European money markets,however,eventually
assumed an important role in the establishment of the new world
economy.This economy was more sophisticated and complex than that
of the 17th and 18th centuries.It was based on new balances and on
a new division of labour on a world scale.The European money
markets strengthened the interrelations and dependencies between
Europe and the rest of the world and in this sense they profoundly
affected the structure of non-European economies.European
predominance soon led to the introduction of European financial
institutions,and of banks in particular,to other couritries.These
new institutions became an important outlet for European
investments and provided major links with the European money
markets.
In this era of increasing and rapid economic integration the
introduction of similar institutions in the Ottoman empire was
only a matter of time.During the 1860's two banks were established
in Con/ple by European capital;the Ottoman Imperial Bank;and the
Credit General Ottoman.Not only did these institutions involve
substantial amounts of foreign capital,but they also proved of
fundamental importance in the growth of the Ottoman Debt.The
Imperial Bank,by far the most important establishment founded by
foreign capital,was created in 1863.It was the result of a
successful combination of French and British banks,bankers and
financiers.
After some unsuccessful attempts to establish a State Bank
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and,in particular,after the 1861 finacial crisis,the Ottoman
State,at the urging of two outstanding figures of the Tanzimat
Period Au and Fuad pashas,was desperately seeking for a new
consortium to undertake the task of establishing a Bank on the
model of the Bank of England or the Banque de France
[BILLIOTI(1909)27].The financial environment in Europe was more
favourable than ever.The task in Turkey looked promising.In the
event various groups were involved in the foundation of the new
bank;the group of the French and Spanish Credit Mobilier;the group
of the London based Ottoman Bank(s) along with individual
capitalists such as Baron Seiler and P Hottinger were among the
most important.The nominal capital of the bank was fixed at £
2.700.000 divided into 135.000 shares [YOUNG(1906)32].In 1865 it
was raised at £ 4050.000.The convention of 4 February 1863 gave
the bank considerable powers.The bank was responsible for
collecting on behalf of the Treasury all revenues in Con/ple and
f or paying all Treasury orders in the same city.With this quality
of "l'encaisseur et le payer de l'Etat" it was in a position to
influence the conduct of Ottoman fjnances.In addition the bank
was granted a note-issuing privilege which,surprisingly enough it
used	 in	 a	 rather	 limited	 way
[BILLIQTI(1909)155,ISSAWI(1980)340].For its part,the Imperial Bank
was obliged to credit the government annually with £ 500.000 at
6%.Moreover the bank was charged with the opening of branches in
several provincial cities.
However,the groups which negotiated the agreement with the
government succeeded in securing the Bank's independence vis-a-vis
the state.True,the government reserved the right to supervise the
bank's activities by appointing a commissioner.But the latter was
not in a position to influence,let alone to change,the decisions
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of the managerial committee.Needles to say,the Con/ple committee
of the bank was responsible only for the administration of
business.The centre of decisions rested with the Paris and London
committees which were entirely responsible for the bank's policy
[THOBIE(1977)84].Vested with these powers the Imperial Bank made a
remarkable start by issuing the 1863 and 1864
	 loans.Its
position,however,was soon challenged by other rival banks;the
Comptoir d'Escompte and the Societe Generale,both based in
Paris.The Comptoir d'escompte was firstly involved in Ottoman
finances in the late 1860's when it raised the 1869 loans.Yet,the
Comptoir d'Escompte's first operation in Turkey was also its last.
Conversely the Societe Generale proved a much more stubborn
rival.This bank entered the scene in the mid 1860's when,with the
assistance of the London based General Credit,issued the 1865
loan(General Debt).To a large extent the Societe Generale'8
involvement in the Ottoman finances was part of the conflict
between the Rothschild banking dynasty,who had founded the
bank,and the Credit Mobilier,co-founder of the Imperial Bank.The
latter strongly protested that the government's cooperation with
the Societe Generale was an infringement of the 1863 Convention
(BILLIOTI(1909)42J.But in vain.The Ottoman government was not of
the same opinion.Yet this was not all.Not only did the Societe
Generale continue in having a great interest in Ottoman finances
but it also founded its own bank in Con/ple
[THOBIE(1977)89-92].Having secured the cooperation of some of the
local bankers,particularly among the Armenians,the Societe
Generale promptly proceeded with its plans .The new bank,the
Credit General Ottoman was founded in February 1869 with a capital
of	 £	 2.000.000	 divided	 into	 100.000	 shares	 [DtJ
VELAY(1903)201-202].According to its statute the Credit General
30
would participate in a variety of activities including commercial
banking and even tax farming [NEOLOGOS,22/8/1869J.However,far the
most important activity of the bank was its engagement in the
Ottoman loans.Alongside the Societe Generale and
,occasionally,some of the local establishments in Con/ple the
Credit General issued three loans between 1870 and 1873 amounting
to ET 48 million.
During these years the Imperial Bank kept a low
profile.Presumably as a measure of protest the bank did not
participate in any of the loans issued by the Credit General.On
the other hand,the government continued doing business with the
Credit General and did nothing to soothe the anxieties of the
Ottoman Bank.But inlSl3-74,owing to a series of financial crises,the
prices of Ottoman bonds collapsed and with them the solvency of
the Ottoman state together with the position of the Credit
General.Only then did the government turn to the Imperial Bank for
assistance.It was given assistance,but at a price.
On 18 May 1874 an agreement was signed between Sadyk
pasha,the Finance Minister,and the Imperial Bank.The agreement
which received the Cabinet's approval only in August 1874,provided
for an increase in the bank's capital as well as its merger with
the Banque Austro-Ottomane [BILLIOTI(1909)46].On 18 February 1875
the new deal was officially proclaimed in Con/ple with an
Imperial firman.The bank's capital was increased to £ 10 million
divided	 into	 500.000	 shares	 [YOUNG(1906)38	 see	 also
BRtJNSWIK(1875)9-10] .The	 capital	 increase,however,was	 nothing
Compared to the new privileges with which the bank was
endowed.According to the decree the bank would become the state's
general payer and collector.The government engaged itself in
putting all its revenues into the bank's coffers.In its turn the
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Imperial Bank was obliged to make all the necessary payments on a
national scale.Thus the limited privilege of collecting revenues
and paying orders in Con/pie was extended to the whole of the
country.The bank was also entrusted with the conduct of the Public
debt and the coupon payments.The statutory credit to the
government increased from £500.000 to £700.000.However the most
important privilege ceded to the bank was contained in article 15
of the convention.According to this the bank would become the
exclusive agent of the Ottoman State "tant au dehors que au dedans
de l'Empire".Although the government would reserve the right to
resort elsewhere the Imperial bank "juira d'un droit de pr'frence
a conditions e'gales sur toutes maisons..et ..pour tout emission
par voie d'escompte ou de prise ferme" [YOUNG(1906)40].This clause
was the best part of the deal.The bank received a virtual monopoly
in contracting loans for the government.
This success was so remarkable that the director of the Bank
did not hesitate to describe it,in his annual report for the year
1875,as	 "unprecedented	 in	 the	 history	 of	 financial
institutions" [YOtJNG(1906)28] .Thus,after a period of bitter
relations with the government,the Imperial bank succeeded in
recovering its leading position and expanding its privileges.It
then immediately raised a new loan of £ 40 million.This loan was
entirely absorbed through public subscription both in Europe and
Turkey mainly because the issue price stood at 43.5.
Summarising,one should emphasise the leading role played by
the Imperial Bank and the Credit Ottoman in the process of the
Ottoman loans.Despite the outcome of	 their	 conflict both
establishments proved to be
	 major conduits	 for	 foreign
capital.Together they issued seven Ottoman loans of a total amount
of approximately IT 117 million.The reader should always bear in
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mind that their activities and financial power considerably
affected both the context and scope of banking in Con/pie.
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Notes to CHAPTER I.
(1) The formation of the chiftlik economy involved the
dispossesion of the peasantry that had been working the
land.Chiftli holders succeeded in controling cultivators in a
variety of ways.The peasants' indebtdeness was,perhaps,the most
common expedient but there were occasions of open violence as
well.In the event,this led to the establishment of share cropping
as a result of which the cultivator controlled a considerably
smaller part of its harvest than before.
(2) Industry proper was almost non existent.This fact is
highlighted by the failure of the state factories.This project was
encouraged by the Ottoman state and was connected with the supply
of arms and uniforms for the Army.To the
	
existing	 state
industries-a cannon foundry,a musket factory,and a spinning
mill-more factories were added.Modern machinery was imported and
many technicians were recruited in Europe to guarantee the success
of this project.Despite the fact that these factories were
provided with a steady customer,namely the Ottoman Army,the
project was met with complete failure.The failure was the result
of a variety of reasons including lack of managerial
experience,administrative abuses and government interference. In
most of these factories production was soon discontinued.In the
late 1850's only a few of them were still in operation.The failure
of the project was so conspicuous that it hardly deserves the name
of the "Ottoman industrial revolution" [CLARK(1974)on this subject
see also SARC(1966)55-56,OWEN(1981)62-63,AREN(1983)].
(3) Nevertheless,the economic changes of those countries of the
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European periphery,and among them the Ottoman empire,were by no
means restricted.The demand of European markets continued to
provide motives for development,particularly in the agricultural
sector [for the development of this argument see BEREND and
RANKI (1982) 7-27]
(4) Nicolaides rightly points out that "the lawmaker avoids the
use of words such as sale,salesman,buyer using instead the words
firag (renunciation) ,tefviz (concession) ,mefrugun(separation) ,because
e it is not the property of the land which is transferred but its
usufruct.
(5) Investment in railways during the period under discussion was
limited.True,a few lines were constructed during the 1860's and
early 1870's in European Turkey and the Western part of Asia
Minor.Yet,in 1881 Turkey possessed a very 	 limited	 railway
system.It was only after that year that railways construction
received more
	 attention.During	 the	 late	 1870's	 European
constructors succeeded in getting railway concessions,a process
which intensified in the following decades.Construction of lines
such as the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways or the Chemins des fer
Orientaux added thousands of kilometres to the Ottoman railway
system
[BORN(1982)146-159,HERSHLAG(1964)49-54,MORAWITZ(1902)373-411].In
1914 the empire possessed 5.252 km of	 railway	 lines.This
number,however,was rather low in comparison to the lines possesed
by Western European states.It is estimated that in a period of
approximately thirty five years more than a billion fr were put in
railways [ISSAWI (1980) 148-149]
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(6) The reader should not be confused by the total number of £ T
175	 million which
	 Mercret	 uses	 as	 a	 basis	 of	 his
estimations.Presumably Mercret leaves out of his account the loans
guaranteed by the Egyptian Tribute whose holders had negotiated a
separate settlement in early 1877.
(7) See f or example the Report on the Financial conditions of
Turkey by Lord Hobart and H Foster in A&P(1862) LXIV,the Report on
Turkish Finance by Lord Hobart in A&P(1863) LXXV,the Report on the
Taxation of Turkey by Barron in CR(1870) ,and the Report on the
Turkish budget for the Year 1872-1873 in A&P(1872) LIX.See also DU
VELAY(1903) 262.
(8) The Ottoman Bank was founded in 	 1856 with a capital of £
500.000 divided into 100.000 shares.The bank had its headquarters
in London although it aspired to do business in the Ottoman
capital.It was first involved in Ottoman finances in 1856 when it
presented a plan for the establishment of a State Bank in the
Ottoman empire [See below,Chapt.VI 	 ].Yet its first successful
operation took place in 1862 when it raised the 1862 Ottoman loan.
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CHAprEJ II:Ottoman Finances.
As Western economic interests increased,so European
ambassadors more and more exercised their influence in financial
issues.The preparation of accurate and efficient budgets was among
their first priorities.During the same period European holders of
Turkish bonds eagerly pressed for financial reforms and the
regular service of the Ottoman Public Debt.Budgets would give an
accurate picture of the financial position of the
	 Turkish
State.The first budget on the European model was published in 1860
(1).During the 1860's budgets continued to be published
regularly apart from the years 1865-1868.During the 1870's budgets
continued to be prepared except from the years 1870/71,1876/77 and
1878/79.
Yet,many Europeans,who were aware of the financial problems
of Turkey had great doubts about the Ottoman State's
intentions.The idea that the proclamation of financial reforms and
the preparation of budgets in Turkey was nothing but an expedient
to soothe the anxieties of European investors,was widely held in
Europe, "And here it may be remarked as a peculiar feature
connected with Turkish finances...that a budget has never been
prepared without being accompanied or immediately followed by a
loan."[LAYARD(1869)3-4).Sjmjlar views were shared by some of the
European diplomats in Con/ple.For example,the French ambassador De
Vogue,scrutinizing the Ottoman budget of 1874-75,was led to
virtually the same conclusion.According to his viewpoint,financial
reforms such as the secularization of the vakoufs and the regie
des tabacs,were proclaimed only to facilitate the placement of
the	 1873	 Ottoman	 loan	 [letter	 dated	 21/4/1874,in	 AN
F30/356] .British diplomats,however,held a more favourable opinion
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with regard to the future of	 the Ottoman finances.This
traditional,so to speak,policy of encouraging the Ottoman
government to introduce financial reforms was followed from the
early years of the Tanzimat period.The report prepared by Lord
Hobart and M Foster was perhaps the best example of this
policy.Always keeping some distance and criticising some of the
financial measures adopted by the Porte,and at the same
time,always encouraging and inciting the government to introduce
more modern methods of financial administration,this was the basis
of the British policy towards the Ottoman finances.Not
surprisingly Rumbold,the secretary of the British legation argued
in his report on the Ottoman budget of the year 1871/72 that,
"A deficit which may be reasonably estimated not to exceed a
moderate figure...a revenue showing increase...and a reduced
expenditure...such are the broad and cheering statements of a
budget which hostile critics have unkindly described as made for
exportation."[Report by RUMBOLD in A&P(1872 )LIX,559].
Apart from such contemporary disputes,however,the modern
researcher is faced with other problems.Firstly,the value of
Ottoman budgets as a source of examining Ottoman finances is only
indicative.Estimation of both revenues and expenditure was based
on extremely optimistic considerations.Moreover,there are no
available accounts of the effective results.Thus,any analysis of
the Ottoman budgets should be undertaken with caution.Yet,as,on
the other hand,Ottoman budgets reveal important aspects of Ottoman
finances it is necessary that they be examined (2).
The period 1860-75 was marked by constantly growing
budgets,both in terms of revenue and expenditure.Some variations
which emerged during the early 1860's were only exceptions to the
general rule.Conversely,between the years 1876-1881,both revenue
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and expenditure rapidly declined.Owing to the suspension of
payments of the Public debt in 1875,expenditure saw a considerable
decrease.Turkey continued to pay interest on her floating debt but
not so much as a penny on the External debt.During that later
period,however,declining revenues were due to deteriorating
economic and political conditions within the country.The war in
the Balkan provinces largely affected both production and tax
collection.The war with Russia a few years later,had even more
disastrous effects.Due to the mobilization of thousands of farmers
production was seriously damaged.It is not surprising that tithe
receipts fell from 6.374.571 £ '? in 1875/76 to 4.500.000 CT	 in
1879/80 [Harrison to Salisbury,29/1/1879 in FO/78 3067].
The effect of Turkey's integration into the European system
of peripheral economies,combined with an increase in exports
highlighted a more prosperous popu].ation.Presumably the Ottoman
State,whose finances were based on agriculture,conceived these
developments as a new source of taxation and increased estimated
revenues accordingly.Yet,estimates were far from reality.From the
existing evidence it appears that sharp contradiction between
estimates and actual receipts existed throughout the period under
discussion.With regard to the optimistic cosiderations of the
Ottoman government a British official reported in 1867 that,
"Investigation showed that of the £14.589.000 forming the
estimated revenue,the Treasury could only count on receiving
£ 11.250.000 within the year;consequently the revenue in arrears
must amount to £3.000.000 or £3.500.000.Of this amount,only
£1.800.000 could be counted on during the ensuing year,and the
balance perhaps several years later." [Report by BARRON in
CR(1866-67)436).De Vogue,estimated the deficit of the year 1874/75
at 160.000.000 fr,while official estimates showed a deficit of
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only 10.000.000 fr [letter dated 21/4/1874,in AN F30/356.].
To the Ottoman government's great distress things did not
improve in the late 1870's.According to the records of the Ottoman
council of Ministers,
	 "expenditure cannot be suspended,while
for many reasons,revenue is not fully collected.Apart from
that,and as a result of experience it has been proved that only
two thirds of estimated revenues are collected during each
year;the revenue in arrears rests to be collected during the
following years.As during the first semester revenue is extremely
inadequate...no	 chance	 exists	 of	 revenue	 matching
expenditure." [NEOLOGOS,29/4/1880) .Nevertheless,despite confusing
estimates the increase in revenue is beyond doubt.The available
figures,if optimistic,suggest a revenue increase of 73 per cent
between 1859/60 and 1874/75.After 1875,however,revenues declined
rapidly and by 1880/81 they amounted to only £ 14.687.127 or a 13
per cent increase over the 1859/60 level.
On the other hand,expenditure reached much higher levels
than revenue [HERSHLAG(1980)301] .What is more important,effective
expenses greatly exceeded estimated ones.The service of the
Ottoman Public debt,and the cost of administration and military
expenses contributed to a swollen expenditure.True,however,that
sharp budgetary problems appeared only after the late 1860's,when
accumulated debts and increasing Public expenditure produced
enormous budgetary deficits. [see TableI,II] .Estimated expenditure
almost doubled,while extraordinary budgets became common during
the 1870's.In a period of ten years(1871-81),accumulated deficits
reached almost £T 40 million (see Table I).
However,there is evidence to support the view that the
financial position of the Ottoman state was more onerous than it
looks at first sight;a large part of each year's expenditure was
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usually omjtted.The Council of Mjnjsters,whjch was responsible for
the preparation of budgets,decided the annual allowance for each
Department.Then the Treasury provided the Departments with credit
in the form of monthly instalments [Report by HOBART and FOSTER in
A&P(1862)LXIV,498].Apart from the sums originally allotted to them
by the Treasury,all Departments were allowed to issue State
obligations without any restriction (3).In this way,any
effective estimate of public expenditure was impossible.It is true
that these obligations were incorporated into the floating
debt,the service of which was assured by certain public
revenues.Yet,obligations were usually issued after budgets had
been prepared and published.Thus,although budgets were supposed to
be restrictive in the event effective expenditure far exceeded
estimated expenditure.In addition,Departments issued obligations
without informing the Treasury about their number or expiring
date.Consequently,the Treasury faced enormous difficulties in
dealing with such liabilities in subsequent years.Not surprisingly
a committee of local bankers to which the 1875 budget was
presented for inspection emphasized that, "Regular service[of
other items]is destabilized by the service of the floating
debt...This debt was created by the previous years' deficits and
the interest these deficits bear;only their liquidation will
restore public credit and establish the economic balance....A
large part of this debt consists of the expenses of different
Departments,which exceed their budgets .Such practices have led to
a swollen floating debt...The committee believes that
extraordinary expenses should not exceed the amount of total
revenues." [NEOLOGOS,16/3/1874].
The level of floating debt is perhaps the most important
indication of this process.Liaujdated in 1865 this debt emerged
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again during the following years and reached CT 14 million in
1875.The floating debt consisted of short term advances contracted
either by the Treasury or by individual Departments.This debt was
among	 the	 most	 difficult	 problems	 to	 deal	 with
but,paradoxically,it was also an
	 indication	 of	 inadequate
expenditure.undoubtedly,by	 continuing	 the	 issue	 of	 State
obligations,the Ministries manifested their urgent need 	 for
money.Budgetary deficits caused large imbalances and therefore the
issuing of obligations was the Departments' main
	 financial
outlet.This was particularly the case after 1870,when budgetary
deficits increased substantially leaving the Treasury with
insufficient amounts of money (see Table II).It is,however,very
difficult to say the purpose to which this extra money was
devoted.
The increasing financial difficulties of the Ottoman State
during the period under discussion were, in the final
analysis,expressed through budgetary deficits.In order to cover
these deficits,the Ottoman State resorted to foreign and internal
borrowing.Even after 1876,when the service of the Public debt was
suspended and Turkey could no longer resort to the European money
markets,internal borrowing continued.But instead of decreasing
deficits,public borrowing only made things worse.On any
reckoning,borrowing had disastrous long term implications although
it was the only expedient allowing the Treasury to meet its
current obligations.Within this vicious circle,Public debt
payments and military expenses played the major roles.It is true
that certain reforms had been put forward by European and Ottoman
advisers.Even as early as 1860 Lord Hobart and Foster suggested
concrete measures in order to stabilize expenditure [Report by
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also HERSHLAG(1980)300-301].Eminent bankers in Con/pie were in
favour of steps which would improve Public revenues and decrease
expenditure [NEOL0GOS,16/3/1874] .Members of the Ottoman
administration were also aware of the financial predicament and
urged	 the	 government	 to	 impose	 effective	 policies
[NEOLOGOS,24/1O/1879].True also,that European,and
	 British	 in
particular,pressure was to a certain extent fruitful.Yet,all these
produced only marginal results,and the budgetary deficits
continued to highlight the precarious position of Ottoman
finances.
Revenues on the other hand,if increased could not match
expenditure.Throughout the period under discussion the Ottoman
State faced a continuous financial crisis.Inadequate revenues in
their turn,derived from the intrinsic and structural problems of
the Ottoman ecoriomy.Although cash crop cultivation had been
developed in some parts of the empire,this alone could not solve
the Treasury's problems.Given the context of structural and
legislative restrictions the Ottoman economy met its own limits.In
so far as modern industrial production was non-existent,and in so
far as cities and towns were mainly places of trade and the
subsistance economy and traditional cultivation were
widespread,the Treasury could only receive inadequate revenues.In
addition to the structural features of the Ottoman economy,the
traditional and narrow-minded economic policy of the Ottoman State
contributed to its own financial deadlocks;the tax collection
system and heavy agricultural taxation might be compatible with
the short term fiscal necessities of the Treasury,but they
considerably damaged the econorny.Within this vicious
circie,budgetary deficits were the only transparent indication
that something had gone wrong.
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Revenues.
In a country like Turkey where agriculture was the most
fundamental economic activity,taxes in the agricultural sector
provided the state with the bulk of its revenues.The
fact,however,that agricultural taxation,as such,was at the centre
of the Ottoman economic mentality should be emphasised.Since the
early years
	
of the Empire agricultural product 	 and	 its
distribution had been the key 	 function of	 the Ottoman
redistributive mechanisms [SUNAR(1980)552-5551 .Particularly after
the check of Ottoman territorial expansion,agricultural
producuction became the fiscal basis of the Ottoman State.The
distribution of agricultural surplus through the timar system
secured the existence of both social order and political power.It
is worth stressing that the emergence of local landlords and the
subsequent distruction of the timar system was associated with
the appropriation of an increasingly larger part of agricultural
production [KARPAT(1974)90-93].Therefore,it is not an
exaggeration to say that agricultural revenue was in the mind of
the Ottoman bureaucracy closely connected with the maintenance of
power.Inevitably,the control of agricultural surplus was realized
through a number of direct and indirect taxes levied upon the
peasantry.Not only the tithe and other taxes directly connected
with production,but also taxes such as the haradj,the verghi etc
largely affected agricultural populations.Conversely,the urban
population was less heavily taxed.Although customs duties,tolls
and other indirect urban taxes were a valuable source of
revenue,they simply supplemented revenues deriving from the
agricultural sector.
The tithe was the single most important tax.A fixed
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percentage of the land's gross yield usually amounting to 10 per
cent,was imposed as a tax on agricultural produce and was
collected in cash or in kind [Report by HOBART and Foster in
A&P(1862) LXIV 480-483,Report by BARRON in CR (1870)Turkey
183,SHAW(1975)428-429).After 1867 the tithe was raised to 12.5
per cent,an increase from which the Treasury benefitted
enormously [Report by RtJMBOLD in A&P(1872) LIX 582-583].Increased
tithe revenues,however,were not only the result of higher
rates.In many aspects higher revenues derived from the growth in
production proper.However simple this tax was in concept,it
continued to provide the Treasury with ever increasing
revenues.Between 1859 and 1878 the tithe alone accounted for
20-35 per cent of the total state revenues (4) .The sheep tax was
the next most important contribution directly deriving from the
agricultural sector.Initially this tax was a kind of tithe
imposed on sheep-breeding.One tenth of each flock had to be given
annually to the state [UBICINI(1856)II,267].In 1857,a new sheep
tax was introduced related more to income than to capital.The new
tax varied from province to province.In Adrianople,for
example,the tax was raised at 4 per cent while in other provinces
the same tax varied from 2.5-3 per cent [Report by BARRON in
CR(1870)Turkey,229-230,SHAW(1975)429-430].The sheep tax rate
remained unchanged after it was first fixed in 1857.This tax
alone accounted for 7-10 per cent of the total revenues on
average.
The verghi was Turkey's second most important tax and it
represented a kind of property tax [Report by HOBART and FOSTER
in A&P(1862) LXIV 478-480,UBICINI(1856)II,267-269].Initially the
purpose of the tax was to provide the salaries of local Muktars
and Mudirs [Report by BARRON,op cit,199].Before 1845 the verghi
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was levied after a vague estimate of the population had been
carried out by the government.Untill then this tax was imposed on
incomes deriving from real estate.After 1845,however,the Ottoman
state introduced a new kind of verghi which would be imposed on
both real estate and profits.The tax which was imposed on real
estate,name].y buildings and cultivated land,was set at 0.4 per
cent with an additional 4 per cent being added for all rental
incomes deriving from such holdings [SHAW(1975)428].The tax was
supposed to be based on a cadastral survey carried out by special
committees.Thus the government would have known the exact number
of holdings after the completion of the cadastre and would have
acted accordingly. yet,the verghi had been fixed long before the
syrvey's completion and remained unchanged thereafter.Although
special agents employed by the government had been sent to all
provinces with the purpose of registering the land,this proces was
only partly successful,to say the least.In the first place the
registration of cultivated land was never completed.Measuring the
land proved difficult for landmarks were based on "hearsay
evidence" or"a kind of bird's eye view" [Report by BARRON in
CR(1870)Turkey 210-211].In the event,the cadastral survey was
successfully carried out only in a few provinces.By and large the
registration of holdings was finally confined to buildings while
land remained basically unregistered.In addition to the verghi,a
similar tax was also imposed on the annual profits of companies
and crafts.It was set at 3 per cent in 1860 and was raised to 4
per cent in the late 1870's [SHAW(1975)427].If added together
these two taxes accounted for 10-15 per cent of the total
revenues.
Customs revenues were another valuable source of income.They
usually accounted for 10-12 per cent of the total.The Ottoman
Empire was traditionally a country of almost free import trade.
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Import duties were relatively low and remained so till 1838 when
the first Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty was signed.After that
date,three major taxes were imposed on trade.Export
duties,amounting to 11 per cent ad valorem,import duties amounting
to 5 per cent,and transit duties which were set up at 8 per cent
[KOYMEN(1971)48-50,KUTUKOGLOU(1984)57-59].Similar duties had been
also accepted by other European countries which signed commercial
treaties with Turkey after 1838.In 1860,however,the European
Powers consented to a gradual diminution of the export tax to 1
per cent,a process which was finally completed in the late
1860's.They also agreed to an 8 percent increase in import duties









changes [NORADOUNGHIAN(1902) 111,130-143,151-162,171-202] .However,ev
en under the new agreements,Customs duties and the Custom service
in general still faced many problems.Due to the application of
separate tariffs Customs duties suffered from a lack of unity.The
same goods paid duty by either value or weight according to the
country	 which	 exported	 them	 [Report	 by
BARRON (187 0 )234].Moreover,it should be pointed out that	 the
collection of Customs duties faced serious problems.Import export
trade in particular,involved tax evasion.The extent of such
practices was widespread and in most cases Customs officials were
involved.The uncovering in the mid 1870's of an extensive tax
evasion network including many highly placed officials was by no
means an isolated incident[Report of Inspector Homberg dated
31/1/1876,13 in AN F30/356].In fact every single import or export
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transaction was negotiable,and both local and European
merchants,with the connivance of customs officials,made handsome
profits at the expense of the Treasury [SYNGROS(1908)II,6-9].The
amount of money lost to the Treasury by such practices cannot be
estimated.But Customs duties were the only regular revenue and
undoubdetly the Treasury suffered from tax evasion and other
maipractices in import-export trade.
Transit duties created more problems than those they were
supposed to solve.In the first place local officials appropriated
large part of these duties.In addition transit duties strenghtened
the fragmentation of the Ottoman economy by increasing total costs
and discouraging exports.The movement of goods within the country
was subject to three categories of taxation.An 8 per cent tax was
imposed an all commodities,either articles or
foodstuffs,transported to a place where a toll service existed.In
this way,products were taxed according to whether the city they
were destined for was subject to toll control or not.Shipment of
commodities,either by sea or river,was also subject to an 8 per
cent tax.Therefore,grain prices,for example,substantially
increased when their transport involved shipment.Finally,taxes
were imposed on industrial activities at a rate of 2-6 per
cent.Thus when native crafts happened to import raw materials,such
as yarn for example,they paid 5 per cent on import,and then,when
the final product was ready,an additional 2-6 per cent on
transport[Report of the Finance Minister Sadyk Pasha to the Grand
Vizier( undated ),AN F30/356,see also UBICINI(1856)II,272-273].To
the great relief of local trade and industry transit duties were
finally abolished in the early 1870's.
The bedel was a tax paid by those non-Muslims who wanted to
avoid military service.A product of the policy of Ottomanism this
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tax replaced the traditional poll-tax(haradj) levied on the
non-Muslim male population.The remaining state revenues were
produced by taxes imposed on consumption,mining,documents involved
in commercial business,state monopolies and other minor matters
[SHAW(1975)434-448).Accordingly,taxes were raised on the
consumption of tobacco,spirits,timber,silk,and salt.All mining
operations were subjected to taxes according to the ease of
extraction.Taxes were also applied to documents involved in
commercial business such as stamps and licences,perhaps the only
novelty introduced into the Ottoman tax system.
Moreover,taxes were levied by the local authorities
according to their financial needs.Sometimes,the rural population
was even subjected to a kind of corvee.According to the 1869 road
construction regulation for example,the Empire's male rural
population between the age of sixteen and sixty,were obliged to
work on the construction or repair of roads and bridges for 4 days
each year or 20 days every five years [SHAW(1975)432-433].
In a country like Turkey it is very difficult to estimate the
exact tax burden upon the population.Nevertheless 1 it is almost
certain that the cultivators' tax burden was much heavier than
that of any other taxpaying group [AKTAN(1966)109-113).If both
direct and indirect taxes are taken into consideration the farmer
contributed the bulk of State income.This contribution usually
accounted for 75-80 per cent of the total revenue.Only the tithe
and the speep tax alone,if added together accounted for 39.2 per
cent of the State's revenues on average.As agriculture,both in
terms of resources and manpower,was the fundamental sector of the
economy the state's reliance upon it was only natural.Yet,in
contrast to the cultivators' fundamental contribution to the State
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revenues,their benefits from State expenditure were minimal.During
the period under discussion direct State expenses in agriculture
never exceeded 1 per cent of the total.The Department of Public
Works for example never received more than 0.6 per cent of the
total expenses.In the same period the Ministry of Trade and
Agriculture received something like 0.35 per cent of the total
expenditure on average.
It is true that the State some times directly stimulated
production .This happened for example during the American Civil
war when cultivators were provided with cotton seeds
[ISSAWI(1980)236-241].But even this was done in the hope of higher
tax returns let alone that it soon petered out.There is reason to
believe,however,that that particular attitude towards production
was only temporary,while the absence of a transport policy,of
agricultural credit,of private property in land etc were permanent
aspects of the Ottoman State.True that some of this changed later
in the century.But then the impact of the Public Debt
administratjon,whjch was established in 1881,on the government's
policies was enormous.
Urban population was certainly less heavily taxed.Con/ple the
largest and wealthiest city of Turkey,was virtually exempted from
taxation,owing to its status as an imperial city.In 1879 apart
from Custom duties,cash receipts from all other direct and
indirect taxes levied upon the city's population yielded a mere
343.430 [Harisson to Salisbury,7/5/1879,in
F078/3067].Moreover,those taxes which would have any consequence
for the urban population,such as the profit and property
taxes,were undoubtedly less heavy than those imposed on the
cultivators.Furthermore it seems that the peasants'contribution in
comparison with that of the city dwellers had	 increased
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disproportionally throughout the 19th century.Indeed,while the
revenues derived from the urban population remained unchanged and
some even slightly decreased,those deriving from the agriculture
had,on the contrary,increased spectacularly. (see Table
III) .Thus,it would be an exaggeration to say that the Ottoman
bureaucracy ever attempted a "shift of tax burden from the land to
the urban wealth" [SHAW(1975)421).The Ottoman State continued to
rely upon agriculture throughout the period under discussion,and
the cost of the Ottoman administration was almost entirely covered
by agricultural revenues.
In the second half of the 19th century the state's income
was derived from 30 major categories of taxation.Considering that
before the 1840's there were at least 90 categories of taxes one
might suggest that the Ottoman tax system had changed
radically.Indeed these thirty taxes produced a far higher income
for the Treasury than the old ones.Some of these taxes were
directly collected by the State while others were farmed out.Yet,a
closer analysis of the Ottoman tax system reveals that the so
called new taxes had great similarities to the old ones.Basic
taxes,such as the tithe the profit tax,the Customs duties etc had
existed in almost the same form during the previous centuries.The
fact that the same taxes provided much lower revenues had more to
do with the decentralisation process which occured during the 17th
and 18th centuries than with the taxes themselves.
What was apparent,in addition,was that state revenues
continued to lack elasticity.As production was subject to weather
and other unpredictable factors,the tithe,the single most
important source of revenue,was in its turn subject to
variations;a harvest failure usually had disastrous results for
both the Treasury and the population.For when such a situation
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arose,the cultivators not only could not pay the the but their
other taxes as we]i.Moreover,the very Ottoman tax system itself
was full of shortcomings.Its lack of unity was the most striking
feature of the system.Methods of collection varied widely
according to the territory and the period.Different rates were
applied to the same subject,such as the sheep tax for example.And
most important of all,taxes were imposed on gross rather than net
income,for such a distinction scarcely existed in the Ottoman tax
system.Almost every single tax,including the tithe the sheep tax
the profit tax etc,was raised on gross income.In addition,most of
the taxes were fixed at a particular rate and remained unchanged
thereafter,whatever the economic conditions were.
Yet,however ineffective the Ottoman tax system looks by
modern standards it was certainly compatible with the long
tradition of the Ottoman administration.One should always keep in
mind that fiscal priorities were always the basis of Ottoman
economic policy.It is unhikely,however,whether the Ottoman state
was aware of the damage its fiscal policies inflicted on the
economy.
The state's adherence to tax farming illustrates the
situation better.Although the system of malikane according to
which a tax was farmed out for life had been abolished,the
majority of taxes was still farmed out to wealthy persons for a
limited period of time of between one and five years [Report by
BARRON in CR(1870)183,SHAW(1975)422-423].Taxes were auctioned by
the State and farmed out to the highest bidder
[NIKOLAIDES(1889)3980-3987].Musljms and non-Muslims were allowed
to participate in these auctions so long as they held Ottoman
citizenship and were backed by a banker who acted as guarantor
[NIKOLAIDES(1889)3980,GIBB and BOWEN(1950)I,23-24).The collection
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of revenues apart,tax farmers,entitled to a profit of two per cent
on their invested money.The amount they paid in order to obtain
the right of collection was assessed on the average income which
had been received by the State in previous years;usually the basis
for assessment was the average for the previous two or five
years(ISSAWI (1980) 353).
Although tax farming was applied to almost every tax,its
detrimental results were more conspicuous in the case of tithe
collection.Usua].ly the bidder bought the right to collect the
tithe for a whole sanjak or even a vilayet.He then subdivided his
bargain and sold it to other tax farmers,who in their turn
subdivided their own share and then sold etc.Thus on several
occasions tax farmers obtained the right of collecting taxes only
from one village.on each of these sales and subsales profits would
be made,so that the final amount paid for all these transactions
exceeded by many times the price which the State had received from
the first bidder.In this way individual profits earned by such
dealings were enormous.Presumably,tax farming prices were
conditional upon harvest expectations:a rich harvest usually
secured high returns and tax farming prices rose accordingly.The
Treasury was the first to benefit from such transactions,but in
the process,tax farmers increased their earnings as well.Barron
the Secretary of the British embassy in Con/pie estimated the
Treasury's losses from tax farming as varying between 25-30 per
cent of the total revenues [Report by BARRON in
CR(1870)j.84]. yet,tax farming was not always profitable:a harvest
failure led many tax farmers to bankrupcty.In such cases the
State's damages might be substantial for most tax farmers paid the
Treasury back only when they themselves had collected the taxes.
Tax farming however,proved particularly disastrous for the
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cultivators.Tax farmers collected the tithe according to their own
interests and having no long term concern they extracted as much
as they could before their contracts expired.Most of the time they
imposed higher rates than those legally permitted.Sometimes they
even collected the same tax twice in the same period
[QUATAERT(1973)32].In 1861 Lord Hobard and M Foster pointed out in
their report that,
	 "In the first place the farmer of the
tax,having undertaken its collection as a commercial
speculation,proceeds by every means in his power to enhance its
value at the expense of the poorer class of the cultivators,whose
relative position renders it,very difficult if not impossible for
them to obtain redress for unjust exactions.Of the expedients
resorted to by the farmer with this object,the most usual appears
to be that of collusion with the assessors of the tax to
overestimate the amount of produce for which the cultivator is
liable,the assessors of course,participating in the illicit
gain.In the next place,the tax being taken in kind and the
cultivator prohibited from selling or even housing his produce
until it has been assessed to the dime,it constantly happens that
he is prevented for a considerable time from disposing of it;or if
bad weather sets in,the grain is subjected to injury from exposure
and the whole loss from this cause is made by the tax farmer to
fall on the cultivator...In many cases the peasant being unable
to obtain money for his present necessities by the sale of his
produce,is driven into the hands of usurers,always to his
detriment and often to his ruin". [A&P(1862)LXIv, 481 3.
This assessment was not far from that of the Inspector of
the Imperial Bank,Homberg,who fifteen years later reported that
"Le gouvernement,af in de se faire valoir cherchent toujour a
adjurer les dimes au plus haut prix possible,et se souciant peu de
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la moralite et souvent meme de la solvabilite de l'adjucataire.Il
s'entendent avec les dimier pour pressurer outre mesure les
maiheureuse populations agricoles.Le dimer assiste de zapties
saisit les bijoux de femmes vend a vii prix le betail et jusq'aux
instrument aratoires.L'adjudication etant annuelle ii n'aura plus
de rapport et peu lui importe de...a tout jamais le village qu'il
exploite."[letter dated 1O/2/1876,in AN F30/356.]
The Ottoman State,always in financial
difficulties,preferred the direct and secure income deriving from
tax farming to the establishment of a direct collection system.On
certain occasions the government introduced direct collection in
the hope of higher returns.In fact,tax farming was abandoned for a
short period in 1839 and then again in 1853 and in 1861-1866.After
1866,however,tax farming was restored for good and lasted till the
end of the Ottoman empire [SHAW(1975)426,ISSAWI(1980)353].Direct
collection was preserved only in the Trebizond area [Report by
BARRON in CR(1870)190-191] .Moreover,the government introduced
other variations of tax farming,presumably in an attemt to reduce
the tax farmers' abuses.In the Balkan provinces for example,tax
farmers were replaced by village representatives
[SHAW(1977)99].The results however were poor and it was finally
abandoned.Other forms were also introduced but all of them were
variations on the same old theme.
It is generally agreed that tax farming was the least
efficient system of collecting taxes.It was detrimental not only
to the public revenues,but also to the whole of the economy.But
from a financial point of view this system had certain advantages
for the Treasury;the income derived from tax farming was
secure.Apart from the few years when the harvest failed,the
Ottoman Treasury succeeded in securing its revenues.And even in
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cases of harvest failure the state was usually able to recoup its
losses by confiscating the tax farmers' properties and belongings
[Report by BARRON,op.cit,187-188] .Moreover,tax farming relieved
the Treasury of the cost of collecting taxes.In the event
collection expenses were paid by the cultivators.Had the state
introduced direct collection the financial burden would have been
enormous.The establishment of an efficient direct collection
service would have required an army of salaried functionaries and
a great deal of money.
In addition there is evidence to suggest that during the few
years of its application,direct collection was generally
unsuccessful and that peasants were finally in favour of the old
system of tax farming: "Still on the whole the present plan is
preferred by the tax payers to the system of direct collection for
the following reason.The officials would on their periodical
visits be invariably accompanied by a swarm of police and
followers,who would not only be fed and lodged as well their
horses by the villagers,but would also extort with authority as
much as they could possibly wring from the peasant.This is the
taxpayer's view of the question,and from previous experience it is
not unnatural one,The tax farmer on the other hand posses no
official status,but being rather connected with commerce proceeds
to his work in a business-like way,and cannot afford to make
enemies of the people with whom his business lies."[Report by
ARRON in CR(1870)185).
}lowever,it is beyond doubt that,in the long term,direct
collection would have been much more beneficial not only to the
Treasury but also to the economy as a whole.While tax farming was
and continued to be detrimental,direct collection,though its




















Table III: public Revenue.(in
Years
1860/61	 1862/63	 1863/64	 1864/65	 1 6/69	 1869/70	 1871/77	 1177/73	 1873/74	 1874/75	 1875/76	 1877/78	 1879/80
39r)8615	 171'13'	 is,','. H	 '1C237C	 4EC9171	 '4975.	 9j4)	 6367635	 7954454	 5584409
76(51'	 Fj b2
	 1005651	 1436819	 1182918	 1818180	 1863165	 2045453	 1977270	 1462196
2849872	 2745872	 2728841	 2760525	 2805525	 2890170	 2960490	 '960490	 2963370	 2770466
543573	 545270	 54Q474	 580432	 580432	 610995	 597330	 597835	 757170	 770286
2546991	 2250000	 1917000	 1797682	 1775182	 3995820	 1995820	 2045455	 1977270	 1226225
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Stamps	 29909	 202469	 135000	 135000	 86225	 86225	 136360	 181820	 181820	 454454	 183192	
-
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I and 2 in the	 27.28	 32.32	 33.39	 33.93	 42.42	 40.98	 44.49	 44.52	 43.8	 44	 43.1	 41.16
Total
SOURCES:A&P 1872.LIX 231-235. A&P 1861,LXIV 1-17.
çoo Report on Turkish Finances(1867) 432-433,and Report on the Taxation(1870) 178-179.
EconOmist 25 April 1874.Neologos 16 March 1874,24 October 1879,2 April 1880•
Shaw S sThe 19th century Ottoman tax reforms and revenue system.in JMES 6 (1975),451-459.
haw S:Notea and communications ,inIJIES 9(1978).
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could have replaced tax farming and established new relations
among the government,cultivators and the econorny.Here lies one of
the fundamental aspects of the Ottoman State:Its economic policy
was conditional upon its own current financial needs.The rest
mattered less (5).In so far as tax farming secured high and quick
profits the government chose to disregard its effects on the
economy.On the other hand,to the extent that direct collection
would have involed a heavy financial burden it was not introduced
despite its long term advantages over tax farming.When the state
attempted to abandon tax farming,it did it only in the hope of
higher returns.When that proved a fallacy,tax farming,in whatever
form,was restored regardless of the disastrous effects on the
economy (6).
In the circumstances,this traditional fiscal policy led to
a profound contradiction.The economy,one part of which was under
the direct influence of European markets,tended to escape the
state's control.In other words it tended to act independently of
the state.Conversely,the state conceived the economy as its
servant.Thus it was finally both unable and unwilling to deviate
from its policies and to provide the economy with a favourable
environment.
However,it should be emphasised that these features of the
Ottoman State would have been treated differently if they had
occured in a contemporary Western State.The adherence to tax
farming,the State's preservation of land ownership,and the efforts
at controlling almost every aspect of the society should be
attributed to the ideological,political and social heritage of the
Ottoman State.In many aspects,the Ottoman bureaucracy was
reluctant,if not incompetent,to understand and approve many
Western approaches to the economy.This strong ideological heritage
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Expenditure: -
Throughout the period under consideration Turkish
expenditure was mainly connected with defence,civil administration
and the service of the Public Debt.Initially the majority of
expenses were devoted to the Ministries of War,Marine and the
Interior,as well as to the Civil list(see Table IV).The remainder
was absorbed by the other items of expenditure.In the late 1850's
and early 1860's Public Debt payments were relatively small.Due to
increasing state borrowing,these payments soon exceeded the other
items of expenditure in importance.These payments included the
interest and sinking fund(annuities) of the loans raised abroad as
well as the interest on the internal debt.During the late 1860's
and mid 1870's payments related to the Public Debt reached
enormous dimensions.From £ 2.061.016 in 1864 they rose to £
5.216.783 in 1871.Successjve loans after 1870 further increased
the financial burden on the Treasury.In a period of fifteen
years,Public Debt payments came to be of paramount importance.Frorn
a mere £1.577.823 in 1859-60,or 14 per cent of the total
expenditure,these payments jumped to £9.028.404 in 1874-75 and
accounted for 39 per cent of the total(see Table IV).In the period
1860-1881 the Ottoman debt absorbed each year
	 £ 4.028.834 on
average.
However,the Ministries of War,Marine and the
Interior,together with the Civil list continued to absorb large
amounts of money.If added together these four items of expenditure
accounted,during the same period,for 49 per cent of the total,an
enormous percentage even in comparison with payments related to
the Public Debt.From 1850's onwards the Ottoman State spent large
amounts of money on defence.Military expenditure was divided among
strenghtened the state's adherence to policies which by Westen
standards were detrimental.Thus,any historical conclusion with
regard to the Ottoman economic and social policies,would be
meaningless outside the context of this heritage,whose
preservation was secured by the Ottoman State itself.
It would be unfair however,not to admit that at least a part
of the Ottoman bureaucracy had developed a more advanced economic
consciousness.That was true not only during the era of the Public
Debt Administration,when signs of a different,however vague,policy
towards the economy had been demonstrated but even before.Sadyk
Pasha for example,many times Minister of Finances and direct
taxes,made a major contribution to the abolition of transit duties
during the 1870's (7).Yet,the receptivity of the Ottoman
bureaucracy as a whole to economic reform is in doubt.On basic
issues,such as the land question or tax farming,f or example,the
Ottoman state proved more than reluctant to accept any change.
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three Departments;the Ministry of War,that of Marine,and the
Direction of Artillery.Not surprisingly,the bulk of it was devoted
to the Army.It is estimated that the Army's allowance exceeded the
combined expenditure of the other two Departments by three to four
times. (see Table IV).During the 1850's and 1860's large purchases
of military equipment took place:the Army was provided with new
field weapons and new types of rifles.In 1874 the value of
armaments purchased by the Ottoman government,including Krupp
cannons and American rifles,amounted to 100 million fr [De Vogue
to the French Foreign Ministry,letter dated 21/4/1874 in AN
F30/356].Great attention was also given to fortifications.The
fortification of the Straits in particular had eventually been
completed in 1880.In addition,fortresses armed with artillery had
been erected in many border provinces.The Navy due to the Sultan's
personal intervention,was lavishly supplied.By the mid 1870's
twenty four new ships,including four ironclads worth £ 400.000
each,had already been purchased by the Ottoman government
[OWEN(1981)110,see also SYNGROS(1908)II,180].The construction of a
special gunboat fleet for Service in the Danube had also been
decided [MELLON,4/July/1876).
However,a great deal of money devoted to the military sector
was spent in vain.All the Turkish ironclads lay idly at anchor in
Con/ple,always within sight of the Imperial Palace.Smaller but
faster warships would,perhaps,have contributed more to the
efficiency of the Ottoman Navy.But Abdul Aziz was in favour of
ironclads,whose capabilities he admired so much,and undoubtedly
the Sultan's personal opinion had a considerable influence on the
final decision.In addition,expenses devoted to the modernisation
of the Turkish military infrastructure were also spent in an
ineffective fashion:	 "Unfortunately,it is a fact that the large
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sums of money spent on these Turkish establishments were spent in
vain.For instance,the most modern and complicated machinery for
setting up a heavy gun factory,has been provided at great cost,but
no attempt has been made to establish steam-hammers and other
indispensible requisites at all adequate to the work
completed.Thus the large factory,practically does not exist:all
the heavy ordance is to this day ordered abroad;and it is reckoned
that an additional outlay of at least £150.000 would be
indispensible to turn to account works that have probably already
cost double	 that amount,and that now lie
	 idle	 and
unprofitable." [Report by Rumbold,A&P:1872,LIX,5691.
Naturally,Turkey's weak position vis-a--vis its main
enemy,Russia,imposed heavy military expenditure.In the period
1860-1881 this item alone absorbed £ 4.435.038 On average with a
peak in the years 1862/63,1872/73 and 1878/79.Yet,although
military expenses in cardinal numbers were subjected only to
slight flunctuations their proportion to the total expenditure had
considerably declined,mainly due to the enormous increase of
Public expenditure.Frorn 42.5 per cent of total expenditure in
1862,military expenditure fell to 31.5 per cent of the total in
1865 and to 25 per cent in 1874.
Expenses devoted to the Ministry of the Interior were also
important.Even after its separation from the Grand Vezirate in
1869,this Department was responsible for the local and provincial
administration	 and	 for	 the	 police	 [SHAW(1977)71-72].The
Department's expenses covered
	 the	 cost	 of	 internal
administratjon;the salaries of both the lower and higher echelons
of the staff accounted for a large part of the Ministry's total
expenses.The expenditure of that Department underwent a relatively
large increase.From	 £1.524.029	 in	 1860,the	 Department's
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expenditure rose to £ 2.081.256 in 1873 and to £ 2.320.304 in
1878.However after that year it rapidly decreased.In the period
1860-81,due to the increase in Public expenditure the Department's
proportion to the total expenditure had also declined.From 13 per
cent of total expenditure in 1860,the percentage devoted to the
Ministry of the Interior fell to 9.7 in 1878.
The Civil List was the forth most important item of
expenditure.It covered the dotations of the Sultan,the Valide
Sultana,Princess and Princesses of the Royal House,the members of
the Imperial family,and the pensions of the Palace's old
servants.In fact there was an army of the Sovereign's servants
whose salaries also derived from the Civil List.Most of them
participated in the Palace's everyday life,but for purely honorary
services they provided received disproportionaly high rewards.In a
long list provided by A Ubicini one could find people such as the
Keeper of the Crown Jewels,the Chief Officer of the Privy
Chamber,a rather pompous title for a doorkeeper,the Grand Master
of the Wardrobe,the Chief Keeper of relics etc,who were lavisly
paid for doing almost nothing [UBICINI(1856)II,288-290].
With regard to the Palace's expenses the Greek newspaper
Mellon reported in 1874 that: "A rather quaint report has
been published in Con/pie containing details of the Sultan's
spending.A sum of £T1.135.000 is devoted to the leader of the
faithful each year.Yet,it is known...that sums much larger than
the above amount are spent by his Highness the Sultan in order to
preserve Imperial prestige.The number of servants paid by the
Imperial Treasury exceeds 6000 males including 350 boatmen,400
cooks,300 gardeners,600 coachmen,600 black eunuchs 	 and	 600
butlers.Moreover some 1000 girls,or female slaves are 	 also
included,although there is evidence to believe that their real
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number far exceeds the official one.Food and shelter are provided
for all these people.It has been estimated that at least an equal
number of people,who in fact are the servants'servants,are also
provided with food although they do not receive salaries.In
addition,thanks to the widespread view of the Sultan as the light
of Islam,and the father of the people,beggars and poor people who
live around the Palace in great numbers are also provided with
food.Each day no less than 1200 sheep and 2.000 hens are delivered
to the Palace by special contractors.A sum of 60.000 fr is spent
each month to buy wax candles.In addition,a whole army of
acrobats,jugglers,musjcjaris etc are employed by the Palace.Many
cattle breeding and rare birds are also kept inside the Palace and
each day new collecctions are added,thus resulting in an enormous
outlay.This year the Sultan enjoys buying Japanese pottery.Five
white and five azure vases have been bought lately to the tune of
125000 frs.Members of the Imperial family and many ex-ministers
are also paid by the Imperial Treasury."[MELLON 19/10/1874].
In the period 1860-1881 the Civil List absorbed £ 1.069.528
on average.Judging from the available figures it seems that the
amount devoted to the Sultan's personal income decreased.Yet,there
is reason to believe that expenses which ought to be paid by the
Civil List were acctually included in other Departments'
expenditure.Lord Hobart in his report on the Ottoman finances had
pointed out such "informal" payments adding that"The Civil
List...large as it is,does not include the whole of the allowance
for the Imperial establishment."[Report by HOBART and FOSTER in
A&P(1862)LXIV 494].Apparently,part of the Sultan's allowance
continued burdening the expenditure of other Departments
throughout the period under discussion.As other Departments'
expenses were less subjected to European criticism than the Civil
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List,it is possible that their accounts were burdened with part of
the Sultan's expenses.In this way,both the Sultan and the European
ambassadors were satisfied;the former could spend more than he was
formally allowed,while the latter thought their efforts for budget
cuts fruitful.After all the budgets themselves were subject to the
Sultan's personal approval.
The Ministry of Finance was next in the line in terms of
expenditure.Responsible for the Empire's financial administration
in a period when Ottoman finances faced enormous difficulties,this
Department was of crucial importance.In the period 1860-81 the
expenses of this Department averaged £852.120.Yet it seems that
the Ministry of Finance was charged with expenses which finally
benefitted other Departments.Lord Hobart had pointed out in the
same report,that apart from the purchase of meat made on behalf of
thr Palace,the Ministry was also charged with repairs of
forts,rations supplied to the Army,works on the mouth of Danube
etc.
	
These five items absorbed 75 per cent of 	 the	 total
expenditure on average.The remainder was divided among the other
Departments.Not	 unfairly,this	 percentage	 was	 extremely
inadequate.Departments such as the Ministry of Public works,the
Ministry of Trade and Agriculture,the Ministry of 	 Public
Instruction,whose contribution to the economy and society could
have been of great value,never received more than £ 100.000 per
year (8) .And that was the highest allowance each of these
Departments ever received.In fact the structure of Public
expenditure remained almost unchanged throughout the period under
discussion.Any shift or redistribution in expenditure concerned
only the major five items.The Army and Civil administration
dominated the expenditure in the 	 late	 1850's	 and early
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1860's.Thenceforth,due to their low increase relatively to total
expenditure their weight declined.In the long
term,however,military expenses alone exceeded on average terms
every single item despite the fact that after 1870 Public debt
payments absorbed considerably higher amounts of money.
In addition,between 1860 and 1875,while the total expenditure
had almost doubled,the bulk of that increase was absorbed by these
five items.From11.O88.5OO in 1860 total expenditure reached
£22.849.610 in 1874-1875.Yet,the percentage of the five main items
remained unchanged.undoubted].y,jncreasjng Public Debt payments
were mainly responsible.In fact,after 1870 these payments reached
enormous dimensions and absorbed the bulk of any increase in
revenue.However,even if the Public Debt payments had been less
heavy,it is unlikely whether the allowance of the remaining items
would have increased to an adequate and acceptable level.Had the
burden of the Public Debt been less heavy,military expenses would
have most probably absorbed this part of the expenditure.
The examination of the structure of expenditure reveals the
priorities set up the Ottoman government.Apart from the Public
Debt payments,which it was impossible for the Ottoman State to
avoid unless it declared itself bankrupt,military expenses and the
cost of internal administration emphasised the state's concern of
preserving the integrity of the Empire.Once more the economy was
neglected.Certainly,jn a period when Ti,irkey's integrity was at
stake,it was both understandable and legitimate to keep the level
of military expenditure high.On the other hand,however, one may
assume that inadequate expenses on other sectors indicate a lack
of interest.One could argue that military expenditure was too
crucial to be cut in favour of any other Department.Yet,the
emphasis remained on these five items despite a considerable
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increase in revenues.
Moreover,it seems that during the same period an enormous
waste of money took place.Not only the Sultan and his court but
also all highly placed officials were paid extravagantly.These
officials received enormous salaries,not only in comparison with
the lower echelons of the bureaucracy but also in comparison with
contemporary Western standards.It has been estimated that the
salaries of senior officials in Turkey were fifty per cent higher
than the corresponding salaries in Western European countries
[Report by RUMBOLD in A&P(1872)LIX,560].During the 1840's and the
1850's the Grand Vizier's monthly payment was £1000 while the
salaries of other Ministers varied from £ 700-800 per month
[UBICINI(1856)II,292].Provincial governors received £ 400-500 per
month according to their rank.The salaries of other members of the
provincial administration varied between £150-300.In 1860 the
Minister of War received £16000 per year whereas the Capudan
Pasha,the head of the Ministry of Marine,received £13.000 annually
[Report by HOBART and FOSTER in A&P(1862)LXIV,494-497].Salaries
paid to other senior officials ranged from £3000-8000 per
year.Even the heads of smaller Departments received salaries
higher than6000.Conversely,emloyees in the lower echelon,such as
clerks,received,according to their rank,salaries ranging from
£ 6-60 per year [ibid,495].
Thus,in Departments with small allowances the Minister's
salary alone accounted for a large percentage of the total
expenditure.In 1861,for example,the Minister of Public Instruction
received one fifth of the money devoted to his Department.In fact
this situation was common,with the salaries of highly placed
officials accounting for a substantial part of	 the total
expenditure of each Department.In this way,most of	 these
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Departments were ineffectual,as not only were their allowances
inadequate,but in addition,a large part was devoted to senior
officials' salaries.An attempt to cut salaries down in the early
1870's did not have fruitful results (9).As Rumbold pointed out:
"unfortunately,those economies when more closely examined,seem
to have been mainly realized by means of a wholesale suppression
of many minor posts of the Public civil service,and a great
reduction in the salaries of those remaining.Meanwhile the
military service has been left untouched and the highest
functionaries of the Empire continue in the undisturbed enjoyment
of official incomes,which may be fairly said to be out of all
proportion to the services rendered by some of them,and to the
resources of the State which benefits by these
services." [A&P(1872)LIx,560]
Only during the late 1870's,when the Ottoman State was faced
with immense financial difficulties,djd the salaries of senior
officials decrease.In 1880,the Grand Vizier received a mere IT
3000 per year while the annual salary of all Ministers had been
set at IT 2550 [NEOLOGOS:28/4/1880].Salarjes of the middle
echelc.ins of the bureaucracy were considerably lower than in the
previous years and most of them ranged from £T 600-800 per year.In
the same year: "The Ministry(of Finances)wishes to reduce this
year's deficit by decreasing each Department's allowance;yet the
heads of all Departments stated that credit was asked only for the
most necessary needs and a further decrease in these expenses is
considered,so	 far	 as	 they	 are
concerned,impossible."[NEQLOGOS:22/3/1880).
Yet,these cuts had only slightly affected expenditure on
other items,and in consequence no major shift towards other
sectors of the administration was ever effected.It is not dificult
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to estimate the deleterious effects of this policy.With the
Empire's road system in poor condition,the enormous rate of
illiteracy and the absence of proper means of transportation and
of any essential assistance towards agriculture,the economy
suffered considerably.Yet,due to the priorities of the Ottoman
State,as well as its lack of interest in other sectors,the
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the total	 14.2	 15.9	 18.7
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the total.	 39.2	 42.12	 41.8
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SOURCES3See Table III,P.&CQ.
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Notes to CHAPTER II.
(1) It seems that a form of budget was prepared in Turkey before
that year.Yet,these budgets were of a very primitive sort and
strongly resembled a form of general account rather than a
budget. [UBICINI (1856) II,284,KARPAT(1977) 411]
(2) Technically speaking,Ottoman budgets were 	 defective.For
example,the tithe the sheep-tax etc,were,for unknown
reasons,classified as indirect taxes [DU VELAY(1903)176-177].In
addition,accurate accounts with regard to effective revenues did
not exist for the largest part of the period under discussion.Back
in 1861 Lord Hobart reported that:"the opportunity that has been
afforded us of inspecting the mode of conducting business in the
public offices at Con/pie had led to the conclusion that in the
Ottoman Empire accounts,as the term is usually
understood,can,except in one or two instances,scarcely be said to
exist,and that consequently the knowledge upon financial matters
is extremely limited."[Report by HOBART and FOSTER in
A&P(1862)LXIV,499].Accurate accounts of some sort,had,for the
first time,prepared after 1875.A Harrison,who was member of the
Financial committee in 1878/79 provides with valuable information
with regard to many questions concerning the Ottoman finances.His
report are found in the F078/3067,F078/3068.
(3) These ogligations were issued under different
names-serghis,havales etc-and were used for the payment of
purchases or the provision of services.The Department however,by
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issuing these orders accepted an obligation without fixed date.The
contractor in his turn fixed such a price as would be remunerative
at the worst exchange and the most remote date of payment.The
result of these transactions contributed significantly to an
increase in the debt as unpaid orders were exchanged with
debentures of the internal debt,bearing usually high interest.
(4) These calculations are based on the estimated and not the
effective revenue and expenditure.All figures have been taken from
the available Ottoman budgets.There is evidence to support the
view that the effective results hardly matched the estimated
ones.These figures however,could give a general idea about the
major aspects of Ottoman finances.
(5) In this connection it is not surprising that there was no
census for Con/ple.In so far as the city paid virtually no taxes
there was no reason whatsoever from the point of view of the
Ottoman state to register the city's population and trade.As the
British consul reported, "the Turkish government never occupied
itself with acquiring information which do not result in some
direct and palpable benefits for the Treasury" [A&P(1878) LXXIV,no
74,831]
(6) It could be argued,that although the Ottoman state wished to
abolish tax farming,it was either reluctunt or unable to cope with
the vested interests connected with tax farming.These vested
interests however,were also strongly associated with the Ottoman
State.Tax farmers themselves were usually connected with Ottoman
officials.Thus,it is most unlikely that the Ottoman State ever
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wished,let alone was unable,to abolish tax farming.
(7) The efforts of All and Fuad pashas,who succeeded in
convincing the European governments to accept more favourable
tariffs for Turkey are also worth mentioning.Those efforts
however,would hardly been regarded as an important economic
innovation with regard to the Ottoman economy,and would rather be
connected with the prestige of the administration in a period when
Turkey had been accepted as a member of the European system of
states.Nevertheless,a more favourable tariff policy had been
established,and the Turkish economy,or at least that aspect which
was connected with world trade,had benefitted.
(8) The amount devoted to the Ministry of Public Works was
inadequate even if one adds to that the expenditure of the Post
and Telegraph service,which was under the auspices of the
Ministry.
(9) Among other measures to cut expenditure,the government
devised a measure according to which monthly salaries would be
paid at the end of forty instead of thirty days.Justifying the
measure,the government stated that it would ensure punctuality of
payments.But it was almost impossible that these measures had any
effect as far as high salaries were concerned.Conversely,they
certainly affected the lower branches of the administration.In
1872,arrears of salaries had already reached £2,941.150. (Report by
RUMBOLD in A&P(1872)Lix,395-396].
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CHAPTER	 III:The	 Greek	 commercial	 community	 in
Constantinople, 1850-81.
Throughout the 19th century,Con/ple imported large quantities
of foreign commodities.The goods produced in the city could in no
way satisfy local demand.Undoubtedly,Western
competition,manifested by cheaper products and based upon new
forms of industrial organization was responsible for the decline
of crafts in those parts of Turkey more tightly linked with
Europe.The craft industry in Con/pie rapidly crumbled.The
organization of both craft industry and trade in guilds was also
affected.The spirit of free trade based on competition and
profit,rather than co-operation and "fair"
	 distribution of
resources,was	 spreading among the city's
	 merchants and
manufacturers.Particularly for the latter,times were harsh;to
compete with European capitalism was almost impossible.The
diminution of the city's craft industry had been pointed out at
least a decade earlier [tJBICINI(1856)II,339-344].Not surprisingly
in the late 1860's,manufacturers accounted for only a small
proportion of the people who were involved in any form of economic
activity [INDICATEUR CONSTANTINOPOLITAIN(1868) see note (1)).
The decline of the craft industry apart,the city enjoyed
periods of great prosperity due to both local and transit
trade.During the period under consideration a new market based
upon free trade principles had already been
established.Constantinople remained a principal crossroad between
East and West.Each year large quantities of goods and commodities
flooded the city's market;grain,wheat and barley from the Black
Sea and the Danube region,mohair from Anatolia etc were among the
items transported to Constantinople to meet local demand or to be
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reexported	 [A&P(1866)LXIX	 Con/pie,526-27,SYNGROS(1908)
1,145-146] .In addition European goods,such as cotton,silk,wool,and
linen	 manufactures,colonial	 products,jewellery,clocks 	 and
watches,flour and barley,metal and iron products,coai,bricks
etc,were	 imported	 to	 Constantinople	 in	 large
quantities[A&P(1866)LxIx Con/ple,527].The size of Con/pie's
population and the fact that the city was the seat of the Ottoman
government largely contributed to the demand for many products.
Not surprisingly,European goods,such as textiles,flour,luxury
goods etc,absorbed the largest part of local demand.During the
late 1860's the city of Con/ple alone imported goods valued at £10
million [Report by BARRON in CR(1870) Turkey 237-238].Yet,local
consumption absorbed only a part of that vast quantity of
products;the remaining goods were either traded within or
rexported from Turkey.Indeed transit trade with Europe,Russia and
Persia,was,perhaps,the most important sector of the city's
economy.In addition,extensive commercial transactions were also
carried out with the interior of the Empire.Con/ple imported large
quantities of foodstuffs and livestock from the adjacent areas.
In the period under discussion, trade activities in Con/pie
could be divided into two subperiods.From the early 1850's to the
early 1870's local trade flourished and the city remained among
the most important centres of transit and general trade.During the
Crimean War,when large European armies were based in
Constantinople,the city's trade increased considerably.Consumption
by troops,gave a sudden and
	 substantial	 boost to
	
local
trade.Syngros ,one of the
	 leading Greek bankers of the
1870's,who,at the time was working in a commercial house pointed
out that,	 "The acquaintance with one of
	
the senior
superintendants of the English or the French armies was usually
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sufficient to lead to a contract for the provision of articles to
the European armies;that sufficed to make rich not only the
original contractor ,but many subcontractors as well.(....).As an
example I will cite two acquaintances of mine......One of them
undertook the regular provision of eggs to the English reserve
force,and after six months his fortune exceeded 1.000.000fr.As for
the second ,by undertaking the cleaning of linen for the French
army's hospital,he became after some months the owner of a
luxurious yacht." [SYNGROS(1908)I,248-49].
The integration of the Ottoman Empire into the sphere of
influence of European capitalism during the late
1850's,accelerated the establishment of closer trade connections
with Western countries.Constantinople's role as a transit centre
inevitably increased.The city's geographical position greatly
contributed to this development.Merchants who traded in such
important goods as cereals and mohair had their headquarters in
this city [A&P(1878)Lxxlv Con/ple,225].Not only could they use the
facilities of the city's port,but they also had direct access to
the Con/pie money market,the major money
	 market	 in
Turkey.There,the establishment of banking houses greatly
facilitated trade,mainly through the circulation of bills of
exchange.
A further indication of Con/pie's enlarged trade share in
that period is found in the number of English ships entering and
clearing its port.
TABLE I:Trade of Con/ple,Steam vessels(Sailing vessels).
Year Entered Total tonnage
	 Cleared Total tonnage
1861	 71(133)	 60929(70423)	 70(514)	 59554 (148491)
1862	 79(200)	 78477(99653)	 76(502)	 73624 (102625)




82(211)	 81869 (107123)	 89(670)	 86711(212769)
1870
	
369(-	 212914( -	 904( -) 367663( -
1874	 408(72)	 330471 (28534)	 59(86)	 48214 (26645)
Sources:A&P(1869)LXIX,n 69 Con/ple,A&P(1878)LXXIV n 74,Con/ple.
Consequentiy,Con/pie's influence on Ottoman trade was
substantial,and remained so till the mid 1870's.It was during that
period of high commercial profits,that the city became famous as a
large emporium.
In contrast to the period of great commercial prosperity the
trade of Con/ple suffered severe setbacks during the late
1870's.Although no figures are available with regard to the city's
import-export trade,it appears that,during that second
period,commercial transactions in Con/ple rapidly decreased.The
deterioration of trade activities in Con/ple led the British
Consul,in his report on the trade and commerce of Con/pie for the
year 1878-79 to point out that, "The city's trade is getting
into a more hopeless condition and it may now be said that the
commerce of this great emporium is rapidly dying out(...)the
impression of merchants trading with England was that Con/ple's
trade last year was about 20% below that of the previous year"
[Report by Wrench for the year 1879,in A&P(1880)LXXV,no 75,Con/ple
1862-63].This discouraging situation was eloquently described a
year later in an article in the Levant Herald "L'etat du commerce
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a Con/pie est pire qu'ii n'a jamais ete.En realite le commerce de
cette grande place est en agonie." [LEVANT HERALD,8/4/1880].
The most common explanation for the causes of Con/pie's
declining trade,was the development of transportation
[A&P(1883)LXXIv,no 74,Con/ple 1726-27,VALSAMAKI(1874b) in MELLON
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26/3/18 74] .Undoubtediy this was the only factor with long term
effects upon the city's trade.The establishment and development of
ports such as Smyrna,Salonica,Trabzon and Mersina was mainly due
to the introduction of steam navigation to the Levant
[ISSAWI (1980)146-48] .Certainly
	 these	 ports	 were	 important
commercial centres long before the 1850's.In fact their
contribution to Ottoman trade dates back to the 18th century when
Smyrna and Salonica assumed leading roles in the Ottoman trade [MC
GOWAN(1981)29-30].However,jt was only during the 1860's onwards
that these ports challenged the transit trade of Con/pie.
As a consequence,new zones of trade emerged extending even
into remote parts of Turkey.It is true that the development of
most of these"rival"ports was based on exports.Yet,European
imports in these areas were facilitated by the improvement of port
facilities and transportation in generai.Better transport
facilities allowed a reduction in the prices of European products
and contributed to their diffusion within the Ottoman
Empire.Hence,European imports in all these ports increased and
their consumption spread into Turkey's hinterland.On any
reckoning,these ports redefined the existing zones of trade.That
development greatly affected one of the two sectors of Con/pie's
trade;the transit trade which in its turn affected the city's
trade as a whole. As the transportation system was improved and
expanded,many local merchants also found it more profitable to use
ports with cheaper access to local markets and production areas.Of
course,as Con/pie remained a large city in terms of
population,local consumption partly counterbalanced the losses
caused by the development of other ports.Besides,bad harvests and
poor transportation increased the imports of foodstuffs into the
city.In	 this	 sense,Con/ple	 continued	 to be	 a	 large
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emporium. yet,the city's role as a large transit centre had
suffered severe blows.
The decline of transit trade apart,there were other factors
which also damaged the trade of Con/ple.The financial crises which
broke out during the 1860's and the 1870's,and the instability and
insecurity which usually followed them also affected local
trade.In addition the circulation of paper money issued by the
Ottoman government in 1876 proved to have a fatal influence on
trade as a whole and on Con/pie's trade in particular.The
territorial losses in Europe which followed the Treaty of
Berlin,further damaged the city's transit trade.Direct access to
most of the foodstuffs and raw materials produced in Bulgaria and
Romania was now lost.Consequently,in the late 1870's the trade of
Con/ple was,as the British consul put it,"in a state of
inactivity".This disastrous decade which included insurrections in
the Balkan provinces,the suspension of payments of the country's
Public Debt,famines and poor harvests,a devastating war with
Russia and finally substantial territorial losses,had serious
repercussions on the trade and the economy of Con/ple.
In addition,Con/ple lost its character as an exclusively
commercial centre.Although the city remained an important trading
centre,a new form of economic activity emerged;banking.The
development of banking in Turkey was undoubtedly centred almost
exclusively in Con/ple.New banking houses emerged and
capital,realised in commercial activities,was transferred into
banking.The development of the Ottoman public debt gave rise to
numerous banking activities and maintained a network of
bankers,intermediaries,agents,and money changers.The development
of banking in Con/ple was so abrupt that some contemporary
observers went so far as to say that Con/ple had lost its
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commercial character by being transformed into a large banking
centre [VALSAMAKI(1874b) in MELLON 30/3/1874] .Undoubtedly banking
activities in Con/pie were of great importance and their
implications were felt not only in the city's economy but in the
social stratification of the city as well.Almost all of the most
important merchants who,until the 1850's had devoted themselves to
trade be banking.Nevertheiess they did not abandon
trade entirely.Increasingly however,they transferred their profits
from trade to banking .In the late 1860's there were 47 bankers in
Con/pie but most of them maintained commercial houses as well.In
addition there were 37 money changers.During the early 1870's
there was a large network of agents and intermediaries which
employed at least 1000 people (VALSAMAKI(1874b) in MELLON
12/4/1874].The development of banking strengthened the city's
economy,and from an economic point of view,Con/pie retained its
place as the most influential city in the Ottoman Empire.
However,the city's integration into the network of European
capitalism had other implications as well.Social life in Con/pie
"faced West" and as the city was developed with this
orientation,new demands emerged.An important aspect of these
developments was the rise of new economic centres within the city
itseif.From a commercial point of view,the city was divided into
three parts;Galata,Pera and Stamboul.The first two became the
city's new commercial and economic districts where the bulk of
trade took place [KARPAT(1977)421-28].Conversely Stamboul,the old
city,iost	 its	 commercial	 importance.More	 and	 more
commercial,banking and other
	 enterprises were established in
Galata and Pera,while Stamboul's commercial development was in a
state	 of	 stagnation.According	 to	 the	 Indicateur
Constantinopolitain,out of a total of 1159 merchants,bankers,
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manufacturers,people involved in free professions etc,only 222
kept their business premises in Stamboui.The emergence of Pera and
Galata as the new dynamic business centre of the city,was also
reflected in rents and land prices.During the 1860's and 1870's
one pic(=80 cm2) in Pera cost about 200 piastres wheareas on the
outskirts of these two districts,the same piece of land cost only
15-20 piastres [KARPAT(1977)422].Not surprisingly the ethnic
composition of Galata was predominantly non-Muslim.In 1882,out of
the total number of the district's 237.293 inhabitants only
56.280 were Muslims with the rest being,foreign subjects,Greeks
Jews and Armenians [ROSENTHAL(1982) 370].
An aspect of this new orientation was the establishement of
the municipal administration in Galata during the 1860's and the
introduction of public amenities in the district
[ROSENTHAL(1982)375-82] .The improvement of roads,the provision of
amenities,the lighting of the district itself helped to
rationalize economic relations and give the district a European
image LROSENTHAL(1982)377].Despite the fact that the municipal
administration in the event failed
	 to	 live	 up	 to	 its
promises,Galata, throught the last quarter of the 19th
century,resembled a European city [ROSENTHAL(1982)373].It is worth
stressing that a similar attempt to introduce parallel amenities
in Stamboul during the mid 1870's failed to accomplish anything
[A&P(1878)LXXIV,no 74,Con/ple 834].
Another factor which affected the city's social and economic
character and ,in turn ,was affected- by it was population
movement.Traditionally the population of Con/pie contained a
strong non-Muslim element.Greeks,Armenians,Francolevantines and
Jews had lived there,side by side with Muslims,since the fall of
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Con/pie to the Turks in 1453.Yet the Muslim element was much more
numerous in comparison with any other ethnic or religious
group,and the city had a largely Muslim character.During the
first decades of the 19th century the composition of the city's
population remained much the same as in the previous
centuries.Yet,increasing economic relations with the West and the
fame of Con/pie as a place where fortunes could be made through
trade,dramatically affected the city's ethnic and religious
composition.Until the 1840's Muslims largely outnumbered all other
religious communities even if the latter were put together
[UBICINI(1856)I,24].Forty years later the situation had
changed.Although Muslims, in numerical terms,remained the strongest
element they were now outnumbered,if all the other communities
were added together [SHAW(1979)226,KARPAT(1978)254).The first
signs of this process could be traced as early as 1840's.Since
then,thousands of foreign and Ottoman subjects had come to settle
in Con/ple.It was during that period that the city lost its Muslim
identity.Throughout the period under discussion,Con/ple remained a
multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan city,and the ascendancy of the
Muslim element,still the strongest in numerical terms,upon the
city's economy and social life had rapidly declined.
Orthodox Greeks were among those who emigrated to Con/pie in
large numbers.unfortunately,no reliable census is available with
regard to the population of Con/pie before 1880.Although two
censuses had been prepared by the Ottoman government before that
date,one in 1844 and the second in 1857,their results were far
from being accurate.In both censuses only the male inhabitants of
the city were included.
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L. addition,no separate registration was conducted for each
of the different non Muslim religious and ethnic communities.No
doubt,censuses were prepared in a more reliable fashion after 1880
[KARPAT(1978)246-49].Yet,even then,the figures with regard to
non-Muslims seem to be inaccurate.For example,according to the
census of 1885 the Greek Orthodox population of Con/pie was
amounted to 152.742 [SHAW(1979)266].But the number of Greeks
living in Con/pie was certainly higher than the figure provided by
the Ottoman census.As non-Muslims were not obliged to register
with the Ottoman authorities it is possible that a large number of
Greeks was omitted [ALEXANDRIS (1983) 337-8] .Moreover no information
is provided by the census with regard to the Greeks who lived and
worked in Con/pie on a temporary basis.It is almost certain that
these Greeks were not included in the census.Similar objections
could be raised with regard to the size of the city's Armenian
population.In addition,since many Greeks who lived in Con/pie at
the time were citizens of the Greek State,they were classified as
foreign subjects.Thus the real size of the Greek population in
Con/pie appeared to be much lower in the census.
In contrast to the Ottoman censuses,other sources suggest
that the Greek population of Con/pie was much higher.As eariy as
1844,Ubicini estimated the city's Greek popuiation,non residents
included,at 130.000 [UBICINI(1856)I,24 ,see also
KYRIAKIDES(1896)I,442).Another source put the number of the Greek
population in the early 1870's at 230.000
[SYNVET(1878)8-9].According also to a memorandum prepared in 1878
by the Greek syilogoi(societies) of Con/pie and submitted to the
Greek foreign Ministry in the same year,the City's Greek
popuiation,the suburbs inciuded,was approximately 287.000 (Tabieau
stati4iqL&e de ia population Greque et Bulgare en Thrace et
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Macedoine,in	 Memorandum	 of	 the	 Greek	 syilogoi	 of
Con/ple(1878):Archives of the Greek embassy in Con/ple,in A.Y.E].
Of course,apart from the Greeks who held Ottoman citizenship
and were permanent residents of Con/ple,any estimate of the size
of the Greek population in Con/pie should take into account the
citizens of the Greek State living there,as well as these Greeks
who came to the city for commercial and business purposes only but
spent a large part of the year there.According to an American
source,in 1868 the number of Greek subjects living in Con/pie was
as high as 38.000 [ISSAWI(1980)60].And certainly their number
increased during the rest of the 19th century.According to the
1885 Ottoman census,there were 130.000 foreign subjects living in
Con/ple;no doubt a large part of them were Greek citizens or Greek
who had acquired a citizenship other than Greek (SHAW(1977)2761.It
is worth stressing that in the early 20th century there were
65.000 Greek citizens in Con/ple,let alone those who held other
foreign citizenships [ALEXANDRIS(1983)50] .Though the figure
provided by the Greek syllogoi seems to be exaggerated a number
between 200-220.000 appears to be close to reaiity.Therefore the
number of Greeks living and working in Con/pie significantly
increased throughout the second half of the 19th century;in a
period of thirty years the size of the Greek population almost
doubled if the figures provided by Ubicini are to be relied upon.
This demographic trend,however,was not only the result of a
high birth rate.Even if there is evidence to support the claim
that the birth rate of the Greek population was higher than that
of the Muslims [A&P(1878)LXXIV,no
74,Con/pie,832,CLOGG(1982)196],this alone,cannot explain the large
increase in the Greek popuiation.The existing evidence suggests
that this increase was partly due to a more general trend in the
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Greek population,namely emigration to the big cities,especially
those located on the Western periphery of Asia Minor.Throughout
the second half of the 19th century the Greek urban population
largely increased.Smyrna is perhaps the most authentic example of
this trend,but the existing evidence suggests that this had
happened in almost every major city and town in Asia Minor coast
[VALSAMASI(1874b)	 in	 MELLON
19/3/1874,TSOUKALAS(1977)288-295,DIETRICH(1918)36-41].During the
last decades of the 19th century the Greek urban population grew
even in cities where the Greek element had been non existant in
previous decades.It is worth stressing that according to the
Ottoman census of 1885,more than half of the Greeks living in
Con/ple at the time,83.997 out of a total of 152.000,declared a
place of birth other than Con/pie [SHAW(1979)266).In addition,many
subjects of the Hellenic kingdom, attracted by the hope of better
fortune went to settle in Con/ple.
At this point the increasing commercial and economic links
between the Ottoman empire and Hellenic kingdom should be
emphasised.when the first Ottoman official statistics were
published in 1881,Greece held the sixth place,in both imports and
exports,out of a total of 21 countries [Report by Wedham
CR(1883-84)Turkey 484].Given the unstable and problematic
relations of the two states during the period under discussion,
this fact is worth stressing.In many respects these links were
significantly facilitated by the existence of a strong Greek
bourgeoisie in the Ottoman empire.Links between the Greek kingdom
and the Greek Orthodox population of Turkey,not oily on the
commercial and economic but on the cultural ievel,were
considerably strengthened [SvORONOS(1983) 60] .The same phenomenon
is observable between all the Greek communities scattered
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throughout the Levant and the Greek state.As the social and
economic status of these Greek communities was much more important
than that of the small kingdom,their influence upon it largely
increased [SVORONOS(1983)60-61,PANAGIOTOPOULQS(1980)222-223].Greek
subjects,attracted by the economic success of their coreligionists
and compatriots emigrated to places such
as,Con/ple,Alexandrja,odessa,etc to make their fortune.But during
the period under discussion,Con/ple was the city which attracted
them most.There was not only the appeal of the old Byzantine
capital but mainly
	 the	 fortunes	 earned	 by	 Greek
merchants,bankers,etc which provided strong motives
	 for
emigration.A similar trend could be found among Greeks of
Macedonia and Western Thrace who,since the early decades of the
19th century had emigrated in large numbers to Con/ple and other
major cities of Turkey [VAKALOPOULOS(1977b)80].A particularly
strong trend towards emigration to urban areas could also be
traced among the Anatolian Greeks [DIETRICH(1918)54-55).In 1924
only one third of the Anatolian Greeks who settled in Greece as a
consequence of the Anatolian debacle were farmers.The rest
consisted of city dwellers [TSOUKALAS(1977)289].
In this way,the concentration of Greeks in Con/ple was not an
isolated example.Converse].y,during the period under discussion,the
city's Muslim population seems to have remained almost
stagnant.According to the incomplete and unreliable Ottoman census
of 1844 there were at least 102.000 Muslim male inhabitants in
Con/ple at that date.This figure suggests a total number of at
least 250.000 if women,who were generally more numerous than
men,and the Muslim Bekiars(non residents)are included.In
addition,jf those Muslims who did not register with the
authorities for fear of conscription are also to be taken into
82
account a total number of 300.000 would appear to be close to
reality.The figure,provided by Ubicini,of 434.000 Muslims living
in Con/ple at the same date,and including 194.000 males,213.000
females and 27.000 bekyars,seems to be exaggerated
[UBICINI(1856)I,24].Yet,according to the more reliable Ottoman
census of 1886 the city's Muslim population was 384.836.Given the
large number of Muslims who emigrated to Con/pie during the late
1870's,this figure suggests that the size of the Muslim population
of the City did not experience any spectacular increase.
Moreover it has to be pointed out that the thousands of
Muslims who flooded Con/ple during the late 1870's and early
1880's did not emigrate there because they were attracted by the
great economic and commercial opportunities available in the
city.As nationalism swept Turkey's Balkan provinces,and the
national Balkan states became stronger,the Muslims who lived in
these areas fled into parts which were still under Ottoman
controi.The fatal blow for the Muslims living in the Balkan
provinces was the Congress of Berlin as a result of which Serbia
and Rumania became independent and an autonomous Bulgarian kingdom
was established.And when Thessaly and a part of Epirus were ceded
to Greece in 1881 the bulk of Muslim population of the province
emigrated to the Ottoman Empire [FRANCHET D'ESPERY(1911)87-94).
Thus,a distinction should be made between the Greeks and
Muslims who emigrated to Con/ple in the mid and late 19th
century.Greeks came to settle and work as merchants or to staff
the numerous Greek enterprises which flourished in Con/ple at the
time.Muslims on the other hand,found in Con/pie a place where they
could be provided with food and shelter by the numerous vakoufs
which existed in the city (SHAW(1977)241-242].And as most of them
were connected with agriculture and the craft industry they would
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have found it very difficult to adjust to living in this city
where trade and business were its heart.Undoubtedly large numbers
of Muslims who came to Con/pie remained jobless and lived ir
misery with their food provided by vakouf foundations or the
government.But even if some Muslims had the money to invest they
would obviously have found it very difficult to compete with
Greeks,Armenians and Jews whose experience and international
contacts gave them a dominant place in the city's commerce and
economic activities.
On the other hand,the Greeks who emigrated to Con/pie found
things easier than the Muslims.Most of them were absorbed into the
vast network of commercial houses,banks,insurance
conpanies,agencies,shjppjng companies etc,which had already been
established with Greek capital.It should be emphasized. that the
Greeks had an influential position in almost every field of
economic activity in the city.In a list of more than 1100 names
involved in trade,banking,manufacturing,service g
 etc,published in
Con/pie in 1868,at least 348,or 30.5 per cent of the total can be
readily identif led as Greek.Conversely only 43 Muslim names,or
3.6% of the total are found in the list.Muslims were involved
almost exclusively in trade and manufacturing and had no presence
in services and the free professions. They were concentrated
mainly in four professions:the dealers in amber;the keepers of
Turkish baths;and the dealers in candles and wax.The names of
Muslims occupied in these four professions represented 87% of the
total number of Muslims registered in the list.
According to the same list,Greeks were involved in almost
every field of trade,in banking,the free professions,and craft
industry.It is worth stressing that out of a total of 164
merchants involved in general trade 67 were Greeks.In specialized
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trade,the Greek presence,however important,was less
influential.Qut of 240 merchants practising specialized trade only
66 could be identified as Greeks.The Greek presence was very
strong in the field of free professions and services,including
bankers,lawyers,doctors,innkeepers,cafe owners etc.Out of a total
of 346 identified names,112 were Greeks.A similar situation is to
be found in manufacturing and craft industry.In this field Greeks
accounted for 33 % of the total;112 out of 304 names.No doubt,the
Greek presence,especially in banking and the free professions
largely increased in the following years.When the list was
published,there were only private Greek banking houses and only
one major bank established by Greek capital existed.In
addition,some Greek bankers who at the time were not well known
are not found in the list.For example Syngros,one of the most
influential bankers during the 1870's is not even mentioned in the
list.
Apart from the professions presented by the list, a large
number of Greeks were involved in numerous other economic
activities within the city connected with services or small scale
trade and manufacturing.Transportation on water for exampie,was in
the hands of kaykchis(boatmen) the majority of whom were Greeks
[ROSENTHAL(1982)373].There were also Greeks who lived and worked
in Con/pie on a temporary basis.These bekyars(single outsiders)
were part of the so called flunctuating population of
Con/ple;Muslims and non Muslims alike who came to the city to make
some money and who usually returned to their native places after
their task was accomplished,only to return to Con/ple when they
had again run out of money [UBICINI(1856)I,25].They practiced a
large	 number	 of	 temporary	 occupations,such	 as
hamals (porters) ,petty	 sellers,araba	 drivers,fishermen,water
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carriers,builders etc (KARPAT(1977)414-415] .Unfortunately,very
little is known about their numbers.It is only known that during
the 1840's their number was around 75.000 (UBICINI(1856)I,25].The
number of Greek bekyars at the same date is estimated by Ubicini
at 32.000,or 42 % of the total.The respective number of Muslim
bekyars was,according to the same source,27.000,while the
remaining 16.000 were Armenians.According to another source,the
number of bekyars in 1857 was 94.119;two fifths of them were
Muslims with the rest being either Greeks or Armenians
[KARPAT(1978)254]
It is difficult to speculate as to whether the number of
bekyars diminished or not during the following years.As the city
expanded demand for the services provided by bekyars should have
increased and their number should have risen accordingly.On the
other hand the improvement of public amenities from the 1860's
onwards,even if they were finally confined in the Galata
district,was certainly a blow to the traditional bekyar
professions.Yet,new demands created new services and it is beyond
doubt that "redundant"bekyars were employed in new and expanding
sectors of the city's economy as workers in Public works,and
dockyards,Waiters in restaurants etc.Under such evidence,and
although no figure is availabe for the years after 1857,it is
reasonable to assume that many Greeks continued to work in Con/pie
on a temporary basis.Besides,the number of Greek bekyars was quite
impressive during the 1840's and 1850's,indicating that they moved
to Con/pie whenever demand for their services existed.Thus,it is
quite likely that most of them found new temporary occupations
which,combined with the fact that many of them had retained their
traditional	 occupations,suggests	 that	 their	 number
increased.Certainly,similar considerations are valid with regard
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to the Muslim and Armenian bekyars as weil,and it is also likely
that their own number had increased.
At any rate,however,the presence of bekyars in Con/ple
remained strong.During the first decade of the 20th
century,porters and boatmen had successfully organised strikes
against the Quay Company in 1908,and a few months later,the same
guilds had massively participated in the Boycot of Austrian
products [QUATAERT(1983)95-139].
Despite the fact that Greeks were occupied in numerous
sectors it was in the field of commerce and banking that they
mainly distinguished themseives.It was therefore,these special
vocations which gave Greeks fame and prosperity.In comparison with
trade and banking,ali other professions and occupations practiced
by Greeks were relatively insignificant.Besides,the emergence of a
Greek stratum working as doctors,lawyers,architects etc was based
on a prosperous commercial community.The Greek cultural
development which took place after 1850's,was also the result of
the increasing prosperity of the Greek community.In the early
1870's there were 105 Greek schools with more than 10.000
pupils,let alone those Greek children who attended lessons in
foreign schools [CHRONICQ(1871)46-47,SYNVET(1878)10-12].Almost all
of the Greek schools were subsidized by the community.Some of them
were established by affluent Greeks living in Con/pie or
eisewhere.Christaki Zografo effendi,Zarifi,Raili,Zapa,were among
the names most commonly found in lists of donations for the
establishment of schools,societies,or benevolent institutions. In
addition,many Constantinopolitan youths were sent to study at
Athens University at the expense of some of these very prosperous
members of the community.
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The development of the Greek press in Con/pie was also
impressive.By the early 1870's 13 Greek newspapers and magazines
were published in Con/pie with a total circulation of 17-18.000
[A&P(1878)Lxxlv	 no.74	 Con/pie
832-33,CHRONICO(1871)45,KARPAT(1977)418]..It is worth stressing
that only one newspaper was published in the Greek language in the
1840's [UBICINI(1856)II,251].No doubt,the development of a Greek
educational system in Con/ple,apart from being essential to the
community's cultural life,was also of great importance to Greek
trade and banking.Although this system derived from the
community's prosperous position,it provided in its turn,many
competent and educated persons to join the numerous commercial and
banking establishments of the city,thus increasing,the Greek
influence on the economy of Con/pie.
Given the severe blow which the Greek community received when
the Greek War of independence broke out in 1821,its
revival,especially after the 1840's,was quite spectacular.When the
Greek revolution started the prosperous Greek middle class of
Con/pie suffered a severe setback.Most of the Greek merchants
living in Con/pie at the time fled to Europe.Many of them asked
for foreign protection and only returned to Con/pie when they
received foreign passports [UBICINI(1856)II,217-218 see also
PEARS(1911)119-1213.It is worth stressing that only a few of the
most eminent Greek families of Con/pie remained Ottoman subjects.
Moreover,Greek ascendancy in the porte,exerted until then by
the Greek Dragomans,ceased.Thenceforth,only Muslims were employed
as dragomans and a special bureau was established to teach young
Muslims foreign languages.}lowever,though their influence had been
greatly diminished,the Greeks' participation in the higher
echelons of the Ottoman administration continued,and by the second
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half of the 19th century many Greeks were employed by the Ottoman
Foreign Ministry and staffed the Ottoman Embassies in Europe
(ALEXANDRIS(1980)368-375].Musurus Pasha,a member of an old
Phanariot family was the Ottoman ambassador in London for many
years.Members of another old Phanariot family,John and Gregory
Aristarchi,served for many years as ambassadors in Berlin and
Washington respectively.And special mention should be given to
Karatheodory Pasha,whose skillful services as Turkey's
representative at the Congress of Berlin were so highly
appreciated,that he was immediately promoted to be Undersecretary
of Foreign affairs.Yet as a whole,the percentage of Greek
participation in the Ottoman administration was insignificant.In
the early 1880's,out of 23.826 people employed by the Ottoman
administration in
	 Con/ple,only	 348,or	 1.2%,	 were	 Greeks
[SHAW(1977) 244].
Nevertheless,in a period of almost two decades Greeks
succeeded in reestablishing their influential position in trade
and later in assuming a major role in banking.Many factors seem to
be responsible for the revival of the Greek commerce in
Con/ple.The introduction of the Ottoman reforms,namely the
declaration of equality among all inhabitants of the Empire
regardless of ethnic identity or religious belief was very
important [SVORONOS(1983)67-68,PANAGIOTOpOULOS(1980)223].No
doubt,many aspects of these reforms were controversial,both in
terms of legislation proper,and most important,in terms of popular
acceptance.It is also beyond doubt that the reforms were more
acceptable in large cities,the Western coast of Asia Minor and the
Balkan provinces,where the largest part of the non Muslim
population lived [SENIOR(1856)159) .Not surprisingly,non Muslims
accepted the declaration of equality with relief.Conversely,in
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areas where the Old Turk spirit was particularly strong and the
Muslim element the overwhelming majority of the population,Muslim
reaction towards the reforms was apprehensive and sometimes
contemptuous [INALCIK (1978)4-211.
It has been pointed out,that the non Muslim ecclesiastical
leaders responded with scepticism and apprehension as they thought
that reforms would undermine their old-established privileges
[DAVISON(1966)58-59,CLOGG(1982)195].Yet,equality before the law
was certainly welcomed by the non-Muslim populations,especially
those who did not enjoy any kind of foreign protection.And
although the extent and the influence of reforms in Turkey's
hinterland is not yet known in detail,their implementation in
Con/ple was by and large satisfactory.The fact that the city was
the seat of government and the seat of foreign embassies was
certainly responsible for,a more or less,complete application of
the reforms.
Moreover,the existence of strong non-Muslim communities was a
factor which strengthened the spirit of the reforms.The 1869 millet
reform gave new powers to the lay members of the non Muslim
communities.The emergence and establishment of lay influence,both
in the Greek and the Armenian millets,proved a decisive factor
which,at least partly,changed the traditional balances within the
non Muslim communities.This happened despite the attempts of some
ecclesiastical leaders to undermine them.It must be pointed out
,however,that conflicts between the ecclesiastical and lay members
of the Greek millet had started long before.The first blow to the
predominance and influence of the Greek clergy was inflicted by
lay members of the Greek community who considered the Patriarchate
as part of the Ottoman status quo [CLOGG(1982)192,see also
ILIOU (1982)]
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To a large extent,however,the emergence of lay influence was
compatible with the strengthening of the Greek commercial
community,One should not go so far as to suggest that this
community questioned the leadership proper of the
Patriarchate.Although the conflicts which occasionally broke out
between lay and ecclesiastical members of the community should not
be concealed,it is more proper to suggest that a new balance
between them was finally established.Thenceforth,lay leaders such
as George Zarifi or Christaki Zografo exerted
	 substantial
influence in community affairs.The Ottoman
reforms,therefore,provided the Greek minority with a new status
and strengthened the lay influence.The political consequences
apart,the reforms also contributed to commerce.One should not go
so far as to suggest that the development of the non-Muslim
commercial communities was based on the reforms.The development of
the Greek mercantile community in particular,preceded the era of
reforms by many decades.Yet,to the extent that the reforms
established a more favourable environment for doing business they
allowed a further development of trade.
At this point another factor should be discussed:foreign
protection.The emergence and development of a non Muslim
mercantile class and the respective decline of its Muslim
counterpart is attributed by many historians,to the existence of a
network of foreign proteges.This approach
	 implies that lower
taxation-a	 privilege	 directly	 deriving	 from	 foreign
protection-allowed the non Muslim merchants to become more
competitive	 and	 supersede	 the	 Muslim	 merchants
[IssAwI(1982)273,KARPAT(1977)4j.6]
Indeed an aspect of the capitulatory system in Turkey was the





which initially provided berats to people who worked for them
either as interpreters or embassy staff,extended their protection
to many others who could pay for it.The price these non Muslims
were prepared to pay in order to obtain protection varied
according the circumstances,but on any reckoning it was high
enough.There is evidence to suggest that in the late 18th century
a berat cost 2500-4000 piastres.The provision of berats eventually
became a valuable source of revenue.John Angel claims that the
French ambassadors received 400.000 fr from this source whereas
their English counterparts £ 2000-3000 (ANGEL(1901)257].Sultan
Selim III himself was also prepared to offer titles of similar
value to anyone who could afford the price but,presumably due to
non	 Muslim	 distrust,his	 attempt	 failed
(SHAW(1971)177-179,VAKALOpQULQS(1977a)305].
The most numerous class of proteges consisted of non Muslim
merchants who,owing to foreign protection,were in a position to
practice their profession in reasonable safety (SUSA(1936)36].The
holders of berats were bestowed with certain privileges.They paid
lower taxes and had the same rights as European merchants,namely
free movement in the territories of the Empire for commercial
purposes.They also enjoyed inviolability of domicile and even the
protection of Foreign embassies in case they were arrested.During
the late 18th and early 19th centuries the beratli merchants
succeeded in controlling the bulk of the import-export trade with
Europe.The obtaining of these titles eventually became a
precondition of trade.It was the only way in which non Muslims
could avoid practices which were extremely unfavourable to
trade,such as arbitrary taxation,confiscation of
property,imprisonment etc [ISSAWI (1982)273-274].
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In this context the development of the Greek mercantile
marine during the late 18th century was the immediate result of
the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji which placed all ships which flew
the Russian flag under Russian protection and,therefore,allowed
them to sail the Black Sea freely (SVORONOS(1983)26-27].The
development of Greek trade during that period could also be
attributed,at least partly,to foreign protection.Greek merchants
under protection were in a position to operate in many European
cities and to involve themselves in various trades.In fact the
establishment of networks of the Greek held trade in
Vienna,Marseilles,Trjeste,London etc occured during this
particular period.Nevertheless,it should be pointed out that not
all Greek merchants obtained this protection.By any
reckoning,however,foreign protection was a significant factor in
the early stages of the development of the Greek mercantile
bourgeoisie.
During the early 19th century things remained much the
same.The commercial Treaties which the Empire signed with Western
countries secured the rights of all foreign subjects trading in
the Empire.However,the economic environment had
	 changed
radically.Free trade practices had been introduced in the
Empire.Commercial transactions involved new dynamic sectors.The
harassment of merchants by the authorities diminished,mainly due
to the gradual,if not far reaching,liberalisation of the
Empire.Comrnercial success became increasingly conditional upon
factors such as organisation,management,involvement in dynamic
sectors etc.The experience in these conditions which the Greek
merchants had already acquired became a valuable asset.To this
extent the importance of foreign protection eventually diminished.
In addition,the Ottoman government did its best to impose
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some restrictive provisions,with regard to foreign subjects and to
preserve a certain amount of sovereignty.The 1869 citizenship law
attempted to put an end to foreign protection
(DAVISON(1966)262-263,TURGAY(1982),299].Accordjng to this law all
persons living in Turkey would be considered Ottoman subjects
unless they were in a position to prove the contrary.The Ottoman
state attempted to undermine the capitulatory system itself by
allowing foreigners to own land provided that they would pay the
same taxes with the Ottomans [DAVISON(1966)260-261,Texts
	 in
NOURADOUNGHIAN(1902)III,	 271-279].
Yet,the trade conventions which the Ottoman state signed
with European countries in the early 1860's only partly altered
the status of proteges.Each convention stipulated the rights
enjoyed by the subjects of each country separately.However,these
Conventions followed the same patterns.Thenceforth,foreign
merchants,and presumably every merchant who could claim foreign
protection,paid both import and export duties set at 8 per cent.It
was stipulated,however,that export duties would be reduced
annually until they reach the minimum of 1 per cent[Report by
BARRON(1870)370].The Treaties also provided for transit duties set
at 2 per cent.After the passing of eight years transit duties
would be reduced to 1 per cent as well.To the extent,however,that
foreign merchants involved themselves in internal trade they had
to pay the same taxes with the Ottoman subjects.
These Conventions concerned only those who practice
trade.Foreign subjects practicing other profession were usually
exempted.According to a report submitted in 1866 to the Greek
Foreign Ministry by Greek citizens working in Con/pie as money
changers,taxes were levied upon every Greek who participated in
guilds [Argiramivoi(1866):Archives of the Greek
	 Embassy	 in
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Con/ple,in A.Y.E].Having been classified as "manufacturers"by the
Ottoman government,the Greek moneychangers complained because new
taxes,not stipulated by the Greek-Turkish commercial Treaty,were
imposed on them.According to the same report,only Greek citizens
working in Con/ple as merchants were exempted from taxation paying
only the taxes stipulated by the Treaty.Conversely,any Greek
citizen working in the craft industry paid exactly the same taxes
as the Ottomans.
In addition,the Greek money changers complained that the
action of the Ottoman government deprived them of "the
beneficiary surveillance of the Greek embassy".Greek subjects who
traded in Con/pie not only paid lower taxes but they were also
bestowed with certain immunities.According to a report submitted
to the Commercial Department of the Greek Embassy in 1865 with
regard to the bankruptcy of George Barras, "a foreign subject who
goes bankrupt has the right to resort to the judgement of the
courts of his country" [Ypothesis Barra(1865):Archive of the Greek
embassy in Con/pie in A.Y.E].Moreover,Foreign embassies reserved
the right to appoint members of their approval to the mixed
commercial courts.In the case of Rizos versus Zafiropoulo for
example,a public debate broke out when Rizos complained about the
Greek embassy's interference with the court proceedings by
appointing assessors allegedly on friendly terms with Zafiropoulo
[NEOLOGOS,no 2153] .Rizos himself was outraged because he thought
himself been discriminated in favour of an Ottoman subject.In a
letter sent to the Greek Foreign Minister Rizos protested against
the Greek ambassador who
	 "did not hesitate to change(the
assessors) when my Ottoman contestant asked it....because my
contestant	 is	 an	 Ottoman	 company (Societe	 Minerale
Ottomane)regardless that its shareholders are Greeks"[Ypothesis
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Rizou(1875):Archives of the Greek embassy in Con/ple,in A.Y.E].
Undoubtedly,therefore,the rights enjoyed by foreign subjects
during the period under consideration continued to be
important.However,this was not exactly the case with the Greek
commercial community in Con/ple as a whole.A large number of Greek
merchants,bankers,and manufacturers held Ottoman
citizenship.Among them there were some of the most influential
members of the Greek community such as Christaki Zografo,George
Zafiropoulo,Psichari and others.In addition almost all Greek
commercial and banking houses in Con/ple were under the Ottoman
jurisdiction.The reader should have in mind that many Greek
merchants in Con/ple resorted to foreign protection after the
1820's because of the oppressive measures taken by the Ottoman
government to punish those who supported the Greek revolution.
By the 1850's and 1860's,however,Greek merchants who held
Ottoman citizenship had no reason to ask for foreign
protection.Most of them were not harassed by the
authorities,certain].y not enough to make them resort to European
embassies.To this extent,Greek held trade,during that later
period,was only partly associated with foreign protection.It is
worth stressing that Greek subjects and Ottoman Greek subjects
were very often contestants in commercial trials [see Ypothesis
Vaya(1863),Diafora	 Kanniskeri	 Zarifi	 and
Zafiropoulo(1865) ,Ypothesis Barra(1865) :Archives of the Greek
embassy in Con/ple,in A.Y.E].Obviously the immunities provided by
foreign protection,particularly those with regard to tax
exemptions,were not repudiated by those Ottoman Greeks who already
enjoyed them.However,one should put emphasis to the fact that an
equally large number of Greek merchants in Con/pie could cope
without it.
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Finally tax exemptions proper deserve some thought.As already
mentioned the protected merchants did not pay some taxes
and,therefore,they had an advantage over their Ottoman
competitors,Musljms and non Muslims alike.However true this may be
it is only partly correct.For the cost of commerce included not
only taxation but other factors which eventually were equally
important.It has been estimated,for example,that during late 1868
the cost in the grape trade,including internal taxes,direct
taxes,transportation,and interest on the borrowed money increased
the final price by 65% [KOYMEN(1971)52].Internal duties,namely
those duties not paid by protected merchants,accounted for only a
small part of it-they usually varied between 8 and 10 per
cent.Although this example concerns the grape trade,there is
reason to believe that a similar situation existed in other
sectors as well.In fact,relatively heavier taxes were not as
important as some scholars believe and at any rate they could be
offset by better organisation and more skiilful management as was
the case with those Greeks and non Muslims in general who never
obtained foreign protection.Besides,as already mentioned internal
taxes were gradually abolished in 1870's(see Chap.II1 8
 ).
One may,therefore,argue that foreign protection and whatever
this implied was important only within the context of the Ottoman
command economy of the 17th and 18th centuries.Yet,the basis of
this economy crumbled during the 19th century.To this extent the
importance of privileges deriving from protection had been
reduced.In the era of free trade other factors,eventually,became
more important.One should not go so far as to say that the
economic implications of the capitulations were
liquidated.However,it is more correct to suggest that capitulations
gradually assumed
	 a	 political	 rather than an economic
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dimension.European powers used them for their own benefit,as a
convenient expedient in order to secure their right to interfere
with the internal affairs of the empire.
Given the improvement in the position of non Muslims during
the Tanzimat period,Greeks availed themselves of other factors as
we].l.The bifurcation of Greek trade was perhaps the most important
feature of the Greek commercial houses and it largely contributed
to the development of Greek trade.The diaspora of Greek
settlements throughout Europe,the Black sea and the Levant allowed
the establishment of an extensive network of commercial houses
[LAMPE(1982)39-43].The development of Greek shipping during the
19th century,based both in Turkey and Greece largely facilitated
the establishment of that network. The Greek merchants were
involved in almost every trade,from grain and barley,to cotton and
manufactured goods. The dominant position of Greek merchant houses
in some of the most important and expanding sectors such as the
cotton trade in Egypt or the grain trade in the Russian and
Turkish ports of the Black sea,was among the factors which
reproduced and expanded the network of the Greek commercial
enterprises [On the Greek commercial communities in Romania,Odessa
and England see respectively
PHOKAS(1975)80-137,KARYDIS(1981)111-127,CHAPMAN(1977)35-42].
One important aspect of Greek trade,directly connected with
its expansion,was the organization of the Greek commercial
houses.Though not unique,this organisation was based on a
strict,even patrimonial,hierarchy.Members of the same family
working as merchants,agents,or bankers were part of the family's
commercial and financial network and in direct contact with the
house's headquarters in Con/ple,Smyrna or Alexandria.Members of
the Ralli family,the founders of one of the most eminent Greek
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commercial houses,were scattered from Alexandria to London,and
form Con/pie to Odessa [SYRIOTIS(1911)lO1-109,CHAPMAN(1977)37].In
1865 they were already involved in the Indian trade.The Ralli
branch in Bombay closed down only in 1977.The house of
Zarifi-zafiropoulo,having Con/pie as its headquarters had
extensive economic relations with other members of the family in
London,Marseilies,and Odessa.The occupations of the individual
members of each family varied according to the place each one of
them was sett].ed.Those who resided in Paris or London for
example,occupied themselves mainly as financiers,while 	 these
resident in Manchester or Marseille,were involved almost
exclusively in trade.Syngros went so far as to consider the way in
which Greek commercial enterprises were organized as the mainstay
of the Greek predominance in trade [sYNGROs(1908)I,122 	 and
11,267-273].
Marriages among members of different families strengi*iened
commercial relation and contributed to expanding business.For
example when Odyseas Negreponte,a member of an eminent Greek
merchant family of Bucharest,married the daughter of George
Zarifi,business relations between the two families increased
substantially.Negreponte,thanks to the help of his father-in-law
was in a position to involve himself heavily in Ottoman
finances,while Zarif i joined the Negreponte family in some very
important economic activities in Bucharest,such as the Gas factory
in the same city [NEOLOGOS,3/15/1l/1871].
Certainly,Greek merchants did not trade only with each
other.European merchants also had extensive commercial relations
with them.The expansion of trade relations with Europe,largely
intensified during the period under consideration,boosted the
commercial and economic activities of Greek merchants.As 	 a
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consequence,the more extensive trade transactions with Europe
were,the more prosperous the Greek commercial houses became.It is
usually argued that Greek merchants,and non Muslims in
general,were simply agents of European capitalism [See for example
the works of
KARPAT(1977) ,TSOUKALAS(1977) ,ISSAWI (1982) ,PSIRUKIS(1977) ,MOSKOF(19
72)].Undoubtedly,Greek merchants carried out a large part of
Turkey's trade and in this
	 sense they cooperated with
Europeans.Yet, these	 "intermediaries",as	 they	 are	 usually
called,would have been insane if they had not availed themselves
of the increasing opportunities, in Ottoman-European trade.In
fact,they had the same motives as Europeans who traded with
Turkey;the highest possible profits.And although they adjusted
themselves to the existing conditions,namely European
predominance,and free trade,their activities had their own logic
and autonomy.
No doubt that the influence of non Muslims,and of the Greeks
in particular,grew along with European power in the Middle
East.Even so,it is also unquestionable that they were involved in
the production and trade of the goods Europe needed most.Cash crop
cultivation for example,remained in the hands of non
Muslims,particularly the Greeks,throughout the 19th and early 20th
centuries [SUzzNISKI(j.918)115-125,IsSAwI(1982)262-264).Thus,given
the European ascendancy both at the political and economic
level,it was free trade,the infrastructure of the Greek commercial
houses and the sectors in which they were involved which,in the
long term,enabled Greek merchants to establish their leading
position in trade.Cooperation with European commercial houses,and
consequently with European capitalism,does not necessarily imply a
relation between a "master" and a agent.Particularly in relation
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to economic cooperation any analysis on these lines appears to be
an oversimplification and ,more or less,leads to moral rather than
historical conclusions.
In Con/ple,where Greek economic activities were particularly
important,all these factors largely contributed to the revival of
the Greek trade and economic activities in general.There,the
improvement of trade conditions,the domination of free trade,the
existence of a Greek network of commercial houses,together with
the superior education of Greeks and ,to a lesser extent,foreign
protection,were among the factors which made the Greeks perhaps
the most important element in the city's economy.
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Nap IsConstaxitinople in the 1870's0
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Notes to CHAPTER III.
(1) The Indicateur Con/politain was a local periodical,but
unfortunately shortlived,review,which provides a good deal of
information about the social and economic life in Con/ple.One of
the achievements of the review,however,was the publication of the
"Liste des principaux Corps des Banquier,Commercants,Arts et
Metiers,de la ville de Con/ple".The list includes 93 categories of
professions linked with trade,industry,banking,free professions
and services.1159 names are registered accompanied by profession
and address of business premises.No doubt,the list is not
complete.The publishersof the "Indicateur",Servakis and Sargologou
pointed out,in a brief introduction,the difficulties they faced in
preparing the guide,implying obviously that it was not
complete.There are two main shortcomings worth stressing.To start
with, the menian element is certainly underepresented in the
list.Given the size of the Armenian population in Con/ple,almost
equal in number with the Greek,and the fact that the Armenians
were as active in trade and industry as any other of the non
Muslim communities of Con/ple,the number of Armenian names is
surprisingly low.Armenian names accounted only for 16 per cent of
the total numer.Certainly,the underestimation of the Armenian
element stems
	
from the difficulties connected with such an
undertaking in a period when no official records were kept and
everything was relying upon personal knowledge and
work.Moreover,had the total number of names been identified,the
proportion of the Armenians would be certainly higher.
Certain objections could be raised with regard to the number
of Muslims.Yet,as Muslims were much less involved in trade and
industry than non Muslims,the number shown in the list was close
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to reality.Besides the development of a Turkish middle class
involved in trade and industry took place only during the 20th
century and must be connected only with that period.Moreover some
details provided by the list with regard to Muslims are
accurate.The concentration of Muslims in only a few occupations
such as the fabrication of essences or the trade of candles and
amber for example is amply shown in the list.
Secondly,the list includes only persons who had business
premises.Certainly this shortcoming has nothing to do with the
list itself ,but the fact that no figures are given for professions
such as the hamals,kaykchis,oarsmen etc by the publishers is
unfortunate as that would be a major contribution to the economic
history of Con/pie.
Yet on the whole,the picture which is presented by the list is
correct.For the overwhelming dominance of non Muslim elements in
trade,industry,bankng and free professions,shown in the list,is
beyond doubt.Moreover,according to the list most of the business
premises were located in Galata and Pera and not in the old
city.The establishment of Galata and Pera as the main economic
centres of Con/pie is also evident even by a brief perusal of the
iist.The shortcomings apart,the importance of the list as a useful




CHAPTER IV :The origin and develoie
	 of credit in the Ottoman
empire:some introductory remarks.
Demand for credit in the Ottoman Empire first appeared in the
late 16th century.Not surprisingly,interest bearing credit was
initially provided by vakoufs,the only institution whose income
was not subject to taxation,and could be accumulated and invested
without any interference by the authorities.As early as the 16th
century there were several occasions where vakoufs provided credit
to individuals and they remained the most important,if
informal,credit institution until the first half of the 18th
century [CVETKOVA(1983)299-300].Later during the 17th and 18th
centuries,credit was also provided by individuals,especially
Muslim landlords.There is evidence to support the view that the
provision of interest bearing credit gradually became one of the
most profitable investments in the Ottoman Empire
[ASDRAHAS(1975)166-167].It is true that due to the complexities of
Islamic law interest-bearing credit was not permitted,and the
Muslim courts did not recognise interest if the sum derived from
it was registered separately
	 in the	 contract	 [ECONOMICI
EPITH.1879-80,299-300] .Nevertheless,this theoretical hindrance
could usually be overcome by certain prearrangements.In this
case,interest was considered by both sides to be an integral part
of the borrowed amount.
Capital resources 1 however,were scarce and what was available
certainly could not match demand.Consequently,loans could only be
raised at very high interest rates:30-40% were the usual figures
charged,while rates of 60-80% were not uncommon.It must be pointed
out,however,that high interest rates in the Ottoman empire should
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not be considered usurious.From an economic point of view usury
exists alongside a formal banking system and already established
legal interest rates.It could be argued therefore,that high
interest rates in Turkey were capital's habitual reward in a
country where banking was non-existent and capital accumulation
inadequate.To consider the role of credit and banking,and
consequently,of interest rates in Turkey in isolation from the
whole context of inadequate capital accumulation would be
unrealistic.Inadequte capital accumulation was the major factor
which,in the last analysis,determined the development proper of
banking in Turkey.
Credit facilities,however,did not lead to direct investment
in production.Quite the contrary,Credit was used either to meet
tax obligations,or for consumption purposes
[CVETIOVA(1983)300-302].In a way therefore,credit was used as a
necessary supplement to agricultural income.This was more obvious
with regard to the incomes of timariots rather than
cultivators,for,among other means,it was through credit that many
timariots attempted to increase their income
[CVETKOVA(1979)90-92).It is generally agreed that the checking of
Ottoman territorial expansion resulted in the destabilazation of
the timar system,which was by and large the most important
institution of the Empire.Timar incomes,therefore,were greatly
affected by this development.As,during the 17th century,these
incomes tended to decline sharply,there were many occasions when
timarios resorted to vakoufs,or individual moneylenders in order
to borrow money for various purposes.There even were occasions
when credit was used to prepare a military campaign
[CVETKOVA(1983)302].Cultivators on the other hand borrowed money
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mainly to meet their tax obligations.Such debts,however were
responsible for ruining large numbers of cultivators who,when the
payment date came,were not in a position to repay their debts.
Demand for commercial credit assumed some importance during
the 17th and 18th centuries.Growing commercial
transactions,especialy in the Balkan provinces expanded credit
activities.Along the trade routes of	 the Balkan mainland
trade credit was,in many cases,available in cities and towns from
individual	 money	 lenders.Money	 lending	 among
individuals,however,did not include the spread of bills of
exchange,a major mechanism of credit widespread in Europe at the
time.This restriction seriously hampered the expansion of credit
facilities	 [LAMPE	 and	 JACKSON(1982)27,126-127].By
	
and
large,therefore,credit facilities during this period were
restricted,corresponding to the low level of monetarisation of the
Empire;individual debts did not usually exceed a few thousand
piastres [CvETK0vA(1983)303-306] .Presumably,the devaluation of the
Ottoman coinage after the late 16th century,further diminished the
importance of credit facilities.
It was during the early decades of the 19th century that the
money market of the Ottoman Empire expanded along with the
spectacular development of trade in the region.Two factors mainly
determined the pattern of credit in Turkey during the 19th
century:existing capital resources and the pattern of economic
development in the Ottoman Empire.Inadequate capital resources
continued to be the most important long-term factor affecting and
determining interest rates.To begin with,interest rates
were,according to the area,as high as in previous centuries.In the
area of pre-independence mainland Greece,f or example,interest
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rates during the early 19th century varied from 12-30%.In towns
and cities where commerce prospered,and trade links with Europe
were close,12% was the usual figure charged.Conversely,in more
backward areas,i.e those of subsistence agriculture,interest rates
were considerably higher,varying between 30-40%
	
[ECONOMICI
EPITH.1879-80,299-300].Later in the century,the condition of
interest rates remained much the same,even in the most prosperous
regions of the country.In 1848 interest rates in Salonica were 20%
but with skillful management that could go as high as 32%
[ISSAWI(1980)343.In Smyrna during the early 1860's,interest rates
for commercial transactions reached 12-18% per annum.During the
same period,interest rates in Salonica were at least 12%,while in
Bursa,ordinary rates varied,from 15-18% [FARLEY(1866)28,37].And
this is only to speak of areas where commerce and
export-orientated agriculture were extensive.In other parts of
Turkey,20% was the lowest figure charged.
Such variations in interest rates undoubtedly reflected the
fragmentation of the Ottoman economy and market.Interest rates are
usually considered to be an indication of the existing capital
resources of a certain region.Capital accumulation in areas of
Turkey with either no,or a limited,connection with European
markets,was likely to remain inadequate.Since commerce with Europe
became a major source of wealth,the development of trade came to
be tantamount to prosperity.Despite the fact that the increase in
commercial activities in Turkey was derived from the development
of a specific sector of Ottoman agriculture,these activities came
in their turn to be an indication of the degree of integration of
a certain area in the system of European peripheral economies.As
European demand provided the incentive for further expansion of
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cash crop cultivation,capital circulation,an inevitable result of
trade,became more frequent and capital more abundant.Not
surprisingly,therefore,interest rates were considerably lower in
areas with closer links with European markets.
Broadly speaking,the Ottoman Empire was divided,into two
parts;one with a low and one with a high level of interest
rates,In areas around the Western coast of Asia Minor,a part of
the Southern coast of the Black sea and the region of southern
Macedonia and Con/ple,interest rates varied between 12-18%,while
rates in the rest of Turkey varied between 20-40%.This
distinction,however,is relative,and important only within the
context of the Ottoman economy,for if compared to contemporary
Western interest rates,both levels look exorbitant.
The pattern of economic development,i.e the expansion of
cultivation of certain cash crops determined the nature of credit
in Turkey.Commercial credit essential to carry out trade in cash
crops such as cotton,silk,opium,grain and tobacco,became the major
kind of credit provided to the export-oriented sector of the
Ottoman economy.Industrial credit on the other hand,was almost non
existent.The decline of urban crafts,the only 	 institution
associated with some form of industrial production was
	 so
sharp,and the influx of European manufactured goods so
extensive,that one may
	 assume,with reasonable 	 safety,that
industrial credit was a rather risky operation.Besides the
provision of industrial credit was conditional upon an already
existing industrial structure and production.As has been shown in
the case of European countries,links between banking houses and
industry were not particularly important in the early and mid 19th
century [GILLE(1980),KEMP(1978)66-82].
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The expansion of credit was mainly associated with a parallel
expansion of trade in the Middle East [OWEN(1981)88-89].In almost
every city connected with import-export trade such as
Smyrna,Salonica,Beyrout,Trebizond etc the demand for credit
increased enormously.The establishment of close links between the
Ottoman empire and European markets,as well as between local and
European merchants,facilitated the expansion of credit in the
area.The expanding trade in goods produced in the area absorbed
large amounts of money.In the early 1840's for example,a newly
arrived merchant in Smyrna would have needed capital of at least
£ 20.000 "to do any good" [OWEN(1981)88].In addition the cost of
cash crop production involving more sophisticated machinery and
methods of cultivation,undoubtedly boosted demand or credit.
Credit,therefore,was closely connected with commerce,and it
was in the main ports of the Empire that banking
activities,however	 limited,took	 place	 in	 a	 regular
fashion.Circulation of bills of exchange,discount
facilities,drafts,exchange of coinage and similar transactions
were carried out in most of the main ports of the Empire with
relative frequency.Despite all these however,the lack of
commercial credit was still urgent and the limited local resources
of capital could not match demand.Finding credit in Europe became
therefore an indispensible outlet for merchants working in
Turkey.In all major ports of Turkey commerce and banking became to
a large extent inseparable and banking transactions were carried
out by commercial houses,especially by those which themselves had
good credit in Europe.For example,among the sixteen largest houses
of Salonica,representing a capital of six million fr,there were
only three banking houses,but the rest were involved in banking as
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well [VACALOPOULOS(1980)49-54].
In Smyrna an attempt to establish a bank did take place
during the early months of 1843.According to a letter addressed to
Canning by the founders of this establishment, "The bank is a
purely commercial institution...founded entirely on the principles
and basis on which similar banks are formed in Europe...to put
down certain local commercial abuses,to reduce the usurious rates
of interest and to give an effective central facility to the money
transactions.."	 (F0195/178,letter 	 dated	 20/1/1843].The	 bank
however,was shortlived and was liquidated one year later
(ISSAWI(1980)340].But even during the early 1860's there was no
bank in that city but only"good houses doing occasionally banking
business...when profits are so large that they are induced to
enter into such transactions" [FARLEY(1866)25].There is also
evidence to suggest that a large number of commercial transactions
were realised through commercial or banking houses in Con/pie on
very costly terms.In this way,credit facilities in most of the
ports were effected in a rather unorganised and,by and
large,ineffectual fashion.Conversely it was in Con/pie
	 that
banking activities became more concrete,organised and
effectjve..But as will be shown below,banking in the capital of the
Empire was only partly connected with commerce.The numerous
banking houses established in that city between the mid 1850's and
early 1870's were mainly involved in another,much more lucrative
and secure field,namely the provision of credit to the Imperial
government.
After the first three decades of the 19th century,the Ottoman
empire faced insuperable problems.The emergence of vigorous
national movements among the Balkan peoples,the Greek war of
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independence,and the defeat Turkey suffered at the hands of the
Russians in the late 1820's proved a harsh blow to the Empire.The
war with Mohamed Ali,who had escaped the control of the Ottoman
government and established his own autonomous State in Egypt
proved equally disastrous.In addition,economic conditions within
the Empire were far from ideal.The state of commerce with Europe
was severely affected by the Napoleonic wars,and its revival had
not yet been accomplished.Poor transportation facilities,devalued
coinage,and the existing monopolies considerably affected the
existing conditions and contributed to the general economic and
commercial stagnation.The repercussions of all these factors led
to an immense pressure on the Treasury.Followirig the Tresury
crisis during the late 1830's,the government was forced to
introduce paper money (kaime) for the first time
[DAVISON(1980)243-244].The kaime bore interest of 12.5%and had no
backing specie.It was not convertible on demand into metallic
currency unless it reached maturity,namely,after eight years from
its issue [DAVISON(1980)245,Mc KENZIE(1983)].In 1842 however,the
Ottoman government decided to withdraw kaime from circulation in
all provinces except the city of Con/ple.This decision was mainly
due to the shortcomings of the kaime proper.Paper money could be
very easily counterfeited,as the original notes were writen by
hand on large sheets of paper,and in addition,were not numbered
serially [DAVISON(1980)247].In reality paper money was the first
domestic loan to get funds for an empty Treasury.
This,however,was not the first time the government had
resorted to individuals for credit facilities.Short-term credit to
the Ottoman government first appeared to an important extent
during the late 18th century.Local capitalists,the so called
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sarrafs,initially provided credit to the members of the Ottoman
government,and only later came to meet the immediate needs of the
Treasury.A firman in 1795 legalising interest rates on commercial
transactions greatly facilitated transactions between the Ottoman
government and individual money lenders [ISSAWI (1980) 340] .All
sarrafs,known also as the Galata bankers,were non-Muslims,mostly
of Armenian origin [FARLEY(1866)5,DAVISQN(1982)325].They performed
two types of services;the exchange of currencies,and the granting
of loans.They were also involved in the provision of the Army and
Navy.In dealing with the government however,the sarrafs asked for
anticipated tax receipts as a guarantee.This particular aspect of
banking activities led many of them to acquire tax farming
concessions [ISSAWI(1980)340-341,SYNGROS(1908)II,17].By the early
1840's sarrafs had therefore,become a stratum closely linked with
tax farming.There is evidence to believe that sarrafs had invested
most of their capital in tax farming[STURDZA(1983)459].such
investments were not only profitable,but secure as well,as most of
the transactions were made on behalf of,or with the overt
cooperation of,pashas and other senior officials.Not
surprisingly,it was due to the sarrafs'influence and opposition
that the abolition of tax farming,following the Gulhane rescript
of 1839,was finally revoked [DAVISON(1966)44,(1980)243-244].It is
not an exaggeration to consider sarrafs as a part of the Ottoman
establishment.The services they provided to the Ottoman State were
immense,while the relations they had with many of the senior
officials, pashas,members of the Imperial family and even the
Sultan himself,made them important elements,if informal,of the
Ottoman administration.
The credit they provided to the government is also worth
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mentioning.Unfortunately,there is no detailed information about
the short term loans to the Ottoman State during the first decades
of the 19th century.In February of 1840 however,a group of local
sarrafs,lent the government nearly one million sterling with an
interest rate of 18%,in order to help the government to avoid the
immediate financial embarrassment [DAVISON(1980)244] .Ten years
later,another group of local capitalists was prepared to lend to
the government 45 million fr,an advance which in the event was not
made as the capitalists feared that the government was not in a
position to repay them.
Yet,times were changing,and the local sarrafs faced two new
competitors in the early 1850's;the emergence of Greek and Jewish
banking houses and the introduction of foreign capital.The
development of Greek banking houses will be discussed in detail
below,but a few brief remarks are necessary.As has already been
pointed out the revival of the Greek commercial community in
Con/pie was associated with the development of the Ottoman
import-export trade.Greek merchants had established close
connections with the European capital markets.Their own credit was
estimated to be high and their capital resources were iarge.During
the early 1850's,Greek bankers had already established banking and
commercial houses in Con/pie based on modern banking principles.
It was during the early 1850's that the Ottoman government
tapped the European money market for a loan.In 1852,an Imperial
rescript authorised prince A Callimachi,minister of the Sultan in
Paris,to negotiate a loan in Europe on behalf of the Ottoman
government.Caliimachi was in constant communication with Theodore
Baitazzi and John Aileon two leading bankers of Con/pie who,in
their turn,had close relations with Reshid Pasha,the prominent
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Ottoman ref ormer,who at the time was head of the Ottoman
government.The negotiations were fruitful and in the end,three
European houses were ready to advance 35 million fr to the Ottoman
government (the contract is found in F0195/460].The loan would
bear a modest interest of 6% plus 1% for prime and 2% for
commissjon,and would be guaranteed by the Tributes of Egypt and
the Principalities.Despite the fact that negotiations were
successful the loan was not raised.This failure was mainly due to
the opposition of some of the wealthiest Armenian bankers.It
appears that they sabotaged the loan,fearing that its success
would benefit the Greek and Jewish banking
houses. [STURDZA(1983)461].
These early clashes between Armenian bankers on one side,and
some of the Greek and Jewish banking houses on the other,is an
indication of changing conditions.While the Armenian bankers
appeared reluctant to implement new methods of banking,and to
accept the opening of Turkish finances to foreign capital,Greek
and Jewish bankers were not.Obviously,it would be unrealistic to
suggest that the early of Greek and Jewish bankers were not,at
least in part,associated with the local sarrafs.Yet it seems that
a diversification had occured among the bankers of Con/ple.For
example tax farming,which was an important area of investment for
the sarrafs was only of limited interest to the Greek
bankers.Instead they concentrated on strictly financial or
commercial business.In addition,most of the Greek merchants who,at
the same time,were also involved in banking were eager to achieve
financial stability,a development which would certainly damage the
interests of traditional sarrafs who benefitted mainly from the
trade in depreciated currency.
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In this context,a letter sent to Canning by the directors of
the Bank of Smyrna-a commercial establishment founded mostly by
English French and Greek merchants-is revealing.According to this,
"the Armenian sarrafs and many others,are intriguing to excite
the Porte to put down the bank in their jealousy and fear lest it
rnay...interfere with their usurious traffic as the sole speculator
of the revenues of the Empire." [letter dated,20/1/1843 in
F0195/178]
In the event ,the decline of the traditional sarrafs was
manifested during the following decades when the distinction
between sarrafs and bankers became more apparent.This
development,is highlighted by the fact that the term "sarraf" came
to be equivalent to the petty seller of coinage.In the early
1870's there were at least 5.800 sarrafs in Con/pie aione,involved
in exchange of coinage [LEVANT HERALD,3/5/1877].And later in the
century a Greek traveller reported that there were as many sarrafs
in Con/pie as dogs [FRANGOUDES(1901)38-39].In their initial
stage,however,sarrafs came to play leading roles in financing the
Treasury or individual officials of the Ottoman State,and through
these activities they aquired wealth and power.
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CHAPPER V:The early stages of Greek banking in Con/ple.The role of
the Greek bankers in the establishment of a National Bank in the
Ottoman Empire.
By the mid 1840's,the recovery of the Greek commercial
community in Con/pie was almost compiete.Increasing commercial
transactions with Europe contributed considerably to the
re-emergence of a strong Greek mercantile bourgeoisie in Con/pie
which proved able to avail itself of increasing commercial
opportunities	 and of
	 establishing	 extensive	 commercial
networks.Not surprisingly,the capital accumulated by Greek
merchants often reached large proportions.The development of trade
in the Levant and the opening of Turkey to European
capitalism,soon opened new fields for investment.The development
of Greek banking houses inevitably derived from a prosperous
commercial community with sufficient capital accumulation to
support this venture. The financial embarrassments which the
Ottoman State faced during the same period,were perhaps the most
important factor responsible for the deflection of part of Greek
capital to banking.Trade profits undoubtedly remained high,yet
there is evidence to suggest that transactions with the State were
more lucrative.Short term loans to the government yielded profits
far superior to those deriving from trade;interest rates on most
of these transaction reached 18%,a yield which could no longer be
earned in commercial transactions.In addition the guarantees
granted by the Ottoman government provided sufficient security to
those who wished to invest in short term advances.
The nucleus of the wealthy Greek bankers therefore,derived
from trade	 [for a chronology of	 this	 process	 see
HADJIIOSIF(1983),see also the interesting
	 but	 controversial
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account of MC NEILL(1978)31-64].When,for example the first Ottoman
Bank was established two of the three Greeks participants in the
bank,Zarifi and Glavany,were merchants.Even Baltazzi who since the
late 1830's had been a leading banker in Con/pie but in whose case
there are no indications that he was involved in trade,came from a
Greek merchant family of Smyrna.This situation is highlighted by
the fact that during the late 1860's almost all Greek bankers were
directly involved in trade.Most of the time however,this
connection was established through the houses of other members of
the family engaged in commerce.Nevertheless it is reasonable to
assume that the interrelations among individual members of the
same family,irrespective of the field they were engaged in,were
close.
The case of Zarifi and the Zafiropoulo families,provides an
ecxellent example.Since George Zarifi had married the sLster of
George Zafiropoulo business connections between them became so
close,that,after	 some	 time,they	 decided	 to	 merge	 their
houses.Zarifi's brother,Michalis Zarifi,was at the time in London
practising trade,while the brother of Zafiropouio,Stefano
Zafiropoulo,who lived in Marseilles,was also engaged in trade with
Egypt and Syria.Zarif i's other brother,Nicos Zarifi,soon joined
the firm,when he became a partner of Zafiropoulo in Marseilles.The
establishment of the network was therefore complete.The members of
this network were able to draw bills upon the houses of the two
others or to find credit relatively easily.And even when the firm
of Zarif I & Zafiropoulo was heavily engaged in banking,it
continued to practice trade.For example,at a time when the
Ministry of War was having difficulty to finding grain for the
troops,Zarifi provided the Ministry with 40.000 kg of grain
[NEOLOGOs,24/6/1879]
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Greek Bankers had to rely on credit in Europe.This,was a very
important aspect of Greek banking,as the capital engaged in
banking was not sufficient to support the bankers'activities.The
increasing financial needs of the Ottoman State required vast
amounts of capital,which the Con/pie money market lacked.Resorting
to credit in the European money markets was therefore
unavoidable.Not surprisingly,the more the Greek,and other
local,bankers advanced capital to the State,the more they became
dependent on European credit.As a consequence,the Con/pie money
market became extremely vulnerable.When political or economic
conditions in Europe seemed gloomy,credit facilities to the Galata
bankers were restricted,with grave consequences for this
market.Thus,on several occasions,Greek bankers found themselves in
an extremely precarious situation,where they owed money in
Europe,but could not pay as their credit was limited and their
capital was engaged in short term advances to the Treasury. [see
aiso below Chapt.VI ].
Another important aspect of Greek banking was its relation
with European capital.Greek bankers,it should be emphasised
were,to a greater or lesser extent,forced
	 to take	 into
consideration the activities
	 of	 European	 banks	 and
capitalists.Faced with European economic penetration the Greek
bankers were left with the options of co-operation or rivalry.They
opted for one or the other according to circumstances,aligning
themselves with one particular European syndicate against
another,only to change sides when the times suited them.This is
not to say that European capitalists were more reliable than Greek
bankers.They too,cooperated with Greeks only when their interests
seemed compatible.Otherwise,they tried hard to undermine the
activities of the Greeks.But that was only to be expected,as
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competition for control of the Ottoman finances proved in the end
to be very harsh.In addition,there were incompatible interests
within the camp of the Greek bankers.It should be stressed that
not all Greek bankers found cooperation between themselves
acceptable.Although alliances among Greek bankers were to a
certain extent permanent,there were also occasions when reciprocal
distrust among individual bankers was so intense that they found
any cooperation impossibie.On the other hand,cooperation also
occurred among the different sides of both Greeks and European
capitalists,although alliances among them were hardly
permanent.Therefore to consider the development of Greek banking
activities outside the context of European economic penetration
would be unrealistic.
The aforementioned remarks are valid also with regard to the
relations of Greek bankers with the other local elements involved
in banking;the Jewish,Catholic,and Armenian bankers.The Jews in
particular,with their connections with Jewish banking houses based
in Europe,proved to be serious competitors,and bankers such as
Cammondo or Fernandez were a force to be reckoned with
[FRANcO(1897)216-218,syNGRos(1908)II,157-59) .The Catholic
community of Con/pie included some of the most dynamic bankers of
the city.Tubini,a Catholic from Chios,became the most important
Catholic banker when he succeeded in cooperating with the Societe
Generale of Paris,although his success must be at least partly
attributed to his close connections with the Tubini & Cie banking
house in Paris [SYNGROS(1908)II,278,THOBIE(1977)90].The
Armenians,on the other hand,were the less powerful element in
connection with banking,although some of the Armenian bankers,such
as Kieotseoglou and Misirli,had a large share in most of the
banking activities in Con/ple.Greek bankers dealt with their
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Jewish,Armenian and Catholic counterparts the same way as they
dealt with Europeans,and vice versa.Attitudes of cooperation or
rivalry were as conspicuous among Greeks and the other local
bankers,as they were in the case of European banks and
capitalists.
The involvement of Greek bankers in transactions with the
Ottoman State was deep.When the financial crisis of the Treasury
broke out in the early 1840's,and the Porte was anxious to reform
its monetary system,it resorted to the services of two of the
leading bankers of Con/ple;Theodore Baltazzi,a Greek,and John
Alleon,a Jew.The main task of the two bankers was to keep the rate
of exchange with the English pound at par EDt) VELAY(1903)126].This
early efforts finally led to the establishment of the Bank of
Constantinople.The Bank was founded in 1847,in accordance with an
Imperial Decree,for the purpose of preserving the parity of the
Ottoman pound,which had become the basis of Ottoman currency since
1844	 [BILIOTI(1908)91-96]
	
with	 European	 currencies	 and
particularly	 the	 English	 pound
[UBICINI(1856)11298,STrJRDzA(1983)4551.Baltazzi,and Alleon were
appointed managers of that new institution and presumably,used
some of their own capital [DU VELAY(1903)126].The initial capital
reached 25.000.000 piastres,but it was hoped this could be
increased to 100 million through public subscription,although this
in fact never happened [MORAWITZ(1902)18].The bank's association
with the government was close,and the management was obliged to
conform to the government's wishes.These tight links were
highlighted by the fact the bank was subsidised by the government
to the tune of 450.000 fr annually.The activities of the bank in
the commercial field were confined to the issuing of bills of
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exchange,always maintaining the parity with the English pound to
110 piastres [STORDZA(1983)456-457].In a period of three years the
bank issued bills of exchange equal to 810,259,560 piastres with a
loss of 26.282.744 piastres.In order to back its bills the bank
was obliged to buy currency at a high price,although it issued
bills of exchange at a lower rate EUBICINI(1856)II,302].
In addition,the bank was obliged to exchange devalued coinage
at a certain parity.In this case the discount of devalued currency
was favourable to the holder.It is well known that currency
depreciation was one of the traditional ways in which Ottoman
governments attempted to escape financial 	 embarrassrnent.This
currency however remained in circulation and commercial
transactions were often conducted with poor coinage.Trade in
currencies had become an extensive and profitable field of
business.Yet,poor coinage was harmful to merchants who apparently
wished for financial stability.In a period when the Ottoman State
was trying to improve its image in Europe,the hampering of trade
in this way,was presumably a hindrance to this attempt.Besides,the
monetary reform which the government had proclaimed in 1844
certainly could not be accomplished,unless the devalued currency
was finally withdrawn.Obviously with this end in mind,the Ottoman
government attempted to withdraw poor coinage,and the bank was
assigned the job.This attempt,however,proved disastrous to the
bank when holders of devalued currency found this an excellent
opportunity to dispose of it with the minimum damage
(MORAWITZ(1902)18-19).The bank also dealt in paper money.Ifl
instances when the metallic currency in Con/ple was in short
supply,the bank provided paper money at the official price,though
it	 bought	 paper	 money	 only	 at	 considerable
discount.Nevertheless,dealing in paper money was not detrimental
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to the bank,mainly because of the price of kaime at the time
which,thanks to the regular payment of interest,was quite stable
[DAVISON (198) 249]
In this way the bank suffered periodic losses which it could
ill afford.The subvention of the government did not suffice to
sustain the activities of the bank which,in 1852 showed a loss
exceeding its real capital,and in the same year the bank wound up
its	 affairs	 with	 a	 loss	 of	 35.000.000	 piastres
[UBICINI(1856)II,303].Although this final result was to be
expected,some remarks must be made with regard to the operation of
the bank.The bank lacked the means to achieve its ends and be
profitable at the same time;the capital employed was,to put it
mildly,insufficient and to abide by the policy of the government
could not be sustained for long.The withdrawal of devalued
currency in particular,needed vast amounts of capital as later
experience would show,and even then it was questionable whether it
could be successful.The close association of the bank with the
government was the most important aspect.According to its statute
the bank was bound to follow the policies of the government,and in
this way it was reduced to the status of"public servant".Control
of the economy and its mechanisms was,as has already been
discussed above,a permanent feature of the Ottoman state,and the
establishment of the Bank of Con/ple is an excellent example of
this particular aspect.
Notwithstanding,the monetary and financial problems with
which the Bank was supposed to deal remained,causing confusion in
commercial affairs and distabilizing an already vulnerable
economy.In addition the government was anxious to establish an
institution to which it could entrust its monetary policy,namely
the withdrawal of devalued currency and maintainance of the
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Ottoman pound and paper money at par.In fact during the early
1850's several projects were submitted to the Ottoman government.
During the early months of 1853 three projects had been presented
to the Ottoman government concerning the creation of an Ottoman
bank.The first was submitted by the banking company Trouve &
Chauvel,which also represented a group of London based capitalists
[F0195/460 letter dated 3/3/1854,see also DU
VELAY (1903)129].According
 to a letter sent to Lord Redcliffe by
Theodore Baltazzi,the bank would undertake the withdrawal of
devalued currency within a period of two years at its own
expense.In addition,the bank would maintain the parity of the
Turkish pound with sterling at 110 pst,and would exchange all
interest bearing paper money at par.The Ottoman government,on the
other hand,would subsidise the bank's capital with 30 million
piastres,and would pay the bank 450 million piastrs within a
period of fifteen years without sharing in the profits.Baltazzi
however,had an interest in the failure of the project,because he
himself ,along with the Jewish banker Cammondo and a group of local
capitalists,had also proposed a similar project to the Ottoman
government.His project was presented to Fezid Effendi,the Sultan's
first secretary,in a letter dated 24 March 1853 [
	
FO195/460].
It is interesting to note the fact that the bulk of the
participants in Baltazzi and Cammondo group were,as Baltazzi
himself put it "des sujets fideles a la Porte."In its main
points the project of Baltazzi and Cammondo was exactly the same
as that of the rival group.There was a difference,however,which
made Baltazzi's project more tempting.His project would be
accompanied by a loan of 2 million sterling which would be of
immediate benefit to the Treasury.In addition,Baltazzi's project
appeared to be less costly,and,if it had been finally accepted,the
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Ottoman government would have saved 144 million piastres.Baltazzi
himself was optimistic about his project noting,in his letter to
Redcliffe,that, "With the exception of the Grand Vizier,all
other ministers are favourably disposed towards our projects
because they realise the huge economies that will take place..".In
the event,no project was approved by the
government.Baltazzj,however,succeeded in signing a contract with
the Ministry of Finance according to which his house would be able
to draw bills at a discount in order to keep down the exchange
rate with the English pound to 132-133 piastres.In return for
this,the Minister would pay Baltazzi the value of bills drawn not
in Ottoman currency,but in French napoleons [Contract dated
26/4/1854,in F0195/460].
This early attempt however,was soon followed by another
project which was submitted to the Ottoman government by a group
of local capitalists.This time the attempt was fruitful,and the
group succeeded in obtaining the right to found a bank which,as
will be shown,was based on practically the same principles as the
Bank of Con/ple.The Ottoman bank was established in accordance
with an Imperial irade of April 5 1853 (the ferman is in
F0195/460,see also UBICINI(1856)II,297].The bank was founded by a
group of local capitalists with the capital of 200.000.000
piastres.According to a letter of J Hanson,an English merchant who
participated in the bank,to Lord Redcliff the bank would consist
of the following capital:100 million piastres would be subscribed
by the founders,30 million piastres would be given as dotation by
the Ottoman government,and 70 million piastres would be provided
through Public subscription [F0195/460,letter dated,5/4/1856] .The
group included some of the wealthiest Armenians who,apart from
being opulent,were also directly connected with the Ottoman
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State.The most important among them were,Mihran Douz,the director
of the Imperial Mint,Boghos Douz,Keeper of the Sultan's jewels,and
Diran director of the gold and silver refining Department
[F0195/460].However a group of merchants and bankers also
participated in the establishment of the bank.The presence of
Greek capital in the establishment of this bank appears to be
important.The group of bankers and merchants includes the names of
Psychari,Zarif I and Glavany,who at the time were among the leading
capitalists in Con/ple (1) .The arrangement was that the Ottoman
government would subsidise the bank with 30 million piastres for a
period of fifteen years [tJBICINI(1856)II,297].The bank undertook
to withdraw devalued coinage,and to maintain the parity of the
Ottoman pound with European currencies stable.In addition the bank
was granted the right to issue bills of exchange and to discount
or cash bills.The bank was also obliged to repay the State for the
paper money at the end of fifteen years and without
interest,maintaining	 it	 until	 then	 at	 parity
[UBICINI(1856)II,297-298].Although there is no information
available with regard to the operations of this bank it seems that
it was also shortlived.Both the amount of the capital involved as
well as the fact that the bank was engaged in the same activities
as the Bank of Con/pie suggest that the results were
disappointing.This bank however,should not be confused with the
Ottoman Bank of London which was founded three years later (see
above, 3G ).
The failure of the Ottoman bank to cope with paper money and
devalued currency soon prompted the government to seek new
combinations for the establishment of a new bank which would be
assigned the job.During the late 1850's several projects were
submitted to the government with the objective of founding a
125
bank.Among those projects two seems to be the most important.One
was the project of the Ottoman bank in London,elaborated by the
directors of that institution,and presented to Reshid Pasha by
Layard.The second project was proposed by a group of Greek and
English capitalists based both in London and Con/ple
[ISINKSAL(1968)2-5,LANDEs(1958)62]
According to the Ottoman bank's project,presented in a letter
dated 13 Dec 1856,the "National Bank" would be assigned all
financial operations of the government both abroad and within the
Empire,including the issuing of loans in European money markets
and other similar operations [F0195/460,letters dated 13/12/1856
and 18/12/1856].The group of the Ottoman bank however,did not
include Ottoman subjects,which appears to have been the main
shortcoming of the project.For this reason the directors of the
bank were willing to accept the participation of Ottoman
capitalists on one condition:that the committee of the new bank
established in Con/pie by Ottoman capitalists would be prevented
from obtaining control of the bank.The letter,however,did not
mention the capital which would be engaged in the establishment of
the bank.This was not the only point on which the project was
obscure,for the syndicate of the Ottoman bank in London did not in
the end produce a detailed plan [BASTER(1934)83].Presumably this
was because,as Layard put it in a letter addressed to Lord
Redcliffe, "we[the syndicate],could not,without much local
knowledge and experience,see our way [letter dated 22/2/1856 in
FO195/460]
Conversely,the project of the Anglo-Greek group had been
elaborated in detail (2).According to this project,the invested
capital would reach enormous proportions.The first part of the
capital however would not exceed £2.500.000,although according to
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the bank's statute the founders were obliged to establish a
capital of £10 million [see the bank's statute in F0195/460,see
also THE TIMES,19/3/1857].According to the statute submitted to
the Ottoman government the bank would hold issuing privileges.This
was the most important aspect of the project because that
privilege would give the bank substantial powers.In addition the
bank would advance to the government any amount of capital
required to meet the needs of the Treasury.The government in its
turn,would be obliged to grant Treasury bonds to the bank,with the
purpose of serving as a guarantee for any future advance.It was
this second project which was finally accepted by the Porte and
the initial negotiations with the group were concluded in March
1857.As a consequence an original convention was signed between
the concessionaires and the Ottoman government,which in Europe was
thought to be finai.After admitting that"the detais of
administration had been left open"the correspondent of the Times
in Con/pie who reported the news in the first piace,goes on to say
that "in the original form of convention,the supreme
direction of the bank was vested in a committee sitting in London
and composed in such a way as to insure at all times a majority to
the English holders...such an arrangement was evidently
vicious,arid Reshid pasha would not in any way consent to it.He
insisted on the direction being entirely in Con/pie." [THE
TIMES,19/3/1857]
It seems that the Ottoman administration was not prepared to
accept foreigners controlling an institution which was supposed to
play a role similar of that of the Bank of England,or the Banque
de France.In addition,according to a scrutiny of the bank's
statute by an expert it appears that there were at least eight
points where this statute was obscure [see Remarks on the Bank of
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Turkey,in F0195/460).Thus,in spite of the initial agreement,the
Ottoman government became reluctant to proceed with the project.In
view of the government'hesitation Wilkin,the head of the
syndicate,was found in a difficult position.In July 1857 he went
to London"in search of new combinations [Letter to Musuros
Pasha,21/July/1857,in F0195/460].He obviously thought that £10
million could not possibly be raised in Con/ple
alone,and,therefore,a more powerful combination was needed.In the
event,however,Wilkin's mission failed and the project was
abandoned.The government's reluctance apart,the opposition of the
Ottoman bank in London could have also been responsible for this
failure.There is evidence that the Ottoman bank group strongly
opposed an attempt by Rothschild to establish a bank in Con/ple.In
a letter addressed to Reshid Pasha Layard,the head of the
bank,claimed that the interests of Turkey were incompatible with
those of the Rothschild family,because the latter"might sacrifice
the interests of the country to another Empire,and even to a power
hostile to Turkey,when time.. .seems appropriate" [F0195/460,letter
dated 13/12/1856].Thus,although there is no evidence directly
supporting the view that the Ottoman bank opposed the success of
Wilkin's project,it may be also said that it had very good reasons
to do so.After all,Wilkin's group proved to be its most important
rival.
However,it was another Anglo-Greek group which finally
succeeded in getting the approval of the Ottoman
government.Nevertheless,it should be pointed out,that at least
some of the senior members of the Ottoman administration favoured
the project of this group.For example,Musuros Pasha,a member of an
old Phanariot family who,at the time,was the Sultan's minister in
London and,who had assisted Wilkin during his visit to this
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city,urged the government to appoint his brother,Panagiotachi
Musuros,to the post of the Deputy Governor of the new
Bank,which,according to the wishes of the founders was to have
been reserved for a member of the Ottoman administration
[ISINKSAL(1968)4].Besides,it would be unrealistic to believe that
a project could be approved without the assistance of at least
some,of the members of the Administration.
The new bank,which was established in May 1858,was styled the
Bank of Turkey.The group which proposed this project was headed by
Emanuel Rodochanacki,a leading merchant of Con/ple,and William
Gladstone an English capitalist [ISINKSAL(1968)5].Among the group
of Greek capitalists who backed the project,are the names of
Mavrokordato , Ral 1 i
	 and
Vlasto.[ISINKSAL(1968)4-5,BANKERS'MAGAZINE(1860),xx,81 (3)].The
capital of the new bank was £ j..000.000,divided into 50.000
shares,with the condition that it would increase to £3.000.000 if
the government requested it.The Bank of Turkey started operations
the same year and its prospects were good.The financial crisis of
1861,however,proved to be a major setback to the bank and led it
to its liquidation a few years later. [see below,Chapt V,I6 ].
The failure of this bank did not discourage the Ottoman
government which soon began negotiations with another interested
group.The two sides concluded an agreement which led to the
establishment of the Ottoman Imperial Bank [see above,Chaptl,fl-30
].The Imperial Bank did not share the fate of its predecessors.It
enjoyed substantial privileges as well as the support of some of
the most powerful groups of financiers in Europe.In the event this
bank came to play an important,if not decisive,role in the conduct
of Ottoman finances.It was a typical example of European economic
predominance.
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At this point,however,another question should be discussed.At
which extent did the Tanzimat reforms contribute to the banking
development in the Ottoman ernpire.It is well known that,apart from
political reforms,the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 stipulated the
establishment of banks in the Empire [DAVISON(1966)55].Yet this
significant political document only marginally dealt with such
questions.One may well suggest that the few clauses regarding
economic or financial issues simply supplemented a political
declaration.In other words the emphasis was not on economic
questions.The reforms apart,however,the government was obliged to
establish a State bank.Not only because the government was in need
of money-it could still resort to local private bankers-but also
because such an institution was essential,so it was thought,for
the stabilization of Ottoman finances.Yet,similar institutions,if
unsuccessful,had already been established in Turkey before 1856.
It appears,therefore,that the contribution of the reforms to
banking was only marginal.Instead,it ws roec economic penetration
that allowed and strengthened the development of banking.The
"formal" introduction of foreign capital in the empire,first
through trade and then through loans,railways and mining,soon
dominated the major sectors of the Ottoman economy.It was this
process which eventually led to the major financial and economic
instabilities.One could,therefore,argue that the attempt of the
Ottoman state to stabilize its finances,and the establishment of a
state bank in particular,was also a side effect of this process.By
the late 1850's,however,this process was already under way and the
Hatt-i Humayun simply endorsed the inevitable.
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Notes to CHAPTER V.
(1) The group of capitalists which was assigned the foundation of
the bank also included:Ohanes Tighris,Allahveri
Maksoud,Bedros,Youghikdgian,Bilikdgi Mihran,and A Hanson.
(2) Another proposal,apart from the Wilkin project,was submitted
to the Porte at approximatelly the same time.This scheme was
presented by E Paxton a member of the English parliament.Paxton
represented a group of powerful figures in British economic and
political life.The group included S Laing,Chairman of the London
and Brighton Line,A Darby of the Ironworks,J.A Chowne director of
the Telegraph Company as well as E.J Ewar,MP,E Cangley MP,and N
Jackson MP.The project contemplated the establishment of the
Imperial National Bank of Turkey with an established capital of
7 million.There is no indication that the two groups had any
connection whatever.A Baster in his article "On the origins of
British Banking expansion in the Near East"(1934),does not refer
to the Wilkin Group and confuses it with the Paxton group.In
addition no member of the Paxton group participated in the Bank of
Turkey finally founded in 1858.Yet,the material found in the file
460 in the series 195 in the PRO/FO archives is incomplete and
fragmented and perhaps further research would establish a
connection between the two groups.
(3) The	 group	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 Turkey	 also
included,Lak,Hambesfazis,Misiroglou 	 effendi ,Maurogordato,P
Kirilas ,Rodelaki ,Kalaronis ,Horasancioglou	 Effendi ,Pismitsioglou
Effendi,A Hanson,and Vlasko(Vlasto?).
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CHAPTER VI:Euphoria and frustration:1850-1875.
Short term advances to the Treasury.
The fact that various projects had been submitted to the
Ottoman state during the previous decade should not lead to the
conclusion that Greek banking activities were limited.Quite the
contrary:throughout this period,Greek bankers were heavily engaged
in various advances to the Ottoman government.The sums due to
native bankers amounted in 1854 to about 550 million fr(=122
million) [Report by BARRON(1867-1867)438].A few years later,in
1859,of the total of the Ottoman state debt of 774 million fr the
internal debt corresponded to 450 million fr and it was almost
exclusively in the hands of local bankers EDU
VELAY(1903)154-155].The division of Turkey's internal Debt at that
date reads as follows:
Table I:Internal Debt of The Ottoman Empire.
Short term loans to Theiinistry of Finances: 127.000.000fr














*issued in order to consolidate the Civil list.
Source:DAMIRIS(1915)26-27,/
How much of that debt was in the hands of Greek bankers is
impossible to say.One may assume however,that since Greek bankers
were heavily involved in short term advances to the State,they
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controlled a large,and perhaps the major share of the Internal
debt.The profits deriving from these transactions with the
government were enormous.Syngros,who at the time was working in
the house of G Petrochochino recounts in his Memoirs that"Only in
the years of 1859 and 1860 did the balance sheets of our branch in
Con/ple show an annual profit of 2.5 million fr.Bear in mind that
this branch was working without capital proper because the
necessary capital was provided by the central branch [of
Petrichochinos's House] in Marseille." [SYNGROS(1908)II,24].
It is necessary to explain the major mechanism which enabled
Greek bankers to make such profits.Money was provided to the
Ottoman Treasury or its indvidual Departments against
guarantees,mainly in the form of Treasury bonds,or other documents
acknowledging the obligation of the State to pay back the borrowed
sum with interest.Greek bankers,in their turn,used these documents
as a guarantee in order to borrow money from European money
markets.If payment to the bearer of the document was
acknowledged,they simply discounted those documents in Europe.In
both cases however,large profits could be made for the simple
reason that interest and discounting rates in Europe were
considerably lower.For example,when a Greek banker borrowed money
in Europe at 3-4%,which was the ordinary interest rate in European
money markets,whjle at the same time he charged the Treasury
12-18%,which was the ordinary rate in Turkey,he benefitted by the
difference of 9-15% on his invested money.Thus,according to the
amount of the invested money,rates of profit could be
extraordinarily high.Syngros,who during the 1850's was only a
small bankbroker,found himself after a decade with a fortune
exceeding 600.000fr.Success was so sudden that,as Syngros himself
put it,
	
"The limit I had set for myself was 300.000fr...When
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however I saw my fortune increased beyond my expectations I
decided to set a new limit of 1 million fr"
[SYNGROS(1908)II,29-30].Needless to say,Syngros changed the limit
he set to himself many times.
A further indication of the profits realised through these
transactions during this early period was the annual charge
payable for the service of the short term loans conducted between
the Government and local bankers.According to the report of Lord
Hobart and M Foster,in 1859/60,the Ottoman government was obliged
to	 pay	 17.million	 fr	 for	 its	 internal	 debt	 alone
[A&R (1862) LXIV, 493)
In fact,short term advances were the most important activity
of Greek banking in Con/ple.As will be shown,Greek bankers were
generally only indirectly involved in the Ottoman loans.They were
mostly associated with the service of the Ottoman Public
Debt,rather than with the issuing of loans.The Ottoman loans were
almost exclusively raised in European money markets,and Greek
bankers participated only marginally.However,the fact that Greek
banking capital abstained from the syndicates which issued most of
the Ottoman loans does not necessarily imply that Greek bankers
were unwilling to participate in these loans.Nor,in addition does
it mean their capital was insufficient for such ventures.After all
the issuing of Ottoman loans never did rely upon the capital
proper of a particular group.It was always dependent on public
subscription.The Greek bankers' abstention was mainly due to the
fact that in the Western markets they could not compete with
European contractors.The latter were in a position of power since
they were backed by powerful groups of European capitalists.Greek
bankers participated in the issuing of Ottoman loans when this
suited the European contractors either because they relied on the
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Greeks' experience and knowledge or because they used a particular
group of Greek bankers against another rival group.
This was for example the case with the participation of the
Societe Generalle de l'Empire Ottoman-a bank in which Greek
capital played an important if not decisive role-in the Pinard
loan of 1869.By that tinie,three major coalitions had been formed
to the issue the Ottoman loans:the group of the Imperial
bank,which included the powerful Credit Mobilier of Paris;the
group of the Societe Generale of Paris,which included the Credit
General Ottoman;and the Galata bankers.Irt connection with the loan
of 1869,the group of the Imperial bank had been involved in
negotiations with the Ottoman government as early as August of
1869.During the first week of September however,the Imperial bank
decided not to participate in the new loan ENEOLOGOS,7/9/1869].The
Societe General de l'Empire Ottoman along with the Credit General
rushed to fill the gap.Yet,on the 16th of November,the Credit
General opted out,and the Comptoir d'Escompte came to take its
place [NEOLOGOs,16/lj./1869].A week later,Neologos announced
that"the Societe Generale of our town joined the Comptoir
d'Escompte in the conclusion of the loan of £12 millions.0
[NEOLOGOS,23/11/1869)..The syndicate providing this loan included
some of the most emminent Greek bankers,such as Zarifi and
Christaki Zografo Effendi,who also participated in the bank's
board of directors (NEOLOGOS,23/11/1869 and
14/12/1869,SyNGROS(1908)II,201,Du VELAY(1903)287-288].Pinard who
at the time was the managing director of The Comptoir d'Escompte
of Paris,succeeded in elbowing aside both the group of the Societe
Generale of Paris,and that of the Ottoman Imperial bank,in order
to issue the loan.However,he left the issuing of the loan in
Co/pie in the hands of the Societe Generale which,in the
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event,successfully raised 98.000 bonds of the loan through public
subscription [DU VELAY(1903)288].In connection with the issuing of
this loan,Neologos of Con/ple reported optimistically that
"Besides,the Societe Generale of our city,which enjoys the
confidence of both the public and the government,has such an
experience that we have no doubt that the public of our city
should trust it for the final promotion of the operation."
[NEOLOGOS,16/12/1869] .Since that was the first,and iast,attempt of
the Comptoir d'Escompte to involve itself in Ottoman finances,it
is reasonable to assume that it had to rely on the experience of
the Societe Generale of Con/ple.In addition,one should not
underestimate the influence of Greek bankers in the Ottoman
government.As the Societe was already involved in the
negotiations,Pinard was undoubtedly willing to accept its
participation in the issuing of the loan.
A somewhat different case is presented by the participation
of the Banque de Con/ple,a purely Greek bank,in the issuing of the
1873 Ottoman loan.On 13th August 1873,the Ottoman government
contracted a loan of £30 million with the Credit General,the
subsidiary company of the Societe Generale of Paris,the Banque de
Con/pie and the Credit Mobilier of Paris [ANF3O/356,letter dated
13/8/1873,F078/2269,telegram dated 4/8/1873].The Banque de Con/pie
subscribed for 20 percent ferme,while the remainder was equally
divided between the other two institutions.In this case however,it
was not the lack of experience which led the European contractors
to include the Banque de Con/ple in the loan's syndicate.According
to a Greek newspaper,it was the management's skill which permitted
the bank's final participation in the loan [MELLON,26/3/1874].In
fact,the entry of
	 this Bank	 into	 Ottoman finances,was
characterised by audacity and 	 inventiveness.It	 appears
136
therefore,that the management of the bank did not want to restrict
its operations only to traditional transactions with the
Treasury.Had the future of Ottoman finances not seemed so
gloomy,the bank would certainly have been involved in other
similar operations.
These were the major cases where Greek banking capital
participated directly in the Ottoman loans.The economic
environment,defined by the predominance of European capital,left
little room for Greek bankers to benefit from the issuing of
Ottoman loans.With time,European capital became capable of
conducting loans with the Ottoman state without the mediation of
Greek and other native bankers.Hence the latters'role in the
issuing of the Ottoman loans was inevitably reduced.
This is not to say that Greek bankers did not buy large
amounts of Ottoman bonds.There were cases where individual Greek
bankers held large numbers of Ottoman bonds.For example George
Zarifi was"one of the largest holders of the Ottoman loan of 1871
and of other loans." [ROSE and STANIFORTH(1875)45].They usually
had at their disposal large quantities of Ottoman bonds granted to
them as security for short term advances to the Ottoman
government.Most of the time these bonds were in their turn used as
security to obtain credit in Europe.It should be pointed
out,however,that Greek bankers never kept these titles for long
periods of time,simply because it was dangerous for them to become
too involved with less liquid forms of investment.Instead they
needed liquid assets.Keeping titles for long periods of time meant
they could not avail themselves of the increasing financial
opportunities.In addition the income deriving from these titles
was not only negligible but unsafe as well because as early as
1866 the Ottoman government faced insuperable problems in paying
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the interest on its public debt.
Nevertheless,Greek bankers were heavily
	 involved in
transactions with Ottoman bonds when the latter were finally
accepted in European stock exchanges in 1865.Syngros's
transactions in bonds of the Pinard loan present a typical
example.Syngros borrowed money in London,pledging large numbers of
these bonds as security.When he returned the money he found his
creditors had sold his titles on the Stock exchange and were not
in a position to return them on the prescribed date.Syngros found
this an excellent opportunity.After thoroughly researching the
market he found that large numbers of these particular bonds were
in the hands of investors who kept them for income purposes and
they were therefore in short supply.He then started purchasing
large amounts of available titles through his agents.As a result
the prices of these bonds were pushed up.When the expiry date for
the return of the titles came,Syngros's creditors were still not
in a position to return them and thus became his debtors.They
either had to pay him interest on the value of titles pledged to
them,or they had to buy similar titles in order to return them to
Syngros.Since the market was in short supply they bought these
titles from people working on Syngros's behalf.In this way Syngros
succeeded in making a profit of £20.000;the nominal value of bonds
Syngros bought was equal to £600.000.The operation lasted less
than a few weeks [SYNGROS(j.908)II,274-28j.].
However,if Greek bankers did not directly involve themselves
in the Ottoman public Debt,they did so indirectly.They provided
the money with which the government paid the interest on the
Ottoman Public debt.To this extent the Greek banking houses
functioned as a conduit for European economic penetration.Although
the contracting of short term loans with the government was a
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relatively autonomous process
	 from the Ottoman	 loans,it
was,however,the other side of
	 the	 same	 coin,namely	 the
introduction of foreign capital into the Ottoman empire.
As already pointed out,the largest single item of
expenditure after 1865 was the service of the Public debt (see
above,Ch.II,T ) .The Ottoman government found two ways of dealing
with these payments;new loans raised abroad,or short term advances
provided by native bankers.The former expedient has already been
discussed.On the other hand short term advances to the Treasury
for the purpose of paying the interest on various issues of
Ottoman loans also look impressive.By the early 1860's the volume
of the Ottoman internal debt,a large part of which consisted of
short term advances to the Treasury,had exceeded £T 25
million.Until that stage,however,short term advances were
contracted mainly for the purpose of financing the Ottoman
administration.Instead,short term advances contracted for the
service of the Ottoman Public debt saw a rapid increase only after
the mid 1860's.Paradoxically,that was the result of the 1865 loan
which the government raised in order to convert its internal debt
into a unified General debt.As has already been mentioned this
loan caused a major shift in Ottoman expenditure (see above,?
).Thenceforth,the contraction of short term advances in the
Con/ple money market became a major expedient for servicing the
Ottoman debt.
In addition the 1865 loan brought some changes on the Con/pie
money market.The conversion of bonds of the Internal debt was
compulsory and old documents could only be exchanged with new ones
bearing a lower interest rate.In addition the titles of the
General Debt were placed in European stock exchanges,the first
time that Ottoman bonds had been accepted there.Local bankers did
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not react simply because they considered the occasion as an
opportunity to sell their titles in London and Paris or to use
them as a guarantee in order to get credit from European
houses.Zarjfi,jn one of his letters to the National Bank of
Greece,showed no signs of anxiety. "The conversion...proceeds
successfully despite reactions abroad.Until today the value of
titles presented for conversion exceeds £3 million" [ETE,letter
dated 9/11/1865].Syngros recounts in his memoirs that Greek and
other local bankers benefitted from the conversion only marginally
(SYNGROS(1908)II,71].Moreover he claims that after the conversion
had taken place,native bankers were not in a position to charge
the government with figures of 20-24%.Although Syngros's account
is obscure on this point,one may assume that the monopoly of
credit enjoyed by local bankers was severely affected.However,this
is only partly correct because local bankers were still in a
position to advance large sums to the government.But the remarks
of Syngros are correct to the extent that he recognised that the
Ottoman state could find cheaper money by just tapping the
European money markets directly without the mediation of local
bankers. yet the Ottoman state had had this alternative since
1863,when the establishment of the Imperial Bank created a major
conduit for foreign capital investments in Turkey.
Although the Ottoman government had proceeded with the
liquidation of its Internal debt it could not prevent it from
rising again.In fact,the State's financial embarrassments in
connection with the service of its Foreign debt dated back to
1866.In April 1866 the coupons of the 1865 loan[General Debt] were
paid only when the government contracted a loan with some of the
native banking houses [Report by BARRON(1866-1867)461].A year
later a new advance from the Imperial Bank and the Societe
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Generale again assured the payment of the coupons of the same loan
[Report by BARRON,op.cit,460,DU VELAY(1908)277].After that date
several short term advances were conducted for that purpose.
The financial position of the Empire worsened in the late
1860's.The Cretan insurrection proved a heavy burden on the
Treasury and consequently the Ottoman government was not in a
position to pay of f the coupons of several of the Ottoman
ioans.Poor harvests and drought during the early 1870's,further
reduced the Porte's ability to service the payment of its debt.In
addition,the more loans the government raised abroad the more it
became dependent upon the banking houses of Con/ple,including the
Imperial Bank.As revenues,aithough increased,could not match
expenditure,the only solution was to raise a new loan in Europe.As
the service of the new loans could not be achieved the government
had to resort to the local money market[see tableU].This vicious
circle in practice continued until 1875,when the government was
forced to suspend payments on its foreign debt.
According to the correspondence of the house of Zarifi with
the National Bank of Greece,short term loans were contracted more
often during the early 1870's.Unfortunately Zarifi's
correspondence with the Bank did not present a complete account of
all short term advances contracted during that period,simply
because these affairs did not interest the National Bank.This
material refers to the Bank's affairs in Con/ple,the placing of
the Greek loans on the Con/pie money market and the affairs of the
house of Zarifi & Zafiropoulo in Greece.Zarifi,therefore,ofliy
informed the bank occasionally and then only with regard to the
repercussions these advances had upon bills of exchange,drafts etc
in the Con/pie money market.















b1e;The interaction of loans,budget deficits1 and short term
advances.
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example.In this month,the government contracted three short term
loans with local bankers.There is no doubt that Zarifi
participated in all of them because his account is very detailed.A
loan of '3OO.00O was contracted on 16 January 1873.The second of
£800.000 was conducted on 28 January followed two days later by a
third one of £1.2 million [ETE,letters dated,17/1/1873,29/1/1873
and 31/1/1873].Presumably these advances were devoted to the
payment of coupons of several loans expiring in January 1873.
The Porte's increas financial difficulties in paying its
debt inevitably led to the contraction of more short term loans in
the money market of Con/ple.Local bankers,realising the serious
effects a suspension of the payments on the Public debt would have
on their affairs were willing to advance the necessary amounts.A
year before the suspension took place,the Ottoman government had
come to rely more on the advances of local houses and of the




inspector of Ottoman finances to the French Foreign Secretary,a
few months before the suspension of payments 	 "the current
account of the bank[Imperial] had been entirely absorbed while the
capital of all local establishments was already heavily involved
in short term advances to the Treasury which nevertheless lacked
the necessary amounts of bonds to place as security.....The fear
that a suspension would have disastrous effects...forced local
bankers to assure once more the payment of the coupons of
April[1875]with a1advance of £1.5 million" [AN F30/356,report
dated 31/1/1876].Short term advances used for the service of
Ottoman loans assumed enormous proportions during the late 1860's
and early 1870's.Unfortunately,there is no detailed information
about the total capital involved in short term advances to the
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Treasury.There is evidence to believe however,that after 1865 the
amounts of capital engaged each year in these advances exceeded
130 million fr.The development of the floating debt during the
early 1870's is the most revealing indication of the volume of
short term advances.






Sources:a)Report by Barron ( 1F66-67),443,b)Report by Rurnbolc3 A&P(1872) LIX,9,c)tU1
F 30/ 3 5 6 , d ) AN F30/356,e)BILLIOTI(1908),48
The reason why the floating debt remained stable until 1873
and then rapidly increased was that more short term advances were
needed to service the Ottoman debt.As a consequence the floating
debt never fell below 250 million fr.Not surprisingly this debt
was again almost entirely in the hands of local houses [AN
F30/356,letter dated 29/12/1873].It is worth stressing that the
government raised two loans,each of
	 10 million,during 1872 in
order to reduce it. [F078/2216,letter dated
3/4/1872,F078/2218,].etter dated 8/8/1872].Yet,the floating debt
continued to rise.
It should be pointed out,however,that apart from being an
indication of the volume of short term advances,the development of
the floating debt was also an indication of the increasing cost of
internal administration.Although the largest part of the debt
consisted of advances devoted to the service of the Public
debt,the remainder was made up of advances to individual
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Departments.Credit was granted to these Departments by the same
houses which advanced to the Treasury namely local bankers.In
return the Departments pledged bonds drawn on provincial
Treasuries as security.Syngros,describing his dealings with the
Department of War,recounts that "we discounted such bonds at
70-80% paying usually with the mandates we had at our disposal.But
even in the cases where we paid in currency....we were able,due to
the influence our house had on senior Ottoman officials,to collect
our money from provisional Treasuries within a short period of
time."[SYNGROS(1908)II,183-4] .Similar operations were conducted
with regard to bonds and other promissory notes provided by other
Departments.
In the event,Greek bankers were in a position to control a
large part of the floating debt.Syngros,who by late 1868 had
assumed (oMePj role in Ottoman finances,introduced the method
of mandates in his dealings with the Ottoman government.According
to him,his house accepted as security Treasury bonds payable to
London by the branch of the Imperial bank in this city.The
arrangement was that the bank would pay the Treasury bonds only
when it received money to do so.Instead of holding Treasury bonds
until maturity,Syngros preferred to discount all bonds at his
disposal in Europe.He then lent the money to the government
charging it at 12%,while he himself paid a discounted interest of
3-4%.During late 1869 his house was involved in similar
transactions to the extent of £700.000.Similar operations went On
during the early 1870's and Syngros and Zarifi discounted Treasury
bonds valued at least £1.000.000 every year
[SYNGROS(1908)II,180-181,277-279].The product of the discount was
once more lent to the Ottoman government to pay the coupons of
various loans.
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Another indication of the extent to which Greek capital was
involved in these short term advances is provided by a Table
published in the Levant Herald concerning the short term loans
contracted by the government between November 1871 and March 1872.
TABLE III: Local loans contracted between November 1871 and March 1872(iri £T).
Advance from the Societe Generale:
	 1.400.000
Advance from the Banque de Conpie:
	 600.000.
Advance from the Austro-Ottoman Bank:
	 600.000
Advance from the house of P.Clado:
	 100.000
Advance from the Austro-Ottoman bank:
	 300.000
Advance from the house of Coronio&Cie:
	 300.000






According to the table it appears that Greek capital
participated directly in the largest part of these advances.The
Societe Generale,a largely Greek concern,the Banque de Con/ple,a
Greek bank,and Coronio and Clado,two Greek bankers provided the
Porte with £T 2.4 million within a period of six months.The
picture presented by the table describes the situation quite
accurately.Since the financial needs of the Ottoman government
were in reality increasing it is reasonable to assume that Greek
capital played a very important role in this process.With the
exception of the Imperial Bank which in 1874 obtained substantial
power,Greek capital assumed the leading role in financing the
Ottoman government (see also below,Ch.VIII).
However,the government's increasing loans from Greek and
other local bankers resulted in a heavy financial burden.Short
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term loans were renewed rapidly,thus obliging the government to
pay high interest rates on ever-increasing amounts of money.In
March 1874,the government had to pay interest of almost i.2 million
on its floating debt of £13.386.363,i.e 16% on average [THE
ECONQMIST,11/4/1874].The situation became so onerous that
Rumbold,the British Charge d'Affairs,even considered that the
contraction of short term loans was ruining Ottoman finances.In
connection with a recent advance he wrote that "The Grand
vizier assured me that through the recent advances obtained by the
Porte,although of a ruinous rate,the government is provided with
the means of meeting all its engagements up to the month of
March[1874]....That the resources of the Empire are sufficient I
truly believe...but it is another question whether they can be
made by Turkish statesmen surrounded as they are by a horde of
Greek and Armenian bankers to whom they appeal for advice and who
without scruple made enormous profits from the necessities of the
government which they consequently have no wish to see conducted
upon sound principles.Unless the system of carrying on the
government by means of advances at ruinous rates of interest from
the Galata houses can be effectually broken up,it is impossible
not to see that a fatal crash cannot be indefinitely deferred."
[F078/2212,letter dated 14/11/1873].
The remarks with regard to the Galata bankers were certainly
exaggerated,because they were as - anxious as the government to
stabilize Ottoman finances.Yet,it is debateable whether interest
rates were in fact as heavy as the report described them.According
to the report presented to the annual meeting of the shareholders
of the Credit Ottoman in 1873,interest rates in Con/ple had fallen
from 15% to 10% [DtJ VELAY(1903)305].This reduction seems quite
remarkable and it is correcta4 r 4 the exceptional year of 1872
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is concerned.During the late 1860's and early 1870's however,10%
was the lowest figure charged and this was on long term loans.On
the other hand interest rates undoubtedly increased when the
solvency of the Ottoman state was declining.In his letter of the
5th of March 1874 to the French Foreign Minister,De Vogue reported
that the local bankers were reluctant to advance money except at
rate of 30%.During this year the London capital market had lost
confidence in Turkey's solvency and it became almost impossible to
raise a loan there.De Vogue,realising the damage which a
suspension of the service of the public debt would cause to French
holders of Ottoman bonds,urged the French minister to intervene on
Turkey's behalf and to assist in raising a new loan in Paris [AN
F30/356,letter dated 29/12/1873].
However,the first six months of 1874 should also be
considered as an exceptional period because European capitalists
thought the suspension of Turkey's payments imminent,while local
bankers realising the risk to their money were also reluctant to
lend to the government.Yet,since an Ottoman insolvency would
affect them dramatically they were willing to advance,but at a
high rate.However,there is evidence to suggest that during the
period under discussion interest rates on short term loans varied
between 12 and 18%.Higher figures were also charged but only on
exceptional periods or on very small sums.For example,the French
ambassador reported the contraction of a loan of f4.000 bearing an
interest of 24% [AN F30/356,letter dated 5/11/1873].However,these
figures,although not uncommon,were not usual.
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Rates of profit and the development of banking institutions in
Con/pie.
One may assume therefore,that in spite of the large sums of
capital introduced in Turkey during the period under discussion
interest rates remained high.This could be explained by the fact
that,although credit was provided regularly,capital did not reach
adequate levels of accumulation.This development is highlighted by
the dependency of Greek and other local bankers on the European
money markets.These bankers would never have been in a position to
finance the Ottoman state without having access to European
credit.The explanation of that inadequacy is to be found in the
options of capital investment in Turkey.The most important factor
affecting investment choices was the rate of profits.And in
Turkey,short term loan and other banking activities yielded the
highest possible profits.Not surprising ly,theref ore, local
capitalists invested and reinvested their money in short term
loans to the Treasury totally neglecting other sectors.For example
apart from the establishment of public utility companies,such as
the Societe des Tramways and the Compagnie des Eaux de Con/ple
Greek and other local bankers eschewed investing in sectors other
than that of Ottoman finances (1).
In addition,industrial investment was non existent.Local
capitalists obviously did not wish to be involved in non-liquid
forms of investment,because their affairs with the Treasury
required liquid assets which they could circulate effectively and
rapidly.Moreover,industry in Turkey was negligible.If one includes
the inadequacies of transportation,the cost of conducting
industrial	 activities was very high.Therefore 	 industrial
investment certainly did not appeal 	 to	 local	 bankers.A
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contemporary authority on the subject was bewildered if not
indignant at the insistence of local bankers in not investing in
productive sectors,failing to understand that high profits were
the only criteria of investment [DI) VELAY(1903)305-306].
However,abstaining from investments in industry,not only
associated them as closely as possible with the Ottoman state and
its financial needs,but also deflected their capital from
involvement in a sector which in the long term would have provided
a stable economic basis.Of course these remarks have only relative
importance for the simple reason that capital flows where it
receives the highest returns.Greek and other native bankers were
more anxious to enjoy high profits than to invest their money in a
sector which at the time was not profitable.Had industrial
investments been profitable,there is no doubt they would have
participated.
Conversely,during the period under discussion,short term
advances provided far higher profits than any other field of
investment.The Ottoman government was willing to pay high interest
rates to meet its immediate necessities.Local
bankers,therefore,were only happy to advance their money since
they enjoyed high returns.Yet these bankers were not the only
capitalists who benefitted from this process.European capitalists
as well,made enormous profits out of the Ottoman state.For
example,the interest which the government agreed to pay when
contracting loans abroad varied between 6-7% on the nominal sum of
each loan.But as the Ottoman loans were issued at a considerable
discount the real interest exceeded 1O%.In addition it should be
pointed out that native bankers lent their own capital,which means
they were taking the risk of losing part,or all,of it.Conversely
the European syndicates which issued the Ottoman loans were
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liquidated as soon as they disposed of the bonds through public
subscription.Therefore the figure which local bankers charged the
government was higher because it involved higher risk.In this way
capitalists found it more profitable to advance to the Treasury
although this decision affected to a large extent the capabilities
of the Ottoman economy.
Yet,high rates of profit were mainly responsible for the
expansion of banking activities and the development of banking
proper.During the mid 1860's Con/pie had become a "nouvelle
Californie" where profits could be made in the easiest possible
way and with practically no risks.Transactions with the Ottoman
government were considered to be quite safe since the latter
pledged sufficient securities.In addition the financial conditions
in Europe allowed the introduction of large amounts of capital
into the Turkish capital and the Ottoman empire in
general.Moreover,the concept of the joint stock company was
rapidly spreading among capitalists in Con/ple.During the period
under discussion,the idea that joint capital could inaugurate
development or at least provide large profits became the starting
point for most of the new institutions.Individual Greek bankers
continued to operate,but to a lesser or greater extent were also
involved in joint stock companies.The case of the Zarifi &
Zafiropoulo house presents a typical example.Both bankers found
themselves associated with almost every newlyfounded institution
in Con/pie throughout the period under discussion.Zarifi in
particular,who,according to the special envoy of the Credit
Lyonais in Con/pie Kieinmann,was "un banquier excelient",was more
interested than his partner in promoting the establishment of new
companies.Yet there is evidence to suggest that apart from a few
occasions,such as their participation in the Societe Generaie and
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the Banque de Con/ple,they always limited their participation so
even the bankrupty of a company would not affect their interests
dramatically.Although they played leading roles in the
establishment of companies,such as the Societe Minerale Ottomane
and the Regie des Tabacs de Con/ple they always encouraged the
participation of others.Unfortunately there is no information
about the exact amount of capital they employed in these
operations,but the catalogue of the companies and banks they were
part of is certainly impressive (2).
In 1864 two new companies,based on the model of joint stock
societies,were established in Con/ple:the Societe Generale de
1 'Empire Ottoman,and the Ottoman Financial Association.According
to Syngros,the first bank was founded by
	 G Zarjfi,G Zafiropoulo,J
Stefanovic-Skjljtzj,E Baltazi,A Ralli ,and Cammondo
[SYNGROS(1908)II,79-80] .Unfortunately his account is not complete
because,apart from these Greek capitalists other participants in
the Societe were the European houses of Oppenheim and Alberti;that
of Fruhling and Goschen;that of Bischoffsheim;and most important
the	 group	 of	 the	 Imperial	 Bank	 [Dt.J
VELAY(1903)200,BOTJVIER(1962)684].The capital of the bank
	 was
£2.000.000 divided into
	 one	 hundred	 thousand	 shares.From
these,6,500 were offered to the public of Con/pie through public
subscription,26,500 were reserved by the Ottoman bank for English
subscribers and the rest 67,000 were reserved for the founders of
the bank [DU VELAY(1903)200].According to its statute the bank
would participate in the loans of the Ottoman government,as well
as in the advances made to the Treasury or individual
Departments.The bank would trade bills of exchange,drafts and
other commercial paper.It would also reserve the right to
participate in the establishment of new banking institutions or in
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any commercial or industrial company.Moreover,the bank would
undertake tax farming contracts,either on its own account or on
behalf of others.In addition,the bank would issue bonds,although
to a limited extent [IMEROLOGION TIS ANATOLIS(1878),277-278].
According to the report of Kleinman,the special envoy of the
Credit Lyonnais in Con/ple,the Societe Generale was a subsidiary
company of the Imperial bank which was established in order to
deal with those affairs the Imperial bank could not handle because
of restrictions in its statute [BOUVIER(1962)683-684].Although
there is evidence to support this statement there is also evidence
to suggest that the Imperial bank was not in a position to control
the Societe Generale.There is no question that the Ottoman bank
wished to influence the affairs of the new bank to a greater than
to lesser extent.But as William Gray,the director of the Imperial
bank,explained to the shareholders at their annual meeting in 1864
"The idea which led the bank to join the project was that in
Turkey were two distinct spheres of action in finance and
trade.For all such matters as related to intercourse with the west
of Europe....the Imperial bank was the appropriate instrument.But
on the other hand,there were many financial operations connected
now with the government ,others with municipal bodies,and others
again with individuals,in which local experience,knowledge,and
connexjons of the native bankers and capitalists of Con/ple made
them the most fitting instrument.It became clear...that a
combination might be formed between the bank and those
parties....and it is the feeling of the directors that it was far
better to have such persons as friends and co-operators with the
bank than as rivals." [Cited in LANDES(1958)65].Although it is
impossible to determine the exact influence of Greek bankers on
the management of that institution,it appears to have been
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substantial.Greek capitalists participated in all boards of
directors between 1872 and 1882 and most of this time formed the
majority (3).Besides the Societe Generale and the Imperial bank
were found on different sides at least once:when the Pinard loan
of 1869 was contracted.As already pointed out,the influence of the
Imperial bank had diminished dramatically after 1865 when the
rival groups of the Societe Generale of Paris and the Credit
Ottoman,as well as that of Comptoir d'Escompte succeeded in
depriving the bank of participation in all the Ottoman loans
raised between 1865 and 1873 (see above,Ch.I,31).Therefore one may
assume that the influence of the Imperial Bank upon the Societe
Generale had to a large extent diminished after 1865 while that of
Greek bankers increased.
The participation of Greek capital was certainly less
influential in the case of the Ottoman Financial Association which
was founded a few months after the Societe Generaie.The bank was
the creation of Lewis Fariey,backed by a group of English
capitalists headed by P Kitson who was simultaneously the Director
of the London based International Contract company
[FARLEY(1865)15].Farley however,secured the support of some of the
Greek bankers and merchants who had been overlooked by the Societe
Generaie:Stefano Mavrokordato,a leading merchant and banker of
Conple,and Pittaco and Constandinidi,two of the leading merchants
of Smyrna [LANDES(1958)66].The bank's capital was £1.000.000
divided into 20.000 shares of £50 each [ISKENDER(1874)79].The bank
was founded with the aim of conducting commercial banking both in
Smyrna and Con/ple.In the event,however,the London committee to
which the bank's policy was entrusted was more interested in
financing European than Turkish enterprise,and the bank's branches
in Con/pie and Smyrna were deprived of the necessary funds to
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conduct their business properly [FARLEY(1865)7-8.1O-15] .According
to a letter from Mavrokordato to Farley,only a few months after
the establishment of the Association in Con/pie the situation
looked desperate: "I see with regret that our rivals
succeed.The Societe Generale has concluded a loan for the
Government;we on the the contrary,sink daily on account of the bad
position that the Executive committee in London have created for
the branches....I rely on you for finding the way of saving the
interests of the bondholders and our own honour."[Cited in
FARLEY(1865)1O].Despite the attempts of Farley and Mavrokordato to
deflect capital to business conducted in Turkey the Bank was
almost completely destroyed one year later [LANDES(1958)66].
The economic situation within Turkey was favourable for the
creation of new combinations.The expectation of high profits was
the most important factor prompting the foundation of many new
establishments between 1868 and 1873.During this
period,companies with insufficient capital were liquidated only to
be replaced by new ones.This was the case with the two major Greek
houses which started operations in September 1868:the house of
Syngros,Coronio & Cie and that of Camara and Clado
[SYNGROS(1908)II,154-170,see also NEOLOGOS,8/6/1868].The history
of the establishment of these two houses reveals not only the
delicate balance among individual interests,but also the financial
habits of local bankers.
Syngros cooperated with Coronio after the Company of the
latter,Camara & Coronio had been liquidated in the middle of July
1868.According to Syngros it was thanks to the inducement of
Nassim Cammondo that he finally decided to accept Coronio as his
partner.Coronio's reputation among the financial cycles of Con/ple
was bad because,although an efficient banker,his activities as a
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speculator on the stock exchange and his extravagances made him
inappropriate for trustworthy banking operations.Syngros points
out,however,that Cammondo's interest in Coronio's future was not
only personal, "The position of his house[Cammondo's]did not
permit him to pay daily visits to the Turkish Ministries or to
confer with the people in the middle and lower echelons [of the
bureaucracy] ,peopie he needed most in order to do business with
the Government.He knew however that Zorzis[Coronio]was extremely
efficient in this job..." [SYNGROS(1908)II,158-159].In this way
Cammondo attempted to combine Syngros's inventiveness and aptitude
with Coronio's efficiency in dealing with the Ottoman bureaucracy
for his own affairs.In return he promised Syngros that he would
include him in every operation he was going to conduct in future
with the Ottoman government.Similar combinations were an everyday
reality in Con/pie where the capabilities of individual bankers
counted for more than the capital they employed,and the success of
banking affairs relied mostly on management.This is highligted by
the way profits were allocated.According to the statute of
Syngros's house the allocation of profits would be as follows;55%
to the management and 45% to the share holders.In addition one
might assume this allocation was more generous to the shareholders
than was usually the case [DERTILIS(1979)28-29].The capital of
Syngros's house was modest,reaching only £120.000.Syngros himself
paid up 35.000,Coronio 1O.000,and Scouludi,the third member of the
management,5.000.The remaining 70.000 was paid
	 up	 by	 the
shareholders.
On the other hand the house of Camara and Ciado had secured
the support of the "big" Greek
bankers,Zafiropoulo,zarifi,Stefanovic-Skiiitzi and Zografo.Most of
them,with the exception of Zarifi,who opted for participation in
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both houses,distrusted Coronio deeply and thought any affiliation
with him disastrous.In addition,Camara,who would later become
famous as the private banker of the Russian ambassador
Ignatief,had also secured the support of the Imperial Bank
[SYNGROS(1908)II,177-179,BOtJVIER(1962)683).Unfortunately there is
no information about the capital of Camara's house,although it is
reasonable to assume it did not exceed that of Syngros Coronio &
Cie.In the event however,the company of Syngro,Coronio & Cie
proved more succe5ful and when it was liquidated three years later
it showed profits far exceeding Syngros's expectations:35% on
invested capital.
However,the most important period in the development of
banking in Con/ple,particularly Greek banking,was that of
1871-73.During this period the Con/pie money market experienced an
unprecedented influx of European capital.In fact,the inf low of
European capital into Con/pie between 1871 and 1873 began during
the Franco-Prussian war.This war saw the flight of French capital
to London and Paris.As a consequence the liquid assets of the
recipient banking houses in these cities increased
dramatically.Soon,however,this extra capital became a burden.Given
the uncertainties deriving from the war,the employment of this
capital in Europe was difficult.The same was not true for the
Con/ple money market.Part of this capital eventually found its way
to Con/ple.Greek bankers were among those who took advantage of
the situations.
Syngros's conversation with Bischoffsheim in 1870 is
revealing.Syngros went to London to find credit only to discover
this market was tight.When he visited the house of Bischoffsheim
he believed the latter's response would also be negative.Yet,tO
Syngros's surprise,Bischoffshein told him that	 "At this moment
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I face serious problems because my liquid assets have increased
dramatically for my father sent me large sums from Paris which I
don't know what to do with...Therefore I am pleased to hear you
making this proposal of discounting transactions of Turkish
Treasury bonds and I hope that we will do a lot of business
together in the future."The credit Syngros got was certainly
beyond his expectations.Instead of the UOO.000 he had asked
for,Bischoffshein offered him £400.000 with interest at 3.5% and a
margin on the bonds Syngros placed as security of
20%. [SYNGROS(1908) 11,262].
However,the financial developments following France's defeat
affected the Con/pie money market far more (4).As a consequence
of the war Vienna rose as the new financial capital of Europe.The
large war indemnity paid by France found its way to the Austrian
capital.Never in this city had investing fever reached such levels
as those during 1871-73.Large amounts of Viennese capital were
eventually introduced in Turkey.The results can be seen in the
establishment of two major banks;the Austro-Ottoman bank,and the
Societe Austro-Turque (Report by RUMBOLD,in A&P(1872)LIX,588,DU
VELAY(1903)202-203].Not surprisingly,Greek capitalists found in
this new development an excellent opportunity to expand their
affairs.The first bank founded by Austrian capital was the Banque
Austro-Ottomane.In the establishment of this bank participated
some of the major Viennese banks such as the Union Bank and the
Anglo-Austrian Bank.Along side the Austrian banks however,ofle
finds the Societe General de l'Empire Ottoman which was also
involved in this affair [DU VELAY(1903)203,MORAWITZ(1902)43-44].
Greek involvement,however,was much more significant in the
second bank founded by Austrian capital.In January 1872 an article
appeared in Neologos reporting that Kostas Karapanos,CriStaki
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Zografo's son-in-law,and a member of the managing board of the
Societe Generale,had gone to Vienna to negotiate with some of the
leading banks and bankers of this city the establishment of a bank
in the Turkish capital [NEOLOGOS,1/2/1872].On 13th March 1872 the
same newspaper reported that "With national pride we are
announcing that the Greek element of our city which first
conceived and put in practi5 the joint stock credit companies
which greatly contributed in the welfare of this
country [Turkey]...has once more taken the initiative of that
important affair[the Societe Austro-Turque]...as one can ascertain
from the indefatigable efforts of	 Karapanos	 in Vienna."
[NEOLOGOS,13/3/1872].Four days later on 17 March 1873 the
announcement of the establishment of the Societe Austro-Turque wS
was published in Neologos.According to the newspaper the
participation of Greek capital	 in the new bank was
considerable.Six of the eight Con/politan bankers who took part in
this	 operation	 were
Greeks:Zarifi,Zografo,Karapano,Ralli,Stefanovic-SkilitZi and
Vlasto.Alongside the Greek bankers were Cammondo and Otto Ullman,a
former employee of the Jewish house of Stern of London,who had
close relations with Zarifi.Not surprisingly,the Societe Generale
also took part.Among the Viennese bankers and Banks participating
in the Societe Austro-Turgue were the Union Bank of Vienna,the
Banque Anglo-Autrichienne and the house of Oppenheim.The bank's
capital was £2 million,divided into 100.000 shares.The bank would
be involved almost exclusively in operations with the
Treasury,though according to the announcement in Neologos,it would
also be involved in commercial banking and trade.The Greek
presence in the first board of directors was impressive.Christaki
Zografo became president of the bank,while all participating Greek
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bankers were also elected to this board.The banks's establishment
was followed by a frenetic public subscription.In European
capitais,demand for the Bank's shares reached the impressive
number of 3.272.560.In Con/ple,the pulic also subscribed heavily
and demand reached 118.000 shares [NEOLOGOS,19/3/1872].
However, the initial success of the Bank and the enthusiastic
public subscription should have been expected.Foliowing the end of
the war in Europe the confidence of the European public in joint
stock companies reached its zenith.It is no exaggeration to say
the concept of the joint stock company had become legendary.And
although this legend lost most of its appeal after the 1873
financial crises in Vienna and Beriin,in 1871-72 the public was
very happy to buy shares in joint stock companies.The joint stock
company fever reached Con/pie during the early 1870's and by the
mid 1871 this process was well under way.In November 1871 there
were already nine joint stock companies in Con/ple
[NEOLOG0S,20/11/1871] .Alongside the well-founded establishments of
this city,such as the Imperial bank,the Societe General and the
Credit Ottoman,one finds others which,to say the least,had no
future at all.Such impressive names as the Russian Bank,The
Agricultural bank,the Credit Company of Estates etc may have
appealed to the public but their eventual liquidation was only a
matter of time.In November 1872 Neologos announced the
establishment of the German Oriental bank by Raili,E Baitazzi and
some German capitalists,an institution which never operated
[NEOLOG0s,16/11/1872] .Yet between November 1871 and November 1872
Con/pie had acquired at least ten new establishments.The bank of
Ralli and Nomico,The Bank of Cossoudi & Verisi,the Bank of Parisi
and Calouthi,the Societe Minerale Ottomane,the Societe Cornmerciale
Ottomane,the Credit Industriel d'Orient,the Banque de Con/ple,The
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Societe Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs and the Societe des
Tramways [ISKENDER(1874)69-70].Most of these institutions had
insufficient capital while others were totally devoid, of it.All
of them however,had been founded in the hope that a succe$ful
public subscription might contribute to the establishment of
sufficient capital.
Not surprisingly,Greek capital participated in almost every
one of these new establishments,As later experience would
show,most of them proved shortlived and had to .
 wind up their
affairs when a series of financial crises broke out in Con/ple
between 1873 and 1875.}Iowever two of the banks founded with Greek
capital were to play an important role in Ottoman finances
and,therefore,special attention must be paid to them.They were the
Banque de Con/pie and the Societe Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs.
The Banque de Con/ple was founded by Syngros Coronio and
Scouloudi in November 1871.Syngros and his two partners had
decided to liquidate their company in April of the same year
[SYNGROS(1908)III,3-4].Syngros himself was reluctant to engage its
capital again in an establishment similar to that of
Syngro,Coronio&Cie considering that a joint stock company ,where
personal responsibilities were reduced,would be more
appropriate.The reasons which led Syngros to this decision can be
found in the increasing risks which his company faced after the
1869 financial crisis (see below, I7O).During his visit to London
in 1871 Syngros had come to an understanding with Bischoffsheim to
place the shares of his new bank on the London stock exchange.When
Syngros had reached a agreement with his two partners,he proceeded
with the establishment of the Banque de Con/ple which started
operations on the 20th May 1872.The bank's capital was £1.000.000
divided into 100.000 shares.The arrangement was
	 that the
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shareholders would pay the first instalment of j6 when they
subscribed [SYNGROS(1908)III,3].Syngros in his memoirs recounts
that "according to our statute the bank would start operations
as soon as the 2/3 of the capital had been paid up.Within a few
days we were offered subscriptions of 52.000 shares while the
public subscription in London and Con/pie had not yet begun."
[SYNGROS(1908)III,7,see also DU VELAY(1903)204] .The introduction
of an Ottoman bank in the London stock exchange had never taken
place before.
Syngros had also secured the assistance of the Imperial bank
which guaranteed the issuing of shares [DU VELAY(1903)204].Antonis
Vlasto,a former Director of the Societe Generale and a personal
friend of Syngros,soon joined the direction of the new bank.In
addition,on Coronio's insistence,Syngros asked Zarifi to join the
bank along with 0 Negreponte,a leading merchant of Bucharest and
Zarifi's son-in-law.According to Syngros
	
"I thought that in this
way	 I	 introduced conservative elements[to	 the	 bank's
rnanagement],and at the same time I was relieved of a large part of
the burden." [SYNGROS (1908) 111,28-91 .This move,however,was
accepted favourably in Con/ple.According to the Levant Herald
"The Bank de Con/pie has very wisely strenghtened its board...by
enrolling upon it Mr G.Zarif I and Mr 0 Negreponte.G Zarifi enjoys
a financial reputation second to none in the Levant and is beyond
all question a financial power.O Negreponte is also a man whose
respectability and business qualifications 	 render him an
aquisition to the board which he has joined" [LEVANI
HERALD,5/4/1875].As was to be expected the bank was to be involved
in operations with the Treasury,although its statute also provided
for commercial	 banking,involvement 	 in public works	 ta
farming,loans	 to	 individuals	 etc	 [IMEROLOGION	 TIE
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ANATOLIS (1878) 283]
The Societe Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs was founded a few
months later by one of Syngros's rivals Pavios Clado.After the
liquidation of Camara & Clado company in 1871,Clado was also in
favour of joint stock banks.His partnership with Evgenidi,who
until 1871 was a private banker with a modest capital of
	 3O.00O
and Barker,an English capitalist living in Con/pie at
	 the
time,resulted in the establishment of the Societe Ottoman which
began operations on 18th November 1872 with a capital of 6OO.00O
of which only half was paid up.The bank's shares had been
guaranteed by the Credit Ottoman.According to an announcement
published in Neologos the bank would be involved in"the ordinary
works of banking and commercial mediation and in addition would
undertake any transaction with commission,abstaining at the same
time from any speculative activities on bonds of wares"
[NEOLOGQS,18/11/1872].In fact,the bank's statute provided for
transactions with the government either on the bank's own account
or on behalf of other capitalists.In addition it provided for the
issuing of bonds not exceeding the bank's
	 liquid assets
[IMEROLOGION TIS ANATOLIS(1878)286-7].The Societe Ottomane
was,perhaps,the only bank which was not exclusively involved in
transactions with the government.The first board of directors
consisted solely of the founders and there is no indication
whatever of any direct participation by other
	 Greek
bankers. [NEOLOGOS,18/11/1872].
Between the years of 1872 and 1874 the Con/pie Stock Exchange
of Con/pie presented the following picture.
TABLE V:
Name,	 Year Nominal Capital Subscribed capital
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The bulk of these companies intended to involved themselves
in transactions with the Treasury.However,this did not
happen.Instead,most of these newly founded establishments became
heavily involved in speculation.The continuous influx of capital
into Con/pie during that period pushed up share prices to the
highest possible levei.A contemporary observer recounts that,
"speculators in bonds and shares used to buy either with their own
capital or by borrowing.The extent of such borrowimg usually
exceeded their cash reserves five and even seven
times" [VALSAMAKI (1874a)38] .According to the same source profits
from speculation reached 20-25% while the traditional transactions
with	 the	 Treasury	 yielded	 profits	 of	 12-18%.One
realises,therefore,that during this period profits were
substantial enough to tempt the most astute of capitalists.It was
the "golden era" of the Con/pie money market.
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Banking and financial crises.
Yet the fact that Greek and other local bankers enjoyed high
rates of profit does not necessarily imply that the Con/pie money
market was stable.Greek bankers were faced with a severe financial
crisis as early as 1861.In fact,periodical crises in Con/pie were
as common as high interest rates.Once again the inelasticity of
banking investment in Con/pie was mostly responsible for the
embarrassments the Con/poiitan bankers and other local capitalists
faced throughout the period under discussion.This aspect of
banking in Con/pie combined with credit restrictions in Europe
usually resulted in financial crisis affecting dramatically the
Con/ple money market as well as the bankers of this city.On the
other hand,European credit was conditional upon two
factors:poiitical and financial stability in Europe and the
abiiity of the Ottoman state to pay interest on its Debt
regulariy.In addition,poiitical instability within Turkey also
affected the money market in Con/ple although in a somewhat
indirect way.The cost of suppressing inssurections inevitably
restricted the Treasury's liquid assets and consequently the
Ottoman state's ability to service its debt.In this case,the
repercussions on the prices of Ottoman bonds were heavy,causing
substantial damage to individual holders.The balance1therefore1was
very delicate and if one,or a combination of,these conditions did
not exist the effects on the money market of Con/pie were felt
heavily:credit facilities in Europe were restricted and panic
spread among the bankers and capitalists of this city.On the other
hand to overcome financial crisis,large amounts of money were
required and only when the contraction of credit was recalled
could business go on as usuai.
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Of course not all Greek houses were affected by these crises
to the same extent.Houses with good reputation in Europe were
always in a position to get credit.This,however,was possible only
at high cost,which consumed a part of the anticipated
profits.Things were worse with small houses,especially these with
a questionable reputation,which suffered severely.
The first financial crisis in Con/pie broke out in January
1861.It followed the failure of the Mires loan issued in December
1860,which to a certain extent was associated with the crisis.As
already stated,the amount of the Internal debt held by local
bankers in 1859 exceeded 440 million fr.Local bankers in their
turn,were heavily indebted to European,particularly French,houses
[DU VELAY(1903)164-165].They borrowed money using short term
commercial paper.Syngros recounts that in this way almost all
Greek bankers borrowed money far beyond their own capital.Some
times they even used false drawees in per commodo transactions
[SYNGROS(1908)II,30-33] .Comrnercial paper was discounted in
European houses which in their turn re-discounted it to the Banque
de France or the Bank of England.Presumably local bankers used the
money received in this way for further advances to the Treasury
enjoining high interest rates.Not surprisingly,the Turkish
government was anxious to liquidate this debt and for this reason
it sought to raise a loan abroad.With the London market having no
confidence in Ottoman finances,the government turned to Paris the
only money market at the time purportedly willing to provide a
loan,In Paris a loan of 400 million fr was successfully negotiated
with Mires,the Director of the Caisse Generale des Chemins des
Fer.Mires in his turn,knowing nothing about Ottoman finances found
co-operation with local bankers absolutely necessary.He turned to
the Bank of Turkey,the largest credit institution at the time,and
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offered it a place in its syndicate,an offer which was finally
accepted.Three members of the Bank's managing
board,Rodocanachi,Glavany and Hanson,became its representatives in
the syndicate [DLI VELAY(1903)159-161].The bank was assigned to
place 50.000 obligations in Con/pie through public
subscription.Yet,public subscription both in European capitals and
Con/pie certainly did not live up to Mires's expectations.Out of
250.000 obligations only 102.000 were finally soid.One must seek
the reason for the failure in the lack of confidence among the
European public in Ottoman finances.Although Mires's newspaper in
Paris,the Journal des Debats,attempted to soothe anxieties by
exposing the positive perspective of the Ottoman economy and its
unexploited resources,it finally achieved little.
The effects of the loan's failure were felt heavily upon
Con/pie's money market.One might say that the failure of the loan
simply precipitated an already smouldering crisis.Local bankers
had thought the issuing of this loan would enable the Ottoman
state to redeem them.In fact,what happened was quite the opposite
[BANKERS'MAGAZINE,1861,XXI,453].The loan's failure not only left
the Treasury empty,but also spread panic among	 the	 local
bankers'creditors who refused to renew credit facilities.In
addition,short term commercial paper payable by houses of Con/pie
reached maturity and was protested by its signatories.With no
credit facilities avaiiable,the position of local bankers became
onerous.The value of protested commercial paper held by the Banque
de France was equal to 50 million fr [DLI VELAY(1903)165].According
to Syngros,Greek and other local bankers in order to save their
reputation were forced to dispose of all their assets:jewels,gold
bullion,precious stones etc,along with all available liquid assets
were sent to France to pay	 the	 bankers'debts	 off
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[SYNGROS(1908)II,31].It was estimated that in February 1861 alone
£700.000 in gold were sent from Con/ple to Marseilles
[BANKERS'MAGAZINE,1861,XXI,137,204].As a consequence the losses of
the Banque de France,the largest single recipient of those bills
were less heavy than it was initially expected,reaching 10 milion
fr [DU VELAY(1903)166].In	 Con/ple,many	 local	 houses	 went
bankrupt:the houses of Rodochanachi,Baltazzi and Psychari,to refer
only to the big houses,had to wind up their affairs.In
addition,the Banque of Turkey was almost destroyed.Since the
crisis took place,the bank's affairs decreased rapidly until 1864
when it was finally liquidated.
In addition the crisis severei affected the London based
Greek metntile houses.According to the list of suspensions
published in the Bankers' Magazine,out of the 43 firms which went
bankrupt between January and June 1861 22 were in the Greek
trade,the overwhelming majority of which was owned by Greeks
[BANKERS'MAGAzINE,1861,xxl,134-5,209,456,597 (4)).Most of these
establishments conducted business with Con/pie based houses and
inevitably found themselves involved in the revulsion of this
market.As the Bankers'Magazine pointed out, "the value of
money has naturally been regulated by this exceptional situation
of things and the distrust thrown upon the Greek interests has
necessitated the payment of high rates of discount especially
among those whose credit has not been first class...the principal
of the large establishments are...presumed to be safe except in as
much as the losses they may have incurred by the by the smaller
suspensions will have to be provided for."
[BANKERS'MAGAZINE,thid,138].By March 1861 it appears that the
worst had passed and confidence had been restored.Yet it was only
in April 1861 that the repercussions of the crisis finally
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subsided.The remaining Greek firms were again in a position to
meet their liabilities: "the strength of the first class Greek
establishments has been for the moment well tested and it is
believed that their wealth and resources have been strained to the
utmost to preserve their character in discount circles.In this
they have no doubt succeeded but it will yet require great care
and discretion to surmount the effect of the late revulsion."
(BANKERS ' MAGAZINE, 1861, 279-80]
A combination of political and financial instability in
Europe along with the financial embarrassments of the Ottoman
government led to the financial crisis of 1866.In April 1866 the
Ottoman state was not in a position to pay the coupons of the
General Debt.The war between Austria and Prussia made it difficult
to raise a new loan in the European money markets
	 [DO
VELAY(1903)276-277].As a consequence the price of the
Consolides[bonds of the General Debt]fell sharply.According to a
letter from Zarifi to M Renieris,the Director of the National bank
of Greece"these news [the war in Europe] considerably affected our
market...contributing to the pushing up of exchanges,while
credit[from Europe]is provided to good houses only" [ETE,letter
dated,11/4/1866].Two days lat@r in another letter he pointed out
that"the distrust which is sreading in our market derives from the
decline in the prices of Turkish bonds...Damages caused by this
decline are substantial...and credit is restricted to reliable
houses only,because these days our market lacks good payers."
[ETE,letter dated,13/4/1866].
The financial crisis which broke out in London in May 1866
aggravated the situation.This crisis soon assumed serious
dimensions.According to Michalis Zarifi,bankruptcies followed one
another.In a letter to the director of the National Bank of
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Greece,Renieris,Michalis Zarifi reported that by 17 May 1866 the
total loss from bankruptcies had exceeded £ 10 million and that
the Bank of England was forced to back protested commercial paper
at the value of £ 4 million.As a result the discount rates of the
Bank of England increased to 9-1O%,an enormous increase if one
takes into account that usually these rates varied between 3-3.5%
[ETE/L letter dated,17/5/1866].Despite the fact that the danger
finally elapsed,the repercussions of this crisis led many more
companies to bankruptcy.According to Michalis Zarifi it was the
import of capital from America along with the increasing hopes for
peace in Europe which finally stabilized the financial situation
[ETE/L,letter dated,30/5/1866].The bankruptcy of the Imperial
Mercantile Association,where,G Zarifi's brother M Zarifi,had been
a member of the managing board,leaving only two months before the
actual crisis broke out,and that of the Oriental commercial bank
of Pappas,destroyed two houses closely linked with the Greek
banking houses of Con/ple [Zarifi to Vouros,Letter dated,17/5/1866
(6)]
The combination of the war,the financial embarrassment of the
Ottoman government and the financial crisis in London,resulted in
severe restrictions of credit.European banks were reluctant to
lend their money to local bankers or to discount bills of exchange
payable by Con/politan houses.As a consequence many,particularly
small houses,had to wind up their affairs.Between April 1866 and
June of the same year five houses went bankrupt in Con/ple:the
house of Giuliani a former employee of Oppenhaim and Alberti,that
of Giudi,a Franco-].evantjne private banker and that of an Armenian
named Harens.In addition,two Greek houses also wound up their





amounted to £150.000.The end of the war in Europe and the short
term advances of local bankers which enabled the Treasury to pay
the coupons of several Ottoman loans stabilized again the position
of the money market of Con/ple.
The prospects of war between Germany and France in the summer
of 1869 combined with the financial embarrassments of the Treasury
once more led to financial crisis [DERTILIS(1979)33].The loan of
125 million fr which accompanied the establishment of the Credit
General Ottoman 1869 proved insufficient to meet the needs of the
Treasury.The political uncertainty in Europe restricted credit
facilities and many Con/politan bankers again found themselves in
a difficult position.Between June and October of 1869 Zarifi
reported the bankruptcy of five houses.In June 1869,S Treves a
Jewish banker,Livanis and Anastasiadi,two Greek private bankers1
went bankrupt with a loss of i30.000.In October two other houses
wound up their affairs:that of Zanos & Saraf is with a loss of
£50.000 and that of Rodochanachi and Agelasto with a loss of
£30.000 [ETE,letters dated,16/6/1869 and,14/1O/1869).The house of
Syngros was also in a difficult position.When the crisis broke out
this house was heavily indebted in
Europe.Syngros,however,succeeded in averting bankruptcy when Sadyk
Pasha,the Minister of Finance and Syngros's personal
friend,returned part of the Ministry's debt to Syngros amounting
to 5 million fr [SYNGROS(1908)II,202].The financial situation in
Con/ple was stabilized only when the Pinard loan was contracted in
November of 1869.Not inaccurately Syngros described this loan as
"a true salvation for the money market of our city".
}lowever,political instability in Europe once again resulted
in credit restrictions.The war of 1870-71 between Germany and
France severely affected the money market of Con/ple [Report by
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Vice consul Wrench,A&P,1878(LXXIV),no 74,818-819].According to
Syngros "in the middle of July [1870]arrived the news of the
declaration of war in Europe...and[the news of]the decline of
prices of all state bonds and debentures,particularly those of
countries with questionable credit,such as Turkey whose credit was
based	 on	 absolute
[political]tranquillity".[SYNGROS(1908)II,213].The decline of
prices of Turkish bonds was followed by panic and,inevitably by
contraction of credit.On 27 July 1870 Zarifi reported that
"distrust and lack of money are increasing...the position of all
exchanges bonds and debentures is unstable...Transactions on
exchange are limited because people here are afraid...choosing to
send remittances in gold rather than exchange." [ETE,letter dated
27/6/1870] .After two weeks the bank of England increased the
discounting rate to 6%. [ETE,letter dated
10/7/1870].Therefore,credjt from London,the only money market
still in a position to advance money to local bankers,became not
only more difficult to get but also more expensive.At the time the
debts of Con/politan bankers in Europe were,as usual,heavy.For
example,Syngros's debts in French and English houses amounted to
20 million fr.Available and cheap French capital which had found
refuge in London was mobilised,thus saving the situation.In
addition the panic with regard to Ottoman bonds subsided and in
November 1870 the price of the bonds of the General
Debt(Consolides) recovered,reaching 57.5 piastres.Local bankers
were now in a position to provide acceptable securities to the
European banks in order to renew their credit.In this way many
Greek bankers escaped bankruptcy although at a high cost.They were
forced to dispose of their titles,to have their bills of exchange
discounted at a considerable reduction,or to place as security
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bonds with large margin.
The period following the war was,as has already been pointed
out,a convenient one for the Con/pie money market.Yet in May of
1873,a severe financial crisis broke out in Vienna and its
repercussions affected Con/pie to a considerable extent.Since this
crisis broke out,and until the Ottoman suspension of payments in
October 1875 took place,the money market of Con/pie remained in an
extremely vulnerable position.This crisis differed from the others
in the sense that it had more lasting effects.The roots of the
crisis in Con/pie are found in the inelasticity of capital
investments.The flow of capital which enabled the establishment of
many banks and credit institutions did not change investment
attitudes.In the event,when the Vienna financial crisis broke out
panic spread among the capitalists of Con/ple.They were heavily
indebted in Europe and thought this crisis would affect them
dramatically.
The situation is eloquently described in one of De Vogue's
letters to the French Foreign Minisrty, "For three years the
Galata market has been full with shares of societies and companies
founded during these years.The statute of most of them provided
for industrial activities yet in reality they were all involved in
advances to the Treasury and in speculation in the stock
exchange...the value of the shares of most of these companies did
not correspond to any productive basis...but instead was based on
the plight of the Treasury,a fragile basis which was bound to
collapse in a crisis:this eventually happened and two months after
the Vienna crisis a sharp decline[in prices] followed,which
absorbed the majority of fortunes in this place." [AN
F30/356,letter dated 29/1O/1873].Yet the repercussions of this
crisis were not as heavy as is usually beiieved.In one of his
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letters to Renieris,Zarif i reported: "I want to bring to your
attention the sharp decline of all prices of bonds and debentures
which took place in our market because of the Vienna
crisis...Panic and fear prevailed in our market...but fortunately
the situation now shows signs of recovery," [ETE,letter dated
23/5/1873].In addition,Zarifi did not report bancruptcies of
banking houses as he usually did when the previous crisis took
place.In fact,the only companies which were severely affected by
the Vienna crisis were those established by Viennese capitai:the
Societe Austro-Turgue and the Banque Austro-Ottomane.The former
wound up its affairs one year later in July 1874 while the latter
merged with the Ottoman bank in late 1874 [YOUNG(1906)27,DU
VELAY(1903)203).This is not to say that the Vienna crisis affected
the money market of Con/pie only marginally.It is more correct to
say that,despite the crisis,most of the banking institutions of
this city succeeded in escaping banruptcy if at a considerable
loss.
The situation was temporarily saved by the loans which the
Ottoman government raised in summer 1873.However,the financial
situation in Con/pie remained precarious,to say the
least.Moreover,the difficulties the Ottoman state had in servicing
its debt increased during the years 1874 and 1875.European money
markets,alerted by the continuous delays in payments were
unwilling to raise new loans for the Ottoman government.In this
way,a crisis deriving from Ottoman insolvency immediately followed
the repercussions of the Vienna crisis.In November 1873 Layard
reported that
	
"The financial crisis which prevails in so many
places is being felt at Con/pie more severely than anywhere
else.Many of
	 the	 largest establishments	 find	 themselves
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Table VI:The movement of share prices of the major
banking establishme n ts in Con/pie*.
Source:Cours des fonds 	 found in Zarifi's
correspovIe.ce with the National Bank of Greece
*Note : Estjmatjons based on incomplete data.
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to find money for the immediate necessities of the public
service." [F078/2272,letter dated,3/11/1873].In another report,the
British Vice counsul Wrench makes no reference to the Vienna
crisjs..Instead he ascribes the crisis to the financial
embarrassment of the Ottoman state [A&P(1878)LXXIV,no 74,819].
Indeed the Empire's financial problems were largely
responsible for this crisis.Local houses again found themselves in
a position where they could not pay their debts in Europe.The
decline in the prices of Ottoman bonds which followed the
embarrassments of the Ottoman state,severeiy affected those
companies which were mostly involved in speculation in Ottoman
bonds.In the circumstances,the inelasticity of capital investment
in Con/ple proved to be a major obstacle and combined with the
continual problems of the Ottoman government in servicing its
debt,aggravated the crisis.The panic in the stock exchange of
Con/pie also affected the share prices of all the major banks.With
speculators selling everything they had,the share prices of these
establishments fell dramatically.In March 1874 the price of shares
of the Societe Generale fell to £6 while a year before they had
been priced at £13 [See Table VI] .The shares of the Credit Ottoman
fell from £T19 to £T7,those of the Banque de Con/pie from £9 to £4
[VALSAMAKI(1874a)40-41].Although there is no detailed information
regarding the total losses incurred during the crisis,a draft
assessment provided by a contemporary source puts the total damage
at £3 million [NEOLOGOS,13/3/1875].
Nevertheless,the crisis of 1873 and early 1874 was followed
by a financial recovery in the summer and autumn of
1874.Shareprices were stabilized and financial activities
recovered.That is particularly true for banks such as the Societe
Generale and the Banque de Con/pie which during 1874 showed good
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profits. [see below,Ch.VIII,201,ZlI ] .However,in early 1875 the Ottoman
governnet was still in a predicament.The service of the Public
debt was achieved with great difficulty and at a high cost.Not
surprisingly,European bondholders responded with mass sales of
Ottoman bonds.Prices fell sharply,with the Consolides priced below
45 piastres.According to a report in Neologos on the 23/1/1875 the
situation in the Con/ple Stock exchange was desperate with the
speculators in a state of panic and fear selling shares and bonds
at their disposal in order to minimise the damage.Due to
increasing panic what followed was mass sales of bonds and shares.
During 1874-1876 most of the banks and companies of Con/ple
involved in speculation were forced to wind up their affairs.In
fact,speculation was based on financial order,and the continuous
influx of capital.Once these conditions were no more,the fragile
basis of these banks inevitably collapsed.The liquidation of the
Societe Austro-Turque in July 1874 was followed by the liquidation
of the bank of Ralli and Nomico.The increasing financial
difficulties of the Ottoman government in January 1875 affected
the prices of Ottoman bonds and as a consequence the position of
local banks.This time the Societe Commerciale Ottomane was
liquidated in March 1875 due to unacceptable losses
[NEOLOGOS,3/3/1875].In addition,a decision was reached in April
1875 by the shareholders of the bank of Verisi and Cossoudi to
liquidate the bank,which was finally implemented in June of the
same year [NEOLOGOS,15/4/1875 and,1O/6/1875].Other institutions
such as the Banque des Courtages and the Bank of Parisi and
Calouthi had already been forced to wind up their affairs during
late 1874.Not surprisingly,in the circumstances,the money market
of Con/ple experienced severe restrictions of credit because
European bankers were alarmed to the prospect of an Ottoman
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insolvency and,therefore,reluctant to advance money under such
unfavourable conditions.
In this way,apart from the brief financial recovery of summer
1874,the Con/pie money market suffered its most severe and
prolonged crisis between May 1873 and April 1875.During this
period almost all of the institutions founded between 1871 and
1873 were liquidated.It appears that the repercussions of the
crisis were so overwhelming that they frustrated even the most
ardent supporters of the joint stock companies.Neologos,a
newspaper advocating the idea of association,was among the first
to realise the failure.In one article it admitted that "In the
East,the idea of associations(stock companies) failed,proving to
be only a false image of its successful counterpart in the
West...It is true that there are some well known exceptions both
in Turkey and Greece...but exceptions always exist.By and large
what prevailed was failure...which
	 unveiled	 the miserable
conditions (of stock companies) [NEOLOGOS,13/3/1875] .According to
the same account the failure is ascribed to most
companies instead of serving the general interests of the country
were involved only in speculation.The article goes to wondering
"how after so many years of economic and political development
of Turkey,our country lacks a modern textile industry,metal
industry,paper industry,shipping industry etc".This pessimistic
aproach is supported by another contemporary source.A Valsamaki
with an article in Economici Epitheorisi also points out the
failure of the "association" in the East ,empkccising the disastrous
effects of speculation which in the period of 1871-74 was the main
activity of many banking institutions [VALSAMAKI(1874a)].
Yet,these results should only be expected.The fragile basis
of all institutions heavily involved in speculation certainly
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could not prevent the final catastrophe.Those still secured were
the banks which had the prudence or wisdom not to involve
themselves in speculation,at least to an extent which would
jeopardise their position.These banks were the Societe
Generale,the Credit Ottoman ,the Banque de Con/ple and the Societe
Ottoman des Changes et Valeurs.In addition all wealthy local
bankers,the Greeks included,also survived the crisis.No doubt all
of them suffered damages,mostly because they were bondholders,some
times to a significant extent,in all those institutions which were
forced to wind up their affairs.Yet,the bulk of their capital was
engaged in short term advances to the Treasury which,most of the
time were sufficiently secured.
The Ottoman government declared the suspension of payments on
its Public Debt in October 1875.When this happened the situation
within the money market of Con/ple was already clarified.Most of
the city's banks and joint stock companies had been liquidated or
went bankrupt.The money market of Con/ple had suffered severe
damages and the banking houses which survived the crisis faced
new difficulties,name].y how to get back the money they had lent to
the Ottoman government.
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Notes to CHAPTER VI.
(1) The Societe des Tramways was founded in 1871 by a group of
local banks and capitalists,including Zografo
Effendi,Zarifi,Vlasto,the Societe Generale,etc and the Imperial
Bank.The concession was granted to K Karapano who also became the
company's first Director.He remained in this Post untill 1876.The
company created the first civil transportation in Con/ple by using
coaches
[PECH(1906)194-197,GARDIcA-ALExANDR0P0UL0U(1983)328-329] .The
Compagnie des Eaux de Con/pie was founded in 1874 with the puprose
of providing water to parts of the city.The company would use
water from the lake of Dercos located on Kara-Bouroun and then
distribute it in Pera and Galata.The concession was initially
granted to Kiamil Bey,the Sultan's Grand maitre des ceremonies,who
after facing many difficulties sold the company to a group of
European and local capitalists.This group included the Banque de
Con/ple,the Societe
	 Generale,the	 Imperial	 Bank,the	 Banque
d'escompte	 of	 Paris,Zarifi3Oppenheirn,Caminondo 	 etc
[PECH (1906) 175-177,THOBIE (1977) 141-142]
(2) The house of Zarifi and Zafiropoulo directly participated in
the following companies:Societe Generale de l'Empire Ottoman
1864,Syngro,Coronio & Cie 1868,Clado and Camara 1868,Societe des
Tramways 1871,Socjete Austro-Turque
	 1872,Banque	 de	 Con/pie
1872,Regie des
	 Tabacs	 de	 Con/pie	 1872,Company	 for	 the
encouragement of tobacco cultivation and trade 1872,Shipping
company "He Pontoporia",1871,Bank of Verisi & Cossoudi
1872,Societe Minerale Ottomane 1871,Societe Commerciale Ottomane
1872,Credit industriel 1873,Bank of Smyrna 1874?,Societe des Eaux
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de Con/pie 1877.
(3) The compositipn of the board of the Societe Generaie between
the years 1872-1882 was as follows:
1872:G Zarifi president,D Fernandez,A Baltazzi,S Raili,E Devaux,Z
Stefanivick,A Vlasto,M Foster,O Oiman,C Zografo.
1874:A Baitazzi president,Z Stefanovik,E Devaux,D Fernandes,M
Foster,S Raiii,L Zarifi,G Zarifi,C Zografo.
1875:G Zarifi president,O Ulman,C Zografo,L Zarifi,Z Stefanovik,M
Fister,S Raiii,K Karapano,D Fernandes.
1877:Z Stefanovik president,D Fernandes,G	 Zarifi,L	 Zarifi,M
Foster,E Devaux,O Missirly,S Fernandes.
1879:S Fernandes president,M Foster,A Raiii,E Devaux,B Skilitsi,L
Zarifi 3 O Missirly.
1880:L Zarifi president,Z	 Stefanovik,E	 Devaux,O	 Missirly,D
Fernandes,A Ralii,M Foster.
1881:M Foster president,Z Stefanovik,L 	 Zarifi,D	 Fernandes,E
Devaux,O Missiriy,A Raili.
1882:Z Stefanovik president,D Fernandes,M	 Foster,E	 Devaux,L
Zarifi,A Ralli 3 O Missirly.
(4) In addition,the "Great Depression" in Europe had also
affected the Con/pie money market.After two years of investment
abstention,due to the Franco-Prussian war,the public in Europe
rushed to reinvest its money.Yet,the first signs of the Depression
were apparent.Deposits on the other hand increased rapidly.In the
event,European banks found their coffers full of money which they
could not invest because investment opportunities in Europe were
siim.Therefore,they were willing to lend this capital to Greek
bankers who,as always,were expanding their affairs with the
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Ottoman Treasury.Nevertheless the impact of the Great Depression
on the Con/pie money market was shortlived.European banks and
banking houses soon were aware of the predicament of Ottoman
in 1874 and became increasingly reluctant to lend their
money to Con/politan bankers.
(5) The crisis affected both the large and small houses.The list
reports	 the	 names	 of
Zizinias ,Salvago,Maurogordato,Rodochanakj (Manchester)
,Schilizi,Vouros,Rallj,and others.The
	 total	 loss	 of	 these
establishments	 is	 estimated	 as	 high	 as	 £	 1.800.000
[BANKERS'MAGAZINE,1861,XXI ,136,208,457]
(6) This letter is included in Vouros papers cuntly kept in
Haritatos private archives in Athens.Many thanKs are aknowledged. to
Katerina Boura who provided me with a copy of the letter.
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CikPPi VII:The turning point:the period 1875-1881.
The suspension of payments on the service of the Ottoman
loans was the prelude to the establishment of the Public debt
Administratjon.Djd this decision surprise local bankers?To a
certain extent it did,although there were signs that such a
measure would be implemented sooner rather than later.The
increasing financial difficulties of the Ottoman state during the
last two years led to this conclusion and there is no indication
whatever that the suspension could be avoided.In a letter
addressed to the Earl of Derby on 7 September 1875,Sir Henry
Elliot,the British Ambassador in Con/ple,reported that the Ottoman
government intended to reduce the payments on its Public Debt
drastically [A&P(1876)LXXXIV,2].In fact that is what happened.The
Ottoman government proclaimed that the interest payments would be
reduced by half ,while the unredeemed part would be paid in new
bonds bearing 5% interest and payable after 5 years
(BRtJNSWIK(1875)22-24] .Not surprisingly,the prices of Ottoman bonds
were substantially affected.In a letter to the National Bank of
Greece,Zarifi reported that "as a consequence of this measure
all values(of bonds and shares) declined.Although this decline is
sharp,the position of our market seems stable and it appears that
no bankruptcies will occur,unless the decline continues."
[ETE,letter dated,26/1O/1875].When the complete suspension of
Ottoman payments finally took place in March 1876,the price of
Ottoman bonds
	 declined further:after the
	 suspension the
Consolides' price plunged to 12 piastres.
The details of this development will be discussed in a
following chapte ,yet one must point out that the suspension was a
turning point in connection with Ottoman banking because it
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redefined its context.After the decision was taken,the Ottoman
government found itself isolated from all European money
markets.European banks and bankers which were already reluctant to
raise loans on Turkey's account as early as 1874 became,after
October 1875,absolutely negative.Cut off from European money
markets the Ottoman government,in order to raise money,had to
resort to local bankers,including the Imperial Bank.In addition
the government resorted to other measures such as,the issuing of
paper money(kaime),the imposition of further taxes,and the raising
of compulsory loans.Under these conditions,Greek bankers were in a
difficult position.They had to cope with the new
measures,particularly the issuing of paper money,which could
further destabilize the economy and spread confusion amongst
merchants with unforseable consequenses for the exchange.
In addition the position of some of the banks of Con/ple
which had been heavily involved in the Ottoman debt,and
particularly the Credit Ottoman,was shaken.The Credit Ottoman' s
portfolio consisted almost exclusively of Ottoman bonds and
therefore its losses were substantial [DtJ VELAY(1903)358].On the
other hand Greek banks and banking houses were affected by the
suspension of payments because they also kept Ottoman
bonds.However,their capital was mainly engaged in short term
advances to the Treasury the payment of which had not been
suspended.Yet they were anxious to safeguard the capital engaged
in these advances and,paradoxically,this could only be achieved by
renewing their loans to the Treasury and tried to obtain
sufficient guarantees for both old and new advances.Indeed the
strategy of Greek bankers during that period was to achieve the
best possible guarantees for even the smallest amount of money.It
appears that this strategy was finally successful.According to a
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letter of Harrison,the	 British member
	 of	 the	 Financial
Commision,to Salisbury, "The position of the present time in
regard to local loans is probably materially worse than it was six
months ago not only from the positive addition made to the amount
of these debts but from the circumstance that debts previously
unsecured and which perhaps have been arranged on better terms
have now received material guarantees." [letter dated 18/4/1879,in
F078/3067]
The desperate isolation of the Ottoman government from
European money markets was conspicuously manifested in the case of
the 1877 Defence loan.The agreement of September 1877 between the
government and the holders of the Ottoman loans of 1854 and
1877,enabled the former to secure a part of its revenue and pledge
it as guarantee for a new loan in Europe.It was agreed that a loan
of £5 million would be placed on the European markets through
public subscription.The contractors of the loan were the Imperial
bank and the London house of Glyn,Mills,Currie and Co [DtJ
VELAY(1903)372,BLAISDEL(1929)89]. yet public subscription in
European capitals failed miserably.The subscription in London
amounted to £5000 and came from India.In Paris the public
subscription was also unsuccessful.After this failure the Imperial
bank was forced to take the loan ferme and with the assistance of
the major local establishments ,such as the Societe Generale,and
the Societe Ottomane the loan was finally absorbed in Con/pie.
A second attempt to raise a loan in Europe followed,this time
on the part of the Financial committee (1).According to a letter
addressed to Salisbury,Harrison reported that the committee had
unanimously agreed to propose the raising of a loan of £20 million
in	 Europe	 [F078/3066,letter	 dated	 18/11/1878,see	 also
NEQLOGOS,8/5/1879].The loan would redeem the bondholders of the
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1854,1855,1871 and 1877 loans.In addition it would allow the
Treasury to meet its most urgent needs.Part of the loan would deal
with the paper money circulation,which at the time had reached the
ratio of 300 paper plastres to tOOoIctones.[FO78/3066:ibid).This
attempt was rather unsuccessful since no banking house in Europe
could effectively raise a loan of this sum through public
subscription.The European public continued to distrust Ottoman
finances and there was no sign whatever that these attitudes had
changed.
Instead the Ottoman government was obliged to resort to the
assistance of the local bankers and the Imperial bank.This almost
exclusive reliance on local capital resources had in fact begun
during late 1874.After the suspension of its debt service,by
half,the Ottoman government contracted a series of loans with
local bankers and the Imperial Bank in order to be in a position
to service its Debt.The first of these,amounting to £T 1.500.000
was raised in October 1875 to assure payment of the November
coupons.During November 1875,the Ottoman government arranged to
raise three other advances in the local money market to secure the
payment of the 1876 coupon.Two of them were indeed contracted in
1875 [THE TIMES,19/11/1875,see also,A&P(1876)LXXXIV,3].The third
advance was finally raised in May 1876,despite the fact that,in
March 1876,the Ottoman government decided to suspend debt payments
entirely.These advances called the "quatre avances" became the
basis of the floating debt of that period.Presumably,the advances
were used by the government to cover the cost of the
Administration and perhaps to fund an empty Treasury from the
Balkan insurrections and the war with Montenegro and Serbia.Not
surprisingly,these advances were not the only ones conducted
during 1876.The Treasury,always in need of liquid assets,borrowed
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smaller amounts in order to meet current needs.However,since the
Treasury lacked the necessary securities,it was obliged to
hypothecate jewels and other precious stones.In this way Christaki
Zografo,the private banker of Abdoul Aziz,received jewels valued
£ 3 million as security for an advance of considerably less value
[THE TIMES,5/8/1876].
The Ottoman government continued contracting short term loans
with local bankers throughout the rest of the period under
discussjon.11 addition some Greek bankers made advances to the
Government on paper money [BOUVIER(1962)706].In December 1877
Zarifj had in his coffers kaime valued at £T 1.5 million
presumably given as security on some of his adva-nces to the
Treasury [A&P(1878)LxxxII,22) .As a consequence,the floating debt
remained at high levels.According to De Vogue,by the fifth of
March 1877 the floating debt had reached 400 millionfr(=16
million)of which 200 million corresponded to short term advances
[AN F30/356,Letter of 5/3/1877].It was,however,during the war with
Russia that the Ottoman government contracted the most important
loans of that later period.The Defense loan apart,the government
contracted a loan of £T800.000 with the house of Zarifi and
Zafiropoulo and another one of £T 820.000 with the Imperial Bank
,the house of Zarifi. and Zafiropoulo,the Banque de Con/ple,the
Societe Generale and the Societe Ottomane.After the war,and due to
these loans the position of local bankers had been considerably
strengthened.
In November 1878,Harrison notified Salisbury that Turkey's
floating debt was £T 12.783.00O(=I11.6 million) ,and that an annual
charge of £T 3.840.000 was required annually to liquidate it
[FO78/3066,letter dated 4/2/1879].Fortunately,Harrison's
correspondence with the Foreign Office provides a great deal of
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information in connection with this Debt.With his letter of 23
April 1873 he also enclosed a table of the Short term advances
contracted between the Ottoman government and Local bankers
between 1876 and 1879. [See table in the following page].
Harrison however reported that the table was incomplete,which
seems to be correct,yet it still gives a good indication of the
extent of local loans.The sum of £T 8.344.923 standing in the name
of the Imperial Bank should be divided into two parts.From the
total amount,jT 5.168.384 corresponded to the current account of
the Imperial government,to advances to the Ministry of War and the
Civil List while the £T 3.176.539 represented the remainder of the
"quatre avances" on which the Ottoman bank had only a limited
interest,and most of this capital belonged to local bankers.The
participation of Greek capital in these advances was
substantial.There is evidence to suggest that apart from the
advances made directly by Greek banking houses Greeks were heavily
involved in these advances standing in the names of Fernandez and
Barker who was the partner of Clado and Evgenidi in the Societe
Ottoman,as well in the "quatre avances" standing in the name of
the Imperial bank.
What is more important perhaps are the guarantees granted for
these advances.To guarantee these advances the Ottoman state was
obliged to grant some of its most productive revenues.The loans of
Zarifi for example,were secured with all indirect
revenues, [FO78/3067,letter dated 23/4/1879].According to the same
source indirect revenues,including customs duties,were already
pledged as guarantees of short term advances.Even these loans
which were guaranteed by Ottoman bonds appeared to be sufficiently
secured.For example,Baron Hirsch advanced £T 126.000 and received
as security bonds of £3 million of nominal value.Even much smaller
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sums were granted sufficient guarantees.For example,the Societe
Ottomane,for an advance of CT 15.000 was granted as security the
revenues of the port of Zeilah in the Red Sea [Harrison to
Salisbury,letter dated 29/4/1879,in F078/3067].
Advances to the Ottoman state continued until November 1879
when a Convention was signed between local bankers and the
government.However,it is difficult to estimate the exact value of
the floating debt on that date.The Convention represented an
attempt on the part of the Ottoman government to deal with its
most pressing debts.According to the agreement a group of local
bankers,including the Imperial bank,would lease some of the Stc4e's
indirect revenues and keep part of the proceeds for themselves.The
loans included in the Convention amounted to CT 8.725.000,a
smaller sum if compared with the figures shown in Table I .This
amount represented part of Zarifi's advances,amounting to £T
690.000,those of Fernandez and Barker amounted to CT 1.800.000 and
those of the Imperial Bank,including the "quatre avances",amounted
to £T 6.325.000 [see Appendix II,see also DU
VELAY(1903)397-405].The Convention was also signed by other local
bankers,including Theodore Mavrogordato,Goerge Coronio,Bernard
Tubini,E Evgenidi,Leonodas Zarifi,P Stefanovich-Schilizzi and Z
Stefanovich.This suggests that their advances were also included
in the Convention presumably in the loans standing in the names of
Fernandez and Barker,as well as those standing in the name of the
Imperial Bank.
There is reason to believe that,given its financial
predicament,the Ottoman state was not in a position to pay back
almost CT 4 million in a period less than six months (compare to
figures in TableI).It seems,therefore,that a good deal of local
loans were not finally included in the Convention,although it is
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difficult to suggest why some creditors decided to opt out of the
agreement.They may have thought that their advances were
sufficiently guaranteed.There is,however,another factor which
seems to be more important.The Convention of November 1879 saw a
dramatic decrease in the rate of interest of the loans involved.It
stipulated that from 13 January 1880 onwards,and until their their
final reimbursement,these loans would bear an 8 per cent interest
(compare to rates of interest in Table I ).It is most
likely,therefore,that most of the government's small creditors
decided not to participate in the Convention preferring instead to
enjoy higher rates of interest.
Nevertheless,after the Convention was signed,Greeks and other
local bankers were reluctant to provide capital to the Ottoman
government.It seems that they wished the government to liquidate
its debt before they started lending money again.In fact,most of
the bankers,including the group which signed the Convention,kept a
low profile and appeared to be quite happy with that they thought
they had secured.Yet,times were insecure and all the bankers
concerned were well aware that the situation was to change
soon.For one thing,the Convention did not satisfy the demands of
the foreign bondholders.The pressure exerted by the latter on the
Ottoman government was immense and eventually was to be fruitful
(see Chapt X).
The Greek bankers'participation in the loans of that later
period apart,there is another aspect of their activities which
should be emphasised:their deep involvement in the financial
policy of the Ottoman state.There is evidence to believe that the
role of Greek bankers increased after the Ottoman suspension of
debt service in 1876.They became more aware of the problematic
state of Ottoman finances and were willing to interfere even
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suggesting radical measures.Presumably,Greek bankers were not the
only capitalists directly involved in the conduct of Ottoman
finances.The influence of the Imperial Bank was always more
important than that of the Greeks.Yet,the latters'direct
interference in Ottoman finances is more apparent during the later
part of the period under discussion than it was before.This is
highlighted by two developments:,the Greek bankers'involvement in
the settlement of the Ottoman Public debt,which will be discussed
later in detail,and their policy towards paper money circulation.
Although the Ottoman government managed to fund some of its
activities by resorting to the local money market,there is
evidence to support the view that the financial embarrassments of
the Ottoman government could not be alleviated by these advances
alone.Understandably,in a country whose revenues were,to say the
least,insufficiently administered,and which had no access to the
European money markets,a few million pounds were a drop in the
ocean.
The issuing of paper money(kaime) was among the measures taken
by the Ottoman government to stabilize its finances.The first
issuing of Kaime took place in August 1876 and amounted to T 2
million.It was followed by the issuing of £T 1 million in November
of the same year ( On the present condition of the Ottoman
currency,in F078/3067) .Increasing financial
exigencies,however,forced the government to proceed with the
issuing of two more series of paper money:one in January 1877
equivalent to £T7 million and the second in August of the same
year amounting to £T6 million.Therefore,in the autumn of 1877 the
total paper money cicrulation was equal to £.T13 million.The
Ottoman government issued the paper money for two reasons:to repay
part of the debt owed to local bankers and to pay salaries and
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arrears [AN F30/356,letter of 5/3/1877).The kaime was accepted as
legal tender in dealings with the State,although its circulation
was not extended to all provinces.The kaime did not bear interest
and was initially priced at 130 piastres per Ottoman pound.This
meant that the holder of kaime had to give 130 piastres in paper
money in order to receive 100 piastres in gold.
In the event,the value of kaime declined sharply.In March
1877,the parity with the gold piastres was 170 to 100.In January
1879 the parity had reached 450-480 to 100 [AN F30/356,letters of
5/3/1877 and 24/1/1879].The depreciation of kaime caused severe
problems in commercial affairs.According to a report of
Dobognie,the French consul in Con/ple,the kaime circulation in
this city had spread utter confusion,with merchants being forced
to increase their prices constantly.As a consequence,the merchant
houses of Pera decided to accept payments only in gold or silver
[AN F30/356,letter of 24/1/1879].
Greek bankers accepted paper money not only because a part of
kaime would go into their coffers,but also because they thought
the kaime circulation,if manipulated in an efficient way,would
relieve the Treasury of part of its expenses.In December 1877 a
committee of local bankers was summoned by the government in order
to provide a policy of avoiding further depreciation.The members
of this committee were Leonidas Zarifi,George Zarifi's son and one
of the eminent Greek bankers of the late 19th century;E Deveaux
and Von Haas the representatives of the Ottoman bank;E
Mercret,the director of the local branch of the Credit Lyonais;Z
Stefanovic,a Greek banker [A&P(1878)LXXXII,21-27 (2)].The
committee was led to the conclusion that the depreciation in the
value of kaime was not due to the quantity of paper money in
circulation..The total amount of kaime in circulation was small-and
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in comparison to other countries insignificant.According to the
committee,the depreciation derived from public uncertainty about
the intentions of the Ottoman government,namely whether the issue
of paper money would continue or not and to what extent.In
addition,the committee thought that kaime circulation was sapped
by Turkey's vicious monetary system.The circulation of devalued
coinage,both in silver and copper was damaging the value of paper
money,especially in the provinces,because people preferred to use
metallic currency rather than kaime.The bankers concluded that for
these reasons the public distrusted and avoided paper money.
The committee provided a detailed scheme in connection with
the withdrawal of paper currency.I-Iowever it required the complete
reform of the Ottoman monetary system.Although the bankers were
aware of the evils of paper money they suggested that kaime
circulation could,jn the short and medium term,service the
interests of the Ottoman state if its price was kept at a certain
par.Moreover,paper money circulation should spread to all the
provinces of the Empire and it should be accepted as legal tender
for all purposes,taxatjon included.The report suggested that paper
money circulation should be withdrawn,only at a very slow rate:fT
66.666 per month.At that rate the withdrawal of the paper money
circulation would take twenty years.Moreover the committee
suggested that a part of Public revenues should be assigned to the
withdrawal of paper money.It was hoped that these measures would
stabilize the price of kaime at a lower par,at the same time
increasing the public's trust in paper money.Finally,the report
suggested the complete withdrawal of all devalued currency,both in
silver or copper.Silver cu..rrency in particular,should be
demonetised and send to the foundry.Then the Ottoman government
should buy gold which it would definitely need in the future.The
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committee,therefore,suggested the complete overthrow of
	 the
Ottoman monetary	 system,based	 till	 then on
	 bimetallic
circulation,and its substitution by a gold based monetary system.
Harrison himself was led to the same conclusion.In one of his
letters to Salisbury he noted that "if means were taken to
preserve the value of the kairne up to a certain average rate,and
the withdrawal of very moderate amounts from time to time would
suffice to do this,the caime would form a fairly satisfactory
circulation medium and might be left to be dealt with hereafter in
a gradual deliberate manner." [Harrison to Salisbury,letter of
25/12/1878 in F078/3066].In the first place the Ottoman government
did not accept these proposals.The withdrawal of paper money
continued at a more swift rate than the one the committee had
suggested.Nevertheless,jn March 1880 the most important aspect of
the commitee's proposals,namely the introduction of the gold based
currency,was finally implemented.This measure was introduced in an
arbitrary way.The government declared that all currencies not
based on gold would be withdrawn at a rate equivalent to half
their nominal value.Despite this,however,the gold standard became
the	 new	 basis	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 monetary	 system
[NEOLOGOS,10/3/1880,A& p (1880)LXXV,no 75,1883-1885].
It is true the bankers were more interested in stabilizing
the Ottoman finances than anything else.Had Ottoman finances
continued to be precarious,the guarantees given to local bankers
would have been endangered.On such evidence,one may assume that
the bankers were eager to reform Ottoman finances as the only Way
to safeguard their own money and assure the future of both Turkey
and their own financial affairs.
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Notes to chapter VII.
(1) See below,Chapter	 X ,3O43.
(2) Tne report of the Committee was enaorsed by many locdl
oankers and capitalists incluaing G Cororiio, TuDini,J
Chichmdnoglou,A Tavoukdgi,A Foltz,A Barker,A Mavrokoruato,arici S
Maxsouu.
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CHAPTER VIII:Three case studies.The Societe Generale de i'Empire
Ottoman,The Banque de Con/pie and the Societe Ottornane des Changes
et Valeurs:similarities and differences.
The major aspects of Greek banking in Con/pie have aiready
been discussed.The year by year analysis of the operations of
three banks closely connected with Greek capital will demonstrate
these aspects in a more detailed manner.Unfortunately not all
annual reports for this period are available,in particular,these
of the Societe Generale for the financial years 1867-70.These gaps
in material,however,do not prevent a more detailed presentation of
banking activities because comparative data for these years exist
in other annual reports or balance sheets.These three banking
establishments were chosen for reason of both essence and
convenience.The participation of Greek capital in these banks was
decisive.In addition the managing boards of all three throughout
the period under consideration consisted mainly of Greeks.Thus the
operation of these three illustrates Greek banking
activities.Moreover,these banks usually published their annual
reports in local newspapers in Con/pie making at least some
aspects of their activities available to the researcher.
The Societe Generale de l'Empire Ottoman.
The first years of the Societe Generale were crowned by a
brilliant success.The bank was promptly involved in Ottoman
finances,which became its major field of operation.The year it was
established,the bank issued a loan of £2 million for the Ottoman
Treasury guaranteed by the sheep tax [Report by
BARRON(1866-67)444].This was a lottery loan bearing 8% interest
and repayable in rapid instalments by 1869.The loan was finally
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bought by the Imperial bank which used the sheep tax to raise
another loan.At the first meeting of the Societe Generale's
bondholders the results looked quite remarkable.Zarifi reported in
one of his letters to Renieri that, "Apart from the interest of
6% on each share,the managing board decided to distribute dividend
of £2.The reserve fund is credited with CT 35.000 and another CT
5.000 is left at the disposal of the management for distribution
next year [ETE,letter dated 18/5/1866].Although Zarifi is not
referring to the total net profits it seems these were around
T23O.0OO-250.0O0.more than one forth of the paid up capital?
The Societe Generale continued to realise profits for the
rest of the period.The bank's participation in the syndicate of
the Pinard loan secured large profits.Not surprisingly,the Societe
Generale's profits were closely linked with the fate of Ottoman
finances and by and large,its position reflected the situation of
the local money market.The Societe Generale was heavily involved
in Ottoman finances during the early and mid 1870's.According to
the report presented to the annual meeting of bondholders for the
financial year of 1871/72 the bank was deeply involved in
transactions with the Ottoman government.Compared to the £T497.193
lent to the goveniMent during the financial year of 1870/71,the
Societe Generale tripled its advances the following year to
£T1.688.159 [ NEOLOGOS,21/5/1872].During the period 1870-75 the
bank advanced at least £T3.728.172 to the government [see Table
I].Not surpisingly,the Societe Generale's propensity to lend
followed the cycles of crisis and capital influx.The variations in
the amounts of the short term advances to the government usualLy
followed this pattern.For example,during the financial year
1873/74 the bank lent to the government only £T93.882 in short
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Table I: Societ4 Generple;short term advances tothe
Treasury, 1870-1881.
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1873 Ottoman loan,buying bonds valued at £542.000
[NEOLOGOS,29/5/1874].Orie must point out however,that the bank lent
not only from its own funds but also capital put at its disposal
by individual capitalists.In addition participation in the 1873
loan plus the bank's short term advances to the Treasury amounted
to £T690.082.
It appears,however,that new developments were under way.It is
interesting to note that in 1873 the Societe Generale was involved
in the Egyptian loan of 1873 as well as in those of the Spanish
state in which it employed capital superior to the short term
advances to the Ottoman Treasury.In particular,the bank engaged
£T80.000 in the Egyptian loan and cT4B.270 in the Spanish
loans.The participation in the Spanish loans,if shortlived,was an
attempt on the part of this bank to disengage itself,at least
partly,from the traditional transactions with the Ottoman
Treasury.This aspect is highlighted by the fact that the Societe
Generale was willing to involve itself in sectors other than
Ottoman finances as early as 1871.For this reason,the annual
meeting of the bondholders in 1871/72 endorsed the board's policy
of participating in the Societe des Tramways and in the Societe
Austro-Turque.The meeting voted in favour of the amendment of the
Bank's statute which was not clear enough on this point.As the
board put it "We were wondering whether the bank should remain
isolated and in constant conflict with these institutions,or
whether the bank's interests would be better served if we extended
our relations with at least some (of the newly founded
institutions]...we considered that the second choice was the
best." [NEOLOGOS,21/5/1872].
In connection with this policy it is interesting to present
the position of the bank's portfolio.According to the same
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report,the bank held 500 shares of the Verissi&Cossoudi bank,1000
shares of the Banque des Courtages,444 shares of the Tramways,400
shares of the Austro-Ottoman Bank,350 shares of the Societe
Commercja].e,1800 shares of the Credit Generaie of Greece,1 share
of the Societe Ottomane,4500 debentures of the Rumelian railways
and 62.190 bonds of the 1873 Ottoman loan.The value of all these
bonds and shares amounted toT 917.206.Therefore it becomes clear
that during 1873 the bank made a moderate attempt to diversify its
affairs.The influx of European capital between 1871 and early 1873
increased the board's aspirations.The operations in Egypt and
Spain,as well as the large number and variety of bonds and shares
kept by the bank underlines these aspirations.
This attempt is highlighted by the establishment of a branch
in Alexandria in 1873,which in the first six months of its
operations made a net profit of £T15.000.At a special meeting of
the bank's bondholders held in March 1873,presided over by A
Baitazzi,the board announced its new policy, "depuis nous avons
reconnu qu'avec le grand developpeiviequ'ont pris l'industrie et le
commerce sur les places d'Egypte et qu'avec les nombreuses
riations qui existent entre ces places et cette de Con/pie
c'etait surtout a Aiexandrie qu'ii importait de nous e'tabiir
d'abord;voj].a purquoi nous avons deide' d'y fonder une succursale
qui entrera en exercise au her Avrii prochain.Mais...nous ne
pouvions pas perdre de vue,que sur notre place elle mme,les
affaires prennent tous les jours une plus grande extension et que
par consequent ii eut et opportun de detourner une aussi forte
somme des nos operations iocaies;de i naturelle,et nous vint
i'ide d'un agrandissement de capital en rapport avec cette
nouvelle situation." [LEVANT HERALD,3/3/1873] .The meeting endorsed
the board's policy.As a consequence the bank's nominal capital
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increased to 1:2.500.000 and in addition the Societe Generale
founded its first branch in Alexandria.
However,events did not live up to the board's
expectations.The financial problems of the Ottoman government
forced the bank to give priority to business in Con/ple.After
all,financial operations of this extent and diversity could only
be safe and profitable if the bank's position in Con/pie was
secure,and the board came to realise this early on.One may assume
that the financial crisis of the mid 1870's totally ended the
bank's propensity to involve itself heavily in sectors other than
the Ottoman finances.
The effort to avert Ottoman insolvency led the bank to
advance heavily to the government.According to the report for the
financial year 1874/75 the bank's short term advances reached
£T1.448.938 [NEOLOGOS,21/5/1875).In the same year the portfolio of
the bank consisted of shares and bonds valued at only
£T366.964,most of them bonds of the 1873 Ottoman loan.According to
the annual report for 1874/75 the board was faced with the abrupt
and substantial decline in the price of shares and bonds
[ibidj.Nevertheless,the board succeeded in disposing of the bulk
of the values kept by the bank with the minimum of
damage.However,the bank did not stop operating in Egypt.The
decision to withdraw from other sectors did not concern Egypt and
through its branch in Alexandria the bank continued to involve
itself deeply in Egyptian finances.The reason for this lies in the
fact that Egypt,was considered to be an integral part of the
Ottoman Empire in the sense that both economic and political
conditions were similar to those of Turkey.In addition the
existence of an important Greek paroikia[colony] played a crucial
role as the link between Egypt and Con/ple.For these reasons the
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Societe Generale did not withdraw from banking operations in
Egypt.
It appears,however,that the crisis had considerably affected
the bank's board.Due to the prolongation of the financial crisis
,the board decided to cancel a decision taken in 1873 in
connection with the extension of the bank's capital.Quite
rightly,the board argued that,"the increase(of capital) was in
inverse ratio to the affairs of the bank" [NEOLOGOS,21/5/1875].It
is known that the establishment of the branch in Alexandria was
followed by the issuing of 25.000 new shares which extended the
bank's nominal capital to £2.500.000 represented by 125.000
instead of 100.000 shares.According to the board's viewpoint,the
nominal value of each share should be equivalent to the share's
real value.The board decided to retain the number of shares but to
reduce the price of each share.The paid up capital for each share
was £8 and the board decided to pay back £2 for each share and set
the price at £6.Therefore the nominal value of each share was
reduced from £20 to £6.In consequence,the real capital of the
Societe Generale was reduced to £750.000.Undoubtedly,with this
decision the board attempted to stabilize hesrepcIcec.wefl.s
position of the bank.However,this move did not avert the further
depreciation in the price of the bank's shares.The average price
of these shares a few months before the Ottoman insolvency varied
between £3-4.
The position of the bank was considerably affected by the
Ottoman insolvency.One of the board's first priorities during the
financial year 1875/76 was to safeguard the capital it had already
lent to the government.In addition the management of the Societe
Generale was eager to supplement the bank's reserve fund which
according to
	 ±s statute should amount to £ 200.000.Th j s was
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finally achieved in 1875 when the board carried a part of this
year's profits to the reserve fund [NEOLOGOS,19/5/1876].Judging by
the standards of other local banks this anount was extremely high
and in fact represented 30% of the paid up capital.In the case of
the Societe Generale however it proved essential because of the
bank's involvement in Egyptian finances .Although the bank made no
advances to the Egyptian Treasury during 1875 it held Egyptian
stock valued at £T250.000.This amount represented two thirds of
the values	 currently kept
	 in	 the	 bank's	 portfolio
[NEOLOGOS,19/5/1876] .Yet this involvement proved fatal.The
conversion of the Egyptian debt which took place in 1876 absorbed
not only the bank's current profits but a part of its reserve fund
as well: "En rsum les pertes considerables erouves par la
dprciation des titres Egyptien et des autres valeur...ont
absorbe non seulement notre bénf ice brut du dernier exercise de
£T 84.000...mais aussi en outre nous avons toblige de porter
au debit du Fond des reervele dicit de £ T 169.515." (LEVANT
HEARLD,25/5/1877]
Conversely after the Ottoman suspension of payments,the
bank's involvement in the Ottoman increased.Between 1876 and 1879
the bank advanced the Treasury at least £T2.116.000,an amount far
in excess of its own capital.The war with Russia proved a heavy
burden to the Ottoman Treasury.Cut off from European capital
resources,the Ottoman government had to rely on the local money
market.The Societe Generale participated in the major advances
contracted by the Ottoman state to cope with that war.In 1877/78
the bank participated withT56.658 to an advance of £820.000 for
the purchase of ammunitions.In the same year the Societe Generale
also participated in an advance of £T830.000 made by Zarifi with
£ T151.274.In addition,the bank lent the government 	 directly
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£T270.949 [IMEROLOGION TIS ANATOLIS(1878)279].In 1878 the Societe
Generale's direct advances to the Treasury reached £T 297.227 and
in 1879 they were £T151.376J
[NEOLOGOS,28/5/1879,21/5/1880].According to the annual reports for
these years,these advances were guaranteed by the sheep tax or by
drafts drawn upon provincial Treasuries(havales).
The bank's participation in the financial convention of
November 1879 does not seem to have been important.Out of the
total debt of £T8.725.000 million the Ottoman government owed the
Societe Generale £ T398.000.However the bank continued financing
the government:to the tune of £T 103.344 in 1880 and £T 136.733
the following year [NEOLOGOS,4/5/1881 and 26/5/1882].One may
assume that the bank's main policy after 1876 was an attempt to
safeguard the already advanced capital to the government.This
attempt was accompanied by more short term advances.The bank
wanted to receive sufficient guarantees not only for the new,but
for the old,advances as well.In this way the government would have
to agree to service the old advances as well.Yet,the amount of
short term loans to the government became smaller each year.The
Societe Generale gradually attempted to disengage itself from
Ottoman finances applying the most conservative policy.The board
was rather anxious about the bank's future,and by and large
reluctant to make advances to the Treasury beyond a certain
level.This restrained policy is illustrated by the decision
further to reduce the bank's capital following the end of the war
with Russia [see Table ].The board decided to liquidate 25.000
shares thus reducing the capital toi 600.000.
The signing of the Muharem degree in November 1881 permitted
the bank to invest in other sectors as well.For the first time
since 1873,the bank became involved in the establishment of
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companies and in investments abroad.During 1881/82 the Societe
Generale participated in the establishment of the Compagnie des
Eaux de Con/ple,in the establishment of the Bank of
Epirus-Thessaly as well as in the Greek loan of 120 million fr
[NEOLOGOS,26/5/1882] .Although,according to the annual report for
this year,these operations were undertaken "always without going
away from the bank's system of prudence",it seems the final
settlement of the Ottoman Public debt greatly relieved the
management of the bank.
Throughout the period under discussion,commercial and other
forms of credit remained insufficient.Although there are some
exceptional years such as 1874/75,for example,when the entry
"credit to individuals" reached jT378.923,it appears that the
ordinary annual transactions of this kind varied between £ T67.211
and T3O.913.It is not difficult to understand the reason why
commercial credit was neglected.Before the Ottoman suspension of
payments the bank was mainly preoccupied with Ottoman
finances,while after 1875 it concentrated on recovering the money
it had already lent the government and therefore it was forced to
husband its capital resources.In the event however,commercial
credit was neglected.In connection with this insufficiency of
commercial credit,it is interesting to cite the viewpoint of an
anonymous reporter of Neologos who pointed out that, "Zealous
and keen fellow Greeks established many banks by spending millions
of pounds but the government was the only one which availed itself
of this capital resource.For this reason commerce received no
assistance...The government should prohibit banks from lending
their money to the Treasury...Yet,the most damaging aspectlto
trade] is	 the non-existence of well	 organised banks.The
establishment of such banks would save people from the claws of
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local usurers...What I mean is that the bankers of this
city(Con/ple) should establish branches in the provinces which
would be involved only in commerce..." [NEOLOGOS,16/1O/1880].The
article is rather overconfident in regard with the prospects of
this project,yet it correctly emphasises the lack of commercial
credit and its repercussion on local trade.
In spite of difficulties,however,the Societe Generale secured
large profits except for the year 1876.Particularly during the
early years the profits certainly exceeded the board's
expectations.In 1871,the accumulated profits of the six previous
financial years,matched the bank's real capital
[NEOLOGOS,21/5/1872].Profits continued to be high during the early
and mid 1870's.The financial crisis of the 1873-74 gave the bank
some reasons to worry,yet the situation was kept under
control. prof its were undoubtedly affected although the final
results were not as disastrous as one might think.In addition,the
Societe Generale did not suffer severe losses during the prolonged
financial crisis of 1873-1875.In 1873 the bank made net profits of
£T 76.267.According to the annual report for the year 1873/74
"everyone knows the reasons for the depression in our
market.Unfortunately,due to these circumstances,we[the board] were
unable to produce results similar to those of previous years...we
can say however that these results are much better than one might
think."[NEQLQGQS,29/3/1874] .Profits,although much affected by the
crisis continued to be high[See Table next page].Even after the
Ottoman suspensk of payments profits continued to be
realised.Presumably they were much lower than those of earlier
periods,but they remained sufficient to keep the bank going.It is
interesting,however,to see how profits were developed in
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In real terms profits continued to be adequate after 1876
although compared to those of the early and mid 1870' they were
much reduced.This development is highlighted by the fact that the
price of the bank's shares in 1879 was stabilized at between 4 and
5 pounds sterling.
Undoubtedly,high profits were the result of high interest
rates which the bank enjoyed +hroughout the period under
discussion.However,one must point out another aspect which after
1875 not only allowed the bank to make sufficient profits,but also
to stabilize its position.This was the bank's conservative
policies.Instead of taking any risk,the board preferred not tc
exceed its real capital and therefore to limit its operations
considerably.Surprisingly	 enough,this	 policy	 was,at	 least
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partly,foliowed even during the early and mid 1870's,when most of
the banking institutions of Con/pie employed capital much superior
to their capital resources.At the same time the bank kept
sufficient reserve funds to enable it to cope with exigencies.In
fact sufficient reserve funds explain why the bank was able to
survive in 1876,when it suffered huge losses due to the conversion
of the Egyptian Debt.In addition,substantial reserves helped the
bank during the financial crisis of 1873-74.For example,when the
Vienna crisis broke out the bank's reserve fund amounted to
£T201.634.ThrOughoUt the period under discussion the proportion of
reserve funds to the nominal capital of the bank remained around
10-11 per cent,although this proportion in relation to the real
capital was much higher.Therefore,one may assume that the
conservative policy of the board finally helped the bank to cope
with the times.As a consequence,the bank succeeded in making
profits,which according to the circumstances were either brilliant
or moderate.
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The Banque de Con/pie.
The Banque de Con/pie was established almost exclusively by
Greek capitai.The Greek element was predominant both in terms of
capital and participation in the board of directors.Out of the
nominal capital of £T1.l0O.000 the paid up capital was £T660.000
which at the time was a respectable amount.The bank's capital was
divided into 100.000 shares,with the nominal value of each equal
to I 1O.Following the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the influx
of European capital to Con/ple,the prospects of the bank appeared
to be good.The bank's participation in the syndicate providing the
Ottoman loan of 1873 proved to be a major success:it was the
bank's debut in large financial operations with the Treasury.Not
surprisingly,in its first stages the Banque de Con/pie was
associated mostly with transactions with the Ottoman Treasury.This
was particularly the case during the period 1873-1878 when the
bank engaged large amounts of money in such transactions either on
its own account or along with other local capitalists.
During the financial crisis of 1873-75 the bank succeeded not
only in surviving but also in making large profits.Transactions
with the Ottoman government were heavy and it appears the bank was
generally reluctant to disengage itself from the Treasury.In
1873/74 alone the bank engaged a total amount of £T1.801.203 in
transactions with the Treasury.Judging from the bank's total
assets in 1873/74 it appears that the capital it employed in that
year reached a record level:1T3.848.339 [LEVANT
HERALD,11/4/1874,see also Table YIU ].Not surprisingly The bank
showed large profits during the first years of its
activities.During its first two years alone,net profits reached
£T270.000,aimost half the amount of the paid up capital.Moreover
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it appears that the bank was almost unaffected by the Vienna
crisis and the financial crisis which followed the embarrassments
of the Ottoman government in 1874-75.Commenting on the bank's
annual report for 1873/74 the Levant Herald of Con/pie reported
that "The document is in itself so clear and concise it needs
no analysis.It is remarkable in so far only as it displays the
foresight and judgment of the directors which has enabled them to
work their way through a crisis-which was not only sudden in its
first outbreak as it is protracted in its development-not only
without loss but with an amount of profit such as even in
favourable years would not have disappointed moderate expectations
on the part of the shareholders.The secret of the success of the
bank lies in the fact that its directors thoroughly understand
their business" [LEVANT HERALD,11/4/1874] .Additional evidence is
found in an article in the Greek newspaper Mellon concerning the
operations of the bank in 1873/74.In this case aiso,the reporter
was surprised at the way the bank was able to avail itself of
opportunities within the Con/pie money market which was supposed
to be in crisis. [MELLON,,n.1050,1/4/1874].
In the year 1874,the bank found itself 	 "au milieu d'un
concours de circonstances financiers peu
favorables;aujourd'hui[April 1875]nous sommes heureux de pouvoir
vous signaler un amelioration notable dans la situation des
affaires.L'annee 1874 s'est terminee beaucoup plus
satisfaisant...." [Report of the managing board in the LEVANT
HERALD,3/4/1875].The bank was not seriously affected by the
depreciation of Ottoman bonds which occurred in 1874.According to
the same report,during the six first months of 1874 the bank
restrained itself
	
from conducting transactions with the
Treasury.Yet,when some signs of financial recovery appeared,the
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bank rushed to close the gap.Between June and December 1874 the
bank advanced £T 1.500.000 directly to the Treasury and in
addition,along with the Imperial bank it was involved in an
advance to the government in which it participated to the extent
of £1.300.000.What is more important in connection with the bank's
affairs during 1874,was the development of its relations with the
Imperial Bank.In this year the bank signed a contract with the
Imperial Bank.The arrangement was that the Banque de Con/ple would
participate to a large extent in any operation of the Imperial
bank conducted with the Treasury.In addition,the contract assured
the bank"des avantages equivaient$a ceux que nous procureaint des
affaires traites directement par nous".[LEVANT HERALD,ibid].This
was a good move on the part of the bank of Con/pie since it
attempted to align itself with the Imperial bank whose position
had been considerably strengthened by the decree of February 1875
[see below,3I-32 ].However,this attempt was received with
scepticism.According to the Levant Herald"The Bank of Con/pie
gives undue importance to its contract with the Ottoman bank.It
would no doubt be advantageous to the bank..[yet]..at the same
time the bank sinks its individuality by insisting on the
advantages it hopes to secure under the protection of the national
establishment." [LEVANT HERALD,5/4/1875]. yet,jt is difficult to
speculate whether this contract would secure the bank large
profits because the precarious position of Ottoman finances
rendered any large scale operation with the Ottoman state
problematic.
The suspension of Ottoman payments considerably affected the
bank's policy.It was forced to follow the policy of the other
banking institutions of Con/ple,namely to safeguard the capital it
had already lent to the government.Then the bank attempted to
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disengage itself from Ottoman finances and to employ its capital
in other sectors,outside or inside the Ottoman Empire.
In 1875 the bank took part in the various advances to the
Ottoman Treasury to the extent of £T2.022.969.However it succeeded
in recovering most of this capital within the same year.In
December 1875 the Ottoman government owed the bankI.T 653.765.The
net profits for this year amounted to £T217.000 but in view of the
critical situation of Ottoman finances,it was decided to carry
£T85.000 over to a new special fund which thought to provide an
additional security for the bank [LEVANT HERALD,28/4/1876).In
addition,the board came to the conclusion that a change of policy
was absolutely necessary.The board made its attitude clear in the
annual report for the year 1875/76
	
"Pour cela il serait fort
possible qu'en presence de la position actuelle de notre
place...un changement radical dans la marche et Ia nature des nos
affairs devint un jour ne'ssaire.Dans ce cas,il nous faudrait
aggrandir le cercie de nos ope'rations et aussi transporter sur
d'autres terrains qui nous sont restes fermes jusque present on
sur lequels nous n'avons fait que un court apparition." (LEVANT
HERALD,2814/1876].This declaration was accompanied by a proposal
that the board should be able to liquidate the bank or to merge
with another establishment if circumstances were favourable.In the
event the proposal was adopted by the meeting [LEVANT
HERALD,ibid].However,it took a few more years to implement this
new policy.In the meantime the bank continued to make advances to
the Ottoman government.
1876 was a bad year for the bank.Despite the fact that it
showed net profits amounting tofT44.00O,a meagre sum if compared
to those of previous years,it also suffered heavy losses.However
these losses did not derive from Ottoman finances but from the
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conversion of the Egyptian debt which took place in the same
year.The depreciation of Egyptian stock held by the bank caused it
a loss of £T 100.000 [LEVANT HERALD,28/4/1877).Yet the bank was in
a position to recoup these losses with the profits deriving from
transactions with the Ottoman Treasury.In 1876 the bank advanced
£T 1.100.000 to the Treasury and succeeded in recovering a large
part.It should be pointed out,however,that the profits realised in
1876 were the lowest ever.In addition one might say that such low
profits strenghtened the board's determination to turn to business
in Europe and Greece.
The outbreak of war with Russia put the board in a difficult
position.Withdrawing its assistance to the government at this
critical momett would have meant weakening of the bank's position
vis-a-vis the Ottoman State.That would have probably led to the
bank's exclusion from any future settlement of the Ottoman
floating debt in which it had a respectable share.In addition
Greek bankers considered that if Turkey was defeated,Russian
claims would be a serious threat to their interests [see
below,Chap,X,21?-291] .Therefore Greek and other local bankers were
willing to advance to the government no matter what.Not
surprisingly the Bank de Con/pie participated in the major loans
to the Ottoman government during the Russian-Turkish war.According
to the annual report for the financial year 1878/79 the bank was
involved in the Defence loan which was placed in Con/pie by the
Imperial bank and the House of Zarifi.It also participated in the
loan of Zarjfj conducted in 1878 as well as in an advance of
£820.000 used for the purchase of ammunitions.The bank's share in
these advances amounted to £T
	
701.113	 [IMEROLOGION TIS
ANATOLIS(1878)285].Following the end of the war however,the bank
attempted	 to	 disengage	 its	 capital	 from	 Ottoman
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finances.Presumab].y the bank's board considered other sectors more
profitable than the Ottoman finances,as will be shown with very
good reason.The attempt to disengage from transactions with the
Ottoman state is clearly shown in the following table.







Source:Annual reports of the Banque de Con/pie.
Not surprisingly,the board of the bank was greatly relieved
when the Convention of November 1879 was signed.In a detailed
description of the convention,the board announced that "In
spite of all difficulties the establishment of the service of the
six revenues is well under way,and the collection of revenues goes
on with satisfactory results.The collection has not yet reached
the desirable level,but there is hope that the assistance of the
Ottoman government[with the monetary reform)...revenues will
increase and both the interests of the country and its creditors
will be served in the best possible way."
[NEOLOGOS,24/4/1880].Indeed the service of the six revenues was so
successful that in the following year the board was in a position
to rejoice."Thanks to the good will of the Imperial government as
well that of the staff and directors of the service of the six
revenues,the progress achieved
	
lived up to our highest
expectations." [NEOLOGOS,27/4/1881].It is	 not	 difficult	 tc
understand the reasons for the board's satisfaction.Due to the
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successful conduct of the service of six revenues,the amount owed
to the bank by the Ottoman government decreased spectacularly:the
bank received £T64..007 from the service of the six revenues in
1880 and £T61.416 in 1881.As a result the Ottoman government's
debt to the bank fell from T312.089 in 1879 to £T186.666 in 1881
INEOLOGOS,24/4/1880,27/4/1881].In addition,the bank also
benefitted from the Muharem decree,the convention which brought to
terms the Ottoman government with its foreign creditors.For the
unredeemed part of its advances the bank was granted privileged
bonds whose service had precedence over the payment of all other
bonds..The board of the bank continued to emphasise the possitive
aspects of this development and,understandably,it associated the
decree with the economic development of Turkey [RAPPORT DU CONSEIL
D'ADMINISTRATION DE LA BANQUE DE CON/PLE:1882].
Yet,the basic aspect of the bank's activities during the last
part of the period under discussion,was its involvement in
investments abroad.In contrast with the policy of the Societe
Generale,the Banque de Con/ple did not hesitate to extend its
operations in Paris,London,Greece,and Romania.In 1873 the bank
established a branch in London and another in Paris the following
year. yet,the bank extended its activities in these cities only
during the late 1870's.In 1880 the London branch realised net
profits of £T18.700 while in the same year the Paris branch
succeeded in making a profit of 500.000fr(=T 21.739).The
importance of the two branches for the bank is indicated by the
f act that their management was entrusted to two members of its
board.One of the bank's founders,Zorzj Coronio became the director
of the Paris branch while Syngros's representative in England 3
lonides undertook the management of the London branch.In 1881,
third branch was established in Athens the management of which waE
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entrusted to Syngros and Scouloudi.
In connection with this new policy the Banque de Con/pie was
involved between 1879 and 1881 in various affairs abroad.In 1879
the bank joined with the Banque Franco-Egyptiane in issuing Greek
Treasury bonds amounting to 60 million fr.It also participated to
advances in the Romanian state [NEOLOGOS,27/4/1881].In 1881/82 the
bank took active part in the establishment of the Bank of
Epirus-Thessaly,one of Syngros's banks in Greece,as well as in the
issuing of the Greek loan of 120 million fr.In addition,through
its branch in Paris the bank participated in the Banque de
Mexique,the Credit foncier de l'Angletere,the Banque Generale de
Rome and the Societe des terrains du littoral de la
Mediterranee.All together the Banque de Con/pie invested 764.200
fr.in these institutions [RAPPORT DU CONSEIL DE
L'ADMINISTRATION:1882] .Of all these operations,however,the most
important was the bank's involvement in the Greek loan of 120
million fr [ibid).This loan was issued by the Banque de
Con/pie,the Comptoir d'Escompte and the house of Hambro & Co of
London.The loan bore 5% interest and was divided in 240.000 bonds
[ECONOMEKE EPITHEORISES,1882,voi 9,246,KATASTATIKON ETHNIKES
TRAPEZES (1882) 114,ANDREADES(1925)S] .According to the annual report
for 1881/82 the board justified participating in the Greek loan in
the following way: "L'affaire se recommandait surtout a nos
yeux par un ensemble de disposition dont les prescription
rigoureuses donnaient aux preteurs en dehors d'avantages
multiples,les garanties le plus solides et les plus compfetes.Dans
ses conditions la Banque n'a pas craint d'y	 ?rendre un interet
considerable." [RAPPORT DO CONSEIL:1882].The guarantees given to
the syndicate which issued the	 loan were indeed very
satisfactory.For the service of this loan alone the Greek
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government pledged the tobacco tax,the annual revenues of national
lands and the customs revenues of Athens,Pireus,Patras and
Zante. [ECONOMIKI EPITHEORESIS:op.cit,247].
The Bank's emphasis on operations abroad becomes clearer if
one examines the composition of its portofolio during this
period.In 1879 it had bonds and shares amounting to £ 569.596.But
most of these were bonds of the Defence loan.In 1880 the bank held
many bonds of the Defence loan but also bonds of the Greek loan of
60 million fr,Egyptian Treasury bonds as well as bonds of the
Egyptian loan of 105 million fr.According to the annual report for
the year 1879/80 the bank decided to restrict the sale of bonds
because there were no worthwhile investment orportunities in Turkey
[NEOLOGOS,24/4/1880].The bank did not proceed with sales of bonds
hoping to do so when the prices increased.The following year
however,the composition of	 the bank's	 portfolio changed
entirely.In 1881/82 the bank held bonds and	 shares	 worth
cTl8l.884.Now the bulk of them consisted of bonds of the Chemin
Galicien,of the Banque Maritime,of the Cie Franchaise de
navigation,of the Banque Generale d'Egypte etc [RAPPORT DU CONSEIL
D'ADMINISTRATION:1882],It seems that the bank had sold almost all
Ottoman values at its disposal in order to fund its operations
abroad.Besides that was the reason why the bank held important
amounts of such values..Ottoman bonds of the Defence loan were
considered to be a good asset and could be kept as a safety
capital but as soon the bank found more profitable opportunities
it did not hesitate to dispose of them quickly.
This is not to say that investments within Turkey were
totally neglected.The bank also participated in the establishment
of the Compagnie des Eaux de Con/pie as well as in the advances to
the Societe des Tramways.Yet,at that time investments in Turkey
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had become of secondary importance and,in the event,the bank's
board opted for operations abroad.
However,since its establishment the bank had succeeded in
making large profits (See Table next page] .Particularly after
1875,it realised profits far superior to those of the Societe
Generale.In this context it is worth presenting the profits
enjoyed by shareholders between 1873 and 1881.











Source:Annual reports of the Banque de Con/pie.
Undoubtedly,the bank's profits,particulariy in the later
period,were partly associated with the policy of investing outside
the Ottoman empire.It was the activities of the branches in Paris
and London-and later of Athens-along with the involvement of the
bank in numerous operations abroad,which made these large profits
possible.The gradual disengagement of the bank from the Ottoman
finances however,was not followed by a corresponding decrease in
the bank's real capital as happened in the case of the Societe
Generale.The bank retained its real capital and availed itself of
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large profits.One may ask whether this policy was a risky one and
whether if something went wrong the bank's position would be
jeopardised.In fact,this was a risky policy but the bank was
always in a position to cope with exigencies.It had two reserve
funds:the regular reserve fund and the provisional reserve
fund(fonds de prevision) .The first reserve fund was allocated the
5% of net annual profits.The second fund was also financed from
net profits but not at a fixed percentage.As already explained,the
provisional fund was created in 1876 due to the precarious
position of the Ottoman finances.The board decided whether to
distribute dividend or not according to the circumstances.If it
was decided that dividends should be distributed,the board used
the capital accumulated in the provisional fund.Conversely,net
current profits were carried over to the provisional fund to
assure future dividends or,if the prospects appeared gloomy,to be
used to stabilize the bank's position.A similar technique was used
by the Societe Generale but the latter husbanded its resources far
more than the Banque de Con/ple.In this way the Bank of Con/pie
was in a position both to secure large dividends for the
bondholders and to keep sufficient amounts of capital as a reserve
fund.
One other aspect which should be emphasised is the total
assets used by the bank during this latter period
.It appears that the bank used far less capital after 1875 than
before.In view of the precarious position of Ottoman finances,this
was only to be expected.Yet the Bank de Con/pie retained a
substantial amount of capital far superior to the Societe Generale
[see table V].This happened because of the bank's new
policy,namely to invest large amounts of money abroad instead of
restricting itself to the Ottoman Empire.It must be pointed
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out,however,that the bank was joined by other capitalists who
entrusted their capital to the bank.The bank used to concede a
part of the advances it conducted with the government to other
capitalists.In practice this policy had been continuously followed
since the bank's establishment.Some times the proportion of the
participants'capital to total investments was far larger than that
of the bank itse].f.In 1873 for example,this capital amounted to £T
1.461.183 out of a grand total of £T 1.801.761.With this policy
the bank was in a position to employ large amounts of capital
without at the same time exceeding its capital resources.Of course
the bank received commission.This,according the circumstances
could be substantial.
One may assume therefore that the bank did quite well.It
secured large profits,it expanded its activities abroad,and it
retained its real capital.In addition it was always in a position
to cope with emergencies despite the fact its reserve funds were
relatively small,and certainly much smaller than those of the
Societe Generale.Not surprisingly,in 1881 the Banque de Con/pie
had become the leader among the commercial banks of Con/ple,a fact















The Societe Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs.
This bank was established in 1872 by two Greek bankers,E
Eugenidi and P Clado together with an English capitalist,M
Barker.In comparison to the other two banks the Societe Ottomane
was smaller.Its nominal capital amounted to £T 660.000 while the
paid up capital was only £T 330.000.Considering the scope of
commercial banking in Con/ple the founders of the Societe Ottomane
concentrated their efforts on commercial banking.In fact,the
initial purpose of the Societe Ottomane was to specialise in
commercial banking.In the event,however,it became involved in
Ottoman finances to the same extent that the others did,and
sometimes this involvement was extended far beyond its
means.Nevertheless brokerage,commissions and other commercial
transactions continued to hold a large part of the bank's turnover
and in fact the bank succeeded in making sufficient profits out of
it.
The first annual report of the Societe Ottomane was presented
in April 1874.Not surprisingly the report referred to the
financial crisis of this year and its repercussions on the money
market of Con/pie:	 "Due to the abundance of capital and the
low interest rates in Europe the first part of 1873 was
characterised by a financial fever.Unfortunately,although the
condition of our market seemed to be sound and the share prices of
all local establishments were at their highest level ever,the
outbreak of the Vienna crisis spread fear....Our market felt the
repercussions heavily...and the distrust on all shares resulted in
a depreciation beyond anything anticipated."
[NEOLOGOS,27/4/1874] .It appears,however,that the bank was not
affected by the Vienna crisis.In 1873-74 brokerage and commission
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anticipated premium,a large discount was the result.The Societe
Ottomane which had participated in the transaction to the extent
of 11.850 bonds,out of a total of 652.780,suffered losses
amounting to £T 12.460. [LEVANT HERALD,4/4/1876].One must point
out,however,that when the Ottoman suspension of payments was
declared,the management of the bank was generally reluctant to
advance to the government.The board made this clear in the annual
meeting for the financial year 1875-76, "Our advances to the
government up to 31 December[1875] was £T 554.022:that they
reached this figure was owing to circumstances beyond our
control.The Syndicate of 1873...had entered into an engagement
with the Government to pay all advances guaranteed on the 1873
bonds...in case the participants in those advances should decide
to claim payment.Such being the case we were justified in
continuing on the repayment of our advances of 13th October
last,seeing that we had but to declare ourselves unwilling to
renew in order to compel the Syndicate to re-imburse us.Towards
the end of September last,the various financial houses were asked
by the government to lend it the aid in obtaining the funds
necessary for the payment of the October coupon...we consented to
participate in this advance...but we were deceived in our
expectation the Syndicate declaring that the decree of October the
6th annulled its engagement towards the government and liberated
it from repaying the advances...The consequence of this was that
our	 "advance	 account"was,contrarily	 to	 our
provisions,considerably increased." [LEVANT HERALD,4/4/1876].
One may reasonably assume that the management of the Societe
Ottomane was dismayed when the service of the Ottoman debt was
suspended.The bank had extended itself far beyond its means.In
comparison to the other two banks the involvement of the Societe
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Ottoman was much heavier.According to a contemporary source,since
1874 this bank had lent to the governmentjT1.395.000 of its own
capital [LEVANT HERALD,4/5/1876].Obviously the reporter of the
Levant Herald was referring to the actual amount which appeared on
the balance sheets of this period.In reality the bank had advanced
much more substantial capital:during the same period it had
employedT 1.155.068,of its own capital not including that of its
customers.Part of this capital was repaid,but the remainder was
still disproportionate to the bank's small capital
resources.Summarising its report with regard to the Societe
Ottomane the Levant Herald points out that, "The company
shows good profit,good general management careful and economic
working .But the lock up in advances to the Treasury is so
disproportionate to the means of the company that the shares have
dropped to £1.8(5 paid)and the direction feels called upon to
postpone for a time the distribution of dividends." [LEVANT
HERALD,ibid].
In spite of the bank's reluctance to reinvolve itself heavily
in the financing of the Ottoman government the general situation
was such that it had no other option.The Societe Ottomane,like all
other local establishments,was dependent on the economic revival
of the Ottoman State,just as the Ottoman government was dependent
on these establishments for its current needs.This interdependence
led all local banks to advance to the government and made them
practically its only financial resort.The danger that a Russian
victory would represent to the bankers'interests has already
pointed out.The Societe Ottomane was not an exception to the
rule.For these reasons the bank continued to assist the government
hoping for a future settlement which would allowed it to recover
its early advances.In the mean time the bank secured sufficient
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guarantees for its new advances;almost all its advances to the
govenment contracted between 1876 and 1879 were guaranteed by the
sheep tax,customs revenues or the indirect taxes of Turkey.In the
board's own words, "Nous sprons que le gouverneMe.1t Impe'rial
prendra en serleuse consideration la necessite irnperieuse de
sauvegarder les intrets des tablisse,ents financiers de
Galata,qui seuls lui ont prte un concours devoue dans les
circonstances difficulte qui 1]. traversait,et dont la prosprit
est en
	 troit cc4re'lation
	 avec	 celle	 du	 pays."	 [LEVANT
HERALD,30/4/1877]
During the financial year of 1876/77 the bank advanced £T
513.785 to the government.One year later the Societe
Ottornane,directly or indirectly,lent to the Ottoman Treasury
another £T658.975 [IMEROLOGION TIS ANATOLIS(1878)287].During the
next two years the bank advanced similar amounts of capital to the
Treasury:T 506.384 in 1878 and £T 272.570 in 1879
[NEOL0G0S,29/4/1879,21/4/1880] .Despite these advances,however,the
bank was eager to restrict its connections with the Ottoman
Treasury as much as possible.So in 1878 the bank disposed of all
its Ottoman stock fearing a further depreciation in their prices
[NEOLOGOS,29/4/1879].During the following years there is no
indication that the bank was involved in transactions with Ottoman
bonds and it appears that the management of the bank was extremely
unwilling to accept such bonds as a guarantee.Instead the bank was
always asking for direct or indirect revenues to be placed as
security.
Uriderstandably,the bank participated in the convention of
November 1879.When this convention was finally signed the Ottoman
government owed the bank £ T 705.118 .Nevertheless,the bank
abstained from any advance during the years 1880 and 1881
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restricting itself to the collection of the amounts already owed
to it by the government.Indeed the bank recovered a large part of
its money back during these two years and in 1881 the government's
debt to the bank had been reduced to £T 173.779.When the Muharem
decree was signed in December 1881 the bank was granted privileged
bonds for the same amount [NEOLOGOS,1O/4/1882].
During the 1870's,however,the Societe Ottomane did not
involve itself in investments outside the Ottoman empire,not even
in Egypt where financial conditions were similar to those of
Turkey and,as has been already pointed out,other banks were
heavily involved.In addition,the bank did not take part in
investments in the Greek kingdom which at that time was becoming
an important field of banking investment.Consequently,unlike the
Societe Generale and the Banque de Con/ple,the Societe Ottomane
suffered no losses from the conversion of
	
the Egyptian
debt.Instead its embarrassment derived directly from its
transactions with the Ottoman Treasury.The Societe Ottomane's
early policy for participating in the Ottoman finances far beyond
its capital resources proved disastrous.Undoubtedly,the reason for
this involvement lies on the high interest rates which the bank
enjoyed.For example in 1873/74 the bank enjoyed rates varying
between 10 and 13 %.
One should point out however that the management continued to
devote attention to commercial banking.Between 1873 and 1876 the
bank's profits from brokerage and exchanges amounted to £T 95.000
ELEVANT IIERALD,4/5/1876].In 1877/78 the bank made a net profit of
fT 43.804 out of brokerage and exchange transactions.However,it is
essential to emphasise that,particularly after the disastrous
year of 1876,the bank's net profits heavily relied upon brokerage
and other commercial transactions.In this way,the commercial
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recession of the late 1870's and early 1880's affected the profits
of the Societe Generale to a much greater extent than those of the
other two banks whose involvement in commercial transactions was
limited,to say the least.According to the annual report for the
financial year of 1878/79, "the decrease of brokerage profits
derives from the bad condition of all commercial and economic
transactions throughout the last year." [NEOLOGOS,29/4/1879] .A
similar situation was presented in the following years.In 1880/81
the bank not only made no profits from brokerage and exchanges,but
it suffered slight losses of £T 1.170.
Despite all this,however,the bank showed substantial profits
throughout the 1870's.Certainly,the total amount of profits
realised by the Societe Ottomane was smaller than that of the two
other banks [See Table next page] .Yet if these profits are
compared to the bank's paid up capital,they seem extraordinarily
high.This is clearly shown by the following table comparing the
net profits to the bank's real capital.
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the early 1880's,the bank's net profits were proportionaly as high
as those of the other two banks which in the final analysis used
far superior capital.From its establishment in 1872,the bank
provided the shareholders with a dividend of 145% on their paid-up
capital which should certainly be considered a
	 good
result.Moreover,despite the difficulties the bank faced it
retained its capital and made no attempt to reduce it as was the
case of the Societe Generale.Nevertheless,after 1876 the bank's
directors were forced to reduce its turnover [See TabieXX ].After
the suspension of the service of the Turkish Debt however,this was
the common denominator of banking activities in Con/ple.Even the
turnover of the Bank of Con/pie which had become the leading
Con/politan bank,was much lower if compared to the turnover of the
early and mid-1870's.The policy of the bank after 1876 was similar
to that of the Societe Generaie and it appears that the management
was happy to wait for the settlement of the Ottoman floating debt
before it engaged in other banking activities.Even after the
Muharem decree the bank showed no investing interest in projects
concerning Greece,presumably judging that the cautious policy
followed since 1876 should be continued.
In conclusion,one may say that the Societe Ottomane was in a
position to realise good profits despite some poor years.The major
embarrassment to the bank came from its involvement in Ottoman
finances.The suspension of the service of the Ottoman Debt caused
the bank losses and at the same time forced its management to be
more cautious.The conservative policy followed by the bank after
1876,however,did not prove particularly successful.The bank
succeeded in surviving and making moderate profits,but they were
still far less than those of the Banque de Con/pie.The








bank of some investment opportunities.Yet it appears this policy
was essential as the bank had extended its activities with the
Ottoman government far beyond its capital resources.The Societe
Ottomarie employed almost the same amount of capital in these
transaction with the other two banks,but its capital resources
were much smaller.In this way one may say the bank was forced- to
limit its activities because in the long term only the settlement
of the Ottoman debt could take the bank out of its difficult
position.In addition the commercial recession of the late 1870's
was a major setback for the bank's commercial transactions and
severely affected its net profits.This additional
difficulty,however,was only partly responsible for the relatively
small profits of that later period,mainly because the Societe
Ottomane's embarrassments were mostly connected with the fate of
Ottoman finances.
Evaluation:The presentation of the activities of these three
banking establishments highlights some of the major aspects of
Greek banking in Con/ple.Similarities and differencies did exist
but all these establishments followed the same policy.They heavily
involved themselves in Ottoman finances until October 1875.After
the declaration of the Ottoman suspension of debt service they
attempted a gradual disengagement from the financing of the
Ottoman state.However,developments beyond their control,such as
the Turco-Russjan war,and a feeling of general insecurity made all
three of them extremely cautious during this later period.One
reason for this was that a large part of their advances made
during 1875 and 1876 were unredeemed.Safeguarding the service of
their earlier advances along with the service of those conducted
after 1876 became the basis of their policy.Of course this policy
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could be applied to every single banking institution operating in
Con/ple,from the Imperial Bank and the large private houses,to the
small bankers who never lent the to government more than a few
thousand pounds.The pressure exercised on the Ottoman government
by local banking houses,including the three banks under
consideration, led to the signing of the convention of November
1879 which finally settled the debts of the Ottoman government
towards them.Moreover the signing of the Muharem decree two years
later proved to be a further security for the unredeemed part of
the floating debt of the late 1870's.In this way the three banks
succeeded in recovering their capital.
Disengagement from Ottoman finances,however,was dealt with a
different way by each bank.The Societe Generale and the Societe
Ottomane safeguarded their capital resources and applied a
conservative policy,lending gradually less money to the government
and waiting for the settlement of the floating debt.Particuiarly
in the case of the Societe Generale this cautious policy led in
addition to a reduction of its capital.Conversely the Banque de
Con/pie followed a different pattern.Although it also limited its
advances to the Ottoman government,this bank concentrated a large
part of its activities on investments abroad,without waiting for a
settlement of the money advanced to the government.Greece,in
particuiar,appeared to be a promising new field for investments
and this is clearly shown by the annual reports of the late 1870's
and early 1880's.
Profits on the other hand continued to be high.Throughout
the period under consideration all three banking establishments
enjoyed large profits,despite the fact that they were faced with a
significant financial crisis.This is perhaps the most revealing
aspect of banking activities in Con/pie because one might have
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expected that,particularly after 1875,profits would have been much
more moderate or even non-existent.It must be emphasised that
management was a very important factor in the realisation of large
profits.All three banking establishments were directed by
extremely efficient boards which were responsible for their
progress.This fact is highlighted by the proportion of profits
distributed to management.The board of the Societe Ottomane
received 35% of net profits for its contribution,while that of the
Bank of Con/pie received the smaler,but still very high proportion
of 20%.The arrangement was different in the case of the Societe
Generale whose board received only 4% of net profits.This low
percentage however should be considered as an incentive to
potential investors rather than an indication that the board's
importance was not recognised.
One may assume therefore,that the position of these banks was
sound enough.They involved themselves mostly in transactions with
the Ottoman government while they did not participate in sectors
which might have affected their interests.That is particularly
true with regard to speculation which was widespread during the
period 1871-74.There is evidence to believe that the Societe
Generale was tempted by speculation and in fact during 1873 it
involved itself in such transactions to an important extent.But it
is also certain that this bank was not involved in this game for
long and consequently it suffered no damages.Conversely,the other
two banks abstained almost entirely from speculation.According to
the Levant Herald,
	 "When these two establishments of which
one[the bank of Con/ple]has a speculative reputation,came
scatheless out of the crisis of 1873...while all their neighbours
were constrained to plead the crisis as a force major which had
more or less neutralised their labours,it was currently insinuated
228
that these dividends were not warranted by real position of the
affairs of the two companies-that they were declared as a matter
of policy to sustain the shares in the market-that no realised
profits justified them and that the shareholders of 1874 were
benefitting at the expense of those of succeeding years.The result
however,emphatically belies these insinuations.Both the Bank of
Con/ple and the Societe Ottomane are able to show a sound position
and to declare dividends which may compare favourably with those
of the best joint-stock banks in London.There exists no trace in
the accounts of either institution of the speculative tendencies
to which we adverted above...In both establishments it is clear
that speculation is not their business." [LEVANT HERALD,5/4/1875].
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CHAFFER IX.The placing of Greek loans on the Con/pie money
market.
The Greek National loans,1862-1877.
During the period 1850-70,the Greek economy presented the
typical features of capitalist underdevelopment.The burden of the
agricultural sector was,to say the least,heavy.Industrial
production,with the exception of the island of Syra and the port
of Piraeus,was rudimentary;The system of transportation poor and
the urbanisation process limited.In addition,banditry in the
country spread insecurity,and had became a major threat to the
rural population.
Despite all these problems new developments were under
way.Agricultural production had become export-oriented and was
closely linked with European markets.Exports increased
drastically.The production and exports of currants alone,had
increased	 fourfold	 between	 1850	 and	 1875	 [Kendriki
Ypiresia,Phakelos	 Stratiotikai	 kai	 Statistikai
pliroforiai(1877),in A.Y.E].The development of export oriented
sector in Greece was realised at the expense of grain
cultivation.As already pointed out,grain cultivation was closely
associated with subsistence farming.Therefore any change in the
patterns of agricultural production towards the export oriented
economy might well be considered as a further step towards
integration into the world economy.Given the fact that the export
oriented economy in Greece was relatively developed one may assume
the integration of the Greek economy in the world economy was near
completion.Certainly,integration did not necessarily produce
industrialisation, let alone that in the long term the concrete
pattern of integration had negative effects for the Greek
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economy.At the time however,integration into the world economy
produced incentives for further development in agricultural
production.CoQ QMU4jth
 money surplus deriving from agriculture
inevitably increased.
The positive aspects of integration notwithstanding,Greece
faced sharp problems.The most important was the permanently
deficient balance of trade.In fact Greece was a net importer of
grain and foodstuffs.Conversely exports,if increased,could not
match imports.In the event,trade deficits became a fundamental
aspect of the Greek economy [SINARELIS(1985)349-370].Such deficits
were responsible for a continuous drain of exchange and gold to
Europe,thus affecting the country's limited capital resources.
Not surprisingly,shortage of capital inevitably affected the
Greek state.Current needs were increasing,thus absorbing the
meagre resources of the state.What is more important however is
the Greek state's exclusion from the European money markets.Since
the suspension of the service of the two loans contracted during
the Greek War of independence,and presumably as a punitive
measure,European bankers abstained from lending the Greek state
(DERTILIS(1984)146-150),Some attempts to settle the Greek Debt
proved futile,due mainly to Great Britain's opposition,which
thought that the settlement of this Debt might lead to the
rearmament of the Greek Army.This development was considered,and
not without reason,to be a threat to the stability of the Ottoman
empire,the support of which was the basis of British policy in the
Eastern Meditterranean.
In addition,Greece had agreed to pay 900.000 fr annually for
the service of the unredeemed loan of 1832 which was guaranteed by
the three Protecting powers.Greece co1cde4to this demand in 1860
when she signed a convention with Great Britain,the largest holder
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of this loan,France,and Russia [DERTILIS(1984)157].Accor ding to
this convention,the Greek state was obliged to give priority to
the payment of this annuity which absorbed a large part of its
small revenues.This development however,did not bring the
financial isolation of the Greek state to an end.In spite of
increasing European investments in foreign loans,Greece was
ignored.
In view of these difficulties,the Greek state resorted to
internal borrowing.The growth of the Greek internal Debt began
during the 1860's.Until then,this debt was non-existent. [see Table
I] .The resort to internal borrowing,however,was initially
undertaken with caution.The first loan of 6 million dr followed a
second of the same amount one year later.The Greek government
contracted its first large loan of 28 million dr(=25 million fr)
in 1867.After that date and until the final settlement of the
Greek foreign Debt in 1878,the total amount of internal borrowing
exceeded 100 million fr.
The most important aspect of the Greek loans contracted in
that period was their connection with the political and military
developments in the area.All loans were contracted to finance
directly militaty expenses or to cover the budget deficits
deriving from similar expenditure.The policy of the "Megali
Idea",or Great Idea,strongly associated with the expansion of the
Greek state,was predominant among •the political parties	 in
Greece.Political	 developments	 within	 the	 Ottoman
empire,particularly the outbreak of the revolt in Crete-a largely
Greek inhabited island-reinforced expansionist	 ideas which
inevitably implied military readiness.However,military preparation
proved a heavy burden for the Greek state.The 	 indirect
participation of Greece in the Cretan revolt finally led to the
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contraction of the loan of 28 million dr in 1867.The possibility
of a war with Turkey and the repercussions of the revolt in
Crete,such as the relief of 60.000 refugees who fled to Greece in
i.868,considerably influenced Greek politics.The Greek parliament
went so far as to vote in favour of an extra loan of 100 million
dr which,hopefully,was never contracted [A&P(1868-69)LXI
Greece,326/27]. yet,in an attempt to find additional funds,the
Greek state negotiated in 1868 a loan with the National Bank of
Greece and the lonian Bank.The loan led to the enforced
circulation of banknotes issued by these banks and added to the
National Debt 12 million dr.The cancellation of the enforced
circulation a year later,necessitated the contraction of another
loan of 9 million dr this time with the National Bank.
However,continuous borrowing apart from demonstrating the
shortage of liquidity which the Greek state faced,created enormous
problems.In order to cover accumulated budget deficits successive
Greek governments (a British consul observed that no government
remained in office for more than eleven months on average)were
forced to contract more loans.Extraordinary expenses were always
expected to be covered by further internal borrowing.Commenting on
the contraction of a 4 million loan in 1871,Watson,the Secretary
of the British Embassy in Athens reported that, "one of the
chief obstacles of obtaining a clear idea of Hellenic finances
lies in the fact of supplementary credits being each year voted
for the service of several Departments.Thus the Chamber,before its
dissolution,voted on account of previous deficits for the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs the suplementary sum of 635.000dr;for that of
Justice,180000;for that of the Interior,651.000;for that of the
War,1.310.000;and for that of the Finance,1.204.000dr;to meet
which the Government was authorised to contract a fresh loan of 4
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million fr,on the security of a third of the returns of the
Custom-House of Syra" [A&P(1871)LXVII,Greece,Athens,265-66].
The financial burden of interest and sinking fund paid by the
Greek state for the loans contracted between 1862 and 1868 proved
to be heavy indeed.For this reason the government contracted a new
loan of 29 million dr with the purpose of converting the various
high interest loans to a Genaral low interest Greek National Debt
[A&P(1875)LXXIV,Greece,226-8,A&P(1875)LXXVI,The
Piraeus,1215-16).In contrast to previously contracted loans whose
interest rates varied between 8 and 13%,the new loan bore the
modest rate of 6.5%.
However,political developments in Turkey,particularly the
escallation of hostilities between Serbia and Montenegro on one
side and Turkey on the other,triggered off a new fever of
patriotic enthusiasm in Greece.These developments led to ar
increase in military expenditure.For this purpose the
Koumoundouros government raised the loan of 10 million dr bearing
an interest of 8.5% [A&P(1877)LXXXI,Greece,376-77].In an attempt
to induce people to invest in this loan the Greek government
reduced the issue price further,from 81 to 79
[[A&P(1877)LXXXIII,The Piraeus,1350-51] .The amount which the Gree}c
state would pay annually for the service of this loan was 541.853
dr.This was the last loan coroc-ed, before the settlement of
Greece's foreign Debt in 1878;during the period 1862-1877 thE
Greek state borrowed a total sum of 129 million dr the service 01
which absorbed on average 15% of its annual revenues [ECONOMIKI
EPITH.IX,58-59,KATASTATIKON	 ETHNIKES	 TRAPEZES	 TE
HELLADQS:1882,11O-113,A&p(1875)LLIV,Greece,22933,A&P(1871)LXVII,
reece,163-67,	 (1)].
One must point out,however,that not all loans were offered
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for public subscription.Some of them were advanced by the National
and in some cases and by the lonian Bank.Only three loans were
raised through public subscription:that of 4 million dr in 1871
which was entirely absorbed in Athens;that of 28 million dr in
i.867;and that of 10 million dr in 1876.Conversely,the loan of 29
million dr represented the renewal of previous debts to various
Greek banks and only a small part was finally offered for public
subscription.
The terms of these loans were unfavourable to the GreeK
state.In a period when states with access to European money
markets paid interest of 3.5%-5%,the Greek state had to pay 10%.In
addition,one must stress that the exclusion of the Greek state
from European money markets inevitably contributed to high
interest rates.For this exclusion further restricted capital
supply in Greece thus affecting interest rates.Yet,one may also
assume that the Greek state offered high interest rates in order
to tempt investors.In a way high rates and the regular service of
the Debt were the government's only cards,or to put it in a
diffenent way,the necessary price it had to pay in order to obtain
credit.
Understandably,strong incentives had to be provided to all
individuals willing to invest in the Greek loans.With the regular
service of its debt,the Greek state attempted to establish its
solvency both in the country and in the various Greek colonies in
the Ottoman Empire,Egypt and Europe.Certainly the Greek state did
not expect to attract foreign investors.It rather wanted,not
unreasonably,to attract the capital of Greeks living outside the
Greek kingdom.Cut off from the European money markets the Greek
state hoped to find in the Greek colonies the answer to its
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financial problems.As already pointed out,these colonies
represented a considerably more wealthy community than the Greek
kingdom itself.That was true not only with regard to the colonies
of the Ottoman empire but those of Egypt and Europe as
well.Indeed,if properly invested,the capital of Greeks living
outside the Kingdom couid,so it was thought,become a panacea to
the Greek State.
For this reason the Greek state attempted to attract this
capitai.The National loans could 1 therefore,be the right mechanism
to attract the capital of Greeks living abroad.Not
surprisingly,Con/ple with its large Greek population and wealthy
business community was thought to be the proper city for placing
the National loans.The economic environment in Con/pie was
favourable.As already pointed out,banking and financial activities
in Con/pie were at the time flourishing.The Greek community of the
city enjoyed wealth and prosperity.Quite reasonably therefore it
was hoped that part of Greek loans could be successfully raised
there through public subscription.In addition,the interests of the
National Bank of Greece,the largest single contractor of Greek
loans,in this city were represented by the house of Zarifi &
Zafiropoulo.understandably,this cooperation meant,so it was
believed,that Zarifi would undertake the placing of Greek loans on
Con/ple.In addition,it was also hoped that other prominent Greek
merchants and bankers of this city would react with enthusiasm and
participate in the loans.In the event,however,the placing of Greek
bonds in Con/pie money market did not live up to the expectations
of the Greek state.
Greek bonds appeared in the Con/pie Stock exchange in a
period of increasing financial activities.The high issue price of
the loans was counterbalanced by high interest rates.As already
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pointed out,Greek capital in Con/pie was heavily involved in
banking,particulariy through the financing of the Ottoman state.To
a degree the Greek loans coincided with the shift of Greek capital
to banking and finance.This,however,did not imply that capitalists
would buy bonds of the Hellenic state simply because they
themselves happened to be Greeks.That was a major misunderstanding
which the Greek State had never anticipated.Certainly the
patriotic response was often strong,but never among the leading
Greek bankers and merchants,the people the Greek state most wanted
to attract.The response mainly came from the less wealthy Greeks
who found profitable as well as patriotic to invest in Greek
loans.This is not to say that the Greek bankers had less patriotic
feelings than the dozens of petty-merchants,priests,sailors and
housewifes who finally bought large quantities of Greek bonds.As
already mentioned,the contribution of the leading Greek bankers of
Con/pie to the cultural development of the Greek community was
considerable.And yet,subsidising societes,music companies etc,or
building schools and institutions of higher education was much
more expensive than buying 1000 or 2000 Greek bonds.This seeming
paradox could be explained if one takes into account that banking
and patriotism are not always compatible.Therefore,Greek bankers
acted both as Greeks who contributed to the development of their
community,and bankers whose interests led them not to invest in
the Greek loans.
The correspondence of the house of Zarifi& Zafiropoulo with
the National Bank of Greece provides sufficient material with
regard to the placing Greek loans on Con/ple.In April 1867,the
National Bank notified Zarifi of its intention to place bonds of
the 1867 loan on the Con/pie money market.Zarif i was reluctant.He
refused to undertake the public subscription in this city,on the
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grounds that the loan was destined to cover military expenditure
(2) .His thoughts about the fate of the loan were clear
"Supposing,and I do not doubt it,the Greek parliament votes in
favour of the loan and its issuing is successfui.What does the
Greek Treasury gain?Receiving less than 20 million fr,it will be
endebted with 25 million fr.At the same time annual payments for
the service of the loan will reach 2.800.000 dr(=2.545454 fr).This
amount is such a heavy burden that it will not take long before
the government recognises that the loan was a bad choice.Greek
finances will not improve because of the loan.The solvency of the
Greek state would be at stake.Of course,some ardent partisans[of
the Great Idea] will say that,with the loan,armies will be formed
and Turkish provinces will be gained.I say that in this way it is
impossible to gain provinces.The only way[to do so]is to build
roads,to do away with brigandage and to balance the budget.To
achieve all these however,the Constitution must be suspended for
ten years and Greece should be left to the patriotic judgement of
the king.I don't want to predict the worst but in view of the
present situation the loan will fail.In a way this should be
expected because those who bought shares in the Greek Navigation
company are not satisfied.Personally I hold shares in this company
to the value of 50.000dr.Aiong with my partners we hold bonds of
the 6 million dr loan of the same amount.Although I consider the
money invested in the Navigation company iost,whiie the coupons of
the 6 million loan,expired four months ago,are still unredeemed,I
subscribe for 100 bonds of the new loan...I do so,not because I
think I help my country,but because I do not want to be in
opposition." [ETE,letter dated 5/4/1867].
In the event,Zarifi proved right;public subscription in
Con/pie	 for	 the	 1867	 loan	 failed
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[ANDREADES(1925)73-74,DERTILIS(1979)24].According to Syngros's
memoirs"The Greek consulate in Con/pie had formed a committee with
the purpose of collecting subscriptions for the loan.However the
committee failed miserably:I subscribed for 50.000 fr but I doubt
if the total amount of subcription exceeded	 500.000	 fr"
(SYNGROS(1908) 11,187] .However,one should not come to the
conclusion that the loan's failure derived from the opposition of
Con/politan Greeks to the irredentist policies of the Hellenic
state.Indeed Zarifi's views were only partly accepted among Greeks
in Turkey.It is known that there were many Greeks in Turkey who
welcomed the policies of the Greek state.Therefore the Greek state
could rely on the support of,at least,part of the Greek population
living in the Empire.Yet,this did not happen.Or at least it
happened only to a small extent.What really kept the Greeks in
Turkey from investing in the Cretan loan was the prospect of a
national defeat [DERTILIS(1979)24].One may assume with reasonable
certainty,that a Greek defeat in a war with Turkey would ruin the
finances of the Greek kingdom and in consequence the money placed
on the loan would be lost.
The end of the Cretan insurection found the Greek state with
empty coffers.Much worse,the loan of 28 million dr had
failed.Despite the fact that not only banks,but also public
institutions and even orphanages had participated in the loan,only
half of the bonds were finally sold [SYNGROS(1908)II,187-188].In
view of this situation the Greek government accepted a proposal
submitted by the National Bank.It was agreed that the interest
rate would increase from 8% to 9%.Extra interest was thought to be
a good incentive which would facilitate the purchase of unsold
bonds.Moreover,regular payment of coupons would become a major
priority of the state.
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In addition,the end of war in Crete and the prospects of
peace in the region,if temporary,changed the disposition of
investors towards the loan.This development is highlighted by the
interference of two Con/politan bankers,Syngros and Baltazzi,who
negotiated the purchase of the unsold bonds.The two Greek bankers
stepped into the scene in autumn 1869.According to Syngros-who
recounts this transaction without mentioning Baltazzi's
participation-the Greek government in order to dispose of the rest
of the bonds,worth some 3 million fr,was willing to sell them at a
considerable discount.Syngros,realising the profits he could
extract from the loan,informed the government of his intention to
buy the unsold bonds.He went to Athens where he signed a contract
with the government and then he immediately advanced 300.000
fr.Baltazzi on the other hand bought his share through his agents
in Athens [DERTILIS(1979)27].
The move of the two bankers brought the desired results.The
prices of the bonds,which Syngros had bought at 192 fr,begq,n
moving upwards.Individual investors,especially those living in
Greek colonies,were now attracted by the bonds.This development
led Syngros to boast that"I do believe my involvement ....affected
many(Greeks]in Turkey and Trieste,who,convinced by my example
decided to purchase large numbers of bonds."
[SYNGROS(1908)II,195].The mass purchase of bonds by Syngros and
Baltazzi reestablished the solvency of the Greek state which at
the time was at the lowest levels.In this context,Syngros's
conversation with the Greek Foreign Minister is revealing.Syngros
recalls that"On the following day[of the signing of the contact] I
received a visit from S Valaoritis,the Greek Foreign Minister,who
announced to me the government's decision to award me the Golden
Cross of the Saviour....He also wanted me to sell him bonds of the
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1867 loan to the amount of 50.000 fr.I promised him I would do
so,but I did not miss the opportunity to ask him why he had not
bought of these bonds before.He replied:I trust ,you know well why
you bought them(the unsold bonds)"[SYNGROS(1908)II,193-94}.In the
event,when Syngros left Athens he had alredy sold bonds to the
value of 300.000 fr.It is obvious that the involvement of the two
bankers had nothing to do with patriotism.Only the prospects of
high profit brought the bankers into the scene.As Syngros himself
put it"I only conducted business"..Yet this interference should not
be interpreted from a moral point of view.At the time,economic
considerations were more important and one should not blame the
bankers for it.
The new disposition towards the loan is also highlighted by
Zarifi's attitude.In February 1870 Zarifi notified the National
Bank of his intension to undertake the selling of unsold bonds in
Con/ple.However,Zarifi was still reluctant to buy bonds on his own
account.He simply agreed to undertake the placing of bonds on
commission [ETE,letter dated,11/2/18703 .Between February 1870 and
September 1873,the house of Zarifi & Zafiropoulo sold on behalf of
the National Bank 1500 bonds representing a nominal value of
375.000 fr.Therefore,during 1870 Greek bonds of the 1867 loan
appeared in Con/ple in large numbers.The mass purchase of such
bonds by Syngros and Baltazi had already affected prices.In a few
months the price of bonds bearing 8% reached 202 fr while that of
bonds of 9% reached 210.Yet,despite the acceptance of Greek bonds
in the Con/ple Stock exchange their placing continued to be
difficult.According to a letter of Zarifi to Renieris there were
only a few buyers whoin addition 1 were never willing to purchase
more than 100 bonds [ETE,letter dated 11/2/1870].Even Syngros
himself was facing difficulties in selling his bonds.During
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February 1870 he was forced to sell bonds to the tune of 198 each
thus losing part of the premium.Yet,although not
spectacuiar,demand for these bonds was rising and consequently
their prices continued to increase.In 1874 the 8% bonds were
priced at 251 fr exceeding thus their nominal value,while that of
bonds bearing 9% had reached 261 fr.Their price remained almost
unchanged throughout the 1870's.
Apart from the mass purchase of bonds by Syngros and
Baltazzi,the only large transaction concerning such bonds took
place during 1874-75.In fact a large number of the 1867 loan
bonds,exceeding probably 10.000,was resold to Greece.From 1874
forward,the house of Zarifi & Zafiropoulo paid much smaller
amounts for the servicing of that loan.This development is also
recorded by Merlin,the British charge d'affaires in Piraeus who
reported in 1874 that, "That the inhabitants of the Piraeus
are more wealthy than formerly may be gathered also from the fact
that the large quantity of Greek stock,consisting of shares of the
National Bank and of Government securities sent here for sale from
Turkey and Europe have been absorbed and that the fall in the
value of such securities,notwithstanding the threatening aspect of
political affairs in the East has	 not exceeded	 4	 to
5%."[A&P(1877)LXXXIII,The Piraeus,1347].
One may conclude that the placing of the 1867 loan was
relatively successful.The total number of bonds sold in Con/pie
both before and after the rate conversion although it did not live
up to the expectations of the Greek state was satisfactory.Judging
from the amounts the house of Zarif I paid for the service of the
loan,the number of bonds sold in Con/pie did not exceed
25.000.This figure represented one forth of the total number of
bonds issued by the Greek state.No doubt this number also included
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the bonds sold in Con/pie by Syngros and Baitazzi.
Public subscription for the loans of 26 and 10 million fr in
Con/ple,was also undertaken by the house of Zarifi & Zafiropulo.As
already mentioned,only a small part of the loan of 26 million fr
was offered to public subscription.According to a report of Merlin
the loan was divided into the following way:the National Bank of
Greece assumed Bonds of the new loan for the conversion of other
securities held by it to the amount of 14 million fr;the lonian
Bank in exchange for bonds of the late lonian Treasury held by
it,assumed bonds to the amount of 1.627.500.Other societies,banks
and public institutions assumed bonds to the amount of
6.372.500;and bonds valued at 4.000.000 were disposed of through
public subscription [A&P(1875)LXXVI,The Piraeus,1215).
It is obvious that this loan was raised to remit earliest
debts.In this case Public subscription as such,piayed only a
marginal role.The total number of bonds offered to individual
investors was 8000.As a consequence only a small part of the loan
was placed on Con/pie where public subscription absorbed 1027
bonds.This figure represented 12% of the total number of bonds
offered for subscription.In addition,the house of Zarif I sold
bonds on behalf of the National Bank of Greece.Following the terms
of the Bank,which set the price of each bond at 410 fr,Zarifi sold
800 bonds.However it is also known that a number of bonds of the
1874 loan was transacted in the Con/pie stock exchange through
individual intermediaries [ETE,letter dated,4/8/1875] .Even SO
however,it is unlikely that the total number of bonds circulating
in Con/pie ever exceeded 2000.
Once again the leading Greek bankers of Con/ple remained
indifferent towards the loan.In fact,no leading banker purchased
bonds of the 26 million fr loan.Zarifi himself declined an offer
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by the National Bank for 500 bonds on favourable terms [ETE,letter
dated,9/4/1875].In view of Zarifi's participation 	 in	 every
investment in Greece made by Con/politan bankers this is
particularly revealing.Zarifi,in company with Syngros,Baltazzi and
many other bankers,had participated directly in the establishment
of the Credit General of Athens [DERTILIS(1980)35-36].He had also
participated in the Credit Industriel and the Laurium Company.In
the case of the Laurium company Zarif i asked the National Bank to
mediate on his behalf and buy 5000 shares in the company.Although
he finally obtained only 400 he was satisfied	 [ETE,letter
dated,25/4/1873].Yet,Zarifi's attitude was not an isolated
case.Other Greek bankers heavily involved themselves in these
investrnents,though without participating in the Greek loans of the
period.
Similar attitudes were displayed towards the loan of 10
million fr which was offered for public subscription in February
1877.In Con/ple the loan was unsuccessful.Public subscription in
this city absorbed 1300 bonds representing a nominal value of
325.000fr.The fact that public subscription was concluded only in
September 1877 is an indication of how small the demand
was.According to Zarifi's correspondence with the National Bank
there were only a few buyers.In addition,many Con/politan Greeks
preferred to buy bonds directly in Athens [ETE,letter
dated,27/4/1877].Even so,the total amount of bonds of the 1877
loan held by Greeks of Con/ple appears to have been limited.
The only exception was Zarifi's sister,E Zarifi,who bought
800 bonds,more than half of the total amount sold in Con/ple
(ETE,letter dated 4/5/1877].Zarifi credited the failure of the
loan to "the price of bonds,which high as it is,does not
induce ordinary people to buy them.In addition,the brochure for
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the loan was not published at the proper moment.It is true the
brochure was posted...u.p in our offices but this is not
enough.Besides,we should take into consideration that the holders
of bonds of the 26 million loan enjoy higher benefits and this is
the main reason for of the failure."[ETE,letter dated 21/2/1877.]
Zarifi's opinion however,is only partly correct.As far as the
price of bonds of the 1877 loan is concerned,it should be stressed
that it was significantly lower than that of other loans.Their
nominal price was 250 while the real one varied between 200 and
2lOfr.Conversely,the price of bonds of the 1873 loan was 420
fr.Therefore it was not the high price which averted people from
purchasing bonds of the 1877 loan.It was rather the general lack
of interest in these bonds which led to the failure of the loan.It
is also likely that the Ottoman suspension of payments contributed
to the failure.It seems that petty investors had in general lost
confidence in State bonds and,consequently,did not invest in the
1877 loan despite the fact the Greek Debt was too small at the
time and there was no danger of insolvency.The price of bonds of
the 1877 loan remained at low levels throughout the rest 1870's.In
1879 their real price varied around 200 fr.
It appears,therefore,that only the bonds of the 1867 loan
cicrulated in Con/pie in large numbers.The loan of 26 million fr
was covered almost exclusively in Athens and only a small part was
offered for public subcription in the City.Finally the placing of
the 1877 loan on Con/ple was a failure and the circulation of such
bonds very small.Therefore only a small part of Greek loans was
finally absorbed in Con/ple.Not surprisingiy,the overwhelming
majority of these bonds was purchased by Greeks living in Con/ple
and Turkey in general.Despite the fact that the National Bank of
Greece,the largest single creditor of the Greek state,attempted to
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place bonds at its disposal in Con/pie through the house of Zarifi
& Zafiropoulo,it appears that demand for Greek bonds was
inadequate,with the exception,perhaps,of those of the 1867
loan.1Judging from the total number of coupons paid by the house of
Zarifi for the service of Greek ioans,it appears that the total
nominal value of Greek bonds held in Con/pie did not exceed
8.000.000 fr.This amount was small and disproportionate to the
economic power of Con/politan Greeks.In addition,if one takes into
account that a large part of those bonds was held by Greeks living
in Smyrna, AdrianopleEdirne',the islands of Eastern Aegean etc,it
appears that Greeks of Turkey only marginally invested in the
Greek loans.This is particularly true of the leading Greek bankers
and merchants,the group which could contribute most to the
successful placing of the Greek bonds on Con/pie.
Of course there is always the possibility that a number of
bonds circulated in Turkey without being registered by the House
of Zarifi.This,however,seems rather unlikely and if it did happen
it was probably on a very limited scale.For the house of Zarifi &
Zafiropoulo was the only establishment in Turkey authorized to
service the payment of the Greek loans;therefore all bondholders
in Turkey had to send their coupons there for payment.Indeed
Zarifi's correspondence with the National bank provides a detailed
and,by and large,complete account of coupon payments including
those of holders living outside Con/ple.In addition,due to the
free movement of exchange and gold,it is unlikely that bondholders
living in Turkey sent their coupons in Athens for payments.The
National Bank of Greece was always in a position to provide the
necessary amounts of money to assure the payment of coupons of
bondholders living outside Greece.Let alone that Zarifi was always
willing to assist the bank in case of an emergency.
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The reasons which led Greek bankers not to invest in Greek
loans are associated with two factors:the possibility of
alternative investments in Turkey;and the exclusion of the Greek
state from Europen money markets.Alternative investment within
Turkey was linked to the financing of the Ottoman State.Between
1870 and 1874 the Ottoman state raised loans amounting to £ 140
million.The issue prices of these loans was very low,the average
price being 59.2 of the nominal one.[see below,Chap I,27].In
addition short term advances to the Ottoman Treasury absorbed a
large proportion of local capital.High interest rates,considerabiy
higher than those of the Greek loans,lured capitalists who might
otherwise have invested in the Greek ioans.Therefore,it is
reasonable to assume that the financing of the Ottoman state
proved a far more convenient and profitable outlet for Greek
capital.
Yet the difference in issue prices and the high interest
rates for short term advances to the Ottoman Treasury are not
enough to explain the failure of the Greek
	
loans.Without
underestimating these factors,one should underline that 	 the
exclusion of the Greek state from European money markets was the
major factor which made Greek bankers eschew investing in the
Greek loans.As already pointed out,the Greek bankers and merchants
of Con/pie were interested in bonds which could be used to obtain
credit.In contrast to Ottoman bonds,Greek bankers could not use
the bonds of the Heilenic State as a guarantee to obtain
credit.Nor in addition could they dispose of them quickly,in case
they were in need of liquidity.For these reasons no leading Greek
banker purchased large numbers of Greek bonds.Only Syngros and
Baltazzi bought such bonds in large quantities,but they sold them
as quickly as possible benefitting from the premium.One may assume
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therefore,that as far as the Greek bankers are concerned,Greek
bonds were useless.
Then who bought these bonds after all?According to the
catalogues provided by Zarifi most of the bondholders were
ordinary people.Here a distinction should be made between the
investment attitudes of Greek bankers and merchants and that of
Greek petty investors.Greek bankers considered the usefulness of
Greek loans in terms of credit facilities,while petty investors
considered state bonds in terms of income.However,the attitude of
Greek bankers and merchants is more important and certainly would
have had more significant consequences.Conversely the attitude of
petty investors did not impinge upon the financial considerations
of Greek bankers.Petty-investors were mainly interested in high
rates,and from an economic point of view Greek bonds were more
profitable than Ottoman ones.No doubt the fact the Greek state
paid regularly and in gold the coupons of its loans was a major
factor tempting petty investors to buy Greek bonds.Indeed the real
annual payment for Greek loans exceeded in 1877 seven million
dr,representing 17 % of the total state revenues.[see Table II,
(3)].It is reasonable,therefore,to believe that the regular
service of the Debt established the solvency of the Greek state
and pushed the Prices of Greek bonds upwards.That was particularly
true for the loans contracted before 1876 because the loan of 10
million dr was seriously affected by the Ottoman suspension of
payments.Despite the fact this suspension spread panic among
individual investors,the prices of the Greek bonds were not
affected.However,one may add that other factors also contributed
to the high prices of Greek bonds.The most important,perhaps,are
political developments between 1869 and 1875.Indeed after the end
of the Cretan insurrection in 1869,and until 1875,political
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tranquillity was established in the region.The Eastern Question
had entered a temporary respite.In Greece itself,the politics of
the Great Idea lost ground.Prospects of political stability
soothed the anxieties of investors and facilitated the expansion
of financial and banking transactions.
Summarising,it appears that the involvement of Con/politan
Greek bankers in the Greek loans was negligible.Conversely,it was
Greek petty investors who bought and held the bonds of the
Hellenic state and only due to their involvement was the placing
of Greek bonds on Con/ple finally achieved.Despite the fact most
of the Greek bankers were involved in other investments in
Greece,such as the Credit General,the Laurium company etc,they
avoided investments in Greek loans.The "shift",therefore,of
Con/politan capital to Greece was not associated with the Greek
loans.
Con/politan Greek bankers involved themselves in Greek loans
only after the settlement of the Greek foreign Debt in 1878.This
shift concerned not only private banking houses,but also,and
foremost,banks such as the Banque de Con/ple.After 1878 the bonds
of the Hellenjc state could be used in the same way as the bonds
of any state not excluded from the Europen money markets.With the
major obstacle removed,Greek bankers and banking houses in Con/ple
had no reason not to invest in Greek loans.
This particular attitude of Con/politan bankers towards the
Greek loans reveals two major aspects of their activities.One is
the dependent place of Greek bankers vis-a-vis European money
markets,or to put in another way,the dominant role of European
capital.Greek bankers,already dependent on European credit were
obliged to conform to the financial rules of the European capital
markets.The bonds of states excluded from there were useless.Since
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the money market of Con/pie was conditional upon European credit
and,therefore,upon the priorities and choices of European
capitalism the involvement of Greek bankers in Greek loans before
1878 was inevitably negligible.
In addition,this particular attitude of Greek bankers reveals
another aspect of their profile.The Ottoman empire remained the
centre of their activities.Although the introduction of foreign
capital into the Ottoman empire inevitably reduced their
profits,they continued to consider Turkey as the main field for
investment.It is true that some attempts were made to find
alternative investments abroad,and particularly in Greece,where
the Con/politan bankers participated in the major investments of
the late 1870's and early 1880's.Even in view of these
developments,Greece,as far as investments were concerned was the
second best choice.The only exception to the rule,was the Banque
de Con/pie which diversified its activities and disengaged itself
from Turkey to a considerable extent.
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TABLE I:The Greek Internal Debt. (in dr)
Year	 Amount	 Issue price	 Interest rate
1862-63	 6.000.000	 100
	 7
1864-65	 6.000.000	 -	 8
1866-68	 16.000.000	 -	 8
1868	 28.000.000	 80
	 8
1869	 12.000.000	 -	 6





1875	 8.500.000	 -	 8
1876-77	 10.000.000	 79
	 8
Sources:A&P:1871,LXVII,Greece,Report on the financial position of
Greece:1875,LXXIV,Greece,Report on Finance Trade and. Agriculture During
year 1874.KATASTATIKON TES ETHNIKES TRAPEZES TES HELLADOS:1982.
TABLE II:Public Debt Payments. (in dr)
Year Total expenditure Payments of external Debt Payments of Internal
Debt
	
1866/67 28.373.383	 1. 075. 000	 1.875.870
	
1867/68 32.990.123	 1.075.000	 3.159.870
	
1868/69 34.605.254	 1. 075. 000	 3. 163. 070
	
1869/70 34.088.197	 1.025.000	 5. 309. 870
	
1870/71 34.498.262	 1. 025. 000	 6.414.860
	
1871/72 37.889.853	 1. 025. 000	 6. 897. 290
	
1872/73 35.929.035	 1. 025. 000	 7. 121. 617
	
1873/74 41.722.408	 1. 025. 000	 6.523.410
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1874/75 39.062.184 	 1.025.000	 6.478.832
	
1875/76 39.063.836	 1.025.000	 6.433.499
	
1876/77 41.067.825	 1. 025. 000	 7. 287. 749
Sources:A&P,Greece,1871,LXVII:1875,LXxIv:1876,LxxIII:1877,LxxxI.
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Notes to CHAPTER IX.
(1):If one takes into account the Greek foreign Debt,the total
National debt far exceeded this sum.Indeed the total
debt,including unredeemed annuities for the 1824-25 loans reached
300 million dr.
(2) :Zarifi's apprehensions derived from article 12 of the law
of the loan of 28 million dr.This article reads as follows."Two
thirds of the established capital will be employed for the
purchase of new ships as well as the provision of the Army and
Navy,and the remaining one third will service other military
needs.For this reason,the Ministries of the Army and Navy will
issue orders of payment drawn on the Treasury.The National Bank of
Greece which collects the capital of the loan will be responsible
for redeeming these orders" [PHILLON EPHIMERIDOS TIS
KEVERNISEOS,13/April/1867] .Zafiri feared the armament of Greece
might lead to war with Turkey.If he agreed to undertake the public
subscription in Con/ple,the Ottoman government might considered
this act to be hostile.This could have ruined the confidence and
regard which the Ottoman government held for Zarifi with
unforeseeable implications on the activities of his house.
(3):The amount that the Greek government devoted to the servicing
of the Internal debt far exceeded the annuitites of the 1832 loan
to the great exasperation of the British Embassy in Athens.[A&P
,see also Table II].However,the allotment of payment between
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internal and foreign debt was a direct result of the Greek state's
exclusion from the European money markets,as well as the way the
service of the 1832 loan was settled.In both cases,the
responsibilities of Great Britain were great.
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CHAPTER X:The road to the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration:Financial diplomacy and the role of Greek bankers.
On the 3rd of October 1875 the Ottoman government announced
that payments for the service of its public debt would be reduced
by half [BLAISDEL(1929)80-83,DU VELAY(1903)326].In
recompensation,the bondholders would receive bonds bearing 5%
interest.This extraordinary measure would last for five years.Only
the 1855 loan,which was guaranteed by England and France,would be
excluded from the measure.In a dispatch submitted to the British
government in London,the Turkish Minister of Finance Safvet
appealed to the bondholders for understanding.Turkey,he said,was
forced to adopt this measure because its revenues were near
exhaustion.He added that although the measure would harm many
interests the government had decided to proceed with it
[A&P (1876) LXXXIV, 10]
There is evidence to support the view that the Ottoman
government had been considering a reduction of interest payments
for quite a long time.As already mentioned,Henry Elliot,the
British Ambassador in Con/ple,informed Lord Derby that the Grand
Vizier had decided to announce a reduction in the rate of
interest. [A&P(11876)LXXXIV,2] .In addition,the Inspector of the
Imperial Bank,Hornberg,in his report regarding the developments
between October 1875 and January 1876,reported that many Ottoman
officials,obviously aware in advance of the reduction,had disposed
of their bonds before the 5th of October. [AN F30/356,report dated
31/1/1876]
The Ottoman suspension of payments triggered of new
developments and struck a fatal blow to the solvency of the
Ottoman State.The immediate result of the suspension was the
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exclusion of the Ottoman state from the European money rnarkets.The
public in Europe,on whom the placing of any loan depended,lost
confidence in Ottoman finances.Thus,while the European banks were
always in a position to form a syndicate and issue a fresh
loan,from then on it was certain that money raised through public
subscription would be disastrously inadequate.Meanwhile,in view of
the circumstances the European banks were extremely reluctant to
advance capital to the Porte out of their own coffers.In reality
most of these banks had only a marginal interest in Turkish
finances.Most of the European syndicates which had issued loans
before 1875,had acted as contractors and were liquidated as soon
as they had disposed of the bonds to the public.In the event,due
to the public's loss of confidence in Ottoman finances,European
banks were unwilling to involve themselves in issuing new Ottoman
loans.
Conversely,the position of local banks,including the Imperial
Bank,was considerably affected by the Ottoman suspension.The bulk
of the capital of local banks was invested in short term advances
to the Treasury.Individual capitalists who had placed their
capital at the disposal of these banks, knew that the government
could also revoke the payment of these advances which had not been
granted a specific guarantee.Understandably,therefore,local
bankers faced a severe problem:how to get this capital
back.Paradoxically,the only way to achieve this was to make new
advances to the government and try to obtain guarantees which
would also assure payment of their previous advances (see above,Ch
IV	 ).Consequently,they were forced to participate more actively
in the conduct of Ottoman finances,and take a more active stand in
general.
These developments eventually led to the formation of two
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rival groups:the first group included the European bondholders of
Turkish stock,namely the holders of the Ottoman foreign Debt;the
second group consisted of those banks and banking houses of
Con/pie and Europe which,to a greater or lesser extent,were
associated with the floating debt.Given the problematic and
critical position of Ottoman finances as well as the limited
resources of the Ottoman state the interests of these two groups
were not identical;simply there was not enough money for both of
them.
The European Powers eventually stepped into the scene.Each of
them was ready to protect the interests of its own subjects and at
the same time to pursue its individual policy.Rivalry in this case
was taken for granted.The European struggle for predominance had
developed into a game between six Powers.Germany and Italy had
joined Great Britain,France,Russia and Austria.This conflict led
the Powers having different and not always consistent attitudes
towards the settlement of the Ottoman Public debt and towards the
Ottoman empire in general.
The last,and by no means least important,factor was the
Ottoman state itself.With its finances 	 ruined,its	 revenues
declining and a Balkan war at hand,the Ottoman government had to
deal with all these factors,to make its own choices and to favour
one financial group against the other and vice versa.The Ottoman
government was playing its own game,had its own priorities
and,most important,aimed to prevent foreigners from taking control
of its revenues.Rivalry,therefore,was the predominant aspect of
that period:rivalry between financial groups;rivalry between local
bankers and European Powers;rivalry among the European Powers
themseives;and finally rivalry between the Ottoman government an&
all the others.
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Not surprisingly,European bondholders responded to the
suspension of payments with fury.Many individual bondholders
protested strongly sending letters to the British government and
asking for its immediate intervention [A&P(1876)LXXXIV,12-13] .In
addition,European holders of Turkish stock began forming their
syndicates almost as soon as the Ottoman government announced its
measures.The holders of the 1854,1858 and 1871 loans,guaranteed by
the Egyptian Tribute formed a syndicate on the 26th of October
1875.It was headed by E Palmer,an English private banker who,at
the same time,held the office of the Deputy Governor of the Bank
of England [A&P(1876)LXXXIV,29].The bondholders of the
	 1862
loan,headed by E Clark,formed their syndicate the same
week.Finally the holders of the General Debt and of various other
loans decided to form their own syndicate a few weeks
later.Similar developments occured in France where the different
French interests formed their respective syndicates.
The representatives of the Tribute loans conferred with Lord
Derby on 16th November 1875.They argued that the Ottoman
government had violated their rights by taking their security to
pay back unsecured creditors.This accusation concerned the payment
of loans not guaranteed by specific revenues such as,for
example,the General debt which alone constituted a considerable
part of the Ottoman debt.They also emphasised that most of the
public in England was tempted to invest in Turkish stock after
some senior British officials,such 	 as	 Lord	 Russell	 and
Layard,expressed their confidence in the Ottoman finances and
encouraged people to
	
put	 their	 money	 into	 these
loans [A&P(1876)LXXXIV,34]
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The method of payment of the Public debt finally became an
apple of discord among European capitalists.The Ottoman Debt,whose
nominal value was equal to £214 million,was divided into two
categories:the secured loans amounting to 43 million,and the
unsecured loans which made up the rest of the Debt.No specific
security was assigned to the service of the second category
loans.In the contracts it was usually stipulated that the service
of these loans was dependent on the General revenues of the empire
without,however,mentioning special securities.
The holders of the secured loans resented Turkey's attempts
to revoke their securities in order to pay all the bondholders.At
the same time,the holders of the unsecured loans being in a
precarious position,were anxious to come to terms with the Ottoman
government as soon as possible.As one might expect,this group was
more willing to compromise.In December 1875,the syndicate of
various unsecured Ottoman loans produced a detailed plan for the
future settlement of the Ottoman debt.The project worked out by C
Hammond M.P,under whose name it appeared,was published on 13th
December 1875.It contemplated the reduction of the Ottoman Public
Debt from £ 214 million to £ 118 million.This second figure
represented the real amount borrowed by the Ottoman state between
1854 and 1874,plus 1O%.Interest rates would remain the same,but
interest and sinking fund payment would be calculated on the
reduced amount.Ali securities and hypothecated revenues,apart from
the Egyptian Tribute,would be paid over to a joint committee in
Con/pie whose members would be elected by the bondholders [For the
full project see A&P(1876)LXXXIV,63].
In reality,however,the Hammond project represented a
compromise between the two major groups of English holders:the
syndicate of the Tribute loans and that of the various Ottoman
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loans.In a meeting held on 7 December 1875 the two committees came
to terms with one another accepting the plan as a basis for
negotiations with the Ottoman gvrnpien [ROSE and
STANIFORTH(1876)1-2].The Palmer committee agreed on such a scheme
provided that the Egyptian Tribute would be excluded from the
service of other loans and would be kept aside for the service of
the Tribute loans.As far as the reduction of the Ottoman debt was
concerned,it became clear that no settlement could be made without
a reduction of the total Debt.
At the same time,the representatives of the various English
and French committees in Con/ple,apart from undermining each
others activities,strove to obtain the official backing of their
respective ambassadors.The British government,extreme].y anxious
not to affect Turkey's precarious position,declined to back any
individual group unless the various committees come to terms with
one another.Henry Elliot,the British ambassador in Con/ple,was
instructed to give only unofficial support to the representatives
of the various British committees[A&P,ibid,69].Elliot himself was
embarrassed by the insistence of those representatives,to the
extent he once replied to the representative of the committee of
the 1862 loan that"while advocating the wishes of one section of
British subjects interested,I might be acting in a manner which
the other section would consider injurious." [A&P(1876)LXXXIV,54].
The Ottoman government also played its own game.With an
official note dated October 22 1875,it announced its intention of
introducing financial reforms which would increase the state
revenues.At the same time,however,it announced that it would not
increase taxation or impose extraordinary taxes as this would sap
the most productive sources of Turkey[A&P,ibid,39].In other
words,the bondholders ought to accept its policies.In addition,the
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government tryed to play off one group against the other.According
to a letter from Musuros Pasha,the Ottoman minister in London,to
Lord Derby,the government found it impossible to establish a
demarcation line between different groups of bondholders without
being accused of having decided to sacrifice certain interests
[A&P(1876)LxxxIv,57] .Accordingly,the Government was not prepared
to consider any project unless it was unanimously accepted by all
groups.
Since the Hammond plan was accepted by some of the major
syndicates of English holders it might have provided the basis for
negotiations with the Ottoman government.Moreover,Hammond informed
Lord Derby that the French press had praised his scheme and
recommended its immediate adoption by the French syndicates
[A&P(1876)LxxxIv,71] .In the event,however,compromise was not
reached.Qpposition to the Hammond project was spreading,especially
among small individual holders.According to a letter sent to Lord
Derby by a bondholder, "The individuals who advocate that scheme
are large capitalists who hold principally in the oldest
loans...and consequently are quite content to throw off and give
up a considerable sum of the nominal....knowing that if they can
only make a portion secure to their satisfaction they must come
well out.I feel sure this proposed scheme would not meet the
approval of the general holder throughout this and other
countries;jt is absolute surrender of both principal and interest
which is not asked or intended."[A&p(1876)LXxxIv,68].
Yet,the failure of this project should not be attributed to
the opposition of small holders.It should rather be attributed to
the rift between Hammond and Palmer.Although the project itself
was not disputed,Hammond decided not to join the committee
appointed by the December meeting to initiate negotiations with
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the Ottoman government.At a second meeting held in early January
1876,Hammond objected altogether to the names of the proposed
negotiators.He then formed a committee of his own
[A&P(1876)LXXxIV,80-81]
The reasons which led Hammond to take this step were
connected with the duties assigned to the committee.The committee
was to carry out the negotiations with the Ottoman government
using the Hammond project as a basis but being ready to adopt any
necessary modification to the plan in order to reach an
agreement.In addition,Otway,Palmer's representative in Con/pie was
conducting negotiations with the French syndicates on the same
lines.He also used the Hammond scheme as a
basis.Hammond,however,declared that the scheme must be accepted as
it stood.Presumably the representatives of the committee in
Con/ple might have proceeded to further concessions in order to
secure an agreement with the government and negotiations with the
French syndicates could have led to similar compromises.In both
cases any agreement might fall far short of the initial scheme and
any such change would have harmed Hammond's group more severely.In
the event,Hammond decided to go to Con/ple and present his scheme
to the Grand Vizier personally.Some of the members of the
committee protested strongly against Hammond's mission to Con/pie
and claimed	 it was	 unauthorized	 [Elliot to Derby in
A&P(1876)LXXXIV,76].In addition,due to the rift among the
bondholders,Palmer decided to sent his son,G Palmer,to Con/pie to
discuss with the government any problem related to the Tribute
loans [A&P(1876)LXXXIV,77].
On the 30th of January 1876 Hammond arrived in Con/ple.The
Turkish government,which continued to play one group against the
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other,expressed its embarrassment to Elliot regardin whom it
should recognise as representative of the bondholders
[A&P,ibid,87).Hammond,however,discussed his scheme with the Grand
Vizier but when he left Con/pie one week later he had obtained no
definite answer to his proposals.The government once more argued
that unless foreign bondholders reached an agreement among
themselves,it could not take any proposal	 under serious
consideration.
Sir Phillip Rose and John Staniforth,the representatives of
the English committee,reached Con/pie in early March 1876.Although
the Hammond scheme was abandoned,the idea on which it was
based,namely the reduction of the Ottoman debt to a Unified
general stock,remained valid [A&P,1877,XCII,5] .However the means
of obtaining the necessary resources for the service of the
Ottoman debt were subjected to a radical modification.
The Scouloudi plan.
Disagreements among European committees notwithstanding,a new
development was under way.It was connected with a project
originated by the Greek banker,E Scouloudi,who was a member of the
managing board of the Banque de Con/ple.Scouloudi's scheme
contemplated the unification of Turkey's funded and floating debt
into a General Debt.In addition,a new company would be found,the
Societe Fermiere,which would secure the service of the Public debt
by farming out state revenues.Scouloudi,who presumably had worked
out this scheme with his colleagues in the Banque de Con/pie and
probably with other local bankers as well,went to Europe to
discuss it with the major European syndicates.According to the
report produced by Rose and Staniforth on behalf of the major
English committee,Scouloudi's plan evoked a cordial response both
in Paris and London [ROSE and STANIFORTH(1876)8-9).It also appears
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that this project was known to the French Embassy as early as
February 1876.According to a letter addressed to the French
Foreign Minister,Homberg,the Ottoman government was considering
the possibility of ceding to a Farming Company the revenues of
certain vilayets to service the floating Debt.It also reported
that, "Les principaux crenciers de la Dette
Fiotante...concourraient tres certainement a la compagnie fermiere
qui exigerair pour son exploitation un capital restreint et
donnerait ds tres brjllant resuitats."[AN F30/356,letter dated
10/2/1876]
This information,however,was only partly
correct.True,Scouioudi envisaged the establishment of a Societe
Fermiere,but his plan included not only the floating but the
funded debt as well.The reasons for this ostensibly
"unselfish"attitude are obvious.Scouloudi himself,and all other
local bankers who held the floating debt,considered that the
unification of the Turkish debt could better safeguard their
interests.If they proceeded by themselves,iocal bankers would
certainly have had to cope with the opposition of European
syndicates whereas with this combination they would gain the
alliance of,at least some,of the European bondhoiders.In the
event,the Scouloudi plan which for obvious reasons was not
elaborated in detail,was met with an unprecedented consent.
Staniforth and Rose-who arrived in Con/pie on the second of
March 1876-were extremely favourable to this scheme.According to
their report, "The experience and knowledge of the local bankers
as to the available resources which the government could set apart
for their creditors,specially qualified them to initiate proposals
for an equitable readjustment of the Turkish debt,and among the
many suggestions...a proposal based upon a general conversion of
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all the existing loans into one uniform debt,comprising also the
Floating Debt,seemed to recommend itself as the most
advantageous." [ROSE and STANIFORTH(1876)7] .Scouioudi's plan had a
strong advantage.Apart from the reduction of the Ottoman debt1
which was common to all the projects,his plan did not contemplate
the appointment of an International Commission.Instead,the idea of
a Farming company could be easily accepted by the Ottoman
government which was resolved to withstand any attempt to
establish an International commission at all costs.The idea of a
Farming company could be more easily accepted since it did not
involve foreign control.
}!owever,there were still problems to be solved.The most
important was that of the Tribute loans.Paimer's committee,which
represented these loans,was in fact pressing for their exclusion
from any settlement of the Turkish debt.For this reason Palmer
presented Mahmud Nedhim,who was the Grand Vizier at the time,with
a proposal according to which he would accept a reduction of the
Tribute loans' sinking fund,but the Turkish side should have to
leave the status of these loans unchanged [Elliot to Derby in
A&P(1877)XCII,1-2].The Ottoman government in its turn,wanted to
discharge the revenues assigned to the service of these
loans,namely the Egyptian Tribute,and apply it to the service of
other loans as well.
When Rose and Staniforth arrived in Con/pie the situation
regarding the problem of the Tribute loans was far from being
soived.A week after their arrival there the two representatives
were joined by the Vicompte Du Manoir,representative of the French
bondholders.When the three conferred with Mahmud Nedhim they
realised that the Ottoman government was not prepared to deal with
the Tribute loans separateiy.In addition,Mahmud insisted that any
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future settlement of the Ottoman debt should provide for the
liquidation of the floating debt which according to him,was almost
out of control.The Grand Vizier,however,was willing to discuss any
combination which would relieve the Treasury and at the same time
satisfy the bondholders.The two British representatives were aware
that Mahmud was indeed willing to consent to a settlement based on
the Scouloudi scheme.Scouioudi himself,during his visit in London
had urged them to take immediate action so as to benefit from
Mahmud's good intentions and to avoid the risk of any change in
government (ROSE and STANIFORTH(1876)9] .Indeed,during the same
conference Mahmud laid down the basis upon which alone the
negotiations could rest.This basis limited the amount assigned to
the service of the Turkish Debt to £T 8.000.000.This amount
included the interest on the floating debt.
As was to be expected,the problem of the Tribute loans arose
again.Palmer's son,G Palmer who was in Con/pie at the time,was
unwilling to consent to the inclusion of the Tribune loans in the
unified debt.After long and repeated discussions,however,he and
the other three representatives were led to the conclusion that
the reduction of the Ottoman debt was inevitable and the only
solution to the problem was"to distribute the necessary reduction
over all the loans by a rule of-three principie,which had the
effect of reducing the nominal amount of each loan about 6% below
its issue price."(ROSE and STANIFORTH(1876)20-21).In addition,it
was agreed that the service of the unified Ottoman debt would be
undertaken by a Societe Fermiere that was to be established and
administered in Con/ple.In this way Scouloudi's plan had been
accepted by European holders.
Since the major Ottoman demands had been met,the Grand Vizier
requested the representatives of the bondholders to prepare the
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necessary documents for signature.In mid April 1876 therefore,it
seemed that the settlement of the Ottoman debt was imminent.On the
15th April 1876 the Levant Herald welcomed the project.In addition
the newspaper pointed out that"We have reason to believe that
several influential members of the Haute finance in Paris and
London have intimated their adhesion to the project of Mr
Scouloudi.".Henry Elliot informed Lord Derby about the conclusion
of the negotiations.Although not enthusiastic about the
plan,Elliot seemed to favour
it. (A&P(1877)XCII,14-15] .Moreover,Elliot informed Derby that the
nomination of Ghalib Pasha as Minister of Finance in the place of
Yusuf Pasha indicated that the Ottoman government was willing to
accept the project. [A&P(1877)xCII,20].
The final contract,however,could not be signed until some
important problems had been solved.The most important of these was
associated with the new company's capital;the second with the
responsibilities,limits,and rights of the company itself.With
regard to this second problem the Levant Herald pointed out that,
"If the government promise no more than the fact,and figures
justify it in promising,the Societe fermiere calls for nothing
more than honourable and careful administration and a moderate
command of means.These conditions are fulfilled by the Banque de
Con/ple and its present adherents.But if the promises of the
government exceed the means at its commands,no matter how strongly
the Societe Fermiere may be backed,it will not be able to sustain
its position.The only key to the situation is to fit the measure
to the facts;let the government engage to pay only what it has and
no more;the guarantees then become trustworthy and the mediation
of the Societe Fermiere regularising the whole operation...will




In fact this problem had to do with the Ottoman
government:and,more specifically,whether it would accept the
project in its entirety or not.The problem was a real one.Although
the Grand Vizier was favourably disposed to the project his view
was not shared by all members of the cabinet.For this reason
Mahmud,through one of his trusties,had intimated to Rose and
Staniforth that the proposed plan for farming out certain of the
revenues would encounter opposition from some of his
colleagues,who considered these measures as a threat to the
Ottoman government [ROSE&STANIFORTH(1876)17].In view of these
difficulties the Levant Herald also pointed out that, "It is a
known fact to more than one possible chief of the future cabinet
this measure is not acceptable....It seems therefore that the
interest alike of the country and its bondholders,demand some
Imperial assurance of continuity in the arrangements."[LEVANT
HERALD,18/4/1876] .Subsequent developments showed that internal
opposition to the project was -10 prove cLe$iVe..
The companyss financing on the other hand,was mainly
associated with two problems.The first was the amount of capital
engaged in the company.It was unlikely that Europeans would invest
in the Societe Fermiere.They wanted some tangible indication that
the finances of the Empire were on the right path before they
would invest any money.However,local establishments were much more
willing to invest in the company.According to the report by Rose
and Staniforth, "no difficulty arise on their part to satisfy our
requirements.Independently of the large profits anticipated from
the farming of the revenues,some of the local establishments had
already entered into negotiations with the Government on the
basis of our agreement,by which they had offered to receive
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payment of their advances in the new stock at the rate of
45%..."[RQSE and STANIFORTH(1876)23].At a meeting of local bankers
held in Galata on 15 April 1876,the support of local
establishments for the project led to an immediate subscription of
£ 3.000.000 out of the £ 3.600.000 required.At 	 the	 same
meeting,the bankers addressed an appeal to the Grand Vizier and
asked for the immediate approval of
	 Scouloudi's project.The
document	 bore	 the	 signatures	 of
Zarifi,Stefanovic,Mavrogordato,Hanson,and Mahsoud.It was also
signed by the representatives of the Credit Lyonnais,the Banque de
Con/pie the Societe Generale de l'Empire Ottoman,the Credit
Ottoman,the Societe des Changes et Valeurs and and the London
based company Dent,Palmer and Co.
The Grand Vizier informed the syndicate that his government
was prepared to accept the project and asked for the preparation
of the final documents.The agreement which was finally reached
between the Porte and the syndicate of the Societe Fermiere was as
fol].ows.The Ottoman Debt would be reduced to 125 million Turkish
pounds.The new Debt would bear 6% interest;96 million of this
would be applied to the funded debt and 29 million to the floating
debt.In order to guarantee payments the government ceded to the
Societe Fermiere the administration of indirect taxes,inluding
Customs,the tobacco duty,taxes on liquors,silk etc.In addition the
tithes of certain districts would be set apart for the service of
the Public debt.The Societe Fermiere was to collect the revenues
directly.With its capital,the company would guarantee the payment
of coupons.Firialiy the society would last for thirty years [ROSE
and STANIFORTH(1876)32-33,LEVANT HERALD,20/4/1876].
As can be seen the Imperial Bank did not participate in the
Societe Fermiere.The reason for this absence can be attributed to
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the fact that the position and privileges of the Bank had been
ignored by the Ottoman state ever since the announcement of the
suspension of payments in October 1875.The Imperial bank strongly
opposed the extraordinary measures.However,despite the Bank's
efforts,the government decided to ignore it
[BILLIOTI(1908)49-50].After strong pressure the bank succeeded in
obtaining an irade according to which it was ceded the right to
collect the revenues of Indirect taxes and those of the Customs of
Con/pie [AN F30/356,letter dated 31/1/1876).This privilege however
was abolished after two months [BOTJVIER(1962)702].Thus,one may
assume that the bank had good reasons to resent any attempt by the
government to further sap its position.tinderstandably,the
management of the Imperial bank regarded the Societe Fermiere as
an iritruder.Despite the fact the Bank was also heavily involved in
the floating Debt,and therefore had every reason to accept this
settlement,it never participated in the negotiations and generally
kept a low profile.Yet,although the bank kept aloof from the
negotiations,it offered no opposition to the project itself.When
the final agreement was reached however,the bank was forced to
decide.It either had to undermine the syndicate of the Societe
Fermiere or join it.After the management in Con/pie communicated
the agreement to the Bank's headquarters in London and Paris it
was decided to join the syndicate.The Levant Herald announced the
Bank's decision on 27 April 1876, "Yielding to the request of
the Grand Vizier the Imperial Bank has now placed itself,if not at
the head of the uridertaking,at least in the first rank of its
promoters...".Two days later the same newspaper reported that"The
Grand Vizier conferred with the Imperial bank and has expressed
his desire that this establishment should take a prominent place
in the arrangement of the Societe Fermiere..The Bank has no4
acceded to the wishes of the Grand Vizier and the Scouloudi plan
now appears	 to have gathered about 	 it the financial
support....which was
	 the	 only	 doubtful	 point."[LEVANT
HERALD,27/4/1876]
However,jt was not till the 6th of May that the bank finally
signed the contract with the others.According to the Rose and
Staniforth report this delay proved fatal.Negotiations for the
signing of the document continued normally.The syndicate of the
Societe Fermiere consented to a further reduction of the interest
of the unified debt from 6 to 5 per cent [LEVANT
HERALD,11/5/1876].The final document was ready for signature on 11
May 1876 and for this purpose Muhmud arranged an appointment with
the syndicate's representatives.According to Rose and
Staniforth,"on proceeding to the Porte on Thursday at 2 o'clock,we
found indeed the Turkish clerks in waiting with the papers as
promised in readiness for the Grand Vizier's signature,but the
Grand Vizier had been removed from office a few moments
before."[ROSE and STANIFORTH(1876)28].
As the negotiations neared completion,an insurrection broke
out in the Balkan provinces.Yet,military developments did not seem
a threat to the Societe Fermiere.According to Levant Herald of 22
April"The cabinet has approved the plan and the provisional
contract is initiated.Under present political circumstances there
will be obstacles to the immediate practical application of the
project,but these will disappear with the cessation of political
anxietjes"Even the defeat of the Ottoman Army in Herzegovina a
few days later did not seem to alter the government's views with
regard to the Scouloudi project [LEVANT
HERALD,27/4/76].However,due to continual political instability in
the Balkans and the Serbian intervention,the Sultan changed his
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cabinet.Mahmud Nedhim,the main supporter of the project in the
cabinet,was removed and replaced by Mehemed Rusdhi Pasha.Yusuf
Pasha,who had strongly opposed the scheme in the first place and
had been removed from office in April,rejoined the cabinet.The
delicate balance which had favoured the scheme was no longer
there.In spite of renewed negotiations the new Grand Vizier was
adamant.In a meeting with the syndicate's representatives the
Grand Vizier expressed the views of his government, "At this
moment one-half of the empire is on fire.We are struggling for
existence.Any financial arrangements made at such a moment would
offer no guarantee to their application.When the country is
pacified the government will immediately consider the best manner
in which relief can be given to its creditors."[ROSE 	 and
STANIFORTH(1876)37].
That was the end of Scouloudi's project.One may reasonably
assume that the views of the new Turkish government in the end did
not favour such a project.In addition,Mehemed Rusdhi did not
commit himself to any settlement of the Ottoman debt based on
similar lines.Of course this attitude was only conjunctural,but at
the time it was the refusal of the government to accept the idea
of a Societe Ferrniere which led to the failure of the project.
In addition,due to this failure,the alliance among different
groups of creditors broke into its component parts.For the first
time a major coalition of banks financiers and bondholders had
agreed to a specific project.Not that all classes of bondholders
had supported the plan:Hammond's committee along with another
committee of English holders,that of the 1862 loan,strongly
opposed it.The Austrian committee,which was mainly interested in
the Rumelian Railways bonds,had its own plans:they demanded the
establishment of an International committee which would undertake
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the service of coupons [ROSE and STANIFORTH(1876)19].However,the
Scouloudi project succeeded in compromising two of the major
classes of creditors:the holders of the floating debt and the two
major syndicates of European bondholders.After the plan's failure
each group of creditors followed its course.As was to be
expected,this led the different groups into new conflicts.
The interval of confusion.
The importance of the Scouloudi project was found in the idea
of a company which would administer some of the empire's
revenues.This company would have no connection with European
governments and therefore Turkey would escape foreign
control.Subsequent developments would show that this idea became
the starting point of future negotiations.
Political and military developments during the summer of 1876
rendered the settlement of the Turkish debt more difficult.The
replacement of the Sultan Abdul Aziz by Prince Murad and the
dominance,if temporary,of liberal elements of the bureaucracy did
not produce any solution.Foreign bondholders,however,continued to
exercise pressure for a prompt settlememt of the debt.This was
particularly true of the syndicates of the Tribute loans.In
September 1876,the League of Tribute bondholders presented a
scheme to the Porte which contemplated the reduction of interest
on these loans.According to this scheme the Egyptian tribute would
be reserved for the service of the two loans.In its major points
the scheme resembled a similar project submitted to the government
by G Palmer in February 1876 IA &p( 1 877)XCII, 1 -2 ) .Not surprisingly the
Government rejected it.The project offered the government no
immediate relief,let alone that the bulk of the Ottoman debt
remained unsettled.
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In late 1876 the Ottoman government faced insuperable
financial problems.The payment of interest,now reduced by half ,was
achieved at great effort and high cost.In view of political
developments in the Balkans the Porte was forced to devote ever
increasing amounts of revenue to military expenditure.On 27th
December 1876 the Ottoman government finally announced that,
	 "La
I	 •loi du 6 Octobre,qui a porte le trouble dans 1 economie financiere
de l'Empire en branlant son credit et en blessant le sentiment
/	 •	 A.	 •	 /public de ustice et de loyaute,doit etre consideree des
aujourdhui comme entirenet abroge,et le Gouvernement se reserve
de preenter aux Chambres...un projet de loi nouvelle propre
donner la meilleure satisfaction possible aux droits et aux
A.	 •	 •interets des interets de sa dette publique,et a sauvegarder
l'honneur de l'Empire."[Safvet Pasha to Musuros in
A&P(1877)XCII,65] .It appears,therefore,that the government had
found a convenient way of evading the pressing financial
reality.In this way the Porte evaded its immediate
responsibilities and to transfer them to the newly elected Ottoman
parliament.In the event,however,the Ottoman Assembly did not
discuss the issue of the Ottoman debt mainly because it hardly had
the time to do so.In the short period of its existence-December
1876 to February 1878-the Parliament had other,more pressing
preoccupations.
The war with Russia in 1877 intensified the financial problems
of the state.Due to increasing expenditure,and unable to meet its
current expenses the government decided to come to terms with some
of its creditors.It was thought that the settlement of part of the
Ottoman debt would enable the government to issue a loan on the
European markets.It was decided to initiate negotiations with the
syndicates of the Tribute loans,presumably on the grounds that,in
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this case,a prompt solution was feasible.Besides,these syndicates
were making the most pressing and urgent demands for a settlement
of their interests.It is worth stressing that the representative
of the League of Tribute loans,Stewart went so far as to ask for
the arbitration of the English Court of Chancery
[A&P(1877)XCII,102].In addition,unofficial negotiation with the
delegates of the Tribute loans' bondholders were already in
progress.In March 1877,the Porte intimated to the syndicates that
it would initiate discussions with appointed delegates but no
project could be accepted unless ratified by the Chamber
[Tenderton to Stewart,in A&P(1877)XCII,90].
In September 1877,two members of the cabinet arrived in
Con/ple to confer with the syndicates.After short negotiations the
two parties signed a Convention which settled the question of the
Tribute loans.According to this,the interest and sinking fund of
both loans would be reduced.The holders of the 1871 loan agreed to
defer receiving payment until the 1854 loan,of which 1.800.000 was
still unredeemed,had been totally payed of f.m this way a part of
the Egyptian tribute would be
	 left to meet other obligations
[Musuros to Derby,in A&P(1878)LXXXII,34-37,DU
VELAY(1903)369-371].After a while the Ottoman government attempted
to place the 1877 "Defence" loan on the European money markets.The
government assigned the remainder of the Egyptian Tribute to the
service of the loan.As already mentioned,the loan failed
miserably,a sign that European investors were not willing to
support the government before the final settlement of the Ottoman
debt.
In Con/pie the holders of the floating debt went their own
way.Aithough no syndicate of the floating debt was officially
founded,it was clear that an understanding existed among the
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holders of this debt.The development of the floating debt during
this period has already been discussed.It is obvious that the
holders of this debt did agree to pursue a common course.Since
arrangements with foreign holders were not feasible,the local
bankers' only hope was to secure an agreement on their own account
with the Ottoman government.Certainly cooperation with foreign
bondholders was not,by definition,excluded.what local bankers
attempted to achieve was the inclusion of the floating debt in any
settlement of the Ottoman debt.This opportunity missed,they were
forced to follow their own course.Therefore,one may assume that an
unofficial syndicate had been formed in Con/pie by local
bankers,consisting of all concerned parties,including the Imperial
Bank.
Their case was publicly presented by Mercret,the director of
the Credit Lyonnais branch in Con/ple,in an article in a local
newspaper.After estimating the floating debt at about £ T 12
million,Mercret argued that the service of the Public debt should
be the government's first priority.Eight million out of the twelve
represented the share of local bankers who "en des epoques tres
critiques"advanced them to the Ottoman State.He claimed in
addition,that the immediate redemption of this debt would enable
local bankers to renew their advances to the government and help
it to stand on its feet again.Whereas,if the government assumed
the service of its Foreign debt at the expense of that of the
floating debt,it would deprive the country of enormous amounts of
capital needed at such a crucial time [COURRIER D'ORIENT,no
117,4/4/1877 in AN F30/356J.Mercret was obviously alarmed by the
prospects of a settlement of the Public Debt,due to increasing
fears that a war with Russia was imminent.In order to fund the war
the Ottoman government might rush to negotiate with its foreign
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creditors and settle its debt.If that happened,the interests of
local bankers would certainly be harmed.For in order to assume the
service of the Public debt the government would remove the
bankers' guarantees for many of their advances conducted between
1875 and 1877.At this stage,however,the government was not
interested in initiating negotiations with its foreign
creditors.Remember that foreign holders continued to be divided
and,therefore,no settlement could be reached with all parties
concerned.
Yet,it was during the war with Russia that the position of
local creditors vis-a-vis their foreign counterparts was
strenghthened.Not only did they agree to absorb the Defence
loan,but they also provided the government with various loans to
meet its immediate and most pressing expenses [See above Chap VU,
].This development provided the bankers with a strong argument in
the following events.
Turkey's defeat in the war resulted in the Treaty of San
Stefano in March 1878.The news of Russia's extreme demands had
reached the creditors of the Ottoman State at an early stage.On
28th February 1878,almost two months after the armistice,the
Chairman of the British holders of the Ottoman General Debt
Guedalla,notified Salisbury about the terms of the Treaty.Guedalla
expessed his alarm, "at the monstrous pretensions put forth by
Russia which are calculated to completely ruin the unfortunate
holders of existing Turkish loans."[Guedalla to Derby,in
A&P(1878)LXXXII,27].Guedalla argued that the money had been lent
to Turkey as an independent state whose existence was guaranteed
by the Six European powers.The latter were to blame as they had
"introduced" Turkey to European capitalists.Certainly this remark
is exaggerated,to say the least,because European capitalists had
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wanted to be "introduced" to Turkey as much as the latter had
wanted to collect their money.In the event,Guedala demanded the
intervention of other European Powers to safeguard the interests
of their citizens: "Should then any cession of Turkish
territory be proposed,it will be the duty of the governments of
the various countries whose respective subjects are interested in
this question to protect their rights.., by ensuring a just and
proper provision for them in the Treaty of peace..."[A&P,ibid 281.
The final draft of the Treaty of San Stefano confirmed the
fears of Turkey's creditors.Firstly the Ottoman government agreed
to pay an enormous war indemnity amounting to 1.4 billion
rubles.Yet this indemnity was reduced to 300 million rubles(=IT 35
million)after Turkey agreed to cede the Sandjak of Toulcha and the
Western part of the Caucasus including the cities of Ardahan,Kars
and Batum to Russia [A&P(1878)LXXXII,52,ANDERSON(1970)101].The
Tribute of the Bulgarian Principality was to be decided by an
agreement between Russia,the Ottoman government and the other
cabinets. yet,there was no mention of the fact that many of the
revenues of the Bulgarian lands were hypothecated for the service
of the Ottoman debt.
Understandably,these terms greatly alarmed the creditors.On 21
March 1878 a meeting was held in Con/ple.Presided over by
Stefanovic and adressed by Deveaux,the Director of the Imperial
Bank in Con/ple,this meeting declared that, "considerant que le
Traite de paix que le gouvernment de la Porte a conclu....sera
probablement	 l'occasion	 de	 remaniements	 territoriaux
administratifs et financiers pouvant affecter les garanties
donnees aux creanciers de la Turquie par les contrats et actes
constitutifs de la Dette publique de cet empire,croyons qu'il est
urgent pour les dits creanciers de demander aux Puissances...a
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intervenir dans le Traite de Paix en question ..la sauvegarde de
leurs droits et la protection due a leurs legitimites
interets."[A&P(1878)LXXXII,57-58] .A similar demand was put forward
by European holders.On April 3 1878 Guedalla also asked for
official British intervention [A&P(1878)LXXXII,39-40]
On 15 April 1878,a Memorandum was submitted to all European
Embassies in Con/ple.It was the result of the meeting of 21 March
and contained the claims of local capitalists.The Memorandum was
signed	 by	 all	 the	 leading	 bankers	 including
Zarifi,Foster,Stefanovic,Eugenidi,Devaux,Tubini,Coronio and
Fernandes [MEMORANDUM POUR LES DETENTEURS DE LA DETTE
OTTOMANE(1882),see also A&P(1878)LXXXII,45-49].
According to this,the bankers asked the European Powers to
intervene to safeguard their interests.The creditors'rights,
"doivent etre sauvegardes tant vis a vis du Government Ottoman que
de ceux qui pourront etre appeles a lui succeder dans la
possession d'une partie de son territoire
actuel." [MEMORANDUM (1878)46] .What worried the local capitalists
most was the cession of territories and the Bulgarian Tribute.The
ambiguities of the San Stefano Treaty led the bankers to insist on
these points.According to the memorandum the Treaty should have
taken into account the fact that the revenues of the Danubian and
Rumelian provinces were assigned to the service of the Public
debt.The bankers claimed that the cession of the territories
should not imply the dissociation of their revenues from the
service of the Public Debt.The memorandum argued that in similar
cases the new administration had undertaken part or all of the
debt of the ceded provinces.Understandably,the bankers'major
concern was the floating Debt.On this question the memorandum
argued that the floating debt mainly consisted of the advances
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made to the government to service its Public debt and as such was
guaranteed by special revenues,many of them affected by the Treaty
[MEMORANDUM ( 18 78) 47]
In so far as the Bulgarian Tribute was concerned the
memorandum argued that there was no provision for the rights of
creditors or for the exact amount.In fact,according to the Treaty
the settlement of the Tribute question was postponed for the
following year [ANDERSON(1970)100] .Not surprisingly,the memorandum
referred also to the question of war indemnity.The bankers
criticized the Treaty because there was no provision stipulating
that Russia would present no claims on the old creditors'
rights.It was thought that since no such stipulation appeared in
the Treaty Russia might well claim priority over the service of
the Public and floating Debts [MEMORANDUM(1878)463.In fact this
was a hypothetical claim because the entire service of the Public
Debt had been suspended the year before.It was rather a question
of principle:the new creditor(Russia) should recognise the
priority of the old one(local bankers and foreign bondholders)
over the payments.
One may wonder why the Con/politan bankers were eager to
protect the rights of foreign holders in the first place.The
answer to this question lies in the role these bankers wanted to
play.Not unreasonably,they felt their interests had been damaged
by the San Stefano Treaty.As Turkey was becoming poorer,they had
fewer opportunities to recover their money.Yet since they could
not cancel the results of the war,they attempted to safeguard
their guarantees as much as possible.They thought,therefore,that
at this moment their interests were compatible with those of
foreign bondholders.Not surprisingly when the question was posed
in their meeting the reply was evident. "En luttant pour eux,les
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crenciers de la Dette Ottomane en Europe combattant aussi sans
nul doute pour ceux de la Turquie,vu la solidarite de leurs
intrets;mais ces derniers doivent-ils..s'isoler de ce 	 grand
mouvement?...Poser la question,c'est videmrie1t la ressoudre.Les
Detenteurs de la Dette Ottomane en Turquie7a l'instar de ceux
d'Europe,doit donc s'unir et s'affirmer,et lutter eux aussi pour
la defence des interets communs [A&P(1878)LXXXII,57] .Moreover,one
should take into account that local bankers held a respectable
amount of Ottoman bonds.According to Mercret the value of Ottoman
bonds held by Ottoman and other subjects who resided in Turkey,was
625 million fr [COURRIER D'ORIENT,4/4/1877].ThiS amount
represented one-eighth of the total Ottoman debt.Although there is
no imformation about the exact number of bonds held by
Con/politan bankers,one may assume that this represented more
than half,because the Ottoman government continued to pledge
unsold bonds as security on short term advances .True,local
bankers were mainly interested in the settlement of the floating
debt,but this does not imply that they were prepared to see Russia
seizing their securities.The joint and strong opposition of
Turkey's creditors to the terms of the San Stefano Treaty
contibuted to its abrogation.
In the event,due to the vigorous opposition of England and
Austria to the Treaty of San Stefano,Russia consented to a new
settlement of the Eastern Question.This development led to the
Berlin Congress in July 1878.It was there that the creditors'
claims found at least partial satisfaction.Their 	 case was
presented by the Italian representative,Comte Corti
[BLAISDEL(1929)84-85].Yet his intervention certainly did not live
up to the expectations of foreign bondholders.Comte Conti simply
recommended to the Porte the acceptance of an International
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Financial commission,the members of which would be appointed by
the respective governments,and which would undertake to examine
the claims of bondholders and propose means of settling the
Ottoman debt in a way favourable to them [MORAWITZ(1902)55].
One might assume,therefore,think that the Congress of Berlin
gave no satisfaction to the holders.In a strict sense this is
correct:the Congress was only marginally engaged in settling the
question of the Ottoman debt.What it did was to produce a
provision calling for an International Commission.Karatheodori
pasha,the Ottoman plenipotentiary at the Congress,unequivocally
rejected the provision and merely promised that his government
would be willing to satisfy the demands of the bondholders,but
without	 foreign	 interference	 [MORAWITZ,ibid,DU
VELAY(1903)377-378].Nevertheless,the Congress' final document
included provisions which to some extent met the demands of
Turkey's creditors.A part of the tribute of Eastern Rumelia would
be reserved for the service of the Public debt.It was also
stipulated that similar arrangements would be pursued with Serbia
and 1lontenegro.In addition,Russia declared that it had no claims
against the rights of bondholders.She accepted the principle of
the priority of the old creditors vis-a-vis the payment of the war
indemnity and satisfied herself with small instalments EDt)
VELAY(1903)378-379,BLAISDEL(1929)85].The Berlin Congress was the
only instance when the creditors united to present their
claims.Understandably,the conceived Russian threat
	
to their
interests exhorted them to do so.
This temporary collusion,however,quickly came to an end:the
two groups continued to oppose each other over the question of
priority on payments.This is not to say the two groups were
homogeneous;division of interests was common within both
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groups.The division of interests among European bondholders has
already been mentioned.A similar situation appeared among the
group of the floating debt.It would be more correct to say that
each local banker or bank attempted to secure its interests
againsts foreign bondhoiders,and at the same time secure its
position among the holders of the floating debt.It was in this
context that alliances and conflicts occured within the group of
the floating debt.In May 1878 for example,Zarifi obtained the
revenues of the Con/pie Customs as security for an advance to the
Treasury.The Imperial Bank strongly, if in vain,protested against
this move because it considered it a violation of 	 its
privi].eges[BOUVIER(1962)711-712) .This conflict,however,did not
hinder either Zarifi or the Bank from comming to terms again and
acting together against European bondholders.
Conflict amongst different syndicates and groups was the major
feature of this period.The extent to which each group opposed the
other is clearly shown in the case of the Toqueville scheme in
1879.Comte de Toqueville submitted a project to the Porte
regarding the unification of its debt.The news of this scheme
reached Con/pie in early February 1879.According to these
rumours,the scheme contemplated the unification of Turkey's Public
debt.The amount of the new funded debt as well as the interest
rate would be reduced.In order to guarantee the service of the new
funded debt the Ottoman government would hand over the
administration of indirect revenues to an International
committee.Toqueville promised to the Porte that if it accepted
these terms he would advance it 200 million fr.Commenting on the
main points of this project Neologos pointed out that the payment
of interest on the new Funded Debt would begin only after the new
administration of the indirect revenues had produced concrete
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results.Otherwise,the newspaper emphasised,the old and ineffective
mechanism of obtaining a fresh loan to repay an old one would be
renewed to the detriment of the economy.In addition,the newspaper
suggested that the new loan should be used to liquidate the
floating debt and to intitiate a new programme of financial
reforms [NEOLOGOS,6/2/1879].
An agreement between the Porte and de Toqueville was finally
reached in mid February [NEOLOGOS,17/2/1879].The main points of
the final document did not differ from those published in Neologos
in early February.There was,however,a condition;De Toqueville had
a deadline of two months to meet.Within this period he should
provide the government with the first instalment of the 200
million fr loan.Developments between February and March
highlighted the conflicts among the various groups of creditors.
To begin with Toqueville did not represent any major group
of financiers and bankers [BOUVIER(1962)715-717].He
had,however,the sympathies of some of the European syndicates
and,most importantly,the active support of the French
government.He proceeded to negotiations with the government on his
own account on the grounds he had the support of some Paris
banks,particularly the Comptoir d'Escompte.In the event,this
support was not at all secure.In addition,his project was not
concerned with the floating Debt.Toqueville himself was not
prepared to come to terms with local bankers.Despite the attempts
of Mercret and Devaux to convince him to do so,he declined to
reexamine	 his	 project	 on	 this	 point
[BOUVIER,ibid].He,therefore,lost the sympathies of local
bankers,if he had ever had them.In addition to that,the syndicate
of European banks on whose credit he based his operation finally
turned its back on him.According to Neologos,	 "the project of
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Toqueville still remains a project...The guarantees provided by
the Ottoman government did not live up to the
bankers'demands"[NEOLOGOS,4/3/1879).
In order to meet his deadline and advance the first
instalment of 50 million,Toquevil].e decided to turn to European
bondholders for assistance.This move did not produce the desirable
results;Toqueville remained totally isolated.Neologos commented on
these developments as follows, uAccording to recent reports Comte
de Toqueville has given up from trying to convince the big credit
institutions of Paris and London to help hirn;he hopes instead to
form a syndicate with the bondholders of Ottoman stock.Yet it
seems that these bondholders...appear to be as demanding as the
big bankers.The former did not accept Toqueville's terms whereas
the latter asked for an increase in the guarantee granted by
Turkey.If agreement with big bankers proved difficult,it will be
much more difficult with the holders....For example,the committee
of English bondholders[Guedal].a] rejected the scheme,whereas the
holders of the 1858 and 1862 loans are willing to assist
Toqueville on condition they get at least 400.000 annually and
take priority over any other class of bondholders...Toqueville's
project is approaching total failure." [NEOLOGOS,13/3/1879) .Finally
Toqueville was not in a position to pay the first instalment to
the Ottoman government.Despite a further four day deferment of the
deadline he came out with nothing and the government abrogated the
agreement [NEOLOGOS,18/3/1879] .One may assume that Toquevi].le's
project impinged upon the interests of all parties concerned.Since
the project was not backed by any syndicate of creditors
Toqueville inevitably had to abandon his scheme.He was refused
assistance even from European bondholders whose interests this
project was supposed to serve.On the other hand local bankers
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opposed the project since Toqueville was not prepared to
compromise with them.One could assume,with reasonable safety,that
local bankers would have been prepared to join him if he had
agreed to include the settlement of the floating debt in his
project.The Imperial Bank was also reluctant to support
him.True,this bank wished to see an end to the financial
deadlock,yet it was not prepared to sacrifice its own interests
mainly associated with the floating debt.In other words the
failure indicated how deeply the different syndicates were
divided.
Nevertheless,Toqueville's scheme introduced a new element
into the conflict;an International commission which would
undertake the administration of indirect revenues.Certainly the
idea of the commission was first introduced by the Scouloudi plan
in 1876.Yet,Scouloudi's project contemplated the establishment of
a Societe Fermiere,namely a financial operation,whereas
Toqueville's plan provided for an administrative committee with an
international character.However the exact nature of this committee
was far from clear.The Ottoman
government,understandably,emphasised that the committee should
have a private character.It strongly opposed any committee whose
function would imply foreign interference.When,for example,the
Italian bondholders demanded the right to send their delegates to
join the committee the Porte declined to accept them on the
grounds that the administration of indirect revenues had a private
character and,therefore,the Italians could well be represented by
the appointed members of the committee [NEOLOGOS,28/2/1879].The
idea of a committee administering revenues of the Ottoman empire
became a basic demand of the creditors.In the event,it was on
these lines that firstly the arrangement of	 the	 floating
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debt,and,subsequently,the settlement of the Ottoman Debt were
realised.
Inevitably,the project of the Imperial bank which appeared on
March 1879 was based on these lines.The Bank,realising that
Toqueville had no chance of success,proposed a similar scheme.The
bank would issue a loan of £ 21 million on behalf of the Ottoman
State on condition the government agreed to hand over the
administration of indirect revenues to a committee IDU
VELAY(1908)387,BOUVIER(1962)718].These revenues consisted of the
Con/pie customs,the tobacco salt and stamp revenues and the profit
tax.According to a contemporary source,the loan of 21 million
would be divided in the following way:12 million would be devoted
to pay off the holders of the 1858,1862 and 1863-64 loans which
were guaranteed by these revenues;3 million would be used to
liquidate the internal loans guaranteed by the Customs
revenues;and 6 million would be given to the government to carry
out the promised financial reforms,namely the withdrawal of caime
circulation	 [NEOLOGOS,8/5/1879].The	 Bank	 hoped	 that	 this
combination would satisfy the interests,of at least some,of the
creditors;the syndicates of the 1858 and 1862 loans and some of
the Galata bankers who would receive some of their money back.It
seems that the Bank had made a large concession to the bondholders
by agreeing to include the payment of their loans in its
scheme.For all special guarantees to the Ottoman Debt were
abrogated since the suspension of payments.Yet,the Bank thought
that in this way it could not only come to terms with some of the
bondholders,but that it would also raise the loan in Europe
without their opposition.
This combination,however,did not meet the demands of the rest
of the European holders.Nor did it satisfy the holders of the
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floating debt.In the event,the syndicate of the 1858 and 1862
loans objected to the Bank using the pledged revenues,presumabiy
in an attempt to get the maximum out of the deal [F0/78
2937,letter dated 10th May 18791.In addition other parts of the
floating debt group actively opposed the scheme.Mercret in
particular,exercised all the influence he had on the French
Ambassador;he considered that the plan would pay the current
account of the Imperial Bank but would neglect all the rest
[BOUVIER(1962)718].This claim is not tenable since the project
contemplated the service of other debts as well.
Nevertheless,Mercret was right to protest since the scheme
left out the payment of the"quatre avances",in which the Credit
Lyonnais had a respectable share.The Credit Lyonnais's opposition
to the plan finally influenced the French government
[BOtJVIER(1962)719].The latter's reluctance to back the project
proved a significant obstacle because it exerted pressure on the
British side.On April 8 the Foreign Office informed the British
Embassy in Con/pie that the British government would back the
project but was prepared to give its official support only after
the French government had been consulted [letter in FO/78 2936].On
10 May 1879 Lord Lyons,the British minister in Paris,informed
Salisbuty that,after a months hesitation,the French government
finally decided not to lend its support to the scheme on the
grounds that it did not treat all the loans alike
[A&P(1880)LXXXII,47].Sirice the British government was prepared to
back the project only on condition that it also had the approval
of the French government as well,the Imperial bank found itself in
a difficult position.
Additional impediments were provided by the Ottoman
government.The Grand Vizier himself feared the Bank was not
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sincere in the negotiations and did not intend to bring the loan
forward [FO/78 2936,letter dated 17/4/1879].Moreover many cabinet
members declared that the conditions of the project regarding the
use of money allocated to the government were Lft1acceptable.They
argued that the withdrawal of paper money was already under way
and,therefore,that the government should use this money to meet
other current expenses,such as the demobilization of the
army,payment of arrears etc [NEOLOGOS,13/5/1879].In view of these
multiple objections to the project,the Bank was forced to abandon
it,hoping for more favourable conditions.
Not surprisingly,the failure of the project did not mean the
end of the negotiations.Quite the contrary.The Ottoman government
was in great need of money and knew that it could get a loan only
if it was prepared to come to terms with some of its creditors.It
also knew that any agreement would imply the cession of Customs
revenues and the administration of indirect revenues to the
creditors.The only thing the government could do under these
conditions was to cede as little as possible and extract as many
concessions as it could.
In June 1879 a group of local bankers headed by Zarifi
submitted a new project to the Porte.According to Layard,the new
British Ambassador in Con/ple,Zarifi was prepared to grant a loan
of £ 2 million to the government on the condition that he obtained
the collection of Con/pie Customs and the administration of
indirect taxes.In addition,Zarifi suggested that an increase in
tariffs to last for five years was necessary.However,he asked the
government to consult with the European Powers and seek their
approval for the increase [FO/78 2952,letter dated
12/6/1879].Zarifi's project was finally published in late June.His
group would grant the government a loan of £ 6 million,including
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the short term loans previously contracted.The Customs revenues
would be hypothecated for the loan service.The administration of
the Customs would be undertaken by a commission consisting of
local bankers.However,the government would have the right to
appoint them.In addition,the members of the commission should also
be approved by the Foreign embassies.Zarifi did not neglect to
promise that the rights of the holders of the 1858,1860,1862 loans
would be respected.However,he emphasised that they should expect
to be paid only after the lapse of three years
[NE0L0G0S,25/6/1879] .According to additional information,Zarifi
insisted on the point that the new Customs administration be
approved by the European powers.Otherwise,he and his group were
not prepared to advance money [NEOLOGOS,27/6/1879].The Porte found
itself in a difficult position.It badly needed the money,yet it
was not prepared to accept the control of part of its revenues by
an international committee.It was thought that once this committee
was established the interference of Foreign Powers would
inevitably increase.
Commenting on the project,Neologos pointed out that "the
real question is whether the Porte has enough revenues[to carry
out the administration]without ceding its indirect taxes as a
guarantee for a loan....The Galata bankers offered the loan on
condition that they control the collection of Custom
revenues,whereas the administration proper will remain in the
hands of the Porte.European economists disagree,pointing out that
the collection of revenues will increase only if the
administration is undertaken by Europeans.Not willing to accept
this view the Porte is inclined to approve the offers of the
Galata bankers.Additional impediments arose from the objection of
bondholders who are not prepared to accept the cession of their
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guarantees...Could the Porte avoid the contraction of a new
loan?If yes,then everything seems to be alright.If not,it has to
accept the conditions(of Zarifi's group) on which the loan will be
granted." [NEOLOGOS,1O/7/1879] .Finally,due to the government's
objection to accepting the appointment of a committee controled by
the Powers,the project was abandoned.
It was now realised that any future project should not involve
direct foreign control.It was also realised that the settlement of
the entire Ottoman Debt could not be achieved since the existing
division between different groups made all projects unworkable.For
these reasons,the groups which held the floating Debt decided to
come to terms with one another.Zarifi had already submitted his
project to the Imperial Bank and had opted for compromise.Neologos
declared that, "Only the Imperial Bank,assisted by all other
local establishments is able to achieve an effective
combination." [NEOLOGOS,24/7/1879] .By the autumn of 1879
negotiations between the government and local bankers,including
the Imperial bank,were well under way.
Nevertheless,one may ask why the local bankers were in such a
hurry to settle that part of the Ottoman debt which they
held.After all,were not their advances guaranteed even at the
expense of foreign bondholders?The answer to the question lies on
the economic and financial conditions.The position of local
bankers vis-a-vis the Ottoman government before March 1879 has
already been mentioned.In the autumn of the same year the sitution
was much the same as six months ago.The government's debt to the
bankers was equal to approximately CT 8.5 million.Although these
advances were guaranteed there was no guarantee that the
government would stick to its word.The Ottoman finances were in
such a bad state,that the government could not demobilize the Army
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one year after the end of the war.For example,commenting on a
short term loan of LT 250.000 with the purpose of conducting
emobi1jzation,Neologos pointed out that the government should
bind itself to devote the money to the demobilization of the
Army.Otherwise there was a fear that the money would be spent for
other purposes: "it is an established fact that when the
government finds credit for a few thousand pounds,it receives
dozens and dozens of applications demanding the liquidation of old
debts." [NEOLOGOS,4/9/1879) .Thus,pressed hard by immense financial
difficulties and with inadequate revenues to cope with its
immediate financial needs,the government could very well remove
the guarantees for some,or all,the advances.In fact this was quite
unlikely since after 1875,local bankers were the government's
last,if	 limited,financial	 resort.Yet	 under	 such	 pressing
conditions the bankers did not want to risk it.
In addition,the position of local banks remained precarious;a
large part of their capital was tied up in short term advances to
the Treasury.In many respects the circulation of capital in
Con/ple remained much the same as before 1875.Some bankers lent
their money to the government which used it to repay some other
bankers,who again lent it back to the government etc.This vicious
circle,however,couid not last for ever.The money market of Con/pie
possesed limited capital resources and the bankers were aware of
it.This vicious cycle could be easily broken by the government if
it decided to suspend payments of the floating debt
altogether.After all,the payments of short term advances,if
inadequate,deprived the government of money which could be used to
meet other current expenses.
Not surprisingly the bankers considered private contracts as
an insufficient,and by and large easily revoked,guarantee of their
292
advances.Judging from previous projects,one may assume that the
bankers attempted to "institutionalise" the settlement of the
Public Debt.That is to say,they wanted the government to sign a
more binding agreement securing their interests as much as
possible under the circumstances.For this reason the
bankers'demands included the administration of state revenues on
their own account,a point which became the common denominator of
all the projects after 1875.
As early as September 1879 local bankers were again in
contact with the Government,asking for negotiations.This time they
had agreed among themselves that joint action was necessary.In
addition,the removal of Ahmet Arif Pasha from the office of the
Grand Vizier in October 1879 aroused new hopes for a new
settlement.Ahmet Arif's removal was due to a joint Anglo-French
naval demonstration in the Marmara sea [DU
VELAY(1903)397,BLAISDEL(1929)87].In fact both powers attempted to
exercise pressure on the Ottoman government to reconsider its
position vis-a-vis its creditors.Certainly,the government was not
the only one to blame;the divided interests of the creditors
and,to a lesser extent,the different policies of European powers
also hampered the final solution of the financial question.The
change in the cabinet,however,did not produce the desired results
because Ahmet Arif's successor,Said Pasha strongly opposed any
settlement which implied foreign control,favouring instead an
agreement with the bankers [BOUVIER(1962)720].
The Convention of 22 November 1879:the prelude to the Ottoman
Public Debt Administration.
The first signs of a settlement appeared
	
in October
1879.According to a letter to Layard from Foster,the Director of
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the Imperia$ bank in Con/ple,a scheme had been presented to the
governrle9± for discussion.The new project contemplated the
farming out of the Customs revenues and the indirect revenues for
a period of six years.The project was backed by the Imperial
Bank,Zarifi,and the Societe Generale de l'Empire Ottoman.The
rental would be calculated upon the receipts of five years before
the war,approximately £ 3.5 million.It was also suggested that any
increase in revenue should be equally divided between the
government and the bankers [FO/78 2959,letter dated
1O/1O/1879].Foster himself was not happy with the project;he
thought the period of six years inadequate,and insisted that the
administration of these revenues shoud remain with the bankers.
Indeed,the question of which revenues would be assigned to the
bankers became an apple of discord.The Ottoman government did not
want to cede revenues which were relatively easy to collect and
usually supplied a constant stream of revenues.The
government,therefore,made its own proposals to the bankers in
early November 1879.According to the government's
counterproposals,the bankers would undertake the administration of
some of the indirect revenues.They would also collect the Customs
revenues,though their administration proper would remain with the
government.In addition,the bankers would collect the Tributes of
Eastern Rumelia and Cyprus.Then,the syndicate would divide the
collected revenues into six equal parts,four of which would be
used to pay the interest on the foreign,and two that of the
Internal Debts [NEOLOGOS,3/11/1879].The bankers accepted the
proposal but claimed that the revenues assigned to them were not
enough.If the government was willing to cede more revenues,they
were ready to form the syndicate which would undertake the
administration	 of	 indirect	 revenues	 immediately
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[NEOLOGOS,4/11/1879].The government appeared willing to consent to
some of the bankers' demands;it suggested the cession of Customs
revenues along with the tobacco monopoly and the Rumelian and
Cyprus Tributes to a committee consisting of bankers.This
committee would be responsible for the collection of revenues and
their allocation among different classes of creditors.It was
suggested the local bankers should receive T 1.100.000 while the
rest of the money should be given to the bondholders
[NEOLOGOS,5/11/1879].The project proposed that the committee
should give 125.000 each month to the government out of the
customs revenues whereas the rest should be given to Zarifi for
his advances were guaranteed by the Customs revenues.It was
hoped,that sound administration could increase the Customs
revenues from £T 3-3.5 million,where they stood at the time,to 6
million.If the combination was approved,the bankers would
immediately advance £T 500.000 to the government to cover its
current and most pressing needs [NEOLOGOS,6/11/1879].
Yet the Porte withdrew the approval for the scheme the
following day,when it declared to the bankers that it was not
prepared to cede them the Customs administration.The
bankers,instead,considered the cession of Customs revenues as the
basis of any settlement.This move was to a	 large extent
justifiable because Customs revenues were the only important
source of
	
revenue	 that could be easily collected.The
government,therefore,was not willing to assign it to the bankers'
new administration no matter what.Commenting on these developments
Neologos pointed out that, "The consecutive meetings show that
the government deceives itself as to the condition of the local
money market...The combinations under discussion would be perfect
if it was possible to extract a possitive result out of
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them.Yet,the state needs money and no combination with the Galata
bankers would bring this result.The local money market is
exhausted and the bankers attend the meetings and advise the
government because they want to take their money back and not to
give more..." [NEOLOGOS 8/11/1879]
Foster also appeared to be pessimistic about the prospects of
a deal.Telling Layard about the bankers'discussions with the
Porte,he pointed out that, "I should have kept you more fully
informed of the progress of the financial negotiations at the
Porte,had I not hesitated to waste your time as mine has been
during the last week at the Porte."[FO/78 2961,letter dated
8/11/1879] .Foster,however,provided Layard with information about
the government's latest proposals.Customs revenues apart,the
government was willing to cede to the bankers the administration
of the indirect revenues as well as the Eastern Rumelian
Tribute.The government estimated these revenues at approximately
£T 2.5 million.The committee would pay
	 1.340.000	 to	 the
bondholders and the rest to local bankers.Foster himself
distrusted these estimates.He considered the figures provided by
the government exaggerated and reckoned that the assigned revenues
would yield an amount not exceeding £T 1.600.000.Iri addition,he
was indignant that the government had deprived the bankers of the
Customs revenues. "They console the bondholders and bankers by
saying that under our administration the revenues assigned to us
would be largely and rapidly increase.But if they make this
admission why exclude the customs from the benefit of this
improvement." [ibid,FO/78 2961].
The bankers considered the Porte's proposals before they
submitted their own.They accepted the exclusion of Customs
revenues but they demanded that the assigned revenues should be to
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the value of £T2.4 million.They suggested that the administration
of	 six	 direct	 revenues,namely	 the	 taxes	 of
silk,fish,spirits,stamps,tobacco	 and	 salt,as	 well	 as	 the
collection of the Rumelian and Cyprus Tributes should be under
their control [NEOLOGOS,1O/11/1879].Nevertheless,out of these
revenues only the tobacco and salt taxes were considered to be
worthwhile.It was estimated that these two revenues yielded
approximately £T 1.700.000.One may wonder why the bankers did not
insist on keeping the Customs revenues for themselves.It appears
that,in the last analysis,they were more eager to conclude an
agreement as soon as possible rather than to obtain the
administration of the Customs revenues.It is impossible to say
whether the bankers insisted on these revenues as a bargaining
counter	 only	 to	 secure	 a	 quick
settlement.Unquestionably,however,the government's insistence on
keeping the Customs influenced the course of the
negotiations.Since the bankers had agreed with the government on
the main points,they opted not to exert pressure on this
question,fearing that their demand might lead the project to a
deadend.Negotiations between the two parties continued over the
following days.On November 14th Neologos announced that, "The
financial question is approaching its final solution.At this
moment there is complete understanding between the bankers and the
government..." [NEOLOGOS,14/11/1879] .The newspaper pointed out that
this arrangement did not exclude the settlement of the country's
foreign debt.The paper emphasised that local bankers would not
object to the settlement of the Public debt,providing their own
interests were protected.
On the 19th of November 1879,Zarifi and Fernandez,the two
representatives of the local bankers,visited the Grand Vizier in
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order to discuss the final details of the Convention.A few days
later the documents finally derived from the negotiations were
published in Con/ple.According to the Convention the government
would lease to a group of local bankers the collection of stamp
and spirit tax,the fish tax of Con/pie and its suburbs,and the
silk tax of the districts of Con/ple,Andrianople,Broussa,and
Samsun.The government also gave up to the bankers the
administration of the monololies of salt and tobaccos,with the
exception of the tobacco tithe.The administration of these
revenues would deduct from the receipts of every quarter £T275.000
which would be used to pay off the state's debt to the bankers.The
new debt of £T 8.725.000 would bear a new ,lower,interest of 8%
per annum.The six revenues were leased to the bankers for a period
of ten years at the end of which period,it was hoped,that this
debt would be liquidated (see APPENDIX II).
However,the agreement took into account the rights of the
foreign bondholders as well.The Convention was accompanied by a
decree which announced the resumption of the Debt service.The
decree was communicated to the Foreign Missions and the
commissions of the foreign bondholders (see APPENDIX III) .The
total ammount offered to the creditors,bankers and bondholders
alike,was not to exceed £T 1.350.000 per annum.The bankers would
receive the lion's share:.1T l.l00.00 out of the total.The
bondholders had to content themselves with the remaining £ T
250.000.The	 government	 also pledged	 the	 Tributes	 of
Buigaria,Eastern Rumelia,and Cyprus to the service of its internal
and external Debt along with any contribution which
Serbia,Bulgaria,and Montenegro might make to the Ottoman Public
Debt (see APPENDIX III).In case the administration was not in a
position to produce this amount the government bound itself to
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provide additional revenues.
The Convention was signed by the Ottoman government and a
committee of bankers representing the most powerful banks and
banking houses of Con/ple.The committee consisted of the
representatives of the Imperial bank,Foster,Deveaux and J Von
Haas,the Greek bankers G Zarifi,P Stefanovic,G Coronio,T
Maurogordato,A Vlasto,L Zarifi and E Evgenidi,the representatives
of the Cammondo and Tubini houses,S Fernandes and B Tubini,the
representative of the Societe Ottomane A Barker.The Credit
Lyonnais aslo took part in the Convention,though Mercret did not
sign the document [BOUVIER(1962)721].One may assume that local
bankers,namely the holders of the floatimg debt,were the main
beneficiaries.They had succeeded in binding the Ottoman government
with a Convention and at the same time they had managed to obtain
the administration of certain State revenues.Conversely,the
percentage allocated to foreign bondholders was,to say the least,a
symbolic sum.On the other hand,the Ottoman government succeeded in
imposing most of its demands.The administration of the Six
revenues stipulated by the convention was not controlled by
European Powers.Therefore foreign control of any kind had been
avoided for the moment.In addition the government had retained the
administration and revenues of the Customs revenues for its own
account.Moreover the sum which it agreed to pay was far inferior
to that mentioned in the first stages of the negotiations.
Contemporary accounts also support the view that the
government succeeded in making concessions over less important
issues and finally made the most out of the deal.In connection
with the financial arangements of the Convention,the British
Counsul in Con/ple Wrench,pointed out that, "The remaining
indirect taxes were to a great extent at the mercy of a very
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ill-organised and corrupt administration and the income derived
from them was uncertain and had latterly fallen off
considerably....It is almost needless to say that the yield of the
revenues assigned was,at the time of their assignment,altogether
insufficient	 to	 pay	 the	 annuity	 to	 the
bankers."[A&P,1880,LXX,Con/ple,1883].
The Convention of November 1879 was the result of a
compromise between the bankers and the government.The bankers were
in a position to control State revenues,though these were of
doubtful importance.In this way they succeeded in securing priority
of payments over the rest of the creditors.In a way this was a
financial scandal because the bankers held only a very small
amount of the Public debt.Scandals of this nature,however,were
quite common and certainly the agreement with the government did
not,and could not, impinge upon moral considerations.This is not
to say that the bankers excluded an agreement with foreign holders
by definition.They were prepared to do so as soon they had
sufficient guarantees that their own interests would be
safeguarded.For this reason,the bankers accepted that the
Convention should have a provisional character and that the rights
of foreign holders should remain intact (See APPENDIX II].As a
consequence,the government was in a position to revoke the
convention if a more representative settlement of the Public Debt
could be reached.On the other hand,the government succeeded in
avoiding foreign control and keeping the Customs revenues for
itself.The Convention was the most important development since
1875 because it served as a model for the establishment of the
Public Debt administration two years later.Yet,at the time,the
interests of foreign holders were totally ignored.
Inevitably,the signing of the Convention encountered strong
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opposition from the foreign bondholders.They claimed that the
Porte had deprived them of their guarantees.The French
bondholders,whose interests were harmed mostly by the
Convention,appealed to the Presidency of the French Republic for
help [NEOLOGOS,4/2/1880].They decided to send representatives to
Con/pie with the aim of convincing the Porte to revoke the
Convention.Similar objections to the Convention were raised by the
British bondholders.Hamrnond,in particular,sent a note to the Porte
strictly denouncing the Convention,He was joined by others who
sent a joint communication to Salisbury [DU VELAY(1903)405].The
committee headed by Guedalia also reacted strongly.Guedalla
himself protested to Salisbury and asked the British government to
refuse to r&ognise the Convention and demand the appointment of an
Intenational commission as agreed at the Congress of Berlin
[A&P(1880)LXxxII,78,82-83j
The syndicate of local bankers,ori the other hand,claimed that
all these securities had already been revoked by the government
with the Ottoman suspension.In addition,they claimed that when the
government was in the utmost need of money European capitalists
had done nothing to assist it:instead,it was they who took the
burden of financing the government after 1875 and especially
during the war with Russia [D y VELAY(1903)399).The foreign
bondholders were correct when they asserted that their rights had
been violated but,in the circumstances,the local bankers could
also claim that their own assistance to the government at the most
critical times required their immediate compensation.By any
reckoning,the Convention was neither more or less than the result
of the existing "balance" of power.In this context all arguments
were of secondary importance.Yet,the administration of the six
indirect revenues served as a model for future settlements.It was
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finally proved that no matter what arrangement the different
groups of creditors might reach among themselves,they could not
get more out of the government.Wheareas the latter,had agreed to
cede some of its revenues to the bondho].ders,also permitting them
at the same time to administer them and it was prepared to include
this concession in any future agreement.
In the event,the administration of the six revenues came
under the control of the bankers.The administration proper was
undertaken by H Lang,a European economist.The administration
employed 5.714 employees,of which only 130 were Europeans [DU
VELAY(19 0 3)411].When Lang became manager of the Administration,the
situation looked rather onerous.According to Wrench, "It was
founded that considerable sales of salt had been made by the
government for forward delivery;that many of the Government stamp
sellers were loaded with a supply of stamps sufficient to last for
ten years;and that many tobacco dealers had paid the tax upon
their stock of tobacco in anticipation of future
wants." [A&P,1880,LXXV,Con/ple,1883] .wrench went so far as to say
that the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Finance had regulated
these supplies so that while the revenues appeared to be large
they were in fact much lower than it was expected.
Nevertheless,low revenues were due to unsound administration
rather than to meagre resources.Under sound administration,as was
the case during Lang's management,revenues rose
considerably.According to Lang's first report,during the first six
months the administration of the six revenues showed significant
iinprovement.Lang estimated that the assigned revenues would yield
£T 1.620.000 in the first year.He expected revenues to rise more
rapidly during	 the	 following years,provided that sound
administration	 continued	 (DU	 VELAY(1903)411].Indeed 	 the
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administration lived up to the bankers' expectations.On the 9th
November	 1879 Goshen,the	 new	 British	 ambassador	 in
Con/ple,informed Granville that the Bankers had received £.T
1.100.000 [A&P,1882,,LXXXI,11].During the course of two years they
received the estimated iT 2.200.000 [ECONOMIST,5/11/1881].
Towards the inevitable end:the establishment of the Public Debt
Administration.
The success of the administration after the first six
months,proved a valuable bargaining card for the government.It
could now boast that due to sound administration the indirect
revenues showed large increase.Therefore,it was prepared	 to
negotiate again with the bondholders.For this reason the
government issued the note of 3 October 1880.According to the
note,the government was willing to cede the administration of the
six revenues as well as the Tributes of Eastern
Rumelia,Bulgaria,and Cyprus to foreign bondholders.In addition,the
government would cede part of the Customs revenues,provided that
the Powers would consent to an increase in tariffs.The
government,however,insisted that the bondholders should appoint
their own delegates without any interference from the European
powers [A&P(1882)LXXXI,1,DU VELAY(1903)421ff].
Goshen immediately interviewed Subhi Pasha,the Finance
Minister,and raised the question of the six revenues.He found that
the Ottoman government intended to pay the bankers £T 640.000
annually,setting the balance free for the foreign holders
[A& p (1882)Lxxxl,2-3] .Goshen,in addition,thought that the Porte had
approached the Galata bankers and asked them to assist it in the
negotiations with the bondholders.He himself ,however,strongly
opposed the idea of associating the bondholders' Delegates with
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the Galata bankers because the interests of the two groups
appeared to be incompatible [A&P,ibid,16].The note of October 1879
met with a mixture of scepticism and hope on the part of the
bondholders.Some groups of bondholders,such as those,of Hammond
and Guedalla,rejected the Porte's proposals claiming that they
were unworthy of consideration [A&P,ibid,12] .Others,particularly
the French,took a more realistic stand.
Nevertheless,the question of Ottoman finances was closely
connected to political developments in the region.In addition,the
advent to power of the Liberal party in 1880 changed the
traditional and,by and large,friendly policy of the British
government towards the Ottoman Empire.The new English
government,headed by Gladstone,took a stronger stand towards the
Ottoman Empire.As a consequence,the new British government exerted
more pressure on the Ottoman government in connection with the
financial question.It is not an exaggeration to say that this
question became one of the major issues of the period along with
the Dulcigno affair and the Thessalian settlement.
The British government raised the idea of the International
Commission,claiming that the establishment of such a committee had
already been decided at the Congress of Berlin.This was no doubt
true.Yet the Ottoman side had rejected the proposal altogether
asking,instead,for direct negotiations between the Ottoman
government and the bondholders.Besides,the very idea of an
International Commission had already been abandoned.In addition,in
order to soothe the anxieties of bondholders,the Ottoman
government established its own Financial commission which was to
undertake the task of examining the Ottoman finances.The members
of this commission included both European and Ottoman specialists
(DO VELAY(1908)380].Harison was the British member 	 of	 the
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commission;with this quality he kept the British Foreign Ministry
well informed about the committee's work.
In the event,however,the British government decided to exert
a good deal of pressure on the Ottoman State in order to accept
the establishment of the International commission.Earl Granville
instructed Goshen to emphasise to the Ottoman government
that"they[the Sultan's Ministersican not hope to command the
confidence of their creditors without the security which would be
afforded by the participation of the Powers in any financial
scheme that may put forward."[A&P(1882)LXXXI,6]. At the same
time,the British government asked the French to raise the question
of the Financial committee together"as soon as the Dulcigno affair
should have been settled."[A&P,ibid,7].
The Porte,on the other hand,was adamant on the question of
foreign interference.Not unreasonably,the Ottomans feared that th€
International control of their finances would inevitably lead tc
political tutelage.Faced with this emergency the Ottomar
government took a more active step towards the negotiation wit1
the bondholders.On 4 December 1880,the Ottoman embassies in EuropE
issued an invitation to the bondholders to deposit their stock ii
a number of selected banks in order to elect their delegates
[A&P(1882)LXXXII,17].The list of banks included the Imperia
Bank,the Credit Lyonnais,the Credit Mobilier,the Comptoi
d'Escompte,the Societe Generale of Paris etc.In addition,th
Ottoman Embassy in London notified the British Foreign Ministr:
that the companies which had offered to receive deposits 0:
Turkish stock were acting in concert with the Porte,and in orde.
to be recognised by the Ottoman government delegates of th'
bondholders should be appointed in virtue of such deposits [Lyon
to Granville,in A&P(1882)LXXXI,19].
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The British government,however,insisted on the International
commission.Nevertheless,it became clear that the British did not
have the necessary European consent to impose their views.The
French government had expressed its view on the question quite
clearly:the International committee apart,the bondholders should
have their own representatives [A&P,ibid,18].According to
Lyons,the British minister in Paris,by mid December 1880 the
French had finally abandoned the idea of an 	 International
commission altogether.St Hillaire,the French Foreign
Secretary,informed Lyons that although he personally would have
preferred the plan for an International Commission he did not
consider it feasible"under the present disposition of the
Porte."[A&P(1882)LXXXI,22] .Since the British insistence was,at
least partially,conditional upon the French consent,they were
forced to abandon the idea of the International Commission.
As a consequence of this development,the bondholders were
left free to decide whether to re-open direct negotiations with
the porte or not.Most of them decided to negotiate and promptly
elected their own delegates.Those	 British coTnrnitteeS	which
initially objected negotiation on the grounds the Ottoman
government had made no major concessions to the holders,were
forced to join the others.By January 1881 both the English and
French committees had elected their representatives.R Bourke,the
English representative,and M Valfrey his French counterpart left
for Con/ple.They were joined by the Italian,German and Austrian
representatives a few months later [DU VELAY(1903)419).
Local bankers on the other hand kept a low profile during
that period.They had succeeded in establishing control over some
of the state revenues and at the same time in securing priority of
payments over the rest of the creditors.This however does not
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imply that they felt safe.Firstly,they had to take into account
the acute financial and economic problems of the Ottoman
govenrment.As was to be expected,the latter still faced enormous
liquidity problems.The traditional,and largely ineffective tax
system could not respond to its current needs.In addition,the war
with Russia as well as subsequent developments,such as the
Thessaly question and the Dulcigno affair,further destabilized the
revenue system of the Empire.It was for this reason that the
government imposed a compulsory loan of £ T 3 million on the
country's male population [AN F30 356,letter dated 22/2/1881].In
the circumstances it became clear that only access to European
money markets could solve the government's financial
problems.Yet,the issuing of a fresh loan inevitably impinged on
the unsettled Ottoman debt.It became clear,therefore,that the
government could find credit in Europe only if it satisfied the
bondholders' demands.Certainly 	 these developments did not
alleviate the bankers'anxieties.In addition,the government's
attitude towards some of its guaranteed advances aroused
scepticism if not apprehension.In early 1880 the government
removed the guarantees given to E Baltazzi for his advances in a
most arbitrary way.Although these particular advances were not
included in the November Convention,the action of the government
infuriated local bankers [AN F30/356,letter dated 22/2/1881].
The bankers were also aware of the government's game with the
bondholders.They knew,in addition,that the bondholders were not
happy with the Convention of November 1879:they had every reason
to resent the bankers' agreement with the government.One may also
say that the bankers were not surprised when the government issued
the note of 3 October 1880.They knew that the Convention was only
provisional	 and,therefore,that an agreement between 	 the
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government and the holders was,if not imminent,unavoidable.On the
other hand they had their own interests and knew how to defend
them;no agreement with the holders could be reached if it excluded
the settlement of the floating debt.The bankers' tactic was
precisely to safeguard the payment of their advances whatever
agreement the government might come to with the bondholders.
As early as December 1880 Goschen emphasised to Granville
that, "they[the bankers]are always anxious to please the
government.But I have seen symptoms of fear on their part that the
argument which are now used to justify their claims may be,before
long,used against them;that the Porte will plead that it is again
in a position when it is a matter of life or death to obtain
money...The bankers may feel that under their position an
arrangement with the creditors under which...they may not be
repaid so much of their capital but may render the payment of
their interests more secure...might be advantageous to them under
the present very critical circumstances." [A&P(1882)LXXXI,17-18].
However,the group of local bankers proved more flexible.Not
only did they agree to participate in a future settlement,but also
to cede part of their annual receipts to the bondholders.On 12
September 1881 the delegates applied to the Galata bankers to
facilitate arrangements by accepting a smaller sum from the
government than they had been receiving up until then.	 "The
bankers who have reasons of their own for wishing to release the
large amount of their capital now locked up,and whose interest it
is therefore to help the delegates have expressed their readiness
to accept a lesser annuity than the £T 1.1 million they now
receive,on condition that they get a proportionate extension of
the term of eight years during which it is run." [Dufferin to
Granville,in A&P(1882)LXXXI,50-51].In early November	 1881,the
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bankers and delegates finally came to terms with one another.The
bankers'annuity would be reduced to £T 595.000,the balance being
left to the general holders.In this way the revenues assigned to
the bondholders would exceed two million Turkish pounds
[A&P,ibid,58-59,ECONOMIST,5/11/ 1881] .The Convention of November
1879 was officially cancelled by the government and the
representatives of the local bankers on the 28th of December 1881
[YOUNG(1906)64-69].Accordin g to the Decree which annuled the
Convention,the bankers would cede the administration of the Six
contributions to the creditors and would received privileged bonds
valued at £T 22 each.In addition the new administration would be
obliged to give priority to the payment of these bonds over those
of creditors of all other classes
[YOUNG(1906)64-65,ISSAWI(1980)363].
The final agreement between the government and its creditors
resulted in the Muharem Decree which was signed on 20th December
1881.The decree stipulated the establishment of the Public Debt
Administration(P.D.A)which was going to undertake the
administration of those revenues of the Empire which had been
assigned to the bondholders.The Ottoman Public debt was reduced by
half:from about £T 200 million to 117.Though the P.D.A was the
"collective" representative of the bondholders,it was under the
jurisdiction of the Ottoman government [YOUNG(1906)69-95].
The agreement was nothing more than a compromise between the
government the local bankers and the general creditors.In this way
the government succeeded in avoiding foreign control,the local
bankers in collecting the interest on their advances and the
general bondholders in controlling some of the revenues of the
Empire-the only way in the circumstances to get their money
back.Since it was a compromise all parties lost and gained.In
309
financial terms,the government lost some of its revenues though it
regained access to the European money markets;the bankers lost
their privileged position yet recovered a large part of the
capital which had been locked up in the Public debt;whereas the
general holders had to accept the reduction by half of the Ottoman
debt though they found a way to control state revenues.
The functions and consequences of the P.D.A are beyond the
scope of this thesis.Yet it is essential to emphasise some aspects
and to raise some questions.The establishment of the P.D.A
introduced a new phase in the social and economic history of the
Ottoman empire.In many ways it became Turkey's dynamic new
institution.It dealt not only with the administration of the
assigned revenues,but also with aspects of economic policy.Its
very function initiated a debate which continued for the years to
come;Was it a curse or a blessing for the Ottoman Empire?It was
something between the two;in many ways it contributed to the
economic development of certain aspects of the export oriented
sectors of the Ottoman economy while at the same time thousands of
young Turks were introduced to modern management.On the other
hand,the P.D.A with its special links with European
capitalists,and European capitalism in general,increased the links
between the Ottoman economy and the European markets.In other
words it contributed to the establishment of a specific division
of labour between this economy and European capitalism.What on the
other hand,would Turkey's future have been without the role of
P.D.A?The question,perhaps,sounds naive since the position of the
Ottoman economy vis-a-vis European ones was already been
defined.Yet the role of the Administration was so important that
the question is,in my judgment,valid.Because it is no exaggeration
to say that the P.D.A redefined the context and the functions of
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the Ottoman economy.It was now within this new context that all




The development of Greek banking during the period under
discussion can be understood only in terms of a variety of short
and long term factors.The most important long term factor was the
emergence of the Greek mercantile bourgeoisie in the Ottoman empire
and the Levant.The development of Greek commercial
activities was closely associated with the Ottoman import-export
trade.Availing themselves of the emerging economic opportunities
Greek merchants established large commercial networks and involved
themselves in various trades.The propitious international
environment of the late 48th century allowed the further expansion
of their activities.The Napoleonic Wars had no harmful effect upon
Greek capitai.In fact,these wars allowed Greek merchants to
streng1jen their position and expand their business.The
development of the Greek marine during the Napoleonic Wars further
contributed to the establishment of Greeks as the leading traders
of the Empire.
However,the Con/pie based Greek merchants received a harsh
blow during the Greek War of Independence.Increased oppre.ssion led
them to leave the city and to return only when sufficient
guarantees for their safety had been given.Mainly due to
increasing commercial transactions with European countries the
Greek merchants in Con/pie succeeded in re-establishing their
leading position and welfare by the 1840's.Thenceforth a new
circle begon.The integration of Ottoman agriculture into the
network of European capitalism provided further motives for
commercial activities.Events such the Crimean and American Civil
Wars boosted Greek
	 commerce considerably.As one would expect
Greek merchants began looking for alternative investments.It was
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during this period that large amounts of Greek capital in Con/pie
were shifted to banking.
In the early stages Greek banking was conducted by private
houses which relied both upon their own capital and European
credit.Houses such as those of Zarifi and Zafiropoulo or Syngro
Coronio and Co. played an important role in the development of
banking in Con/ple.There were also several Greek private bankers
such as Christaki Zografo,Schiilizi,Baitazzi etc who contributed
to Greek banking.The introduction of European capital allowed the
establishment of many joint stock companies founded by various
combinations of Greek and other local or foreign capitalists.To a
certain extent these new banks resembled the French banques
d'affaires despite the fact that they were never involved in
industrial investments-a fundamental aspect of these
	 French
banks.Nevertheless the capital of these Con/politan	 banks was
raised through public subscription.In addition they mobilised the
capital of rich local capitalists and used it in various
ways.However,the banks did not accept deposit accounts in the
current meaning of the word.The capital entrusted to them was
always lent and paid back on short term.In fact,Con/ple never saw
the establishment of banques des depots.No Greek bank ever
attempted to mobilize local savings despite the fact that such an
attempt might eventually have proved	 successful.Contemporary
observers have pointed out the enormous amounts of money invested
in jeweliery or precibus
	 stones [FARLEY(1872)219-223,NEOLOGOS:4/16
10/1880]
During the 1870's,therefore,there were two categories of
Greek banking houses.The private banks and bankers and the banks
founded by or closely associated with Greek capital.However,most
of the Greek bankers of the period continued to engage in trade as
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well.In fact,trade and banking continued to be the major fields of
investments of Greek capitalists throughout the period under
consideration.Yet,from the 1860's onwards the emphasis was
undoubtedly on banking.By the 1870's although most Greek bankers
had also trade concerns were,mostly 	 involved in banking.
The reason why the shift to banking finally took place is
simple.Greek capitalists-mostly merchants-came to understand that
banking could provide them with profits far exceeding those
realised in trade.However,the shift to banking only partly
involved merchant banking.The field which mostly absorbed Greek
capital was the funding of the Ottoman state.And with very good
reason.The rapid growth of the Ottoman Public debt provided a
lucrative field for investments and Greek bankers promptly took
advantage of the situation.
However the role of Greek bankers in the issuing of Ottoman
loans was marginal.Apart from a few occasions they did not
participate in the syndicates which raised these ioans.Instead the
main activity of the Greek banking houses in Con/pie was
associated with the provision of short term advances to the
Ottoman state which allowed the latter to service its Public debt
and fund its internal administration.Short term advances to the
Treasury was the fundamental activity of Greek bankers throughout
the period under discussion.In fact it was this field which
provided them with enormous profits.As has already been mentioned
profits from short term advances varied between 10 and 25 per
cent. These figures were much higher than those realised in
banking in Europe.
Not only did advances bear high interest rates,but they were
also usually remitted within a period of a few months.Both capital
proper and the profits realised in those transactions were again
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put to the same use.In this sense these advances ensured a
sufficient circulation of capital and allowed Greek banking houses
to operate profitably.However the capital resources of Greek
bankers were rather limited and therefore the funding of the
Ottoman state could not be sustained on a regular basis.To do so
Greek bankers had themselves to borrow money in Europe.It was the
difference between interest rates in London and Paris and those in
Con/ple which secured large profits.At that time interest rates in
Europe varied between 3.5 and 5 per cent.Yet Greek bankers charged
the Treasury with three to four times those figures-a perfectly
legitimate interest rate if the low level of capital accumulation
in Turkey compared to that in Europe is taken into
consideration.In 1866 Lewis Farley,a keen observer of the Ottoman
empire,attempted to raise the interest of the Lombard street
bankers precisely by comparing the rates of interest prevailing in
London and Con/ple [FARLEY(1866)7].
In due course the Greek bankers and banking houses developed
a very specific relation with European capital.The main aspect of
this relation was the dependence of Greek banking on European
credit.Such an unequal relationship naturally stemmed from the
dominant position of the European capital markets.In the
event,European credit became an indispensible precondition for
banking in Con/ple.The provision of credit and capital eventually
came to influence the Con/pie money market to a considerable
extent. In the long term,however,this influence had both positive
and negative aspects.Positive first:the development of European
capitalism led to a substantial increase in foreign investment
which,among others,affected the Ottoman empire as well.Undoubtedly
the provision of credit to Greek and other local bankers in
Con/ple should be included in this process.The availability of
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European capital considerably boosted banking in Con/pie and
contributed to the emergence of numerous banking houses during
1860's and the early 1870's.
Greek bankers took advantage of the influx of European
capital and participated in the establishment of most of the new
banks.They hoped that increasing European credit would secure the
future of these establishments.To a large extent the provision of
credit lived up to their expectation.Cheap capital was available
for most of the period under discussion.In final analysis Greek
bankers acted as a further conduit for Europen economic
penetration in the Ottoman empire.European credit amended their
limited capital resources and allowed them to participate in an
operation requiring vast and always available amounts of
money,namely the short term advances to the Treasury.
This positive aspect apart,the reliance on European capital
had other,less desirable,consequences.For Greek bankers became so
strongly dependent upon European capital that any contraction of
their credit in Europe caused them substantial damage.The Wars
between European powers,or even the prospect of war in Europe,led
the Con/pie money market to experience severe financial crises.In
addition,financial crises in Europe,such as those of 1866 and
1873,had disastrous effects on the Con/pie money market.In both
cases European houses usually recalled their capital at short
notice.Greek bankers on the other hand were usually indebted in
Europe to a far greater extent than their own capital resources
permitted.Thus,they found. themselves in a predicament.In the
circumstances further borrowing in Europe was much more
difficult.In such occasions many Greek and other local banking
houses went bankrupt.One should emphasise,however,that not all
Greek bankers were affected to the same extent.The leading Greek
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bankers such as George Zarifi,Andreas Syngros and others were
always in a position to cope with emergencies.They resorted to the
Ottoman Treasury requesting the immediate repayment of,at least
part,of their advances.Their connections with the Ottoman state
and the fact that their credit in Europe was good,even during
financial crises,eventually allowed them to find the necessary
amounts.Instead it was the large number of small and middle size
banking houses which usually suffered most.
At this point another aspect of Greek banking should be
emphasised:the association of Greek bankers with the Ottoman
Treasury.In this case a particular interdependence had been
established,The Treasury resorted to the local money market for
credit.Greek and other local bankers usually responded
positively-and had no reason not to since these transactions were
always lucrative.consequently,the bulk of their capital was locked
up in short term advances.However,the difficulty of the Ottoman
state in servicing its debt proved
	 to have	 undesirable
consequences for Greek banking.European houses alerted by the
prospect of Ottoman insolvency were reluctant to lend money to
Greek bankers unless at a much higher price.Cut off from cheap
European credit the bankers had to bear the risk.Most of the time
they decided to make advances to the Treasury lest they risk their
already advanced capital.In such cases profits on short term
advances tended to decline.Certainly lower returns were always a
temporary phenomenon and most of the time profits ran high.In
cases,however,where Europen credit became expensive the bankers
charged the Treasury accordingly.
The Greek,and other local,bankers found themselves confronted
with a dilemma.They relised that without their assistance the
Ottoman state would face enormous financial pressures and,in due
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course,the Treasury would go bankrupt.Yet,the Treasury was their
most important client and its insolvency would have strongly
affected their business.As a result the turnover of almost every
banking house in Con/pie would have declined dramatically.rof its
would decrease accordingly.The capital already locked up in short
term advances would be put at risk.In other words the Treasury's
capacity to pay back what it owed eventually became a precondition
for banking.Keeping the Treasury on its feet not only provided the
bankers with large profits.In the event it became a necessity
which to a large extent secured their own future.
Thus,Greek bankers found themselves operating under pressure
from two sides.On one hand they had to cope with exigencies
deriving from the contraction of European credit and on the other
they had to back the Ottoman state,the sector which not only
provided them with large profits but also absorbed the bulk of
their capital.The picture becomes clearer if one takes into
account the influx of European capital into Con/pie-a factor which
largely contributed to the establishment of these relations.During
the early stages of the period under discussion the Greek bankers'
propensity to lend to the Ottoman state followed the cycles of
capital inflows and financial crises.At a later stage,however,they
had no other option than to advance the capital necessary for the
service of the Ottoman debt.That was particularly true for the
period 1873-1875 when the Ottoman state,already on the verge of
insolvency,had to rely more on local capital resources than those
of the European money markets.In 1875,however,the capital
resources of the Con/ple money market were near exhaustion,a
factor which must have influenced the Ottoman state in its
decision to suspend debt service payments.
One may infer therefore that Greek banking in Con/pie had its
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own dynamic.Greek bankers made advances to the Treasury throughout
the period under disCussion.It seerns,however,that during the early
1870's they became increasingly concerned about the damage that
state insolvency might inflict on their interests.Short term
advances were not only desirable but at a later stage onwards
unavoidable as well.To consider the development proper of Greek
banking without taking into account the double dimension of short
term advances as a source of welfare and at the same time as a
necessary investment is unrealistic.
The Ottoman suspension of debt service payments in October
1875 certainly did not soothe the anxieties of Greek
bankers.Instead it led them to closer association with the Ottoman
state.As already mentioned a large number of local houses wound up
their activities during the crises of the 1873-1875
period.However,the leading Greek bankers and banking houses had
survived the crises and were faced with a new dilemma.The
eventuality they had feared,had now come true:having failed to
avert the Ottoman suspension their preoccupation was how to
recover their already advanced capital.
They realised that the Ottoman state was not in a position to
raise fresh loans in Europe and,therefore,the only way to secure
the payment of their advances was via the state revenues
proper.Certainly the same problems were also faced by other local
establishments,including the Imperial Bank.The Greek bankers'
response to the new conditions involved new strategies.They
continued lending to the Treasury in order to receive better
securities for their old advances,an attempt which in the end
proved successful.Some Greek houses,such as the Banque de
Con/ple,even attempted a gradual disengagement from the Ottoman
empire.All Greek bankers,however,came to realise that in the
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circumstances a more viable solution had to be found.To be
feasible,this solution should involve the control of part of the
Ottoman revenues-a consideration common to all projects regarding
the settlement of the Ottoman debt.The realisation of mutual
interests,namely the involvement in short term advances,led Greek
bankers to ally themselves with the Imperial Bank and the other
local houses.Their common opposition to the claims of European
bondholders derived essentially from the bankers position as
creditors of state cut off from the European capital markets.
The settlement of the Ottoman debt impinged both on
political and economic considerations.Yet,the emergence of new
alliances among the parties most interested in the payment of the
floating debt substantially affected that settlement's
procedure.The Greek bankers participated in the group of the
floating debt alongside the Imperial bank the Credit General and
others.They all shared the same principle:that their payment
should have priority over the payment of the Public Debt.As one
would expect the conflict between the two groups was bitter.The
group of the floating debt considerably strengthened its position
during the war with Russia when the Ottoman government entirely
relied upon local capital resources.The Convention of November
1879 was undoubtedly a success for this group.Despite this
success,however,the parties which comprised the group of the
floating debt finally came to terms with European
bondholders.Fearing that the government might dishonour their
agreement they eventually opted to cooperate with their
opponents.Besides they did not exclude an agreement by definition
providing,of course,that their own interests were to be
safeguarded.The establishment of the Public Debt Administration
was a compromise which satisfied all interested parties.Greek
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bankers succeeded in getting tangible securities for their
advances guaranteed by a respectable Convention.
The reader should alredy have realised that the long term
involvement of Greek capital in short term advances led or rather
strenghtened inelastic capital investments.In fact that was the
final result of the twenty years involvement of Greek capital in
banking.Certainiy Greek bankers involved themselves in other
activities as well but always to a limited extent.Even the
extensive speculation of the early 1870's absorbed comparatively
limited banking capital.Speculation was a temporary and
short-lived phenomenon in the Con/ple money market and was mostly
practiced by small and middle size capitalists rather than by the
leading bankers.
By and large Greek bankers were reluctant to make other
investments for a variety of reasons.Prof it considerations must be
emphasised.Capital flows where it receives the highest returns and
the Ottoman empire was no exception.Compared to other investments
short term advances were by far the most lucrative.In fact similar
attitudes were displayed by European founded banks as well.The
Imperial bank never participated in direct investments,at least to
a large extent.The only cases where this bank did so were when it
co-founded the Societe des Tramways in 1871 and the Societe des
Eaux de Con/ple in 1877.In both companies,however,the Greek
capital,both directly and indirectly,played an important role.A
similar attitude towards direct investment was displayed by the
French Credit Lyonnais-a bank which made a considerable
contribution to the industrialisation of France.The Credit
Lyonnais established a branch in Con/pie a few months before the
Ottoman suspension of payments.This bank,however,was already
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involved in Ottoman finances particularly through the provision of
credit to several Con/politan banking houses.The Credit Lyonnais
entirely abstained from investing in sectors other than the
Ottoman finances.Interest rates were so tempting that the general
director in Lyons finally overcame his initial reluctance and
consented to the provision of short term advances to the
Treasury.The bulk of the total investment of 15.400.000 fr
realised in the period 1875-1881 was placed on short term advances
[BOUVIER(1962) 731]
It is clear,therefore,that Greek bankers displayed a similar
attitude to that of the European banks.Once again the role of
banking proper has to be considered.Banks have not been created to
fund industrial enterprises ,to raise capital for railway projects
or even to issue State loans expressly.According to the
circumstances they involved themselves in every possible field of
investment.In Western Europe banks eventually came to fund
industrialisation,railway construction etc.In other areas banks
responded in a different fashion and gave emphasis to other
investments.The degree of involvement in business entreprise
varied with different companies and individuals.On any
reckoning,however,banks were founded to meet particular needs[See
the interesting article of HARRIS and THANE,1984].
In the Ottoman empire,banking practice was defined by the
financial needs of the Ottoman state rather than by the
requirements of the economy as a whole.Greek bankers in particular
responded to the financial needs of the ..Ottoman state.Owing to
their strong connection with the Ottoman state they came to assume
an important role in Ottoman finances.Some of them,such as
Christaki Zografo and George Zarifi even served as
	
court
bankers,The Greek bankers'jnvestment attitude was
	 conditional
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upon the rate of profit and the availability of capital and
credit.In so far as they realised large profits they employed
their capital in short term advances.And in so far as they found
in short term advances more remunerative terms for their capital
they eschewed investing in other sectors.
This is particularly true with regard to industrial
investments.Yet as far as such investments are concerned one
should take into account another aspect:during the period under
discussion Greek bankers did not contemplate economic development
in terms of Lndustrialisation.Presumably they were aware of this
process but it is highly 	 unlikely that they considered
industrialisatjon feasible in the context of the Ottoman economy
and therefore profitable and worthy of
investment.unfortunately,there is insufficient evidence to suggest
that this remark applied to all Greek bankers.Yet,there is also no
evidence to suggest that,at least to some extent,Greek bankers had
a different approach to the question of direct investments.One
exception is worth mentioning:the Baltazzi	 tobacco factory in
Con/ple.It appears that the bankers approach to this question was
simply practical.Their own fortunes rested upon trade.One
may,therefore,assume that they tended to generalise on the basis
of their own experience,as well as that of their predecessors,and
apply it to the economy as a whole.Zarifi's remarks on the
question are revealing.Discussing the prospects of the 1868 Greek
loan he argued that trade and the improvement in transportation
eventually could bring the Greek state in a position to challenge
the Ottoman empire[see obove chap.IX,238 ].Zarifi,however,did not
mention or even hint at industrial development.
Yet,one should not come to conclude that the Greek bankers
did not approve direct investments a priori.The development of
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other sectors of the Ottoman economy,which took place later in the
century,such as mining,public works,railways etc strongly affected
their approach to the question.It must be remembered that banks
tend to meet every need providing that this is profitable.In fact
the attitude of the Greek bankers in the years following the
period under discussion changed radically:they bego.n to invest in
a variety of sectors.In this context is quite revealing to see the
position of three of the leading Greek bankers,Leonidas
Zarifi,George Mavrogordato and Ettiene Evgenidi in the early 20th
century.From the existing evidence it appears that in 1906 they
directly participated in twelve companies.Yet only three were
banks.The Bank of Mytilini,The Credit Industriel de Grece and the
Deutch Orientbank Aktiengesellshaft.The 	 rest were mining
companies-Mines de	 Balis-Karaidin,Mines De
	 Kassandra,Societe
d'Heraclee,Mines de Karassou-and railway companies-Chemins des
fer Ottoman d'Anatolie,Societe des
	 fer Ottoman Salonique
Monastir,Societe des Fer de Bagdat.They were also involved in the
Societe des Eaux de Con/pie and the Regie des Tabacs
[PECH(1906)34,77,94-100,124-134,135-146].In addition,at that time
Ottoman Greeks had become the leading industrialists of the
country.Unfortunately,it is not simple to say whether Greek
bankers participated in industrial investments as well.I would
simply argue that their investment attitude varied according to
the rate of profit and the availability of capital and had such
factors existed their involvement in industry would have only been
natural.This discussion,however,takes us beyond the scope of this
thesis.
Finally it is true that the introduction of foreign capital
substantially affected the position of Greek bankers.Foreign
investments undoubtedly affected their profits and influence
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particularly after	 1881 when such	 investments	 increased
considerabiy.Yet,it would be misleading to assume that in view of
this development the role of Greek bankers declined
compietely.After all the introduction of foreign capital allowed
them to extend the scope of their business.Instead,it would be
more correct to suggest that they assumed a new,if diminished,role
compatible with the emerging conditions but,by and large,they
succeeded in coping with the situation successfuly.It was only
during and after the WW I that the Greek diaspora,and the Greeks
in the Ottoman empire in particular,received a fatal blow.The
subversion of the existing pre-War political and economic
stabilities,which followed the Great War,was mostly responsible
for the irrevocable decline of the Greek diaspora.With the
exception of Egypt,Greek interests were almost total1 liquidated
in the major traditional centres where Greeks used to hold
considerable economic roles,namely the Ottoman empire and
Russia.Thus,if a date of decline of Greek banking in Con/pie must
be set then it was the year the Greek Army in Asia Minor was
defeated:1922.This tragic year,however,signaiied not only the
decline of Greek banking,but aiso,due to the uprooting of the
Ottoman Greeks which followed the Lausanne Treaty,the decline of











Convention entered into between the Imperial Government and certain
Banks. (Extracts)
Date:22 November 1879.
Art.1:The Imperial government leases to Messrs.M.H Foster,E Deveaux,
J ,Von Haas,George Zarifi,Salomon Fernandez,Bernard Tubini,E Eugenidi,
Theodore Maurogordato,A Vlasto,Alfred Barker,George Coronio,L Zarifi,
Z Stefanovich,Paul Stefanovich—Schilizzj,and Ti Negr€porite who accept
it for the term of 10 years beginning on January 13 1880,and ending
on the 13 January 1890,the collection of stamp tax,and of the spirit
tax(...)with the exception of Customs dues levied on spirits ,of the
fish tax of Constantinople and its suburbs(...) and of the silk tax of
the districts of Constantinople,Andrianople,Broussa,and Samsun.(...)
Art.2:The annual price of rent charge for the whole duration of the
lease shall be eaual to the net revenue,in beshlik or metalic ,of the
four above mentioned taxes plus 10 per cent.(...)The price of the
lease will be paid in beshlik and metallic by the contractors of the
second category(the bankers) in twelve monthly installements in
arrears( . . ..
Art
.3: the four taxes given in lease will be collected according to the
existing Tariffs arid regulations relating to them and they shall not
be modified except by the mutual consent of both Contracting parties.
(...)
Art .5:The Imperial government gives over for a period of ten years,
beginning on the 13 January 1880 to the contractors mentioned in Art.1
the administration of the monopoly of salt and tobaccos produced or
consumed in the villayets of the empire(...)with the exception of the
tobacco tithe.The state will exercise a control over the administration
by means of inspectors appointed by it.(...)
Art.8:The annual revenue of the lease of the four taxes as well as the
net revenues of the monopoly of salt and tobaccos will invariably be
employed in the following manner;the second contractors will deduct from
the receipts of every quarter £T 275. flOO which will be affected to the
rembursement,interest and capital,of the following debts;rough estimate
of Mr G Zarifi's debt with interest guaranteed by the Customs,on the
13 January 1880,1T 690.000;rough estimate of Messrs S Fernandez and
A Barker and their co—contractors'debt with interest(...),'T 1.800.090;
rough estimate of the Imperial sank's debt with interest,guarariteed by
the indirect taxes and forming part of the sum of £T 1.080.000 advanced
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by the said bank on the 13 January 188O,T 860.000;rough estimate of
the surplus of t e statuary current account of the Imperial Bank with
interest on the 13 January 1880,cT 1.750.000;rough estimate of the
Imperial Bank's debt with interest proceeding from the Great Unified
Advances(les quatre avances) with interest on the 13 anuary 1880,fT
3.625.000.Total £T 8.725.000,all which debts will from the 13 January
1880 bear an interest of 8 per cent per annum.This sum of £T 275.000
will be alloted to the payment of the above mentioned debts(...)This
quarterly deduction of ft 275.000,once made,the surplus will belong
to the bondholders of the external and internal Public Debt arid be
deposited by the second contractors through te Imperial Bank into the
hands of the representatives of the bondholders elected by the
Imperial Goverriment.(...)
Art.10:The accounts and deductions mentioned in .Art.YIII will be made
at the end of each quarter after passing to the Treasury's credit the
return interest which accrue to it at a rate of 8 per cent per annum
on the monthly receipts of the four tax es(...i J he second contractors
will equally pass to the credit of the Treasury a return interest at
the same rate of S per cet per annum deducted every fortnight from the
receipts of the monoply of salt and tobaccos until such time as the
quarterly sum of £T 275.000 be complete.
Art.13:The Imperial Government (...) preserves the ri ght of cancelling
before the expiration of the ten years,the stipulation of the present
Convention under the two following essential arid peremptory conditions:
1/in the case the debts maintained in Art.VIII,capital and interest,
are integrally reimbursed.
2/in case a new re gulation more advantageous to the bondholders of the
external and internal public Debt than the present Convention(...)
intervenes between the imperial ( ,overnrnent arid the above mentioned
bondholders.




Decree respecting the resumption of the(Debt) service and the
mortgage of certain revenues.
Date;22 November 1879.
(official text communicated to the Foreign Missions)
The Imperial government,having decided to resswneJe mesure
of its actual	 sources,the service of the external and internal Public
Debt decrees:
Art.1:Beinning from 13/'/ ieeo an annuity of £T 1.350.000 will be
destined for the service of the external and internal Public Debt.
Art.2:This annuity will be devoted to half-yearly(setnestriel) interest
payments on the nominal amount of this Debt.The first payment will
take place on 13 July 188C.
Art.3:The annuity of ft 1.350.000 is assured and guarantied,
1/by the stipulations of the Convention between the Imperil
government on one part,and the Ottoman Imperial Bank and Yessrs. N oste
,Emile Deveaux,J Von Haas,George Zarifi,Salomon Fernandes,B Tubini,
E Eugenidi,Theodore Maurogordato,A Vlsto,Alfred Barker,G Coronio,
Z Stefanovich,Leonida.s 7arifi,Paul Stefanovich-Schilizzi,and
U NegreDonte on the other, according to which the net annual revenue
of the monopolies and taxes on tobacco,salt,spirits,timber,fish arid
silk,after the previous deduction of £T 1.000.000,will belong to the
bondholders(....)
2/by the annual revenus of Cyprus and Eastern Roumelia,which from
this day onwards and in accordance with this decree,are ceded to
the bondholders for a period of ten years.(.....) In case of in-
sufficiency the annuity will be completed by additional sunis(see
Art.4) and if necessary by other Imperial revenues.
Art.4:Independently of the annuity of £t 1.350.000,and from this day
onwards the Government irrevocably assigns to the bondholders,
1/the Bulgarian Tribute and all ammounts which Serbia,Bulgaria,afld
Montenegro will contribute to the Ottoman Public Debt.
2/the third of the net product of future taxes.
3/the third of the product comming from any increase in the duties
which may result as a consequence of the revision of the existing
commercial Treaties.
4/any ammount which may result from the difference between the proceeds
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of the temettu*fee and that of the pattent fee,when the latter
will be enforced by law.
Art.5:The Imperial Government will determine,with a regulation which
will settle with the representatives of bondholders,
1/the allotment of the fixed annuity of £T 1.350.000 and of the
supplementary annuities among the different categories of the
external and internal Debt.
2/the system of payment of the annuity.
Art.6:The effects of the present decree are limited to ten years in
the end of which the final conditions of the service of the external
and internal Debt will be settled by a new decree.
The present decree has only a provisional character and the rights
of the bondholders remain intact.The Imperial government engages
itself not to suspend or modify,before the expiration of ten years,
the arrangements of the prent decree unless with the approval
and concurrence of the bondholders.
*profit fee.
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